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THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF WILLIAM HAZLITT IN
TWENTY-ONE VOLUMES

CENTENARY EDITION

Edited by
P. P. HOWE

VOLUME TWO

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THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM HAZLITT

EDITED BY P. P. HOWE

AFTER THE EDITION OF
A. R. WALLER AND ARNOLD GLOVER



VOLUME TWO

A New and Improved
Grammar of the
English Tongue *and*
Lectures on English
Philosophy



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A NEW AND IMPROVED
GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH
TONGUE

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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PRE FACE

IT is a circumstance which may at first excite some surprise, that, amidst the various improvements in books of modern education, there has hitherto been no such thing as a real English Grammar. Those which we have are little else than translations of the Latin Grammar into English. We shall, however, no longer wonder at this circumstance, when we recollect that the Latin Grammar was regularly taught in our schools several centuries before any attempt was made to introduce the study of the mother-tongue ; and that even since some attention has been paid to the latter, the study of the learned languages still having the precedence, our first notions of grammar are necessarily derived from them. Those who have written on the subject have not been exempt from the influence of early prejudice, and instead of correcting the error, have strengthened it.

The following is an attempt to explain the principles of the English language, such as it really is. We have endeavoured to admit no distinctions, which, but for our acquaintance with other languages, we should never have suspected to exist. The common method of teaching English grammar by transferring the artificial rules of other languages to our own, not only occasions much unnecessary trouble and perplexity ; but by loading the memory with mere technical formalities, accustoms the mind to one of the worst habits that can be,—that of mistaking words for things, and of admitting a distinction without a difference. We might here refer particularly to the accounts given, in the most approved and popular grammars, of the genders, and the objective case of English nouns, that is, of a case without any difference of termination, and of genders without any mark denoting sex, &c. &c. In this respect the French seem to have much the advantage of us ; as their grammars are, generally speaking, real descriptions of their language, not a fanciful and laboured account of what has no where any existence.

It is now above twenty years since Mr. Horne Tooke published his celebrated work on grammar, called the Diversions of Purley. Though this has produced a very important change in the theory of language, no notice has been taken of it by grammarians in their

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definitions of the Parts of Speech, or in that branch of grammar which usurps the name of Etymology—an almost inexcusable neglect in those whose professed business it was to instruct others in the nature and origin of language. It is the object of the following compilation to take advantage of the discoveries contained in that work, without adopting its errors.¹

The soundest and most useful parts of Mr. T.'s system, are his researches into the origin of indeclinable words, and we have engrafted the result of most of these into our little work, so far at least as to make the subject intelligible to the learner, though if we have merely excited his curiosity, we shall not have entirely failed in our object.

The practical rules and observations in the following work are almost entirely selected from other works of the same kind: if it should be thought to have any advantage over them, it must be chiefly in the theoretical and logical part. We shall here therefore present the reader with a short general view of the subject, to enable him to judge in what we differ from others, and whether it is for the better or worse.

It is common to suppose that the parts of speech, or different sorts of words, relate to different sorts of things or ideas; and that it was to express this difference in the subject-matter of discourse, that one class of words was originally appropriated to one class of things, and another to another. We have endeavoured to show on the contrary, that the grammatical distinctions of words do not relate to the nature of the things or ideas spoken of, but to our manner of speaking of them, *i.e.* to the particular point of view in which we

¹ Mr. Tooke has fallen into the same mistake with which he reproaches preceding writers, that of supposing the different sorts of words to be the measure of the different sorts of things. He has only reversed their inference: for as the old grammarians, who admitted more different sorts of words, contended for more differences of things, so Mr. Tooke, who admits of fewer sorts of words, argues that there can be only as many different ideas or things, as are expressed by the different parts of speech. Thus, if substantives and adjectives do not represent substance and quality, there can be no such difference in nature, or in the human understanding. This we conceive to be a piece of as false philosophy, as if we were to affirm that there can be no difference between blue or yellow, because they are both adjectives, or between light and sound, because they are both substantives. Mr. Tooke's whole object is to show that the different parts of speech do not relate to the differences in ideas or things, and yet he would make the difference in the one, the test of the difference in the other. As to all that he has said of abstraction, and the real or physical meaning of words, we believe that we do not understand him; for, as far as we do, his facts and cases seem to us to prove the very reverse of his conclusions. So he has brought 2000 instances of the meaning of words to demonstrate that we have no abstract ideas, not one of which 2000 meanings is any thing else but an abstract idea. Logic and metaphysics are the weak sides of his reasoning. But he has rendered essential services to grammar, which cannot be overlooked or forgotten.

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have occasion to consider them, or combine them with others in the same discourse. The difference between a substantive and an adjective for instance, does not depend on the intrinsical nature of the object we think or speak of, but on its being that concerning which we affirm something, or that which we affirm of it. So if we say that snow is white, snow, the name of the subject of discourse, is a substantive, and white, the name of the quality we attribute to it, is an adjective, not because snow is a substance, and white a quality, for we may speak of a snowy mountain, or say that whiteness is hurtful to the eyes, when these words will change their character, though the things themselves cannot. The things themselves do not change, but it is we who view them in a different connection with other things, and who accordingly use different sorts of words to show the difference of the situation which they occupy in our thoughts and discourse.

The article is generally left quite unexplained, a mere anomaly in language. We have endeavoured to show that it is either the numeral adjective (*un*, one) or that it belongs to the same class with the demonstrative pronouns, *this*, *that*, &c.

A substantive had been generally supposed to be a word expressing a real thing or substance, as A man, a tree, a house, &c. It was however found that this definition would exclude many words from being substantives, which are universally allowed to be so; for example, all words expressing qualities, actions, abstract ideas, &c. &c., such as, Whiteness, conquest, kingdom, virtue. The only definition which in common grammars has been substituted for this circumscribed one is as much too loose and general: for a substantive is defined by Lowth, Murray, &c., to be the name of any thing that exists, or of which we can form any notion. So that all words, *i.e.* all signs of our ideas, must be substantives. We believe that a substantive is neither the name of a thing, nor the name of a substance, but the name of a substance or of any other thing or idea, considered as it is in itself, or as a distinct individual. That is, it is not the name of a thing really subsisting by itself (according to the old definition), but of a thing *considered* as subsisting by itself. So if we speak of *white* as a circumstance or quality of snow, it is an adjective; but if we abstract the idea of *white* from the substance to which it belongs, and consider this colour as it really is in itself, or as a distinct subject of discourse, it then becomes a substantive, as in the sentence, White or whiteness is hurtful to the sight.

Adjectives are constantly defined as if they were the names of certain qualities, and of no other class of ideas. It is evident from what has been said that this definition is fallacious. We speak of a

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stony road, a *golden* mountain, a *leather* girdle, where the words marked in italics, and which refer to the substance of which a thing is made, not to its qualities, are confessedly adjectives. Any idea or thing, considered as a circumstance belonging to or connected with another, may be an adjective. An adjective therefore differs from a substantive, not from its expressing some *quality* of a substance, but from its expressing any thing that is affirmed of or connected with another, to wit, its quality, number, form, size, substance, situation, &c. &c., as may be seen in the instances, A *white* horse, A *tenth* part, A *round* table, A *small* book, An *iron* crown, A *sea* port. On the other hand, the characteristic difference between the adjective and the verb is, that the former expresses something that is usually known to belong to a thing, or which is taken for granted as a circumstance belonging to it; whereas the latter or the verb expresses something not usually belonging to a thing, or known to make a part of it, and which therefore forms the subject of a distinct proposition. The use of the adjective is to describe or define the subject of discourse, that of the verb to *mark* any addition which the speaker wishes to make to it, or any circumstance respecting it which it is his immediate object to enforce upon the hearer. So if we speak of a '*poisonous* plant,' we take for granted the connection between the subject and the attribute as a thing of course, or as already understood; but if we say, '*hemlock poisons*, or *is poisonous*,' we then distinguish this connection of ideas as one which we suppose the hearer to be ignorant of, or which we particularly wish to recall to his attention.

We have been led unintentionally in speaking of the adjectives to anticipate our account of the verb. Nothing can be more vague, unsatisfactory and confused than the definition commonly given of the last, namely, that it is a word signifying To be, To do, or To suffer. From this definition the student may be tempted to suppose that Being, Doing, and Suffering are three particular classes of ideas, which are always expressed by the verb, and by no other part of speech. Let us examine how far this is the case. To love, then, is a verb, because it expresses Being, Doing, or Suffering. Love (the substantive) is not a verb, and yet it surely expresses either Being, Doing, or Suffering. Battle, Conquest, &c., are the names of actions, yet they are not verbs, but substantives. Active, Hasty, Cowardly, are adjectives, all of them expressing Action, Suffering, Being, or a state of being. In fact, those who have made and adopted this definition, have sheltered its weakness under an ambiguous form of expression. If they had said that a verb is a word signifying Being, Doing, or Suffering, their account would not have been admitted. The prefix of the infinitive mood (To be, To do, &c.)

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is the only resemblance which the definition has to the subject. Instead of defining the verb, they make use of one. It remains however to show in what respect To Be, To Do, and To Suffer differ from Being, Doing, and Suffering. It cannot be in the subject-matter, or the ideas themselves, for these are the same.

Some persons have confined the signification of the verb to action. See Introduction to an Analytical Dictionary by David Booth. But this hypothesis, which is more determinate than the other, and at least aims at a meaning, is hardly tenable. The verb To Be does not express action. To belong to, To possess, To contain, To extend over, &c., do not express action, *i.e.* motion or change. Not to say that other classes of words, as nouns and adjectives, express action as well as verbs, as we have shown above. It would be better to say that a verb expresses some fact or event, that is to say, Being, Doing, or Suffering, as distinguished from a state of Being, Doing, or Suffering. But neither do all verbs express a single act or instance of a thing. When we say Two and two make four, we do not mean that they do so in a single instance, but always. It is true, however, that verbs oftener express what happens to a thing, than what belongs to it, and that they do not express any proposition more generally than the nature of the subject requires. They make any thing known in a more marked and pointed, and therefore in a more limited manner. This secondary quality in the verb, however, seems to form the chief distinction between the participle and the adjective. Those indeed who make the participle an essential part of the verb, must adopt the definition here referred to, *viz.* that a verb is a word signifying a single, not a general attribution of one thing to another, or the actually being, doing, or suffering any thing, as distinct from a state of being, doing, or suffering. If we were to adopt any other definition of the verb than the one we have inserted, it would certainly be this. But we think it more consistent both with the particular meaning of words, and with the logic of grammar, to divide adjectives and verbs into words intended to express a *given*, or known connection between our ideas, and words intended to communicate a new or unknown one, than into words representing a continued connection between the subject and the attribute, and an accidental or momentary one.

We shall here just notice by the way the very unsatisfactory account of active and passive verbs given by grammarians. A verb is active, they say, when it denotes the doing of an action, passive when it denotes the receiving one. The words *To receive a blow* will upon this principle signify the doing of an action, and to say *that an action is performed* will signify the receiving one. In fact the notion

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of agency or passiveness has no necessary connection with the active and passive forms of verbs. For an attempt to explain this subject, we refer to the grammar itself.

A pronoun is a general term to express an individual. Thus by the words He, she, it, I, you, &c., we mean that particular person or thing, which occupies a certain situation in the discourse, the person speaking, or the person spoken to, &c. A pronoun is literally a word used instead of, or which supplies the place of a noun, because instead of mentioning the name of the individual, we only refer to it by some known circumstance of situation which ascertains the object we mean. Pronouns are therefore adjectives defining some circumstance of a thing, and put absolutely.

Adverbs are for the most part words expressing the circumstance, manner, degree, &c., of an action, or attribute. Some of them, however, as the words No, Yes, are properly abbreviations of whole sentences, that is, convey assent to or dissent from an entire proposition. The last of these words is in fact the French verb, *Ouis, I hear*, used as an indeclinable term, that is, a term having a definite sense and meaning like declinable words, but not varied to adapt it to different situations, because it is restricted by custom to a particular application. The same account may be given of the other indeclinable words. Prepositions and conjunctions are either nouns or verbs expressing certain ideas like other nouns and verbs, but which are now used only for a particular purpose, and in a particular manner; that is to say, they are abruptly inserted between other words or sentences to join them together, and point out some such abstract relation between them as is implied in the original words themselves. So when we say All except John, we do not mean to address ourselves formally to any person who is to except or leave out John, though the preposition Except is undoubtedly the imperative mood of the same verb. We merely mean to convey the abstract idea, that John is to be excepted from the observation we have made, or that what is true of the others is not true of him. So the word From is a noun originally signifying Beginning, and now inserted before another noun to point it out as the source, cause, or first instance of any thing: as He speaks *from* (source) inspiration, or inspiration being the *cause* of his speaking. Interjections are the last class of indeclinable words, and they admit of a similar explanation. For they are merely words, conveying some sudden burst of passion, and left standing by themselves without any regular connection with the rest of the discourse. We also give an interjectional form to half sentences, when we are hurried on by passion into the middle of what we mean to express without making any preparation,

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as ‘Oh virtue! how amiable thou art! *i.e.* *I cannot express* how amiable thou art.’

We have thus gone through the different parts of the subject, in order to enable those who are conversant in such questions, to judge at one view of the merits or demerits of our plan. It is, we confess, a little different from others. But those, whose time is chiefly occupied in learning grammar, whether Latin or English, are not very strongly prejudiced in favour of established systems. The imperfections of those systems are obvious and unquestionable; and therefore an assiduous endeavour to improve upon them, and to place the fundamental articles of grammatical knowledge on a clearer and more intelligible footing, without implicitly subscribing to error and absurdity merely because they are old, can scarcely fail to be received with favour, and examined with fairness, by competent judges.

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GRAMMAR is the art which teaches the right use of speech.

General grammar explains the principles which are common to all languages.

The grammar of any particular language (as the English) describes the peculiar structure and idiom of that language.

To speak or write a language correctly, is to speak or write it according to those rules, which have been established by custom for conveying our thoughts to one another.

Grammar does not explain the meaning of particular words. It only teaches the use and construction of the different classes of words ; or points out the peculiar variations, or most striking exceptions to any general rule.

It is divided into two parts, Etymology and Syntax. The first treats of the different sorts of words, or Parts of Speech, as they are called : the other relates to the order and agreement of words in a sentence.

Etymology properly signifies tracing the origin of words. In this sense it has been very little attended to, in that part of grammar which bears its name ; though it would often be of great use in explaining the true properties and nature of language. The neglect of it hitherto only seems to render an attention to this branch of the subject the more necessary.

In connection with grammar, Orthography, Punctuation, and Prosody have been usually treated of. The rules for pointing are indeed best explained by a reference to grammatical construction ; those of spelling and pronunciation are quite independent of it. But as something of this kind is expected in a grammar, and as our plan might seem defective without it, we shall consider them in the same order in which they generally occur.

PART I

ORTHOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I.—*Of the Letters of the Alphabet, and their Sounds.*

ORTHOGRAPHY treats of the sounds of letters, and the right method of spelling words. It literally signifies only the last of these.

A letter is the first principle, or least part of a word ; and represents some articulate sound.

An articulate sound is the sound of the human voice, distinctly formed by the organs of speech.

The English alphabet consists of twenty-six letters. They are as follows :

A, a ; B, b ; C, c ; D, d ; E, e ; F, f ; G, g ; H, h ; I, i ; J, j ; K, k ; L, l ; M, m ; N, n ; O, o ; P, p ; Q, q ; R, r ; S, s ; or f ; T, t ; U, u ; V, v ; W, w ; X, x ; Y, y ; Z, z.

Their names are sounded thus : Ai, Bee, Cee, Dee, Ee, Ef, Jee, Aitch, I, Jai, Kai, El, Em, En, O, Pec, Ku, Ar, Ess, Tee, Yoo, Vee, Double Yoo, Eks, Wy, Zed.

Letters are divided into vowels and consonants.

A vowel is an articulate sound, which may be perfectly uttered by itself, without the help of any other letter.

A consonant is an articulate sound, which cannot be perfectly uttered without having a vowel joined to it.

The vowels are *a, e, i, o, u*, and sometimes *w* and *y*. All the other letters are consonants.

W and *y* are consonants when they begin a word or syllable ; in every other situation they are vowels, except that *w* is often mute after *o*. When it follows any other vowel, or is sounded after *o*, it has the effect of *u*, as in *saw, few, now*. *Y*, when a vowel, has the same sound as *i*.

Two vowels, coming together, and sounded by a single impulse of the voice, form a diphthong ; as in *join, ounce*. They are still called a diphthong (though improperly) when only one of the vowels is sounded, as in *beat, boat*.

Consonants are divided into mutes and semi-vowels.

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The mutes cannot be sounded at all, without the help of a vowel. They are *b, p, t, d, k*, with *c* and *g* hard.

The semi-vowels have an imperfect sound of themselves.

They are *f, l, m, n, r, v, s, z, x*; with *c* and *g* soft.

Four of the semi-vowels, namely, *l, m, n, e*, are also called *liquids*, from their readily uniting with other consonants, and flowing as it were into their sounds. They do not, however, unite readily with one another, nor do they unite with all the other consonants with the same degree of ease. The mutes and semi-vowels may in general be distinguished by their names; those of the former beginning with a consonant, as *bee, pee*, and those of the latter with a vowel, as *ef, el*, &c. C and G, V and Z, are the exceptions to this rule.

A perfect alphabet ought to contain as many letters as there are simple articulate sounds in any language. Each simple sound should have its distinct mark or character; and that character should be the representative of no other sound.

The English alphabet, like most others, is both deficient and redundant. We have more original sounds than distinct significant letters: the same letters often express different sounds. Indeed, in the fluctuations of language, it does not seem possible always to adhere to one uniform standard of pronunciation and spelling. We shall, however, attempt to ascertain the precise number of simple sounds in our language, as well as the various pronunciations of the different letters of the alphabet.

To begin with the vowels.

A has commonly four different sounds, as in $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{fall} \\ \text{fate} \\ \text{fat} \\ \text{far} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{au long} \\ \text{ai long} \\ \text{a short} \\ \text{a long} \end{array}$

The difference in the two last is evidently only that of long or short, of a slower or quicker pronunciation.

E has three different sounds, as in $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{me} \\ \text{met} \\ \text{ermine} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{e long} \\ \text{ai short} \\ \text{u broad} \end{array}$

The *e* in *met*, or the common short *e*, is the same as the *a* in *fate*, sounded short, the difference being the same as between the Greek Epsilon and Eta. So we pronounce *passionate* *passionet*, the long *ai* being here shortened by its position.

I has three different sounds, as in $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{pine} \\ \text{pin} \\ \text{flirt} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{i} \\ \text{e short} \\ \text{u broad} \end{array}$

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The second of these (generally called the short *i*) is the *e* in *me* or *mee* pronounced short, as is evident in the word *begin*, for instance. If we pronounce the *be* long, we say be-gin or bee-gin: but if we pronounce the first syllable quick, we say big-in. I in *flirt* and E in *ermine* have both the same sound, which is that of *u* broad.

O has four sounds, as in $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{no} \\ \text{not} \\ \text{move} \\ \text{love} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} o \\ au \text{ short} \\ oo \text{ long} \\ u \text{ broad} \end{array}$

Of these the first is the only one peculiar to it. In *not* it has the sound of *a* in *fall*, only short, there being no more difference between the *o* and *a* in these two words, than between the *o* in *not* and *for* (*four*), or the *a* in *fat* and *far*. In *move* it is sounded like *u* or *oo*, and in *love* like *u* broad.

U has four several sounds, as in $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{mule} \\ \text{rule} \\ \text{tub} \\ \text{bull} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} yoo \text{ long} \\ oo \text{ long} \\ u \text{ broad} \\ oo \text{ short} \end{array}$

Only two of these are original, the *u* in *bull* being the same as the *u* in *rule*, only pronounced rapidly; and in *mule* it is the long *u* or *oo* with the consonant *y* before it, as in speaking the word *you*. The other original sound is in *tub*, and may be either long or short. The *e*, *i*, and *o* borrow this sound of *u*, as has been seen in the words *ermine*, *flirt*, *love*, which might be written *urmine*, *flurt*, *luv*.

Of these eighteen different ways of using the vowels, nine are either repetitions of the same articulate sound, or merely prolongations of it. One of the sounds of *u* arises from coupling it with a consonant. *A* broad or *au* is generally accounted a diphthong, which it seems to be as much as *ou*. So that it appears there are only seven distinct or simple vowel sounds in the English language, namely, 1. *ā*, *ă* (or the long and short *a*); 2. *ā*, *ḗ* (or the slender *a* and short *e*); 3. *ē*, *ĕ* (or the long *e* and short *i*); 4. *i*; 5. *o*; 6. *ō*, *ŏ* (or the long and short sound of *u*); 7. *u* (or the broad sound of this letter in *tub*, *dull*, &c.). *I* (or *i* long) has sometimes another vowel added to it before *r*, as in *fire* (*fiar* or *fiur*); but it seems in itself a perfect elementary sound, unlike any other. Some persons however suppose it to be compounded of *u* broad and *e*.

We have twenty-one letters marked as consonants. Several of these are either superfluous, or represent not simple, but complex sounds. *C* is superfluous in both its sounds; the one being expressed by *k*, and the other by *s*, as in the word *concede*, which is pronounced *konsede*. *G* in its soft sound is the same with *j*, as in *age*. *J* itself is a complex

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sound. *Q* with its attended *u* is resolvable into *kw*, as in *quality*; or has the sound of *k*, as in *opaque*. *X* is compounded of *gs*, as in *example*; or of *ks*, as in *expect*. The letters *ng* in *sing* and *th* in *thick*, *then*, &c. represent either simple sounds, or complex sounds, of which we have not the distinct elements. Some sounds, which have been thought simple by writers on this subject, do not appear to be so; as *sh* in *shun*, or the same sound in *rational*, which might be written *s-yun*, *ras-yunal*, being the consonant sounds of *s* and *y*, pronounced rapidly after each other; *-ch*, which seems to be the same sound with *t* before it; *-zh* as heard in *pleasure*, which might be resolved into *plez-yure*. The sound of *j* or *g* soft only differs from the last, by taking *d* before it, as in *pledge*. *J* is therefore the dull sound of *ch*, being formed by prefixing *d* to *zh*, as *ch* is by prefixing *t* to *sh*.—*W* and *X* are excluded by Dr. Lowth and others from the list of consonants; the first, it is said, having the sound of *oo* before a vowel, as *water* (*ooater*), the other of *i* or *e*, as *youth* (*iouth* or *eouth*). The sound of *you* in *youth* is certainly the sound of *u* in *useful*, *union*, &c. But in fact this sound of the *u* is owing to our prefixing the consonant sound of *y* to it (*yoo*); for which reason, words beginning with this sound of *u* ought to have *a* before them instead of *an*, as *a useful book*, *a university*. Where it has the simple vowel sound, it always requires *an*, as *an uproar*, *an usher*. The impropriety of prefixing *an* to *w* at the beginning of a word, seems also to show that it is a consonant. The letter *H* (unless where it is silent) is a consonant, or a distinct articulate sound, and not merely an aspiration.

According to the foregoing account, *C*, *J*, *Q*, and *X* are superfluous in our language, so that there will remain only seventeen simple consonants. If to these we add the nasal sound of *ng*, and the two sounds of *th* in *thick* and *then*, we shall have twenty distinct consonants, which with the seven simple vowel sounds above enumerated, make twenty-seven in all. Out of these, with their several combinations, all the words in our language are compounded.

It is presumed that this sketch will be sufficient to remove the principal difficulties which obstruct the progress of the learner, from the confused state of the alphabet, or an ignorance of first principles. We refer to No. 1 of the Appendix for a praxis of words, exhibiting in a regular series all the various sounds of the letters, and their simple combinations. It would be of use to the scholar to translate these (particularly the vowels) into their several elementary characters, according to the scheme above given.

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CHAPTER II.—*Rules for Spelling.*

SPELLING is the art of rightly dividing words into syllables, and of expressing a word by its proper letters.

A syllable is a sound, either simple or compounded, pronounced by a single breath or impulse of the voice, and constituting sometimes a word, but generally only part of a word; as *a*, *an*, *ant*, *a-ble*.

A word in Orthography is any number of letters, which, being joined together in writing, express some particular idea.

A word of one syllable is called a Monosyllable; a word of two syllables, a Dissyllable; a word of three syllables, a Trisyllable; and a word of four or more syllables, a Polysyllable.

Words are either primitive or derivative.

A primitive word is one that cannot be reduced to any simpler word in the same language; as *man*, *good*, *content*.

A derivative word is one which may be reduced as another word in English of greater simplicity; as *manful*, *goodness*, *contentment*, *Yorkshire*.—Many of our simple words are derivatives or compounds in other languages. For example, *Circumstance*, which is a primitive in English, but a derivative, if traced to the Latin tongue.

The letters of a word are naturally joined together. They are only divided either accidentally by the ending of a line, or on purpose to show what letters cling together in the pronunciation, and form syllables.

The best rule for dividing words in spelling is therefore to divide them as they are pronounced. This can only be learned by practice. But the following rules may perhaps be of some assistance.

1. A vowel most frequently ends a syllable, if the consonant or consonants immediately following it are proper to begin the next syllable; as *bri-dal*, *de-light*, *re-source*, *fa-ble*, *sti-ple*. Otherwise such of them as will not unite with the next syllable are thrown back into the preceding one; as in *ex-ist*, *ex-amine*, *ut-most*, *un-der*, *brit-tle*, *ab-stain*, *con-strain*, *parch-ment*, *sing-ing*, &c.

2. A vowel does not always end a syllable, though the following consonant might begin the next. When the vowel is short, and the accent is on the same syllable, it must necessarily be joined to the following consonant in pronunciation, and ought to be so in spelling, as in *doc-ument*, *mar-rimony*, *fam-ily*, *acid-ity*, &c. An attentive observation of this distinction might, it is hoped, be of service to our Northern countrymen, who, probably misled by the improper mode of dividing these and such-like words in our spelling books and dictionaries, generally pronounce them *do-cument*, *ma-trimony*, *fa-mily*,

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&c., as if the vowel were long in the first syllable of each of these words.—N.B. Though the vowel is short, if the accent is on another syllable, this rule is not necessary, as we say *fā-miliar*, *syllā-ble*, *mā-jestic*, &c. Again, if joining the consonant to the vowel would alter the sound, we do not join them, as it would not be right to spell *acid* *ac-id*, though this is the real division of the word, since we should thus give the *c* the sound of *k*, instead of *s*. Where the final *e* lengthens a syllable, we should join it to that syllable, as in *change-able*, *tame-able*, &c.

3. Compound words from our own language are divided into the original words; as *up-on*, *un-even*, *dis-ease*. Grammatical and other terminations are generally kept distinct; as *teach-es*, *teach-est*, *great-er*, *good-ness*, *free-dom*. Either none or very little attention is paid in pronunciation or spelling to the original division of words derived from other languages, as in *mad-am*, *rel-ict*, *sep-aration*, &c.

We shall here add a few rules for spelling words.

1. Monosyllables ending in *f*, *l*, or *s*, preceded by a single vowel, double the last letter; as *staff*, *mill*, *pass*, &c. Except *of*, *if*, *as*, *is*, *has*, *was*, *yes*, *his*, *this*, *thus*, and *us*. Monosyllables ending in any other consonant do not double it; except *add*, *ebb*, *butt*, *egg*, *odd*, *err*, *inn*, and *purr*.

2. When any addition is made to words ending in *y*, it is always changed into *i*, unless an *i* follows, or where it is part of a diphthong. *Lay*, *pay*, and *say*, however, change *y* into *i*, according to the common rule.

3. Words accented on the last syllable, and ending in a single vowel and a consonant, double the consonant, when another syllable beginning with a vowel is added to them, as *wit*, *witty*, *thin*, *thinner*, *begin*, *beginning*.

4. Words ending in a double letter, and having *ness*, *less*, *ly*, or *ful*, added to them, keep both letters, with the exception of double *l*, which generally omits one of them; as *harmlessness*, *successful*,—*fulness*, *skilful*.—*Full* and *till* added to words omit the last letter.

5. The only rule for determining whether the silent *e* at the end of words is to be retained or cut off, when an addition is made to them, is to consider whether it is or is not necessary to explain the sound of the new word; as we say *paleness*, *sensible*, *blameable*, *curable*, *abatement*, *judgment*, *changeable*, *slavish*, *facing*, &c.

6. Compound words for the most part remain the same.

The spelling of many words is uncertain, particularly of those ending in *or*, or *our*. 1. The names of things or actions are generally spelt with *our*, those of persons, adjectives, &c. with *or*; as *humour*, *honour*, *favour*, *odour*, *labour*,—*interrogator*, *author*, *conductor*, *protector*, *inferior*, *exterior*. 2. Words that have been long in use, or derived

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originally from the French, are more apt to have *our*, as *saviour*, *behaviour*, &c., which can hardly be written otherwise: on the other hand, modern words borrowed more immediately from the Latin are generally found with *or*. 3. *Or* usually follows double *r*; as in *error*, *terror*, *horror*, *mirror*. In fact, where the practice is very much divided, no positive rule can be laid down. Whenever the practice becomes decidedly favourable to one mode or the other, the rule will follow of course. It is advisable, however, for the scholar to have some one way of spelling such words, and not to be always hesitating which to prefer.

PART II

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

CHAPTER I.—*General View of the Subject.*

GRAMMAR (properly so called) treats of the different sorts of words, and of the manner in which they are combined in a sentence. We shall proceed to consider the first of these, or the use and origin of the several classes of words, with their inflections, which forms the business of Etymology.

Words are certain articulate sounds, or written characters, used, by common consent, as signs of our ideas.

A sentence is any number of these so united as to express distinctly the *sense* which the person speaking has on any subject.—It would be of little use to have names for things, unless we could also say what we think of them. It is chiefly by the regular combination of words that we become intelligible to one another; or can mark not only the ideas which are passing in our minds, but the manner in which we connect them together, or are affected by them.

The parts of speech are the different sorts of words of which a sentence is composed.—This difference does not, however, arise from any intrinsic difference in the ideas to which those words relate, or from the nature of the things spoken of, but from our manner of speaking of them. The grammatical distinctions of words are intended to show their use in *construction*, or in reference to other words in the same sentence. Words, considered nakedly in themselves, are the names or signs of certain things; words, as parts of speech, *i.e.* as component parts of a sentence, are the names or signs of certain things, accompanied with an intimation in what manner they are joined together in the mind of the speaker, and made the subjects of discourse.

There are in English usually reckoned nine sorts of words, or parts of speech; namely, the Article, the Substantive or Noun, the Adjective, the Pronoun, the Verb, the Adverb, the Preposition, the Conjunction, and the Interjection.

1. An article is a word prefixed to substantives, to limit their

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signification to a single thing, or to a number of things already known ; as *a book, an eagle, the Furies*.

2. A substantive or noun is the name of any idea or thing considered as standing by itself, and not as a circumstance belonging to something else ; as *London, man, virtue, conquest, action*.

A substantive may in general be distinguished by its admitting an article before it (except proper names) ; or by its uniting as a nominative case with the verb ; as *a book, the sun, an apple ; temperance preserves health, health is desirable*.

3. An adjective is the name of any idea or thing considered as a circumstance belonging to, and supposed to make part of, something else ; or it is a word added to a substantive or name of a thing, to describe some quality or attribute of it simply, without making it the subject of a distinct proposition, as an *active* man, a *virtuous* woman, the *London* road, a *conquering* general.

An adjective may be known by its not standing as the nominative case to a verb without another word added to it ; or by its being easily resolvable into a noun and a preposition ; as a *virtuous* woman or a woman *of virtue*, the *London* road or the road *to London*.

4. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun, for the most part to avoid the trouble of repeating the name of the particular person or thing we are speaking of ; as *Virtue* is amiable ; *it* is the support of society, and *its* effects are no less beneficial to the individual.

5. A verb is a word which expresses a thing as a circumstance or attribute of something else, by making it the subject of a distinct proposition ; as *I love, I spoke, I am taught*.

Verbs, as well as adjectives, denote the attributes of nouns. The difference is, that the adjective only *implies* the connection between the subject and the attribute ; whereas the verb distinctly *expresses* it. Adjectives serve to define or determine the subject we are speaking of by its unknown qualities. Verbs are used to mark any addition that is made to it, or point out that particular circumstance on which we wish to insist.

Any word which joined with a substantive pronoun makes a complete sense is a verb ; as, 'The bird sings' ; 'She laughs' ; 'It rains.' Or any word that may be resolved into an adjective or a participle with the verb *to be* added to it, is a verb.

The participle is sometimes made a distinct part of speech. A participle may be defined to be any adjective or noun, which being formed from a verb, continues to *partake* of the qualities and construction of a verb. A word may be considered as a participle, or as an adjective partaking of the nature of a verb, when it expresses an attribute definitely, as, 'His lesson is *learned*' ; 'The design is

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accomplished': when it expresses an attribute generally, or without referring to any particular act or event, it is no longer a participle, but an adjective; as, 'He is a *learned* man; she is an *accomplished* woman.' A noun may be considered as a participle when it has the double construction both of a verb and a noun in the same sentence; as, '*Running fast* takes away my breath'; where *running* is the nominative case to the verb, and yet has the adverb *fast* joined to it, as if it were itself a verb.

6. An adverb is a word joined to a verb, an adjective or another adverb, to express some quality or circumstance respecting it; as 'He reads *well*; a *truly* good man; he writes *very* correctly.'—The use of the adverb is to express an additional circumstance with respect to any thing which has been already considered as a circumstance of something else, as the time or manner of an action, the degree of a quality, &c. It answers to the questions, How? How much? When? or Where? as if we say, How does he read? the answer is, *Correctly*.

7. Prepositions serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them; as, He went *from* London to York; she is *above* disguise; they are supported *by* honest industry. Most prepositions require the objective case of pronouns after them.

8. A conjunction is a word used to connect sentences together, and to show the relation between different propositions; as He is happy, *because* he is good.

There is no essential or necessary difference in the ideas expressed by adverbs, prepositions, or conjunctions, and by the other parts of speech. The only difference is in the manner of conveying these ideas. A sufficient proof of the truth of this assertion is, that we can express the very same ideas by words which belong to other parts of speech; as we may say, He writes *correctly*, or in a *correct manner*; His house is *near* mine, or is *contiguous* to, or *adjoins* mine; He is happy, *because* he is good; or He is happy, *the reason of which is*, he is good.

Prepositions and conjunctions and some adverbs are called indeclinables, because they do not vary their terminations. This arises from the use to which such words have been appropriated, which is to express certain abstract relations between things, without attending to the number, person, gender, &c. of the things spoken of, which it is the end of the declensions of words to ascertain.

9. Interjections are commonly words thrown in between the parts of a sentence, not regularly joined to it, which express the sudden passions or emotions of the speaker, as Oh, alas, &c. It has been much disputed whether interjections are parts of rational discourse, or not.

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But it seems easy to decide this question, by asking whether they are not words of articulate sounds used intentionally, as *signs* of certain ideas or feelings.

In the following sentence all the different parts of speech are exemplified :

‘The power of speech is a faculty peculiar to man, and was bestowed on him by his beneficent Creator for the greatest and most excellent uses ; but, alas ! how often do we pervert it to the worst of purposes !’ Here the words, *the*, *a* are articles ; *power*, *speech*, *faculty*, *man*, *creator*, *uses*, *purposes*, are substantives ; *him*, *his*, *we*, *is*, pronouns ; *peculiar*, *beneficent*, *greatest*, *excellent*, *worst*, adjectives ; *it*, *was*, *bestowed*, *do*, *pervert*, verbs ; *most*, *how*, *often*, are adverbs ; *of*, *to*, *on*, *by*, *for*, are prepositions ; *and*, *but*, are conjunctions ; and *alas* is an interjection.

CHAPTER II.—Of Articles.

AN article is a word prefixed to substantives to limit their application to a single thing, or to a number of things already known ; as, *a* garden, *an* eagle, *the* Furies.

In English there are but two articles, *a* and *the* : *a* becomes *an* before a vowel and before a silent *b* ; as *an* acorn, *an* hour. But if the *b* is sounded, the *a* is to be used ; as *a* horse, *a* house, *a* hindrance. *Exceptions.* We use *a* before a vowel, if it has the sound of a consonant, as *a* useful book, many *a* one ; and sometimes either *a* or *an* before *b*, according to the place of the accent, as we say, *a* hero, *an* heroic deed.

A or *an* is called the indefinite article, because it is only used to point out one single thing of the kind, in other respects indeterminate ; as, ‘Give me *a* book,’ ‘Bring me *an* apple.’—It is equivalent to the French article *un*, and, in fact, like it, signifies *one*. It might not improperly be termed a numeral adjective.

The is called the definite article, because it points out some particular thing or things already known ; as, ‘Give me *the* book’ ; ‘Bring me *the* apples’ ; meaning some books or apples, before mentioned. We also use this article where an explanation immediately follows ; as, ‘*The* circumstance, *which* I am going to mention,’ &c. ‘*The* book, *which* I admire the most, is,’ &c. Where it is worthy of remark that we might also say, *That* book *which* I admire most, &c. The definite article has therefore nearly the force of a demonstrative pronoun. What shows the affinity of these parts of speech is, that in French they have the same word (*le*) for *the*, *him*, and *it*.

A substantive without any article prefixed to it, is generally taken

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in its widest sense, or as applicable to all or any of the species ; as, 'The proper study of mankind is *man*,' where *man* and *mankind* might change places without altering the sense.

Examples of the proper and improper use of the articles.

'*Man* was made for society, and ought to extend his good-will to all *men* ; but *a man* will naturally entertain a more particular kindness for *the men* with whom he has the most frequent intercourse, and still more for *the man* whose temper and views suit with his own.'

'And Nathan said unto David, Thou art *the man*.'

'And I persecuted this way unto *the death*.' It should be *unto death*, as no particular kind of death is meant.

'Who breaks a butterfly upon *a wheel*?' Or rather *the wheel*, a particular kind of wheel, or an instrument of torture, known by that name, being understood.

'God Almighty has given reason to *a man* to be a light unto him.' It should be '*to man*' in general.

The genitive case before a noun prevents its having the article, 'Of *man's* first disobedience,' &c., or of *the* first disobedience of man.

Proper names which denote only individuals, as well as the names of those things, in which the idea of number is not attended to, omit the article ; as *Alexander* conquered *Persia* ; *Prudence* is commendable ; *Gold* is heavy. We say however, *the gold of Peru*, to distinguish a particular sort ; *the anger of fools* ; generosity is *a virtue*, or one of *the virtues*, &c. *The Persians*, *the English*, *the French*, signify those nations as opposed to other nations. When we say 'They are *Persians*, They are *English*, &c., we mean certain individuals of these countries.

A proper name is often used with an article before it as the representative of a class, as Every man is not *an Alexander*, that is, a hero ; He would be thought *a Newton*, that is, a very great philosopher. *A Howard* signifies one of that family, that is, one out of many. When there are more persons than one of the same name, and we use the plural number, we prefix the definite article to limit the number, as by *the Howards* we understand the noble family of that name ; by *the Scipios*, two distinguished Roman warriors.—We also say *the George* for the sign of the George, *the Britannia* for the ship Britannia, *the Thames* for the river Thames.

When an adjective is used with a noun, the article is placed before the adjective ; as *a wise man*, *an amiable woman*, *the best friend*.—Exceptions. We always say, *such a shame*, *many a man*. In general the article is joined to the noun, when there is any peculiarity in the manner of using the adjective ; as we say, '*As great a man as Alexander*,' '*Too careless an author*.' Yet we say, '*An equally great man*,

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a *very idle boy*,' because the connection between the adjective and adverb in these examples is more common and readily understood.

The indefinite article is joined to substantives in the singular number only; the definite article is joined indifferently either to the singular or plural.

There seems to be a remarkable exception to this rule, in the use of the adjectives *few* and *many* (the latter chiefly with the word *great* before it), which, though joined to plural substantives, yet admit of the singular article *a*; as *a few men*, *a great many men*. In fact, the words *few* and *many* are not adjectives when so used, but singular nouns with the word *of* understood after them. The real construction is *a few of men*, *a many of men*; which signifies a small or a great number of men collectively taken, so as to give an idea of one whole number, or aggregate. In like manner we say *a dozen*, *a score*, *a hundred*, *a thousand*, because these are *round* numbers, that is, numbers which we use as a standard to reckon other numbers by, and which may be considered as units with respect to them. The custom of dropping the *of* so generally before the following substantives, as *a dozen books*, *a score miles*, *a hundred years*, is probably owing to our constantly considering the common names of numbers as adjectives; so we say *twelve books*, *twenty miles*, *ninety-nine years*.—Remarks. All nouns of number require a substantive form, when we speak of one number as part of another; as *one of the twelve*, *any one of us*, *several of the party*, *fifty of the troop*.—We say *all the men*, or *all of the men*. In things which we are in the constant habit of counting, it is very common (though not correct or elegant) to omit the plural termination, as, Will you lend me *a hundred pound*? He is *twenty year* old. Mr. Horne Tooke explains the phrases *many a message*, *many a time*, by supposing that the *a* is here a corruption of *of*, and that it should be *many*, or *a many of messages*, *many of times*; but the expression (no less common) *many a one* does not seem to bear this interpretation.

The definite article *the* is sometimes applied to adverbs in the comparative and superlative degree; and its effect is to mark the distinction more strongly: as, The more I examine the work, *the* better I like it. I like this *the* least of any.

CHAPTER III.—Of Substantives.

Section I.—Of Substantives in General.

A SUBSTANTIVE¹ is a word which expresses the name of any thing, or the object itself, in the simplest manner, as *house*, *man*, *virtue*, *London*.

¹ Substantives are called nouns, *i.e.* names; and nouns substantive.

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Words are substantives when they represent any thing as a distinct idea in itself, and not as a circumstance of some other idea.

It has been common to suppose that by a substantive was to be understood any word denoting a substance, or thing subsisting by itself, as *a man, a house, a table*. But it was found that this definition would exclude many words from being substantives, which are nevertheless allowed to be so, such as *whiteness, strength, heat, &c.*, in short, all words expressing any quality or action either of the body or mind.

On the other hand, the definition given by Dr. Lowth, and generally adopted by others since his time, seems much too loose and general; for they define a substantive to be the name of any thing that exists, or of which we can form any notion. So that all words whatever that have any meaning in them must be substantives. It therefore becomes necessary to limit this account, by adopting some such definition as that given above; or by saying that a substantive is 'the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion,' *considered* as it is in itself, and not as a circumstance of some other idea or thing.

The substantive or simple noun (without any inflection) denotes merely the idea or object spoken of. A substantive may therefore be the name of any thing whatever, which can be made the subject of discourse. *Man, woman*, are the names of persons; *tree, house, ship*, of things; *whiteness, colour, heat*, of physical qualities; *virtue, wisdom, justice*, of moral qualities; *speech, motion, gesture*, of actions; *love, desire, pleasure*, of feelings; *distance, height, absence*, of relations, &c., &c. We mentioned these different instances, to show that it is not the idea or thing spoken of, but the manner of speaking it, that determines whether any word is a substantive or not.

The usual division of substantives is into proper, and common.

Proper names or substantives are the names appropriated to individuals; as *George, Thomas, London, the Thames*.—To this class belong all positive names given to any number of things or persons, *i.e.* all names which cannot be applied generally to *other* things of the same nature and qualities; such are the names of families, of countries, &c., as *the Howards, the Cæsars, the Romans, the Greeks, France, England*.

Common names or substantives are those which represent sorts or species, containing many individuals under them; as *animal, man, tree, &c.* The characteristic distinction of a common or general name arises, not from the number of individuals actually represented by it, but from the number to which it is *applicable*, namely, to all of the same kind. Thus a Mammoth would be the common name of all animals of that description, in whatever numbers they were found, though we do not at present know whether there are any of the species remaining. *Black, a black man*, is a name universally applicable

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to all persons of a certain colour; a Hottentot is an appellation given only to persons born within a limited extent of soil, *i.e.* only to a limited number.—Proper names are sometimes used as common names, when we single out any remarkable individual as the representative of a general class; as, ‘He is the Cicero of his age; there have not been many Shakespeares.’ Common names are often made particular by the addition of articles or pronouns, as, ‘*The* boy is diligent; *that* girl is discreet.’

To substantives are added gender, number, and case. They are all of the third person when spoken *of*, and of the second when spoken *to*; except when any word is put in *apposition* to the pronouns *I* or *We*; as, ‘Do you behave so to *me*, the only person who treat you with kindness?’

Section II.—Of Gender.

Gender is an artificial distinction in words, intended to point out the sex of the object to which they relate.

Thus, in Latin, nouns or their adjectives had different terminations, which *signified* whether the object to which they were applied was of the male kind, as *equus*, a horse, *honestus*, an honest man; or female, as *equa*, a mare, *honestæ*, an honest woman; or neuter, that is without sex, which gender only belonged to inanimate things. Inanimate things were, however, often personified, as *Sol*, the sun, which requires the masculine termination of adjectives after it; *Luna*, the moon, which is made feminine.

In English, neither adjectives nor nouns have genders, except a few of the latter derived from the Latin or the French. We mark the distinction of sex by different words, not by a difference in the same word. Gender can only be applied to words, when they have some common or known mark, to designate the natural or imaginary distinction of sex in the objects themselves.

The only method of distinguishing the gender of words in English is by adding *ess* (or the Latin *ix*) to nouns, or by changing the last syllable into this termination; as *Count*, *countess*; *baron*, *baroness*; *patron*, *patroness*; *actor*, *actress*; *adulterer*, *adulteress*; *heir*, *heiress*; *executor*, *executrix*; *songster*, *songstress*, &c. This alteration in the word denotes the relation of male and female, and there is no other in English that does.—English adjectives are evidently without gender, as we indiscriminately apply the same word to persons of either sex, or to inanimate things; as a *good* man, a *good* woman, a *good* house; and so in all other cases.

In general therefore we are forced to distinguish sex in the same way that we distinguish any other circumstance in the objects, as their

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age, complexion, &c., either by having a different name for things of different sexes; as Man, woman; boy, girl; king, queen; uncle, aunt; buck, doe; cock, hen; or by prefixing to a common name some other, determining the sex; as, a cock or a hen sparrow, a man or maid servant, a he-goat, a she-goat, a male child, a female child, &c. These have been improperly considered as constituting different genders in the language.

It will not seem strange, from the account here given of the manner of expressing this distinction in English (not by varying the termination of the new common name, but by inventing a new word), that to save trouble we should use many words indifferently, as *parent, child, cousin, friend, neighbour, servant, &c.*, which may be applied either to males or females. The want of variable terminations sometimes, however, produces inconvenience, as when a word has by custom been appropriated to one sex, and no correspondent word has been invented for the other sex, though (either from some accident or a change of manners) we may have occasion to apply it to the latter. Thus we say very naturally, *She is a teacher, a scholar, a witness, an orphan, a companion*, because these words are usually confined to neither sex; but if we have to say of a woman, *She is a philosopher, an astronomer, a general, a mason, a weaver*, there is an awkwardness in the expression, for which we have no remedy in the nature of our language.

In English, as in all other languages, we attribute sex to things which have it not. Those things which are most remarkable for strength or activity we represent figuratively as males, those which are distinguished by their beauty or softness as females. In poetical language, the sun is said to be masculine; and the moon, as the receptacle of the sun's light, to be feminine. The Earth is generally feminine, as being the mother of all things. Time is masculine, Virtue and Fortune are feminine. But in common discourse we apply this distinction only to things which have life, except in one or two instances, as we sometimes say of the sun, *He* is setting, and generally of a ship, *She* sails well. The pronouns *he, she, and it*, are applied respectively to things which either are or are conceived to be of the male or female gender, or without any.¹

¹ It is justly remarked by Dr. Lowth, that the English language, by generally confining the idea of sex to things which have it, has an advantage over most other languages in the poetical and rhetorical style, as the personification of inanimate things is thus rendered more remarkable when there is an occasion for it; as in the following passage:

'At his command the uprooted Hills retired
Each to *his* place; they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heaven *his* wonted face renewed,
And with fresh flow'rets Hill and Valley smiled.'

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Section III.—Of Number.

Number is the consideration of objects, as one or more.

Substantives in English have only two numbers, the singular and plural.¹

The singular number expressed but one object, as a chair, a table; the plural number more than one, as chairs, tables. If we wish to denote *how many* more than one, it must be the names of the different numbers, or by referring to some known number, as *fifty soldiers*, as *many windows as there are days in the year*.—Some nouns from the nature of the things they express are used only in the singular form; as *wheat, bread, pitch, gold, sloth, pride, avarice*, &c., others only in the plural; as *bellows, scissors, lungs, riches, wages, victuals, mathematics*, &c. Others are the same in both numbers, or have no distinction of number; as *deer, sheep, swine*, &c. The plural number of nouns is generally formed by adding *s* to the singular, as *book, books; apple, apples; face, faces*. But when the singular ends in *x*, *ch* soft, *sh*, *ss*, or *s*, we add *es* in the plural; as *box, boxes; church, churches; brush, brushes; miss, misses; rebus, rebuses*. When the *ch* has the sound of *k*, we add *s*, as *monarch, monarchs; distich, distichs*.

Nouns ending in *o* generally have *es* added to the plural; as *cargoes, echoes, heroes*, unless another vowel precedes, when *s* only is added, as *folios, punctilios*, &c. Words ending in *f*, or *fe*, often change them into *ves*, as *loaf, loaves; half, halves; life, lives*. *Staff* in the plural is *staves*.

r at the end of a noun, without another vowel going before, is always changed into *ies* in the plural, as in *beauty, fly, cherry*. If the *y* has a vowel going before it, the *s* is only added, as *boy, boys; key, keys; way, ways*. Some plurals are formed irregularly; as *man, men; woman, women; oxen* and *children* from *ox* and *child*; *brother* has *brothers* or *brethren* (used only in solemn language); *foot, feet; goose, geese; tooth, teeth; mouse, mice*. *Pence* and *dice* used in familiar conversation seem abbreviations of *pennies* and *dies*.

Many words borrowed from other languages form the plural as they do; as *beau, beaux; datum, data; phænomenon, phænomena; metamorphosis, metamorphoses*.

The greatest peculiarity with respect to number is in the words *alms, pains, news, and means*. The first and last are both singular and plural, as we say, *His alms are extensive*, or *to give an alms; a necessary means; by this means; by these means*. *News* is singular, but we do not prefix the indefinite article to it. *Pains* is generally considered as plural; yet

¹ The Greek had three, to signify when one thing was spoken of, or two, or more than two.

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we say *a great deal of pains*, as if it were singular, or as we should say *a great deal of labour*; *a great deal of trouble*. *Much pains* seems to require the singular after it, as *Much pains has been taken* rather than *have been taken*.

Section IV.—Of Case.

The cases of nouns and pronouns are the terminations given to them to mark their relation to other words.

Nouns substantive in English have but two cases, the nominative, and the genitive, or possessive case.¹ Pronouns have also an objective case, or a case which follows prepositions and verbs active.

Some ingenious and able writers (misled by the remains of an early prejudice) have endeavoured to show that English nouns have another general case, which they call the objective, to represent the four remaining cases of the Latin tongue. This, however, seems to be a fruitless attempt to *force* the English language into a nominal agreement with another, which is allowed to be really different from it. For all that has been said on the subject amounts only to this, that though a case signifies nothing more than a difference of termination, yet we have a case in English in which there is no difference of termination; and that though the nominative and the objective case are in reality the same, yet for the sake of variety we ought to suppose them to be different, and to distinguish them by different names.²

The nominative case simply expresses the name of the thing without any variation, or reference to other words in the sentence. It is the real noun or substantive, and is employed on all occasions, where one substantive does not govern another; as, 'The *boy* plays; the *girls* learn; he studies his *book*; they live in *London*.' There is here nothing to distinguish the nominative from the objective case, as we use the words in precisely the same way, whether they precede or follow the verb, or are governed by a preposition or not. We only know the nominative from the objective case by the order in which it stands, or by its agreeing with the verb in number, or by the sense of the passage.—Perhaps what is here called the nominative case might more properly be called the *noun* simply; and wherever in the technical

¹ Neither of these terms is strictly proper. It may be applied to the possessor, or the thing possessed, or to express almost any other relation. It should rather be called the adjective case, for in fact it has the force of an adjective, as *man's* nature or *human* nature means the same thing.

² The difference of the real situation of the noun in the sentence cannot be consistently urged as a plea by those who would establish an objective case; for this would prove that we have as many cases as the Latins, a supposition which these writers reject as absurd. In fact, there can be only as many cases in any language as there are *endings* or marks to express the different situations of the noun.

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construction of sentences it is necessary to distinguish the situation of the noun with respect to other words, instead of saying the *nominative case* and the *objective case* (which only leads us to suppose a distinction where there is none) we might uniformly say, the *subject of the verb* and the *object of the verb*. It will be seen in the course of the work, that these terms may be substituted in the room of the improper ones now in use, without any inconvenience.

The possessive or genitive case is generally used to denote the relation of property, that is, the circumstance either of possessing, or belonging to; as, 'My father's house; the scholar's duty; John's master; the horse's owner.' This, however, is not its only use, as we say, 'To-day's lesson, London's column, the judge's sentence, the prisoner's sentence, the man's ancestors, the sun's absence, virtue's bane,' &c., where the connection between the ideas is certainly very different from that of property or possession. The preposition *of* may always be prefixed to a word instead of using the possessive case; though in some instances the possessive case cannot be used with the same effect as the preposition.

The apostrophic *'s* is a contraction of the old termination *is*; not a corruption of *his*, which is itself the corresponding termination or case of the pronoun *he*. The *s* is not added to plurals in *s*, nor very often to singular nouns ending in *s* or *x*, particularly in poetry, but the apostrophe should always be retained; as '*On eagles' wings; for righteousness' sake; Festus came into Felix' room; the wrath of Peleus' son.*' When the plural is used, it is very wrong to insert the apostrophe before the final *s*; we should say For your *many virtues'* (not *virtue's*) *sake*.

We frequently use a double genitive, or more properly the genitive case with the preposition prefixed; as, A book of John's, a soldier of the king's. This expression seems to mean a book of John's (*books understood*), or one of John's books, &c., for we never apply this form of expression to one thing unless there are others of the same kind understood.

CHAPTER IV.—Of *Adjectives*.

ADJECTIVES have been improperly defined, words added to substantives to express their *qualities*; as if other words did not express qualities as well as adjectives, and as if adjectives did not express many other things as well as quality. Dr. Lowth denies that adjectives are nouns, *i.e.* names of any thing that exists, or that can be conceived to exist; thereby reducing them to mere unmeaning sounds. The distinction between substantives and adjectives as parts of speech does not however arise

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from their severally representing substances or qualities, for they represent both indiscriminately, but from the manner of representing them. Thus *white* is an adjective, *whiteness* is a substantive ; a *stone* is a substantive, *stony* an adjective.

An adjective may be defined to be any word joined to a substantive (or name of a thing) to express its quality, form, number, matter, or any other circumstance belonging to, or connected with it simply, without making it the subject of a distinct proposition, as an *active* man, a *virtuous* woman, a *London* citizen, a *great* conqueror, a *round* table, a *small* book, a *numerous* assembly, a *gold* ring, a *leather* girdle, &c., &c.

Adjectives may always be converted into substantives by adding a preposition which expresses the same relation between the words as the adjective termination, as a *virtuous woman*, or a *woman of virtue* ; *human righteousness*, or *the righteousness of man* ; *the London road*, or *the road to London*, &c.

An adjective does not stand alone in a sentence, for the same reason that a genitive case cannot ; because it implies a reference to some other word, which is the immediate subject of the discourse. Thus *human*, or *man's*, can never become the nominative case to the verb, till it is joined to some substantive, on which by construction we know that it depends ; as *Human happiness* is of short duration. The adjective may however be separated from the noun by the verb, when it expresses the predicate of a proposition, or that which is directly affirmed of any thing ; as *Error is human*.

In English, adjectives are not varied on account of gender, number, or case. We say, A careless boy, careless girls, he loves good books, good books are rare.

The only variation they admit, is that of the degrees of comparison.

There are commonly reckoned three degrees of comparison, though there are (properly speaking) only two ; the first, or positive degree expressing merely the quality of an object, without any increase or diminution ; as *good*, *wise*, *great*.

The comparative degree increases or lessens the positive in signification ; as *wiser*, *greater*, *less wise*.

The superlative degree increases or lessens the positive to the highest or lowest degree, or shows that a thing is greater or less than another which has been already declared greater or less than something else ; as *wisest*, *greatest*, *least wise*.

Adjectives expressing ideas which are not capable of increase or diminution, do not admit of the degrees of comparison : thus we cannot say ' the *most* London citizen, a *more* hundred men, the *more* golden ring,' because these adjectives express the simple fact *that a man lives in London, that a number is limited to so many, that a ring is made of gold,*

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things in which there can be neither more nor less. It has been observed that we ought not to say *a more perfect, the most perfect*, for the same reason. But we should never have occasion to make use of this word at all, if we did not use it in a loose sense, that is, as merely expressing a very high degree of excellence. The comparative degree is formed by adding *r* or *er*, and the superlative by adding *st* or *est* to the end of a word ; as *wise, wiser, wisest, great, greater, greatest*. The adverbs *more* and *most*, placed before the adjective, have the same effect ; as *wise, more wise, most wise*. *Less* and *least* diminish in the same proportion.

Monosyllables are for the most part compared by *er* and *est*, and dissyllables by *more* and *most*, unless they end in *y*, or *le* after a mute, or are accented on the last syllable ; for we may say *happier, abler, politer, &c.*, or *more happy, more able, more polite*. Words of more than two syllables hardly ever admit of the additional terminations.

The superlative is formed by adding *most* to the end of some words ; as *nethermost, uttermost* or *utmost, undermost, uppermost, foremost*.

There are some words of very common use (in which custom often gets the better of analogy) that are irregular in this respect ; as *good, better, best ; bad, worse, worst ; little, less, least ; much* or *many, more, most ; near, nearer, nearest* or *next ; late, later* or *latter, latest* or *last* ;¹ *old, older, or elder, oldest* or *eldest, &c.*

There are other ways of expressing the degrees of comparison, these being in fact infinitely various. The termination *ish*, the adverbs *too* and *rather*, are applied to express a small degree, or the excess, of a quality ; as *a saltish taste, a blackish colour, rather profuse, rather generous, too talkative, too witty*. The word *very* expresses a high degree of any thing, without immediately comparing it with any thing else. It signifies extremes generally, whereas the common superlative signifies only excess in reference to a certain number of things ; so we say *a very tall man, a very little woman ; he is the tallest of the three, she is the smallest of the family*. The degree in the latter instances depends on the number of things brought into comparison. We may therefore make this form of expression more or less general as we please ; as, *He is the tallest man in the county ; Socrates was the wisest of the ancients ; Virtue is more excellent than every other acquirement*.

To express the degrees of difference between things precisely and forcibly, we must employ distinct phrases ; as, *He is twice as tall as you ; your garden is ten times bigger than the one next to it ; snow is a great deal whiter than this paper ; Epaminondas was by far the most accomplished of the Thebans ; God is infinitely greater than the greatest of his creatures*.

Adjectives standing alone, and not referring to a substantive in the

¹ *Later* and *latest* are applied to time only ; *latter* and *last* either to time or place.

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same sentence, are to be considered as substantives; as, 'Providence rewards *the good*, but punishes *the bad*,' 'Evil, be thou *my good*.' In like manner, substantives placed before other substantives become adjectives without any change of termination; as, Sea-weed, land-tortoise, bird-cage, corn-field. In writing, a hyphen (-) generally supplies the place of the adjective termination.

Numeral adjectives are divided into cardinal and ordinal; that is, they either express the number of which any thing consists, as *one, two, three, &c.*, or merely the *order* in which it is connected with a number of other things, as *first, second, third*.

CHAPTER V.—Of Pronouns.

A PRONOUN is a word used *instead of* a noun, to avoid the repetition of particular names, or when the name of the person or thing we are speaking of is either not known or not necessary to be mentioned.

Examples. 'So rapid was the progress of Cæsar's arms, that, to use *his* own words, *he* came, *he* saw, *he* conquered.'¹ '*It* was *he*, whom I saw with you yesterday.' '*He* whom ye seek, is not dead, but risen.' '*You* and *I* will go together.'

Pronouns have been divided into three sorts, *viz.* personal, relative, and adjective pronouns. A better division would be into pronouns proper, or those which (as their name and definition import) are used *instead of* a noun; and in this class the relatives would be included; the adjectives of pronouns; and mixed pronouns, or those which sometimes do the office of pronouns, and sometimes of adjectives. We shall, however, treat of them in the usual order.

The personal pronouns are reckoned as follows, *viz.* *I, thou, he, she, it*, with their plurals, *We, ye or you, and they*. *It* is not, in any strict sense, a personal pronoun, as its use is to distinguish things from persons. The plural of *it* is *they*. *I* always stands for the person speaking; and *We* (in the plural) for the person speaking. This is what is meant by the first person. *Thou* and *ye* represent the person or persons

¹ Grammarians tell us that the use of the pronoun is to avoid a repetition of the same word. In the above sentence, the pronoun *he* is employed three times successively; which can hardly be to avoid a repetition of the same word. In fact, the real use of pronouns is to serve as general marks of reference to particular persons or things already mentioned, or known by the relation of hearer and speaker, or some other common and obvious distinction. Pronouns are merely adjectives put absolutely, and which, like the article, form a class by themselves, not from their peculiar character, but from their frequent occurrence, and singular importance as parts of speech. 'The above-mentioned, the under-written, the last but one,' &c. are as much pronouns in their own nature, as 'He, I, this, or that'; and they would be thought so, if they were as constant and convenient compendiums of discourse.

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spoken to, and form the second person, singular and plural. *He*, *she*, and *they* always signify some person or persons spoken of. We always use this person in speaking to any one *concerning* others, whether they are absent or not. In the singular number, this person always requires the distinction of sex to be attended to, *he* being masculine, and *she* feminine, in its signification. It is applied to things without gender.

We often address absent persons in the second person, when we in imagination suppose them to hear us, or wish they could.

The distinction of sex is marked only in the third person singular, in our language, because it is seldom necessary to explain the sex of the person who speaks, or who is spoken to ; and because, where there are more than one person, it oftener happens that they are of different sexes than the same ; so that it is perhaps more convenient to have a common appellation for both.

Remark. The first and second person plural are used of any number of persons, in whom the speaker or the person spoken to is supposed to be included.

In common and familiar discourse we always employ the second person plural (*you*) instead of the singular (*thou*).

All the personal pronouns (except *it* in the singular number) have a different word or termination to distinguish the objective case. They are thus declined.

Singular.

	Nom.	Obj.
1st person,	I,	Me.
2nd person,	Thou,	Thee.
3rd person,	He,	Him.
	She,	Her.
	It,	It.

Plural.

1st person,	We,	Us.
2nd person,	Ye or you,	You.
3rd person,	They,	Them.

The possessive pronouns are *My*, *thy*, *his*, *her*, *its*, *our*, *your*, *their*. They denote property, or relation, and may be considered either as adjectives, or the possessive case of the personal pronouns ; as *My* book, or the book *belonging to me* ; *His* ancestors, or those *from whom he is descended*, &c. When separated from the noun, or used with a noun understood, *my* and *thy* become *mine* and *thine*, as, Be *thine* despair, To triumph and to die are *mine*. The others (except *his* and *its*) have *s* added to them ; as, The proposal was *yours* or *theirs*, *i.e.* of their or your

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making; The next turn is *ours*, &c. From the use and termination of the last-mentioned words it is not improbable that they were the original genitive cases of the personal pronouns, and that by constant use the final *s* was dropped when they were prefixed to the noun, and retained only when they were used separately from it. In this case, these possessive pronouns will be corruptions of the possessive cases of the personal pronouns, except *his* and *its*, which are the same. *Mine* and *thine* are terminations of the same kind as the obsolete ones of *his-en*, *her-en*, *our-en*, still in use among the common people.—Note. *Mine* and *thine* are still used in the Bible before a vowel, and sometimes also in poetry; as, ‘The strength of *thine* arm.’ ‘And you, ye works of art, allured *mine* eyes.’

Hers, *ours*, *yours*, *theirs* are never prefixed to a noun in any situation whatever, and they are therefore very improperly set down as the regular genitive cases of their respective pronouns by Murray, Lowth, and others. We always say *her* book, *our* nature, *their* fault, &c. in the same manner as we should say, *his* book, *man’s* nature, *the men’s* fault.¹

The relative pronouns are those which relate to an antecedent, *i.e.* to some thing or person already mentioned in the same sentence. They are *who*, *which*, *that*.—*Examples.* He, *who* lives virtuously, will be happy. This is the book, *which* you gave me to read, or *that* you gave me to read.

Who only is declined, making *who*, *whose*, *whom*, in the nominative, genitive, and objective case, whether applied to the singular or plural number.

Who relates to persons, *which* to things; *that* is applied to both, though more properly to the latter; as, I ought to love the friend *who* (that) has done me a kindness, though he has faults *which* (or *that*) I disapprove.

Whose is sometimes used incorrectly as the genitive of *which*. It ought not to be used except in personification, when indeed we should employ *who* in the nominative case, or in poetry, where from the frequency of personification, and other causes, a greater latitude is allowed; as, ‘At *whose* sight (the Sun’s) all stars hide their diminished heads.’—Milton. ‘One stupendous whole, *whose* body Nature is, and God the soul.’—Pope.

The word *what* includes both the relative and the antecedent; as,

¹ *I*, *me*, *we*, *us*, *she*, *her* seem more properly different words than different cases of the same word. They are to this day used indiscriminately by the common people in many parts of England. Both *her* and *it* are constantly both in the singular and plural in old writers; and even in the time of Queen Elizabeth *his* was used as the genitive of *it*. See Lowth. Mr. H. Tooke says that *it* is derived from *bigbt*, and signifies *the said* (any thing). This will account for a use of *it* which is still retained, as when we say *It is he*, *It is they*; where *it* is not confined to gender or number.

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This is *what* I wanted, or *that which* I wanted. *What* is improperly applied to the plural ; it is better to say *those which*. The compound words, *whoso*, *whosoever*, *whichsoever*, *whatsoever*, also have the same force as if the antecedent were expressed, though they admit a different construction ; *Whoever* did it was much to blame ; or, *Whoever* has done it, I will punish *him*.

Who, *which*, and *what* are also made use of as interrogatives ; as, *Who* is it ? *Which* do you like best ? *What* shall we do next ? *Whether* was formerly used in the same manner, as *Whether* of these (*i.e.* which of these *two*) is it ?

This and *that* are called demonstrative pronouns, because, when we use them, we as it were point out the thing of which we speak. *This* relates to something nearer in place, or in the discourse ; *that*, to something further off. *This* becomes *these* in the plural, *that* becomes *those*. Both *this* and *that* are used either separately, as *This* is he, *That* is what I meant ; or with the noun added, as *This* paper, *that* author. In the former cases they are strictly pronouns, or substitutes for nouns ; in the latter case they are more properly articles or adjectives, joined to nouns to define them.¹

There are other words used sometimes to supply the place of nouns, and sometimes to explain them. They are most of them words expressing the distinctions of number in various ways ; such as *other*, *any*, *none*, *some*, *one*, *each*, *every*, *either*, *neither*, *both*, *all*, *most*, &c. *Another*, *i.e.* *an other*, is used either alone or with a noun ; as, *Another*, or *another person*, would have taken advantage of us. *Others* is always used with the substantive understood, but we join *other* with plural nouns ; as, I like *other* poems of his better ; but *others* are not of the same opinion.

Any signifies *one* or *more* taken at random out of a certain number ; as, *Any* man would say so ; Have you *any* pens ? I have *none*, *i.e.* *not one*. *None* is also used as equivalent to *not any*, whence we sometimes employ it in the plural, as we say, *None* of the party *were* come, or There *were not any* of the party come.

Some signifies a certain number out of *many*, and is opposed to *others*. *Many* signifies indefinitely a large number.—*Example.* *Some* of the scholars were reading, *others* were writing, but *many* of them sat idle.

¹ *This* and *that*, put absolutely, ought to be ranked with *it*. The near affinity between these pronouns and the article may be learned, not only from the Greek, in which they are the same, but from the etymology of our own language, the article *the* and the pronoun *that* (*theat*) being the imperative mood and the past participle of the same verb *Theān*, *to take*, *to assume*, *to receive* ; and signifying nothing more than some particular thing to be *assumed*, or already *received* and *admitted* in the discourse. The article is always joined to the noun ; the pronoun *it* is always separated from it ; *this* and *that* are used both ways.

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One, used in an indefinite sense like the French *on*, is joined to the third person singular of the verb, to express any thing done by a number, of which we ourselves make one. '*One* is apt to trust too much to appearances.' *On* in French seems also to express others generally, though we are not included in the number, as, *Comme on dit* means what is generally said by any number of persons, and may be translated either *As one says*, or *As they say*; though these two phrases have not the same force in our language.—*One* sometimes has the plural number, as, The great *ones* of the world, or the great *men* of the world. Where are the little *ones*?

Each, every, either, neither, are all singular.

Each signifies a small number, considered individually, or one by one, as, *Each* of his brothers is doing well.

Every signifies any number whatever, of which we consider the individuals one by one, or not as acting in a body, as, *Every man* must look to himself. *Every* is now generally joined with its noun, or the pronoun *one*, as *Every man*, or *every one*, though formerly used separately.

Either signifies one of two indifferently, as, You may take *either* of the books, that is, only one of them, but which you please.

Neither is *not either*. It is improper to say *either* or *neither* of the three.

Both signifies *the two*, or any two given things.

All is a large number taken collectively, or without stopping to consider each individual; as, *All mankind*, spoken of the species at large.

Most signifies the largest proportion of any number or quantity.

Either, neither, both and *most*, are also used as adverbs or conjunctions.—There are many other adverbs, formed from the pronouns, as *When, where, there, whither, hither, &c.*

We add the word *own* to the possessive pronouns to give a stronger emphasis, as, It is his *own* book. Which is in fact only a repetition or dwelling longer on the same idea, as *own* (owen or owed) signifies something *possessed* or *belonging to*.

We also add *self* to the same pronouns to express the idea of the individual more particularly, as *Myself, himself, thyself, or yourself, itself*, and in the plural, *ourselves, yourselves, and themselves*. *Themselves* is never used, except of persons.

We always join these pronouns to the others: *I myself did it*, or *I did it myself, Will you go yourselves?* &c., unless when we speak of any person as the subject of their own thoughts or actions, as, *I did not hurt her; she hurt herself. She praises herself. We all think favourably enough of ourselves. We say himself and themselves instead of his-self*

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and *their-selves*, which were formerly used, and seem to be most proper.

CHAPTER VI.—Of Verbs

A **VERB** is a word which expresses a thing as an attribute of something else, by making it the subject of a distinct proposition ; or it points out some particular fact or circumstance with respect to a thing, not usually belonging or known to belong to it, or to which it is the immediate wish of the speaker to direct the attention of the hearer ; as, *I walk, Depart thou, Two and two make four.*

Verbs are of the class of adjectives, *i.e.* imply a connection between the subject and the attribute. The difference is, that adjectives take this connection for granted, whereas verbs formally notice it, or show that it is that which it is our immediate object to communicate by speech. Verbs, therefore (for the most part, though not always), express acts or events, or what happens to things ; adjectives denote qualities, habits, or what belongs to, and is known to be a part of them.

The insufficiency of our common grammatical definitions is nowhere more strikingly exemplified than in the account of the verb. A verb is defined to be a word, which signifies ‘to be, to do, or to suffer.’ See Lowth, Murray, Devis, &c. &c.¹

From this definition the scholar must naturally be led to imagine that verbs are a class of words which are exclusively set apart to express these three different sorts of ideas. Yet he cannot read a page in any book without finding the very same ideas which are represented as the exclusive province of the verb, expressed by the other parts of speech. Thus *to be, to do, to suffer*, are verbs ; *being, action, suffering*, are substantives. *To love, to sleep*, are verbs ; *love and sleep* are substantives. Where then are we to look for the characteristic differences of these parts of speech ? Not in the subject matter, but in the form and manner of expression.

Again, a substantive is defined to be the name of any thing that exists, or of which we can form any notion. This definition must include verbs as well as substantives ; for being, doing, and suffering are things of which we can form an idea, and are, in strictness, the only things of which we can form an idea.

An adjective again is supposed to convey the idea of a quality or an attribute ; as, *A loving father*. Yet, when we say of a father that he

¹ Mr. Murray in particular not only adopts, but at some length defends, Dr. Lowth’s definition, as containing ‘all that is essential, and nothing more than is essential, to the nature of the verb.’ How far this praise is just, must be left to the candid reader to determine.

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loves his children, do we not express the same quality or attribute as before?

We believe the account above given of the verb will be free from these objections. It is a word which distinctly marks the connection which we wish to give to our ideas, or what we mean to *say of* any thing. Hence by way of eminence it was called the verb, *i.e.* the word or thing said; and hence, under some one or other of its forms, it is necessary to the regular attainment of all the different purposes of speech; for without it, either expressed or understood, we can neither affirm nor deny, we can neither ask for information nor communicate our desires. The indicative mood affirms or denies one thing of another; the indicative mood used interrogatively makes the truth of a certain proposition a subject of inquiry; the imperative mood commands or enjoins a certain event; the subjunctive *supposes* a distinct connection between our ideas; the infinitive mood expressly refers to the connection between the subject and the attribute, but without determining in what manner they are to be united, *i.e.* whether that connection has really taken place or not, whether it is inquired into, or commanded, &c. That the *copula* is implied in the infinitive mood will be evident from resolving it into the verb *to be*, and the participle. *To walk* is *to be walking*. From this account it will appear that those who have objected to the verb as the *copula* in discourse, have argued from the difficulty of translating this definition into our own language, where we have no one word which answers generally the same end. For the word *proposition*, which comes the nearest, does not signify so much the proposing or laying down any distinct combination of ideas, as making a direct and positive assertion. Neither the imperative, the interrogative, the subjunctive, nor the infinitive mood assert any thing, though they distinctly *propose* something as a command, as a question, as a supposition, or lastly, as the context may determine.

1. The verb differs from the substantive in expressing a thing, as an attribute, or as what is said of something else. We however occasionally use the noun and the infinitive mood indifferently, as, He loves *painting*, or He loves *to paint*. Where it may be observed that the infinitive mood *attributes* the act of painting to the same person, while the noun expresses it generally, as exercised either by the person himself or another. The prefix of the infinitive mood, *to*, is supposed to be the same as the word *do*, or to signify some particular act or thing done. Hence it is, perhaps, that we sometimes use the infinitive mood (put absolutely) as the nominative case for greater emphasis: '*To err* is human: *to forgive* divine.'

2. The verb differs from the adjective by implying a more marked

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connection between the subject and the attribute. When we say *white lead*, we take for granted the connection between those ideas, and are known to be merely describing the subject, and preparing the way for something else. But when we pass the verb, and say *White lead poisons*, or is *poisonous*, we may then be supposed to have done speaking, as we declare by this form of words, that it is that particular connection of ideas which we had to communicate to the hearer. Hence the verb more frequently expresses single acts than habits or qualities, because it is oftener necessary to make known what happens to a thing, than what constantly belongs to it. Adjectives for the opposite reason more frequently express qualities than actions. If the verb generally implied duration or a state of being, it would not be so proper to combine with the tenses, or to express the difference of time. The chief distinction between the adjective and participle seems to depend on this circumstance. Thus, *to be studying* signifies nothing more than the simple fact, or the immediate employment of the person at some particular time; *to be studious* signifies a habit of study, or a general disposition to such acts.

Verbs and participles do not in general require a preposition to connect them with their objects in the same manner as adjectives. We say, *He studies his ease*, or *He is studying his ease*—*He is studious of his ease*. The reason of which seems to be, that verbs and participles, being more determinate in their application, naturally require and coalesce with an object; whereas, adjectives expressing general acts or habits, notice is given by another word when the particular object is about to be specified.

Verbs are generally divided into active, passive, and neuter; or those which express the doing of an action, *I love*, *I rule*; those which express the receiving one, *I am loved*, *I am ruled*; and those which express neither, but being or a state of being, as *I am*, *I sleep*, *I sit*.

This account seems to be far from correct. For if we say, *I receive a blow*, *receive* is a verb active, and yet it evidently denotes the suffering, not the doing of an action. Again, the words *He loves his book*, no more express any real action than the words *He sleeps well*. Yet, *To love*, is an active, *To sleep*, a neuter verb. The difference must therefore be sought in the artificial contrivances of grammar, instead of the real nature of things.

Any verb is active which is followed by a noun without a preposition, or which immediately governs the objective case of pronouns; as, '*He loves his book*,' '*He reads Horace*, and *admires him*.'

Passive verbs are always formed in our language by the neuter verb *To be*, and the perfect participle, and require a preposition between them and the following noun or objective case of pronouns, as, '*I am*

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loved,' 'The post is gone,' 'Asia was conquered *by* the Romans, and afterwards governed *by them*.'—In a strict sense, the English has no proper passive voice, that is, no difference of form in the same *word* to express a difference of idea.

Neuter verbs are those which either have no noun after them, or one which relates to the same person or thing to which the nominative case refers, and is put in apposition to it; as, 'I am,' 'He sleeps,' 'Cæsar was a great general,' 'I am *he*.'

Or the difference between active and passive verbs may be explained thus. A verb is active when the attribute expressed by the verb (whether doing or suffering) is referred to the person or thing in which it resides, as the nominative case, and the object of the verb follows it; as, I *see* the sun. Here the attribute or circumstance of *seeing*, evidently belongs to the person which is the nominative case, and the thing seen, or object of sight, follows the verb. A verb is passive when the nominative case denotes the person or thing, not which is the subject of the attribute, but the object of it; as, The sun *is seen* by me. Here the attribute expressed by the verb, namely, sight, does not belong to the sun; when therefore we make the sun the nominative case or subject of the verb, we are forced to vary the simple expression in such a manner as to show, that seeing is not referred to the sun immediately, but that it is the object of it, or that which causes it in another. In passive verbs the object of the real attribute becomes the subject or nominative case of the verb To be, and the subject of the attribute becomes the object or relative of the verb, governed by a preposition. A neuter verb is a verb in the active form, not followed by an object, or by one which coincides with its subject.

To verbs belong number, person, mood, and tense.

The distinction of number in verbs is very imperfect, being confined almost entirely to the second and third person, both in the simple verbs and the auxiliaries. The distinction of persons is confined entirely to the singular number. So in the present tense of the indicative, I love, thou lovest, he loves, We love, ye love, they love, the verb is the same in the first person singular, and in all the three persons of the plural number. The auxiliary verb To be, makes Am in the first person singular, and Are in the plural. The plural termination in *en*, formerly in use, is become obsolete.

The moods or modes are different forms of the verb, showing the *manner* in which any thing is represented, or the particular view which is taken of it, or the intention of the speaker respecting it. The English language varies the verb in four different manners to answer this end.

1. The indicative mood simply indicates or declares a thing, as, He loves, He was loved. This mood is always used to ask a question by

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inverting the order of the words, as, Does he love? Was he loved? Perhaps this alteration in the order of construction may constitute a distinct mood in the language. Certainly it designates a very distinct state of mind from the indicative, as much so as there can be between ignorance and knowledge.

2. The imperative mood is used to command, entreat, exhort, permit, &c., as, Do thou; love ye; forgive us; let him remain; let us determine. It expresses will, desire, resolution of mind, &c. The second person plural of the imperative is either constructed in the same manner as the interrogative form of the indicative, merely by altering the order of the words, as Love ye, or by omitting the pronoun, as Mind your task. In the second person singular, Go thou, there is a different construction in the words themselves, as well as in the order of the words. Both the first and third persons of the imperative are merely the second person of the auxiliary *Let*, with the infinitive after it. *Let* him depart, i.e. Do *ye let*, or suffer him *to* depart.

3. The subjunctive mood represents a thing as a condition, cause, or consequence of something else, or as *joined* to some other verb, as, Were he (or if he were) good, he would be respected; Let him beware lest he fall; I will speak, though I were to die for it. Observe, that the subjunctive mood does not always follow a conjunction, as in the sentence, *She says that I am wrong, and pretends that she does right.* Here *I am wrong* is no more the subjunctive mood after *that*, than *pretends* is the subjunctive mood after *and*. The subjunctive mood only exists when the verb undergoes a different construction, and this should only be when we mean to express the doubtfulness or contingency of any event.

The potential mood is considered by some respectable writers as forming a distinct division of the verb; but we do not see how we can consistently admit this as a separate mood without introducing as many moods, *Optative, Precative, Hortative, Promissive*, &c., as there are combinations of ideas or words to express them. For, first, there is no peculiar form or construction of the verb to distinguish this potential mood from others. Secondly, it includes a great many various, and even contrary ideas, such as *power, liberty, necessity, will*, &c., which are as independent of one another as they are of the other moods. Thirdly, these different ideas are expressed by different words; as, I *can* go, but he *must* stay; I *would* do it, but I *may* not; They *might* be permitted to walk out, if they would behave as they *should* (or *ought*). It seems better therefore, either to consider these different forms of expression as merely the infinitive combined with different auxiliary verbs, or to erect them into so many independent moods, each having a distinct form as well as meaning of its own.

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4. The infinitive mood expresses a thing in a general unlimited manner, without any distinction of *mode*, number, or person; as, To act, to speak, to be feared.

There are in English six principal tenses, or modes of distinguishing time, besides their variations. The names given to them are the Present, the Imperfect, the Perfect, the Preterperfect, and First and Second Future Tenses. What is commonly called the Imperfect ought to be called the Past Tense simply. It would be better also to distinguish the Perfect by the title of the Present Perfect.

The present tense represents any action or event as taking place at the time of the person's speaking; as, 'I rule, I am ruled; I think; I fear.'—This tense is used to express any period of time, of which the present makes a part; or to express any truth generally without a particular reference to time; as, 'He walks out every morning;' 'He goes into the country every summer;' 'He is an able man;' 'Seneca moralizes well.' It also expresses the relative time of a future action; as, 'When he *arrives*, he *will* hear the news.' Again, in animated historical narration, this tense is substituted for the past to give vividness and reality to the ideas; as, 'He *enters* the territory of the peaceable inhabitants; *conquers* them, *takes* an immense booty, and *returns* home in triumph.'

We have two other forms for expressing the present tense, as instead of I write, we may say I do write, I am writing. 'I do write' expresses the action more emphatically. 'I am writing' is used to signify that the action is passing, but not yet finished. It might be called the present imperfect tense. Neither of these auxiliary tenses is confined exclusively to the present instant; we say, He *does* write admirably, *i.e.* in general; He is *always* writing.

The past, or as it is very improperly called the imperfect tense, refers the action or event to past time, with some interval between that and the present, or it implies the distance as well as completion of an event; as, 'Alexander conquered Persia;' 'I wrote a letter yesterday.'—We have a different form of the past tense to signify the incomplete state of a past action, which might therefore properly enough be called the imperfect or past imperfect tense; as, 'I was writing a letter when you came in.'

The perfect, or, as we should rather choose to call it, the present perfect tense, refers an action or event to past time, but without implying any interval between, *i.e.* it merely points out an event as actually existing before the present moment; as, 'I have written a letter,' 'He has published a book.'—'*He lived* in London many years' signifies that he lived there at a distant period; '*He has lived* in London many years' signifies a period immediately preceding the

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present time. We apply the perfect or present perfect tense to any past action, taking place in a period reaching up to the present time ; we use the imperfect or past in speaking of a period in which the present time is not included ; as, 'Philosophers *have made* great discoveries *in the present century* ; Philosophers *made* great discoveries *in the last century*.' So we say, 'I have written a letter to-day, I wrote a letter yesterday.' We say, 'Mr. Horne Tooke has published an ingenious work on grammar,' meaning that such an event has actually come to pass, but without marking or supposing any distinct interval between that and the present period. But if we remove the event to any distance of time, we must use the past instead of the present perfect tense, as we do not say, He has published it in 1786, but, He published it in 1786. Again, we use the perfect tense figuratively to denote the continuance of an effect, as well as of an action up to the present time : as we say, Mr. Addison has published an elegant treatise on medals, Cicero has written orations ; where we consider the authors by their works as still present to us ; but we do not say, Cicero has written poems, because the poems are lost ; nor should we say, Mr. Addison *has published* a treatise on medals in the beginning of the last century, because we then refer to the date of the work, not to its duration. The perfect tense denotes a past event, but connects it with the present time ; the past or imperfect tense also denotes a past event, but separates it from the present time, or throws it back to a certain distance.—' *I have been writing* a letter,' denotes an action continued up to the present time, but points out the actual employment rather than the finishing of the work.

The preterperfect tense represents a thing not only as past, but as prior to some other past event ; as, 'I had written my letter before, or when he arrived.' 'I had been writing a letter,' signifies an action begun and proceeded in, though not necessarily finished at a previous time mentioned.

The first future tense represents the action as yet to come, either generally or particularly, as, I *shall* see them again ; The sun *will* rise to-morrow.

The second future represents an action as yet to come, but as prior to another future action or time specified ; as, 'I *shall have* dined at one o'clock ; The two houses will have finished their business when the king comes to prorogue them.'—'I shall be writing,' 'I shall have been writing,' may be explained in the same manner as the other imperfect tenses.

Accurately speaking, the English verb has only two variations expressive of time, namely, the present, and past or imperfect tense. The other tenses are not different forms of the verb, but the infinitive

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mood, or the participle combined with other verbs, which indirectly and habitually denote the tense or time.

Neither the infinitive mood nor the participles express times positively, *i.e.* in reference to the moment of the person's speaking, but in reference to the governing verb, or thing spoken of. The simple infinitive mood expresses an event cotemporary with, or subsequent to, the time of the governing verb, as, 'I am willing to send the letter *now* or *to-morrow*.' The compound infinitive expresses an event prior to the time of the governing verb; as, 'I ought *to have sent* the letter before, or yesterday.' The first and second infinitives passive express the same relation respectively to the governing verb; as, 'The letter ought *to be sent* either *now* or *to-morrow*, or it ought *to have been sent* yesterday.'

In like manner the participles only express time in reference to the principal verbs or other participles with which they are compounded, but not always in the same uniform manner. There are but two participles, the active and passive, Being, Been; Having, Have; Loving, Loved; from these the others are compounded. The active participle, or participle in *ing*, neither denotes nor is confined to any particular time. It therefore takes the time of the governing verb or participle, *i.e.* expresses a cotemporary action in the same manner as an adjective would do. Tense belongs to this participle no more than to adjectives. So we say, I am writing, I was *writing*, I shall be *writing*, Being *writing*, Having been *writing*. The passive participle does not define time when joined to or governed by the verb *To be*; it expresses either a thing done or a thing doing, a finished or continued action, according to the nature of the idea. 'The letter is *written*, or 'The letter *being written*' signifies a complete action. 'She is *loved*, She *being loved*,' signifies a continued action, or a present event. 'She *was loved*, She *will be loved*,' &c., also signify actions cotemporary with the governing tense of the verb *To be*. On the other hand, the passive participle distinguishes time, or expresses an event prior to the governing verb when joined to the auxiliary verb *To have*; as, I *have loved*, I *shall have loved*, I have *been* loved, Having loved, Having been loved, &c. It is by compounding this participle and auxiliary verb together that we obtain the present perfect, preterperfect, and second future tenses of active verbs, and of passive ones by adding the passive participle of the verb *To be*; as, I have loved, I *have been* loved, &c. The passive participle *been* is never used but when it follows the auxiliary *have* or its active participle.

Having thus explained the uses of the different forms of the verb, and the peculiar principles which prevail in the construction of those forms in the English tongue, we shall proceed to give an example of the

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conjugation of Regular verbs, beginning however as a necessary step with the auxiliary verbs, To Have and To Be.

TO HAVE¹

Indicative Mood

Present Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1st pers. I have.	We have.
2. Thou hast.	Ye or You have.
3. He, She, or It, hath ² or has.	They have.

*Past Tense*³

Singular.	Plural.
1. I had.	We had.
2. Thou hadst.	Ye or You had.
3. He, &c. had.	They had.

*The Present Perfect Tense*⁴

Singular.	Plural.
1. I have (<i>now</i>) had.	We have had.
2. Thou hast had.	Ye have had.
3. He has had.	They have had.

The Preter or Pluperfect Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I had (<i>then</i>) had.	We had had.
2. Thou hadst had.	Ye had had.
3. He had had.	They had had.

¹ N.B.—Only the present and past, and first future tenses of this verb, the first infinitive and the active participle are used as auxiliaries, or compounded with the passive participle of other verbs, its other tenses being formed by compounding it with its own passive participle Had; as, I have had, I shall have had, To have had, Having had.

² Now never used, except in poetry, or on very solemn occasions.

³ Commonly called the imperfect.

⁴ Or the perfect.

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First Future Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I shall ¹ or will ¹ have.	We shall or will have.
2. Thou shalt or wilt have.	Ye shall or will have.
3. He shall or will have.	They shall or will have.

Second Future Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I shall or will have had.	We shall or will have had.
2. Thou shalt or wilt have had.	Ye shall or will have had.
3. He shall or will have had.	They shall or will have had.

Imperative Mood

Singular.	Plural.
2nd person. Have, Have thou, or Do thou have.	Have, Have ye, or Do ye have.

There is no first or third person in the imperative mood, because we only command or entreat the person or persons to whom we address ourselves. But when the subject of the command or entreaty respects ourselves or some third person, this has been considered as the first or third person of the imperative mood, and is formed by prefixing the word *Let* ; as,

Singular.	Plural.
1. Let me have.	Let us have.
3. Let him have.	Let them have.

Subjunctive Mood

Present Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. { I have.	{ We have.
2. If { Thou have.	If { Ye have.
{ He have.	{ They have.

The remaining tenses of the subjunctive mood are exactly the same as those of the indicative.

¹ *Shall* in the first person singular or plural simply foretells, in the second and third person commands or promises ; as, ' I or we shall go, You or he shall go.' *Will* in the first person intimates resolution and promising, as, ' I will go ;' in the second and third, it simply foretells the event ; as, ' You will go, He will go.' Or *will* signifies an event arising from the will of the person mentioned, *shall* an event arising from that of another person. We do not, therefore, in interrogative sentences say, Will I go ? or Will we go ? but, Shall I go ? or Shall we go ? because we are not supposed to be ignorant of our own will, but another's.

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Infinitive Mood

Present or Imperfect Tense. To have.

Present Perfect. To have had.

Participles

Imperfect. Having.

Perfect or Passive. Had.

Present Perfect. Having had.

The auxiliary and neuter verb *To be* is conjugated as follows.
N.B. This verb is used as an auxiliary only to verbs in the passive voice.

TO BE

Indicative Mood

Present Tense

Singular.

1st pers. I am.

2. Thou art.

3. He, She, or It is.

Plural.

We are.

Ye or You are.

They are.¹

Past Tense

Singular.

1. I was.

2. Thou wast.²

3. He was.

Plural.

We were.

Ye were.

They were.

Present Perfect Tense

Singular.

1. I have been.

2. Thou hast been.

3. He hath or has been.

Plural.

We have been.

Ye have been.

They have been.

¹ I be, Thou beest, We, Ye, and They be, in the present tense of the indicative mood, are now obsolete. 'But oh! if thou be'st he,' seems used by Milton as the present of the subjunctive mood.

² In familiar discourse we always use the second person plural instead of the second person singular, *you were*, instead of *thou wast*. *You was* is sometimes improperly used. If it were necessary to have the verb in the singular number, though the pronoun is plural, we ought to say *you wast*. *You was* is a solecism both with respect to number and person.

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Pluperfect Tense

Singular.

1. I had been.
2. Thou hadst been.
3. He had been.

Plural.

- We had been.
Ye had been.
They had been.

First Future Tense

Singular.

1. I shall *or* will be.
2. Thou shalt *or* wilt be.
3. He shall *or* will be.

Plural.

- We shall *or* will be.
Ye shall *or* will be.
They shall *or* will be.

Second Future Tense

Singular.

1. I shall *or* will have been.
2. Thou shalt *or* wilt have been.
3. He shall *or* will have been.

Plural.

- We shall *or* will have been.
Ye shall *or* will have been.
They shall *or* will have been.

Imperative Mood

Singular.

1. Let *me* be.
2. Be thou, Do thou be.
3. Let *him* be.

Plural.

- Let *us* be.
Be ye *or* you, Do ye be.
Let *them* be.

Subjunctive Mood

Present Tense

Singular.

1. If I be.
2. If thou be.
3. If he be.

Plural.

- If we be.
If ye be.
If they be.

Past Tense

Singular.

1. If I were.
2. If thou wert.¹
3. If he were.

Plural.

- If we were.
If ye were.
If they were.

The remaining tenses of this mood are the same as those of the indicative.

¹ The second person of the past tense of the subjunctive is sometimes used instead of the adjective, as—

‘Thou, Stella, *wert* no longer young,
When first for thee my harp I strung.’

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Infinitive Mood

Present or Imperfect Tense. To be.

Present Perfect. To have been.

Participles

Present or Imperfect. Being.

Perfect or Passive. Been.

Present Perfect. Having been.

Verbs are called Regular when they form their past (or as it is usually called imperfect) tense of the indicative mood, and their perfect participle, by adding *ed* to the verb itself, or *d* only when it ends in *e*.

A regular verb is conjugated in the following manner :

TO LOVE

Indicative Mood

Present Tense

Singular.

Plural.

1. I love.¹

We love.

2. Thou lovest.

Ye or You love.

3. He, She, or It loveth or loves.

They love.

Past Tense

Singular.

Plural.

1. I loved.

We loved.

2. Thou lovedst.

Ye loved.

3. He loved.

'They loved.

¹ In using the interrogative form of the present and past tenses of active verbs in common discourse or writing, we do not simply invert the order of the words, but employ the auxiliary verb *Do*; as, *Do I love? Do you love? Does he love? Did he love? &c.* We also use this auxiliary when we express a negation by the word *not*, as, *I do not love.* The verb *Do*, as far as it is used as an auxiliary, is conjugated in the following manner :

Indicative. Present Tense.

I do, Thou dost, He doth or does. We do, Ye do, They do.

Past Tense.

I did, Thou didst, He did. We did, Ye did, They did.

Present Tense of the Subjunctive.

(If) I do, Thou do, He do. We do, Ye do, They do.—Past tense the same as the indicative.

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Present Perfect Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I have loved.	We have loved.
2. Thou hast loved.	Ye have loved.
3. He hath <i>or</i> has loved.	They have loved.

Preterperfect Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I had loved.	We had loved.
2. Thou hadst loved.	Ye had loved.
3. He had loved.	They had loved.

First Future Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I shall <i>or</i> will love.	We shall <i>or</i> will love.
2. Thou shalt <i>or</i> wilt love.	Ye shall <i>or</i> will love.
3. He shall <i>or</i> will love.	They shall <i>or</i> will love.

Second Future Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. I shall <i>or</i> will have loved.	We shall <i>or</i> will have loved.
2. Thou shalt <i>or</i> wilt have loved.	Ye shall <i>or</i> will have loved.
3. He shall <i>or</i> will have loved.	They shall <i>or</i> will have loved.

Imperative Mood

Singular.	Plural.
1. Let <i>me</i> love.	Let <i>us</i> love.
2. Love, <i>or</i> Love thou, Do thou love.	Love, Love ye, Do ye love.
3. Let <i>him</i> love.	Let <i>them</i> love.

Subjunctive Mood

Present Tense

Singular.	Plural.
1. If I love.	If we love.
2. If thou love.	If ye love.
3. If he love.	If they love.

The remaining tenses are similar to the Indicative.

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Infinitive Mood

Present or Imperfect Tense. To love.

Present Perfect. To have loved.

Participles

Present or Imperfect. Loving.

Perfect or Passive. Loved.

Present Perfect. Having loved.

The passive voice is conjugated regularly by adding the passive participle to the auxiliary verb *To be*, through all its moods and tenses ; as, I am loved, Thou art loved ; I was loved, Thou wast loved ; I have been loved, &c.¹

¹ The potential mood, to which a distinct place is generally assigned, is thus conjugated :

		<i>Present Tense</i>	
	Singular.		Plural.
1.	I may <i>or</i> can love.	We may <i>or</i> can love.	
2.	Thou mayest <i>or</i> canst love.	Ye may <i>or</i> can love.	
3.	He may <i>or</i> can love.	They may <i>or</i> can love.	
		<i>Past Tense</i>	
	Singular.		Plural.
1.	I might, could, should, <i>or</i> would love.	We might, could, should, <i>or</i> would love.	
2.	Thou mightst, couldst, shouldst, <i>or</i> wouldst love.	Ye might, could, should, <i>or</i> would love.	
3.	He might, could, should, <i>or</i> would love.	They might, could, should, <i>or</i> would love.	
		<i>Present Perfect Tense</i>	
	Singular.		Plural.
	I may <i>or</i> can have loved, &c.	We may <i>or</i> can have loved, &c.	
		<i>Preterperfect Tense</i>	
	Singular.		Plural.
	I might, could, would, <i>or</i> should have loved, &c.	We might, could, would, <i>or</i> should have loved, &c.	

Passive Voice

I may be loved, I might be loved ; I may have been loved, I might have been loved.

It is proper to remark here, that what is set down as the past tense of the potential mood is as often the future, or the present tense ; as, I wish you would go to-morrow.— You should not do so now.

On the whole, we think it much better to consider all these *mays, cans, mights,*

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OF IRREGULAR VERBS

Irregular verbs are those which do not form their past, or imperfect tense, and their perfect participle, by the addition of *ed* or *d* to the verb ; as,

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Imperfect or Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
I begin.	I began.	Begun.
I know.	I knew.	Known.

Of these there are various sorts.

1. Such as have the present and past tenses, and perfect participle, the same ; as,

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Imperfect or Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Cost.	Cost.	Cost.
Put.	Put.	Put.

2. Such as have the past tense and perfect participle the same ; as,

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Imperfect or Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Abide.	Abode.	Abode.
Sell.	Sold.	Sold.

3. Such as have the past tense and perfect participle different ; as,

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Imperfect or Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Arise.	Arose.	Arisen.
Blow.	Blew.	Blown.

Many verbs become irregular by contraction ; as feed, fed ; leave, left : others by the termination *en* ; as fall, fell, fallen : others by the termination *ght* ; as buy, bought ; teach, taught, &c.

coulds, woulds, shoulds, &c. as separate verbs with the infinitive mood after them, than to combine under a distinct mood a number and variety of ideas and expressions, which certainly no child's understanding can comprehend as one single form of the same verb or word.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

The following is a list of the irregular verbs.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Abide	Abode	Abode
Am	Was	Been
Arise	Arose	Arisen
Awake	Awoke, R.	Awaked
Bear, <i>to bring forth</i>	Bare or Bore	Born
Bear, <i>to carry</i>	Bore	Borne
Beat	Beat	Beaten (Beat, <i>vulg.</i>)
Beget	Begot	Begotten
Begin	Began	Begun
Bend	Bent, R.	Bent, R.
Bereave	Bereft, R.	Bereft, R.
Beseech	Besought	Besought
Bid	Bade, Bid	Bidden, Bid
Bind	Bound	Bound
Bite	Bit	Bitten, Bit
Blced	Bled	Bled
Blew	Blew	Blown
Break	Broke	Broken
Breed	Bred	Bred
Bring	Brought	Brought
Build	Built	Built (Builted)
Burst	Burst	Burst, <i>also</i> R.
Buy	Bought	Bought
Cast	Cast	Cast
Catch	Caught	Caught, sometimes R.
Chide	Chid	Chidden, Chid
Choose	Chose	Chosen
Cleave, <i>to adhere</i>	Clave, R.	R.
Cleave, <i>to split</i>	Clove or Cleft	Cleft, Cloven
Cling	Clung	Clung
Clothe	Clothed	Clad, R.
Come	Came	Come
Cost	Cost	Cost
Crow	Crew, R.	Crowed
Creep	Crept	Crept
Cut	Cut	Cut
Dare, <i>to venture</i>	Durst	Dared
Dare, <i>to challenge</i>	R.	R.
Deal	Dealt, R.	Dealt, R.

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<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Dig	Dug, R.	Dug, R.
Do	Did	Done
Draw	Drew	Drawn
Drive	Drove	Driven
Drink	Drank	Drunk
Dwell	Dwelt	Dwelt
Eat	Ate	Eaten
Fall	Fell	Fallen
Feed	Fed	Fed
Feel	Felt	Felt
Fight	Fought	Fought
Find	Found	Found
Flee	Fled	Fled
Fly	Flew	Flown
Fling	Flung	Flung
Forget	Forgot	Forgotten, Forgot
Forgive	Forgave	Forgiven
Forsake	Forsook	Forsaken
Forgo	Forwent	Forgone
Freeze	Froze	Frozen
Get	Got	Gotten, Got
Gild	Gilt, R.	Gilt
Gird	Girt, R.	Girt, R.
Give	Gave	Given
Go	Went	Gone
Grave	Graved	Graven, R.
Grind	Ground	Ground
Grow	Grew	Grown
Have	Had	Had
Hang	Hung, R.	Hung, R.
Hear	Heard	Heard
Hew	Hewed	Hewn, R.
Hide	Hid	Hidden, Hid
Hit	Hit	Hit
Hold	Held	Held (Holden)
Hurt	Hurt	Hurt
Keep	Kept	Kept
Knit	Knit, R.	Knit, R.
Know	Knew	Known
Lade	Laded	Laden, R.
Lay	Laid	Laid

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Lead	Led	Led
Leave	Left	Left
Lend	Lent	Lent
Let	Let	Let
Lie, <i>to lie down</i>	Lay	Lain
Load	Loaded	Laden, R.
Lose	Lost	Lost
Make	Made	Made
Meet	Met	Met
Mow	Mowed	Mown, R.
Pay	Paid	Paid
Put	Put	Put
Read	Read	Read
Rend	Rent	Rent
Rid	Rid	Rid
Ride	Rode	Ridden
Ring	Rung, Rang	Rung
Rise	Rose	Risen
Rive	Rived	Riven
Run	Ran	Run
Saw	Sawed	Sawn, R.
Say	Said	Said
See	Saw	Seen
Seek	Sought	Sought
Sell	Sold	Sold
Send	Sent	Sent
Set	Set	Set
Shake	Shook	Shaken
Shape	Shaped	Shaped, Shapen
Shave	Shaved	Shaved, Shaven
Shear	Sheared	Shorn
Shed	Shed	Shed
Shine	Shone, R.	Shone, R.
Show	Showed	Shown
Shoe	Shod	Shod
Shoot	Shot	Shot
Shrink	Shrunk, Shrank	Shrunk
Shut	Shut	Shut
Sing	Sung, Sang	Sung
Sink	Sunk, Sank	Sunk
Sit	Sat	Sat

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<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Slay	Slew	Slain
Sleep	Slept	Slept
Slide	Slid	Slidden
Sling	Slung	Slung
Slink	Slunk, Slank	Slunk
Slit	Slit	Slitted, Slit
Smite	Smote	Smitten
Sow	Sowed	Sown, R.
Speak	Spoke	Spoken
Speed	Sped	Sped
Spend	Spent	Spent
Spill	Spilt	Spilt
Spin	Spun	Spun
Spit	Spit, Spat	Spit, Spitten
Split	Split	Split
Spread	Spread	Spread
Spring	Sprung, Sprang	Sprung
Stand	Stood	Stood
Steal	Stole	Stolen
Stick	Stuck	Stuck
Sting	Stung	Stung
Stride	Strode, Strid	Stridden, <i>also</i> Strode
Strike	Struck	Struck
String	Strung	Strung
Strive	Strove	Striven, Strove
Strow, <i>or</i> Strew	Strowed, <i>or</i> Strewed	Strown, strowed <i>or</i> strewed
Swear	Swore	Sworn
Sweat	Sweat, R.	Sweat, R.
Swell	Swelled	Swoln, R.
Swim	Swum, Swam	Swum
Swing	Swung	Swung
Take	Took	Taken
Teach	Taught	Taught
Tear	Tore	Torn
Tell	Told	Told
Think	Thought	Thought
Thrive	Throve, R.	Thriven, R.
Throw	Threw	Thrown
Thrust	Thrust	Thrust
Tread	Trod	Trodden, Trod

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Wax	Waxed	Waxed, Waxen
Wear	Wore	Worn
Weave	Wove	Woven
Weep	Wept	Wept
Win	Won	Won
Wind	Wound	Wound
Work	Wrought, R.	Wrought, R.
Wring	Wrung	Wrung
Write	Wrote	Written

Defective verbs are those which are used only in certain moods and tenses. The principal are these :

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Past.</i>	<i>Perfect Part.</i>
Can	Could	—
May	Might	—
Shall	Should	—
Will	Would	—
Must	—	—
—	Ought	—
—	Quoth	—

In most languages there are verbs called *Impersonal*, either because they are not applicable to persons, or because, in consequence of this, they are only spoken of in the *third* person, namely, in that in which we speak of inanimate things ; as, It rains, it snows, it thunders, it lightens, &c. We have, however, few words in English, which are not applied metaphorically to persons as well as things ; as, ‘If they were to *rain* mitres on my head,’ *Sterne*. I will *thunder* in his ears, &c.

The whole number of verbs in the English language is about 4300.¹ The number of irregular verbs (the defective included) is about 177. It may be proper to make a remark, which the scholar will easily verify by looking over the preceding list, that of these 177 verbs, all are monosyllables, except 10, which are of two syllables. Except these 10, therefore, all verbs in our language, having more than one syllable, may be known to be regular. At least, we may establish it as a general rule that words of more than one or at farthest two syllables are regular.

¹ The whole number of words in the English language is about 35,000.

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CHAPTER VII.—Of Adverbs

AN adverb is a part of speech joined to a verb, an adjective, and sometimes to another adverb, to express some quality or circumstance respecting it; as, He reads *well*; a *truly* good man; he writes *very correctly*.

The use of the adverb is to express an additional circumstance belonging to any thing, which is itself considered as a circumstance or adjunct of something else; as the time or manner of an action, the degree of a quality, &c. Observe that the action itself must also be referred to some thing or person; for if we describe it in itself or as a noun, we employ an adjective, as, A *good action*, *swift motion*. But if we make the action a verb, *i.e.* refer it to a person, and then describe the properties of it, we have occasion for the adverb; as, He acted *well*; It was owing to *his moving so swiftly*. So we say, She is *fair* and *handsome*, because we speak of distinct qualities residing in the same person; but if we would describe the degree or any other circumstance relating to the same quality, we do this by means of the adverb; as, She is *beautifully* fair, or, She is *tolerably* handsome. We may always express the meaning of an adverb by a periphrasis; as, He runs *swiftly* or *with swiftness*, He writes *correctly* or *in a correct manner*, She is *tolerably* handsome or handsome *in a tolerable degree*, &c. So we say 'here,' for 'in this place;' 'often and seldom,' for 'many or for few times;' 'very, truly,' &c., for 'in an eminent degree.'

Some adverbs are compared; as, Soon, sooner, soonest; Often, oftener, oftenest. Those ending in *ly* are compared by *more* and *most*; as, Wisely, more wisely, most wisely. Adverbs, like adjectives, can only be compared when the ideas to which they relate admit of degrees or of *more or less*.

There are many words in English that are used both as adverbs and as adjectives or substantives, as, There were *more* men than women; I am *more* diligent than he. *More* in the former instance is an adjective, in the latter, an adverb. Again, we say *To-day's* lesson is longer than *yesterday's*; here both *To-day* and *Yesterday* are used as substantives, though in general they are adverbs of time, as He came *yesterday*, and will return *to-day*. In the following sentences *much* is a substantive, an adjective and an adverb; Where *much* is given, *much* is required; *Much* money has been expended; It is *much* better to go than stay. We can only determine when a word is an adverb, and when not, by its connection with the other parts of speech.

Adverbs, though very numerous, may be reduced to certain classes; the chief of which are those of number, order, place, time, quantity,

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

quality, manner, degree, affirmation, negation, doubt, interrogation, comparison, &c.

1. Of number ; as, once, twice, thrice, &c.
2. Of order ; as, first, secondly, thirdly, fourthly, lastly, finally, &c.
3. Of place ; as, here, there, where, elsewhere, whither, hither, whence, thence, upward, backward, forward, &c.
4. Of time ; as, now, to-day, already, yesterday, lately, long since, to-morrow (not yet), hereafter, immediately, often, sometimes, soon, seldom, daily, yearly, always, when, then, never, ever, &c. *Again* may be referred to number or time. Indeed all adverbs of number seem to include time, really or figuratively, as we say, Thrice five or three times five, that is, five repeated three times. Here however time is only figuratively introduced.
5. Of quantity ; as, much, little, sufficiently (too much), enough, how much, how great, greatly, &c.
6. Of manner, or quality ; as, wisely, foolishly, justly, unjustly, quickly, slowly, &c. Adverbs of quality are the most numerous ; and they are generally formed by adding the termination *ly* (*i.e.* like) to an adjective or participle, or changing *le* into *ly* ; as bad, badly ; cheerful, cheerfully ; admirable, admirably ; exceeding, exceedingly.
7. Of comparison or degree ; as, more, most, better, best, worse, worst, less, least, very, almost, little, alike, as, than, &c.

We now come to a class of adverbs which seem to be very different from the others, and which do not so properly serve to describe any thing in the object we are discoursing of, as to express our opinion concerning it. The principal of these are the adverbs of negation, among which is the word *not*. This word occurs oftener in our language than almost any other. Nor is it to be wondered at that it should : for it makes all the difference between truth and falsehood, between all we wish or all we hate. It overturns our opinions ; puts a stop to every business ; disappoints our expectations, and in one word cancels all others. It may be said to be an adverb from its generally accompanying verbs ; but its effect is not to assist the verb, but to render it nugatory. All affirmation is expressed by the verb ; and *not* joined to it has the effect of doing away what is thus affirmed. To say that a thing *is not*, or *does not*, is to say that *it is not true* that it *is* or *acts*, in the manner supposed. All such words, therefore, as Mr. Locke calls ‘ marks of the mind’s affirming, denying, doubting,’ &c. are so many virtual sentences ; and they may be explained by saying that they bear the same relation to an entire sentence or proposition that the pronoun does to the noun. They are substitutes or abbreviations, not of words but of sentences. To this class belong the following words, or adverbs as they are generally called ; *perhaps* (*i.e.* it may be),

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possibly (or it is possible), *verily*, *truly*, *undoubtedly*, *certainly*, *yes*, *surely*, *really* (which all imply either a direct assertion or a confirmation of one already made), *nay*, *no*, *not*, *by no means*, *neither*, *nor*, &c.

Adverbs of interrogation, such as *how*, *why*, *wherefore*, merely inquire into the circumstances of some proposition assumed as true in itself: as, *How*, or *in what manner*, did it take place? *Why*, or *from what cause*, is it so? They are therefore common adverbs.

Besides those already mentioned, there are several others formed by combining prepositions with the adverbs of place, here, there, where; as *hereof*, *hereto*, *herein*, *wherein*, &c. Of these *therefore* is the most common.

In some instances the preposition becomes an adverb merely from its application; as when we say, 'He goes a long way *about*;' 'But do not *after* (afterwards) lay the blame on me.' *Near* is sometimes considered as an adverb without reason, as in the phrase, He was *near falling*, where it may as well retain its character of a preposition as if we say, He was *near ruin*. There are some adverbs composed of nouns and the letter *a*, as *Aside*, *athirst*, *afoot*, *abroad*, *ashore*, *aground*, *asleep*, &c. The *a* thus prefixed is not the article (according to a common mistake¹) but a corruption of the preposition *on*, as *on board*, *on ground*, *on shore*, &c. See Lowth, H. Tooke, &c.

The words *when*, *where*, i.e. at which time, in which place, and all others compounded of the relative pronouns, may be considered as adverbial conjunctions, as the words they are derived from are themselves both pronouns and conjunctions.

Wherefore is included in the preceding remarks; but it does not seem to extend to *therefore*, *consequently*, *accordingly*, and other words of the same kind. For though we say, He is good, *therefore* he is happy, making only one sentence, there is nothing in the construction to require it, for the word *therefore* is as often used to connect sentences as to unite them. We might omit the adverb, and say, He is good, *he* is happy. In both cases we throw the two sentences into one, not because the rules of grammar require their coalition, but because the sense does not require any pause.

CHAPTER VIII.—Of Prepositions

PREPOSITIONS serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them. They are for the most part put before nouns and pronouns; as, He went *from* London to York; She is *above* disguise; They are instructed *by* him.

¹ See Murray's Grammar, &c.

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The following is a list of the principal prepositions :

Of	Within	Beneath	Before
To	Without	Beyond	Behind
For	Over	Except	Off
By	Under	Save	On <i>or</i> upon
With	Through	At	Among
In	Above	Near	After
Into	Below	Up	About
From	Between	Down	Against

The great use of prepositions in English is to express those relations between different objects, which in some languages are chiefly marked by cases, *i.e.* the different terminations of nouns. (They also supply the place of the adjective form of words on many occasions.) The efficacy and use of them will appear from the following examples, where they are omitted. If we say, He writes a pen, The English fell the French, Lambeth is Westminster Abbey, there is evidently something wanting to make sense of these expressions ; that is, they either convey no idea of the relation between the different objects mentioned, or a false one. But if we say, He writes *with* a pen, The English fell *on* the French, Lambeth is *over against* Westminster Abbey, the meaning is clear and consistent. For these prepositions express such a relation between the things as we know either may or does subsist between them.—It is proper, however, to caution the reader against supposing that prepositions are *necessary* to express such relations, or that the same ideas cannot be conveyed by the help of the other parts of speech. For in the following phrases we express the same meaning as before, He writes, *holding* a pen ; the English *attacked* the French ; Lambeth *faces* Westminster Abbey.

Prepositions are therefore a class of words expressing certain relations between objects. This alone, however, does not properly constitute them a separate part of speech, for there are other parts of speech, as verbs, adjectives, &c., which often express the same relations between objects. The characteristic difference therefore between these and other words arises from the manner of expressing the same ideas, *i.e.* from the mode of *construction*. Thus whether we say *Man's* nature, *human* nature, or the nature *of man*, we express the same connection between our ideas. So again we say, His house *joins* mine, or *faces* mine, which expresses our meaning as fully and clearly, and more concisely, than by the help of the preposition. Here the *relation* is included either in the meaning of the words themselves, or in their form. Or where the connection is so immediate and obvious as not

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to be mistaken, we do not employ prepositions ; as we say, He is reading a book, instead of *in* a book. But where the connection is neither implied by the words themselves, nor necessarily and immediately understood, we then have recourse to prepositions, which are in fact words signifying those relations we want to express, and which we place in a kind of parenthesis between other words to demonstrate the particular relation which subsists between the words so connected together. It will appear from the explanation hereafter given, that all or most of these words were originally nouns or verbs, declinable like others ; but at present they merely stand for the abstract signs of the original ideas, governing however the objective case of pronouns in the same manner as verbs, as, of *him*, to *him*, near *him*, &c. The preposition *but* has the nominative case after it, as, All but *he*.

CHAPTER IX.—Of Conjunctions

A CONJUNCTION is a part of speech which is chiefly used to connect sentences together, so as out of two or more to make one. It differs from a preposition only in this, that prepositions show the relation between words or the component parts of sentences, whereas conjunctions are applied to express the relations between distinct sentences or different propositions. It seems hard to say whether the word *and* is sometimes to be considered as a conjunction or a preposition, as in the following sentences : Two *and* three make five ; Louisa *and* Maria are playing together ; He lives between London *and* York. It is certain that *and* does not here join two distinct or complete sentences together, for it is absolutely necessary to make out the sentence in each case. We cannot say, 'Two make five and three make five ; Louisa is playing together ; He lives between London. The word *and* therefore does not serve to connect different propositions, but the subjects of a single proposition, together.

The difference between *and* so used and other prepositions seems to be, that it not only shows a relation between the following word and another, but unites them as the nominative case to the verb, which other prepositions do not necessarily do. Instead therefore of governing the objective case of nouns, it forms the plural nominative. *He and I* are going to the play. *I am* going *with him* to the play. 'I will ride *with you*' only signifies that the person speaking will accompany another on horseback, though the person he accompanies may be on foot. '*I and you* will ride' signifies that both persons will ride. That is, a noun governed by *and* is joined to another as the common subject of the same proposition.

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Conjunctions are generally divided by grammarians into copulative and disjunctive.

The copulative are those which serve to connect or continue the sentence by expressing a connection between different things; as, John, Peter, *and* James were apostles; I will go *if* you will accompany me; He is admired *because* he is eloquent. The disjunctive or disjunctive conjunction connects one sentence with another by showing an opposition between them; as, *Though* he was frequently reprov'd, yet he did not reform; They came with her, *but* did not go away with her.

The following is a list of the principal conjunctions.

Copulative. And, if, that, both, since, for, because, wherefore, as.

Disjunctive. But, or, nor, than, lest, though, unless, either, neither, yet, notwithstanding.

The same word is often a conjunction, an adverb, a preposition, &c. Example, I submitted; *for* it was in vain to resist. He contended *for* victory. In the first instance *for* is a conjunction; in the second a preposition, yet it has the same meaning in both, *viz.* to express the *cause* of submitting or contending; only in the one case this cause is conveyed in a whole sentence, in the other in a single word; and as it relates to one or other, that is, as it conjoins words or sentences, it is either a preposition or a conjunction, for this is all that is meant by these terms. Again, the word *that* is sometimes a conjunction and sometimes a demonstrative pronoun. Yet the difference arises only from the difference of application and construction. So if we say, I believe *that* two and two make four, the word here is evidently a conjunction, yet it means nothing more than saying, I believe *that*, *viz.* the following proposition, two and two make four; just as we might say, Two and two make four; I believe *that*. 'I believe *that* man is naturally vicious,' may mean either 'I believe that (general proposition) man is vicious,' or 'I believe *that* (particular) man is vicious.' We have already observed that the relative pronouns are of the nature of conjunctions. Conjunctions often unite sentences where they only appear to unite words, or parts of sentences; as, Duty and interest forbid vicious indulgences, *i.e.* Duty forbids them, *and* interest forbids them.

CHAPTER X.—Of Interjections

INTERJECTIONS are words commonly thrown into the discourse by way of parenthesis or exclamation, to express the passions, emotions, and sudden wishes or sentiments of the speaker, and are so far from not conveying any rational meaning whatever, that they have the

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meaning of whole sentences. They might many of them be at first the immediate and involuntary expressions of pleasure or pain ; but as they are at present used as the known signs of those feelings, they are certainly parts of speech, with whatever class of words we may choose to rank them. Common words often become interjections by being frequently used to express particular emotions ; as, Lo, Behold, For shame, and many others ; and at other times parts of sentences, introduced abruptly, and left imperfect, have the force of interjections ; as, Oh ! that he were come ! Oh virtue ! how amiable thou art ! In which and such like expressions there is an evident ellipsis, the mind as it were hurrying on to the object of its wishes or admiration, and not staying formally to explain what it feels, as if there could be no doubt with respect to the latter when the objects themselves are named. ' I wish that he were come ; I cannot express how amiable virtue is,' convey the same meaning regularly, but coldly, with less impatience and vehemence.

The most common interjections, are Oh, ah, alas, lo, behold, hush, hist, silence, fie, shame, pish, pshaw, strange, &c. An explanation of some of these will be found in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XI.—Of Derivation

Section 1.—Of the Various Ways in which Words are commonly derived from one another

Words are derived from one another in various ways, viz.

1. Substantives are derived from verbs ; as, from ' to love,' comes ' lover ;' from ' to visit, visitor ;' from ' to survive, survivor ;' &c.

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the substantive is derived from the verb, or *vice versâ*. In general, however, substantives expressing actions may be supposed to be derived from verbs, those expressing things or objects to be the roots of verbs relating to these objects.

2. Verbs are derived from substantives, adjectives, and sometimes from adverbs ; as, from the substantive *salt* comes ' to salt ;' from the adjective *warm*, ' to warm ;' and from the adverb *forward*, ' to forward.' Sometimes they are formed by lengthening the vowel, or softening the consonant ; as from ' grass, to graze ;' sometimes by adding *en*, especially to adjectives ; as, from ' length, to lengthen ; short, to shorten.'

3. Adjectives are derived from substantives in the following manner : Adjectives denoting possessions are derived from substantives

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by adding *y*: as, from 'Health, healthy; wealth, wealthy; might, mighty,' &c.

Adjectives denoting the matter out of which any thing is made, are derived from substantives by adding *en*: as, from 'Oak, oaken; wood, wooden; wool, woollen;' &c.

Adjectives denoting abundance are derived from substantives, by adding *ful*; as, from 'Joy, joyful; sin, sinful; fruit, fruitful;' &c. The termination *ous* has the same effect, as 'Joyous, righteous.'

Adjectives denoting plenty, but with some kind of diminution, are derived from substantives, by adding *some*: as, from 'Light, light-some; trouble, troublesome; toil, toilsome;' &c.

Adjectives denoting want are derived from substantives, by adding *less*: as, from 'Worth, worthless;' from 'care, careless; joy, joyless;' &c.

Adjectives denoting likeness are derived from substantives, by adding *ly*; as, from 'Man, manly; earth, earthly; court, courtly;' &c.

Some adjectives are derived from other adjectives, or from substantives, by adding *ish* to them; which termination, when added to adjectives, imports diminution, or lessening the quality; as 'White, whitish;' *i.e.* somewhat white. When added to substantives, it signifies similitude or tendency to a character: as, 'Child, childish; thief, thievish.'

Some adjectives are formed from substantives or verbs, by adding the terminations *ive* and *ible* or *able*; the former properly signify capacity in an active, the latter in a passive sense; as, 'Imitative, imitable; sensitive, sensible.'

4. Substantives are derived from adjectives, sometimes, by adding the termination *ness*; as, 'White, whiteness; swift, swiftness;' sometimes by adding *th* or *t*, and making a small change in some of the letters: as, 'Long, length; high, height.'

5. Adverbs of quality are derived from adjectives by adding *ly*, or changing *le* into *ly*; and denote the same quality as the adjectives from which they are derived; as, from 'Base' comes 'basely;' from 'Slow, slowly;' from 'Able, ably.'

There are so many other ways of deriving words from one another, that it would be extremely difficult, and nearly impossible, to enumerate them. The primitive words of any language are very few; the derivatives form much the greater number. A few more instances only can be given here.

Some substantives are derived from other substantives by adding the terminations *hood* or *head*, *ship*, *ery*, *wick*, *dom*, *ian*, *ment*, and *age*. Substantives ending in *hood*, or *head*, are such as signify characters or qualities; as, 'Manhood, knighthood, falsehood,' &c.

Substantives ending in *ship* are those that signify office, employ-

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ment, state, or condition; as, 'Lordship, stewardship, partnership,' &c. Some substantives in *ship* are derived from adjectives; as, 'Hard, hardship,' &c. Substantives which end in *ery* signify action or habit: as, 'Slavery, foolery, prudery,' &c. Some substantives of this sort come from adjectives; as, 'Brave, bravery,' &c.

Substantives ending in *wick*, *rick*, and *dom* denote dominion, jurisdiction, or condition; as, 'Bailiwick, bishoprick, kingdom, dukedom, freedom,' &c.

Substantives which end in *ian* are those that signify profession; as, 'Physician, musician,' &c. Those that end in *ment* and *age* come generally from the French and commonly signify the act or habit; as, 'Commandment, usage.'

Some substantives ending in *ard* are derived from verbs or adjectives, and denote character or habit; as, 'Drunk, drunkard; dote, dotard.'

Some substantives have the form of diminutives; but these are not many. They are formed by adding the terminations *king*, *ling*, *ing*, *ock*, *el*, and the like; as, 'Lamb, lambkin; goose, gosling; duck, duckling; hill, hillock; cock, cockerel,' &c.

Section 2.—Etymology of Indeclinable Words;—Compiled from Mr. H. Tooke's 'Diversions of Purley,' Salmon, Booth, &c.

1. Of conjunctions.

The conditional conjunction *if* is the imperative *Gif*, of the old Saxon word, *Gifan*, To give or grant. *If* I go, i.e. *Gif* or *give*, *suppose*, *grant*, that I go. The force of this conjunction is to assume or take something for granted.

The obsolete conjunction *An* (*an* it were so, i.e. if it were so) is also the imperative *An* of the Saxon verb *Anan*, signifying To give or grant.

Unless is the imperative of *Onlesan*, To dismiss or lay aside. 'He will be punished, *unless* he repent;' i.e. *Dismiss*, *set aside*, the supposition that he repents, and he will be punished.

Eke (conjunction or adverb) from *Eac*, *Eacan*, To eke, to add.

Yet (conjunction or adverb) is derived from the verb *Getan*, To get, to obtain. It signifies something *gained*, a saving, exception, or limitation: as, 'Though he chide me, *yet* will I not be afraid;' i.e. I *get*, or *retain* this advantage, not to be afraid. *Yet* as an adverb of time signifies the same thing; for example, He is not gone *yet*, i.e. so much *time* has been *gained* and he is not gone.

Still is derived from *Stellan*, To put or lay down. It has nearly the same meaning as *yet*, when used as a conjunction, but is applied distinctly as an adverb. Though I spoke to him, *still* he is not gone,

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i.e. *depose*, *set down*, *remark*, that he is not gone; where *yet* might be used indifferently. But in regard to time, we cannot use them indifferently. We say, It is day still; but we cannot say, It is not day still, or It is not twelve o'clock still. Here we necessarily use *yet*. It is not twelve o'clock yet. *Still* denotes the *continuance*, *yet* the *deferring* of an event. The former is more properly applied to propositions expressed affirmatively, the latter to negative propositions. The adverb *still* is evidently akin to the adjective; He is sitting there still, i.e. quiet, unmoved.

Else is the imperative of the verb *Alesan*, To dismiss. It is put in *apposition* to the former part of a sentence, or the preceding proposition; as, 'Give me the book, or *else* I will go,' i.e. *set aside* giving me, or *omit* to give me the book, and I will go.

Though (or *Thof*, as it was formerly pronounced and written) is the imperative of *Thafian* or *Thafigan*, To allow, to yield. *Though* in its customary use differs from *if*, inasmuch as it signifies opposition or contrast; as, '*Though* he slay me, yet will I trust in him;' 'She is not handsome, *though* she is fair.'

But is a corruption of *Be-utan* or *Be-out*, and signifies that something, either going before or coming after, is to be omitted, excepted, or left out; as, 'She is fair, *but* she is not handsome,' i.e. *leaving out*, or *excepting* the circumstance of fairness, *in other respects* she is not handsome. 'You pray, *but* it is not that God would enlighten you:' i.e. *leaving out* that you pray, you do nothing else right, for it is not that God would enlighten you, &c. 'None *but* he,' i.e. none save or except him. In the latter instance it is to be noted that the word *but* is a preposition. It does not however, like most other prepositions, govern the objective case.—Mr. Horne Tooke assigns a double meaning and origin to this word, in one sense making it a corruption of *bot*, To boot, to add, and in the other of *Be-utan*, *Be-out*. The former derivation however seems to us unnecessary and inapplicable.

Without (formerly used as a conjunction) has the same meaning as *but*, and is the reverse of *with*, which signifies To join, or add.

And is the imperative *Anad*, of the Saxon verb *Anandad*, To add, or heap together.

Lest is the past participle, *lesed*, from the verb *Lesan*, To dismiss. 'Take care, *lest* you fall,' i.e. *care not being taken* or *dismissed*, you fall.

Since (used as a preposition or a conjunction) is the passive participle of the verb *Seon*, To see. We use the active participle of our own verb, *seeing*, in the sense of the conjunction *since*, '*Since* it is so, or *seeing* it is so.'

The conjunction *that* is the same word as the article or pronoun

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that, from *Theat*, the participle of *Thean*, To take, or assume. It only differs from the pronoun in being applied to sentences or entire propositions, instead of being applied to nouns; as, 'I believe *that*, viz. that proposition, the three angles of a right-angled triangle are equal to two right ones.'

With respect to some other conjunctions, no explanation seems to be necessary, as they are either the same with or easily resolvable into other words still in common use, such as *be it*, *albeit*, *notwithstanding*, *nevertheless*, *save that*, *saving that*, *except* or *excepting that*, *bating that*, *in case*, *because*, *to wit*, *foreseeing that*, *provided*, &c. &c.

2. Derivation of prepositions.

With is the imperative of the old verb *Withan*, To join. It signifies that the idea or word before which it is placed is to be joined to some other, as A house *with* a party-wall. *Without* has the directly opposite signification. It is also opposed to *within*, i.e. signifies *out of*.

Through is the Teutonic substantive *Thuruh*, which signifies *door*, *gate*, *passage*. It denotes that the noun to which it is prefixed is a passage for something else; as, 'The eagle flies *through* the air.' Our common word *door* has the same origin.

From is the Anglo-saxon noun *Frum*, which signifies *beginning*, *origin*, *source*. It points out that the noun to which it is prefixed is the beginning or origin of some other thing, as Figs come *from* Turkey, *From* morn till night the eternal larum rung.

To is generally opposed to *from* with reason, as it is no other than the Gothic substantive *Tau*, signifying *act*, *effect*, *end*, *consummation*. 'From morning *to* night, the eternal larum rung,' i.e. morning being the *beginning*, night the *end* of it.—*Till* (which is applied to time only) is compounded of *to* and *while*.

For (preposition and conjunction) according to Mr. Tooke comes from the Gothic word *Fairina*, signifying *cause*, as, 'They contend *for* (the cause or object being) victory:' 'He set out *for* (the object of his journey being) Scotland.'

Of, according to the same author, is a fragment of the old word *Afara*, or *Afora*, i.e. *consequence*, *offspring*, *succession*, and signifies any thing closely following or depending on another, as, The son *of* David; the owner *of* the house; a bushel *of* corn, &c. *Of* is the most vague of all our prepositions, and can be defined to signify nothing more than a general connection between our ideas. It may be used for most of the other prepositions, as we may say, A descendant *of* or *from*; a friend *of* or *to*; hatred *of* or *for*; an associate *of* or *with*; beloved *of* or *by*, &c.—The prepositions *for* and *of* are perhaps the same as the adverbs *far* and *off*, as they have an analogous meaning; *for*, in its proper application, only denoting an ideal cause, or an

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object contemplated at a distance,¹ and *of* being used to point out any ramification of an idea, or one idea as distinct from, but next following upon, another. 'To be sick *for* a thing,' denotes the absence of the object; 'To be sick *of* a thing,' denotes the actual cause of the sickness. Or *of* (pronounced *ov*) may be the verb Have. The Latin preposition *ab*, and the Greek preposition *ἐκ*, have the same affinity to *habeo* and *ἐχω*. Both denote possession.

By is the imperative of *Beon*, To be. Our ancestors wrote it either *Be* or *By*, as in the following sentence: 'Damville *be* right ought to have the leading of the army, but *bycause* they be cousingermans to the admiral, they be mistrusted.' The force of this preposition is to express one thing as the cause or means of another; as, 'Damville *by* right, i.e. *right being*, ought to have,' &c. *By* and *with* may be sometimes used interchangeably, but not always. *By* seems to denote the cause, agent, or condition of any thing simply; *with* seems to denote the instrumental or accompanying cause; as we say, He struck him *with* his hand; he walks *with* a staff; he was ill *with* fever. He was driven out *by* violence; he walks *by* moonlight; he was killed *by* a fever.

Between is from the imperative *be* and the numeral adjective *twain*.

Before, *behind*, *below*, *beside*, *besides*, are compounded of the verb *be* and the common noun or adjectives *fore*, *hind*, *low*, and *side*. *Beneath* is compounded of the same verb, and the obsolete adjective *neath* (signifying low); from whence *Nether*, and *Nethermost*.

Beyond (in the Anglo-saxon *Begeond*) signifies *be passed*. It is the imperative and passive participle. '*Beyond* that place or time' therefore means, That place of time *being passed*.

Toward is compounded of *To* and *Ward*, the imperative of *Wardian*, To look at, to regard; from whence the phrase of *keeping watch and ward*. 'To move *towards* any place or object' is to move with the view directed to or fixed upon it.

Amid, *amidst*, are *In the mid*, *In the midst*.

Along is *on long*.

Round, *around*, *aside*, *abroad*, *across*, *astride*, are easily referred to their respective nouns or adjectives.

During is the participle of the verb *dure*, formerly in use. *Pending* is the same, from the French *pendant*. Both mean, while any thing lasts, or is *pending*.

Save is the imperative of the common verb. *Except* is the same.

Nigh, *near*, are the Anglo-saxon adjectives, *Nih*, *Neahr*, which signify neighbourhood, contiguity, like the prepositions.

¹ This interpretation agrees with the meaning of *for* when used to signify *instead of*; as, Will you accept of silver *for* gold, i.e. in the absence of gold.

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Instead is the Anglo-saxon *In stede*, i.e. *in place*. We still use the same word as a substantive when we say *home-stead*.

About is from the Anglo-saxon *Abuta*, signifying On the verge or extremity of anything. The French and English noun *but*, i.e. end or mark, has the same source.

After is from the word *aft* (now disused except by seamen), signifying hind or back part of any thing.

Up, over, above, have all one common origin, being derived from the Anglo-saxon adjective *Ufa*, high. *Ufer*, or *ofer*, i.e. *over*, is the comparative degree, signifying *higher*. The words *upper, uppermost*, have the same source.

3. Of adverbs and interjections.

The termination *ly*, in which so many adverbs end, is originally the adjective *like* added to another word.

Ago, as *Long ago*, is the same as *agone*, the past participle of the verb *To go*.

Enough is the substantive *Genoeg* from the verb *Genoeg*, To content, To satisfy.

Fain is the past participle *Faig* from *Faigian*, To make glad. 'I would *faig* (i.e. *gladly*) go.'

Lo is a contraction of *look*, the imperative of *To look*. In the same manner we use *Behold*.

Needs, i.e. *need is*.

Perchance, peradventure, perhaps, i.e. By chance, by adventure, by hap or accident.

May be, May hap, i.e. It may be, It may happen.

Aught, i.e. *a whit*, 'He cares not *ought* (or a whit) about it.'

More, most, are the comparative and superlative degrees of the Anglo-saxon adjective *Mo*, signifying any thing heaped up. We still retain this word as a substantive, as we say Barley-mow, a Hay-mow.

Rather is the comparative of the old English word *Rathe*, early, quick, and signifies, the same as *sooner*. 'I would *rather*, or I would *sooner* do so.'

Fie is the imperative of the verb, *Fian*, to hate, and signifies Disgust, Loathing.

Very is from the French *Vrai* or Latin *Verus*, i.e. True, truly.

Anon, i.e. In one (moment).

Yes is from the French *Oui*, which is, no doubt, the first person of the present tense of the indicative, *ouis*, I hear. So the O yes of the crier in our courts of justice is no other than the imperative *Oyez*, Hear, Attend.

Mr. Tooke derives the negatives *not* and *no* from the adjectives *Nodig*, *no*, still used as such in the northern languages, which signify, *Averse, unwilling*.

PART III

SYNTAX

THE second part of grammar (properly so called) is Syntax, which relates to the combination of words in a sentence.

A sentence is any number of words so arranged as to express distinctly any opinion or sentiment which we wish to communicate to the hearer. The words so combined are said to make a *complete sense*, because the end of speech is then answered.—Any number of words thrown together by accident, convey a distinct sense or meaning in themselves, or separately excite certain ideas in the mind, but they do not inform us of the intention and views of the speaker in using them, which it is the proper object of speech to communicate.

In this view, sentences may be divided into three sorts, *viz.* 1. The *explicative*, or those which affirm or deny any thing, as ‘I am, He is beloved, Two and three do not make six.’ 2. The *interrogative*, or those which ask for information with respect to any object, as, ‘How is he to-day? Is not London larger than Paris?’ 3. The *imperative* or *optative*, which express the will, desire, or passions of the speaker with respect to any thing or person, as, ‘Depart out of my sight instantly, Let us be gone, Would he were come!’ We may however almost always vary the form of expression.

The construction of a sentence depends either on the order, on the agreement or concord, or on the government or regimen of words. The order is the place assigned to a word, to determine its meaning or relation to others; concord is the agreement of one word with another, in number, case and person; government is the power which one word has over another, when it requires it to be in any particular mood, case, or tense.

Sentences are either simple or compound.

A simple sentence has in it but one subject, and one finite¹ verb, as, ‘Life is short.’

A compound sentence contains two or more simple sentences

¹ Verbs are finite, except in the infinitive mood. But the subjunctive mood can never form a simple sentence, as it is only used to show the dependence of one part of a sentence on another.

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joined together by one or more connecting words, as, 'Life is short, and art is long.' We might here however omit the copulative, and say simply, 'Life is short, art is long.'—There is one distinction of great importance to be attended to with respect to compound sentences, and that is, whether the connection is merely made arbitrarily, for convenience, or to save time in speaking, where several propositions, independent in themselves, are thrown by the lump as it were into the same sentence, as, 'Cæsar came, saw and conquered;' or whether the connection is necessarily made in order to complete the sense, or explain what has gone before, as 'I will stay at home to-day, *if you will.*' Here the latter clause is necessary to determine the meaning of the foregoing one, and cannot therefore be separated from it. 'He has determined to stay at home to-day,'—'I have determined to stay at home to-day,' are two distinct propositions, each of them true independently of the other. In this case therefore it is not on account of the sense, but from other reasons, that we connect the two sentences into one, as, 'He has determined to stay at home to-day, and I have also determined,' &c., or 'He and I, or We have determined to stay at home,' &c. In the last instance we convert the two sentences into one simple sentence, there being but one nominative case and one finite verb.

A simple sentence when joined with others becomes a clause.

A phrase is two or more words put together so as to express a certain relation between our ideas, without making them the subject of a distinct proposition; as 'White lead,' 'Dr. Lowth's excellent grammar.' These are phrases, because they only define or characterize the subject of the discourse. But when we say: 'White lead *poisons,*' 'Dr. Lowth's excellent grammar *has been published* almost fifty years,' these are sentences, because they affirm something concerning what had been only named before. Indeed when we say 'Dr. Lowth's excellent grammar,' we not only define or point out the thing spoken of, but express an opinion of it. But we do it in such a manner as to show that that opinion is not the one which we mean particularly to convey, that it is something known before, taken for granted, and merely mentioned by the way, and that this part of the sentence is only an introduction to something farther.

The most common combination of words forming phrases, and sometimes whole sentences, are the following.

1. The substantive before a verb active, passive, or neuter, when we say what thing *is, does, or is done*; as, 'I am; Thou writest; Thomas is loved.' Here *I, Thou, and Thomas* are the nominative cases, or, more properly speaking, the subjects of the verb, and answer to the question, *Who or What?* as, *Who is loved? Thomas.*

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2. The substantive after a verb neuter or passive; when it is said that such a thing *is*, or is *made*, or *thought*, or *called* such another thing, or when the substantive after the verb refers to the same thing or person, as the substantive before the verb, as, 'A child becomes a man; Plautus is accounted a poet; I am he.'

3. The adjective after a neuter or passive verb, in like manner, as 'He is grown *fat*; Exercise is esteemed *wholesome*.'

4. The substantive after a verb active or transitive, as when one thing is said to act upon, or do something to another, as, '*To open a door*; *To build a house*; *Alexander conquered the Persians*.' A pronoun following a verb active is always put in the objective case, as 'He struck *them* both.'—That verbs called active do not always or generally represent action, or the doing of something to another, will be evident by taking only a few of the most common instances; as, 'He *loves* his friends; He *reads* his book; I *see* the sun; I *believe* what you say; They *approach* the town.'—Here there is no action expressed, or the action is confined to the person, and has no effect whatever on the object. No one will contend that the verbs *To see*, *To believe*, *To read*, &c., are transitive. It would be better therefore to call them objective verbs, for that is their real nature. What is called the thing *acted upon*, is often nothing more than the immediate *object* of the thought, or feeling, or perception, or the end of the action expressed by the verb. It is as frequently the thing acting, as the thing acted upon. An active verb is therefore nothing more than a verb preceded by the subject in which any attribute resides, and followed by an object with which the same attribute is intimately connected in any other way, except that of belonging to it, namely, as its cause, object, effect, &c.

5. A verb following another verb, as 'Boys love to play;' where the latter verb is in the infinitive mood.

6. A substantive joined to another substantive, not meaning the same thing, as 'Milton's poems, Man's happiness;' where the thing which is intended to be the subject of the sentence is put in the nominative case, and the thing which is connected with it is put first, in the possessive case, or else last, with the preposition *of* before it, as 'The Poems *of* Milton.' Dr. Lowth considers the possessive case as representing the person or thing to which another belongs; but this, though very generally true, will not hold always. The following are instances: 'The kingdom's ruler, or The ruler of the kingdom; India's conqueror, or The conqueror of India,' &c., where the notion of property as far as its exists is reversed.

7. When another substantive is added to express the same thing differently, as, 'Paul the Apostle; Julian the apostate;' where they

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are each understood to be in the same case, or said to be put in apposition to each other.

8. When an adjective is joined to a substantive to express its quality, &c., as, 'A wise man, A white horse, A learned scholar.' Participles joined to nouns become adjectives.

9. An adjective with the infinitive mood after it, as, 'Worthy to die, Fit to be trusted.'

10. When a circumstance is added to a verb or an adjective by an adverb, as, 'You read *correctly*, He is *very* prudent.'

11. When a circumstance is added to a verb or an adjective by a substantive with a preposition before it, as, 'I wrote *to* you, He reads *with* care, Studious *of* praise, Ready *for* mischief.'

12. When the same quality in different subjects is compared by a conjunction or preposition, as, 'White *as* snow, Wiser *than* he, Greatest *of* all.'

The principal parts of a simple sentence are the subject, the attribute, and the object. The subject, *i.e.* the thing or person in which the attribute inheres, is generally that which is first spoken of; the attribute is the thing or action affirmed, or denied of it; and the object is the thing affected by such action, or to which it relates. In passive terms, this order is reversed; in which case the object becomes the subject of the passive form of the verb, and the real subject of the attribute, the object of it, governed by a preposition.

RULE I

The verb must agree with its nominative case (or subject) in number and person, as, 'I learn; Thou art beloved; The birds sing; He describes them well.'

The following are examples of the violation of this rule :

'What *signifies* good opinion when our practice is bad?' 'The Normans, under which general term is comprehended the Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes,' &c. 'But thou, false Arcite, never *shall* obtain thy bad pretence.' 'I have considered what *have* been said on both sides in this controversy.' 'One would think there *was* more sophists than one.'—Propriety and use do not however always go together, nor is it certain in some cases which mode is best. 'Great pains, or much pains *have* or *has* been taken.' '*There's* two or three of us have seen strange sights.' This is the common use of *there's* in familiar conversation. So we should generally say, 'There *has* been more than one person of that name,' though we ought in propriety to say, 'There *have* been more than one person,' &c.

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When the verb *to be* comes between two nouns, either of which *might be* the nominative case to it, it should agree with the first, as, 'His meat *was* locusts and wild honey.' So we should say, 'One great cause of the low state of industry *was* (instead of *were*) the restraints laid upon it.' 'The wages of sin *are* (instead of *is*) death.'

The infinitive mood, or an entire sentence, is sometimes put as the nominative case to the verb. 'To err is human;' 'To see the sun is pleasant;' 'That warm climates accelerate the growth of the human body, and shorten its duration, is reasonable to believe' [to be believed].—In like manner, the infinitive mood or a sentence often supplies the place of the objective noun after a verb; as, 'Boys love to play;' 'For to will is present with me, but *to perform* that which is good, *I find not*;' 'He wishes *that* you would accompany him to the sea-side.' The infinitive mood was formerly used with a preposition before it, as it is in Greek: 'All their works they do *for* to be seen of men;' 'For not to have been dipt in Lethe's lake could save the son of Thetis *from to die*' [*i.e.* from death]. *Spencer*. This form is now obsolete.

RULE II

Pronouns, where they represent the subject of the verb, must always be in the nominative case, as 'He loves, She is beloved.'

Examples of the violation of this rule.

'Scotland and *thee* did in each other live,' *Dryden's Poems*. 'He, *whom* ye pretend *reigns* in Heaven,' &c. 'If you were here, you would find three or four of us in the parlour after dinner, *whom* you would say *passed* their time agreeably.'

Pronouns, on the contrary, representing the object of the verb, must always be put in the objective case, as, 'He *struck them*; He *was struck by them*; *Whom* do you serve?'

Examples of wrong construction.

'Those *who* he *thought* true to his party.' '*Who* should I meet the other day but my old friend.'

It should be particularly observed, that the first and third persons of the imperative mood must always be in the objective case, as they are not the nominative case of the verb, but are governed by the word *Let* going before, as, 'Let him die; Let us eat and drink.'—'*Let thou and I go*,' 'Let *thee and I dwell*,' are therefore improper.

Note 1. The verb governs the nominative or objective case in the same manner, whether it is expressed or understood, as, 'Who was the author of the report? *He*, whom you see before you,' *i.e.* *he was the author of it*.

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2. Pronouns put in *apposition* to nouns are governed by verbs, in the same manner as if they were in the place of those nouns, as, 'Is this Othello, *he* whom our full senate call all in all sufficient?'

3. The verb To be, with whatever word it is compounded, always requires the same case before and after it, when the same thing or person is meant, as, 'I am *he*; It seemed to us to be *she*; We supposed it to be *her*.'

Examples of wrong construction. '*Whom* do men say that I am?' 'To that, which once was *thee*.' 'He is not the person *whom* he appeared to be.' 'It is not *me* you are in love with, *Spectator*. 'Art thou proud yet?' 'Ay, that I am not *thee*,' *Shakespear*. It cannot be denied that custom has made this construction in many cases familiar, and almost necessary. There is a stiffness and formality in saying, 'It is not *I*,' 'Which once was *thou*,' 'That I am not *thou*,' &c., which takes away all the spirit of the language. It is perhaps best either to use these and such-like phrases in the common way, or to avoid using them at all.

Passive verbs govern the objective case only by means of the preposition; as, 'He was called *by them*; She is loved *by me*,' &c.

RULE III

Every finite verb, with the exceptions hereafter given, requires a nominative case, *i.e.* a particular subject to which it may refer, before or immediately after it in the same sentence. *Note*.—A word which has already stood as the nominative case or subject of a verb, may generally be understood as the nominative case of another verb in the same sentence, as, '*He has* preserved, and *can* continue to preserve us.' The objective case, or object of the verb, in one part of the sentence ought not to be understood as its nominative or subject in another part.

This rule seems not to have been attended to in the following instances. 'If the calm *in which* he was born, and [which] *lasted* so long, had continued.' 'The remonstrance he had lately received from the House of Commons, and [which] was dispersed throughout the kingdom.' 'A cloud gathering in the north, *which* we have helped to raise, and *may* quickly break upon our own heads.' 'Osiris, *whom* the Greeks call Dionysus, and *is* the same with Bacchus.'

'*Whose own example* strengthens all his laws,
And *is himself* the great sublime he draws.'

POPE.

'Will *martial flames* for ever fire thy mind,
And never, never *be* to Heaven resign'd?'

POPE.

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Exceptions.—1. The imperative mood generally has the nominative case understood, as, '*Awake, arise, or be for ever fallen.*' '*Let us do our best,*' &c. The nominative case of the imperative is naturally understood to be the person or persons to whom we address ourselves.

2. The pronouns are in some cases omitted with advantage, as, '*There's two or three of us have seen strange sights.*' '*Not a man of you but trembles at the very name.*' '*'Tis he the obstructed paths of sound shall clear.*' *Pope.* In the same manner as the relative pronouns are continually omitted in the objective case.

3. In some common phrases, where the verb is used *impersonally*, *It* is understood, as when we say, '*The arguments are as follows:*' '*He was in the right, as appears by the evidence.*' The word *It* is here understood, and consequently these verbs should always be in the singular number. Or, altering the construction, we may say, '*The arguments were such as follow,*' *as* after such not being an adverb, but a pronoun.

Note.—The nominative case often stands by itself with the verb understood: as, '*Who wrote this book? Cicero.*' '*To whom thus Adam.*' This happens most generally in answer to a question.

We also use the second person without connecting it with any verb, as, '*O thou that, with surpassing glory crown'd, &c. To thee I call.*' *Satan's Soliloquy.*

The nominative should however stand alone, only when the verb is *understood*. If the verb to which it relates is not understood, but mentioned in the following part of the sentence, it is wrong to separate it from it by introducing another nominative case, as in the following instance. '*Which rule, if it had been observed, a neighbouring prince would have wanted a great deal of that incense which has been offered up to him.*' This irregularity is least exceptionable in the following form of construction, which occurs very frequently in *The Spectator*, and is an imitation of the Latin. '*This cast of mind, as it is generally very innocent in itself, so it renders this conversation highly agreeable to others.*'¹

A noun in English is sometimes joined to a participle without referring to any verb, and this forms what is called the case absolute, as, '*Shame being lost, all virtue is lost.*' The noun is used in the same manner in Latin in the ablative, and in Greek in the genitive case. In English, it should always be in the nominative. The

¹ The following are instances of improper tautology. '*The king he is just.* Many words *they* darken speech. My banks *they* are furnish'd with bees.' We may however repeat the nominative case with propriety, when we wish to recapitulate in one word a number of particulars already enumerated; as, '*Patriotism, morality, self-interest, honour, all these demand our submission to just and lawful government.*'

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following example is erroneous. 'He made as wise and true proverbs as any body has done since; *him only excepted*, who was a much greater and wiser man than Solomon.' It should be, *he only excepted*.

The infinitive mood is often used absolutely, without being regularly connected with the rest of the sentence; as, 'To proceed; To begin with the first; To confess the truth, I was in fault.' We use parts of sentences in the same manner, as, '*With respect to the circumstance you were mentioning*, the less is said of it, the better.' This form of expression is generally used to declare the subject of the following sentence; and might be put in a separate sentence (like the heads or titles of chapters), as indeed is often done. 'But to return to the question. It is my opinion,' &c. So we also say, 'But that we may return to the question.' This mode of expression is quite as irregular as the other, and it therefore seems improper to say that the infinitive mood is sometimes put absolutely, *instead of* the potential mood with a conjunction. See this explanation in Lowth, Murray, &c. Both are parenthetical or elliptical modes of expression.

RULE IV

The nominative case is placed before the verb and the objective case after it; or the subject is placed before the verb, and the object after it; as, 'He loved her;' 'She was beloved by him;' 'Alexander conquered the Persians;' 'The Persians were conquered by Alexander.'

A verb active governs the objective case of pronouns immediately after it.

A passive verb governs it by means of a preposition; as in the preceding instances.

The following are exceptions to the above rule.

1. When a question is asked, a command given, or a wish expressed, the nominative case is then put immediately after the verb itself, or the auxiliary if one is used; as, 'Confidest thou in me? Go thou; May'st thou be happy!'

2. When a supposition is made without the conjunction *if*; as, 'Were it not for this; Had I been there.'

3. When a neuter verb is used, the nominative case may either precede or follow the verb; as, 'On a sudden appeared the king, or the king appeared.' *There* joined to a neuter verb (not to denote any particular place, but merely as an expletive) always requires the noun after the verb; as, 'There was a man; There appeared a man,' &c. In the phrase 'Now is the time,' *now* may be considered as the nominative case.

S Y N T A X

4. *Nor* and *neither* when they disjoin a complete sentence are always followed by the auxiliary verb ; as, '*Nor can I explain myself just now ;*' '*Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.*'—To mark a particular emphasis, we sometimes use the following inversion : '*Die he shall not ; Go he must.*'

5. In pronouns where the relation to the verb is usually marked by the termination, the order of the words is less attended to ; as, '*Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.*' The relative pronoun, whether in the nominative or objective case, always takes precedence, and the preposition governing it is often thrown to the end of the clause or sentence ; as, '*This is the person, whom you were seeking for.*'

The rule above stated is confined to prose ; for in poetry the inversion of the common order of the words is scarcely ever considered as an objection, and is often accounted an elegance.

' These equal syllables alone require,
Tho' oft the ear the open vowels tire.'

POPE.

' The sick and weak the healing plant shall aid.'

Ibid.

' No sigh, no murmur the wide world shall hear.'

Ibid.

' Nor needs they juster title the foul guilt
Of Eastern kings,' &c.

DENHAM.

' What drops the myrrh and what the balmy reed.'

MILTON.

Observation. The nominative as well as the objective case is often placed at a great distance from the verb, by the intervention of prepositions, adverbs, and sometimes whole sentences inserted between and connected together by conjunctions and relative pronouns ; as, '*The Romans, who from a few wandering fugitives became a great nation, who conquered not only all Italy, but the greatest part of the known world, fell by luxury,*' &c.

RULE V

Two or more nouns, &c., in the singular number, joined together by the conjunction *and*, expressed or understood, must have verbs, nouns, and pronouns, agreeing with them in the plural number ; as, '*Socrates and Plato were wise ; they were the most famous philosophers of Greece.*'

Examples of the violation of this rule. '*And so was also John and*

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James the sons of Zebedee.' 'Their love and their hatred and their envy *is* now perished.' 'Ignorance and negligence *has* produced the effect.'

Some writers contend that where several nominative cases are intended only to enforce the same idea, or describe one state of thing, or where they are intended to be applied separately to the verb, the latter should be in the singular number; as, 'Where all joy, tranquility, and peace, even for ever and ever *doth* dwell.' 'Sand and salt, and a mass of iron is easier to bear than a man without understanding.' The plural is at present most generally used in such cases. In the last instance it would be better to say, Sand *or* salt, *or* a mass *or* iron, &c.

Note. It should be observed here, that a singular noun understood, sometimes governs the plural number by an ellipsis; as, 'The French and English *general have* met,' *i.e.* the French general and the English general.

This form of construction may be justified by another, as when we speak of the difference '*between* a real and a seeming good,' where the preposition *between* evidently relates to the substantive *good*, understood as well as expressed, and really forming the plural number. So we should say, 'A real and seeming *good are* often mistaken for one another.'

RULE VI

Two or more nouns, &c., in the singular number, joined together by any other conjunction except the word *and*, or by a preposition, require the verb to be in the singular number; as, 'Ignorance *or* negligence has caused the mistake.' 'He, as well as I, *was* there,' &c.

The following are instances of improper construction in this respect. '*Neither* character *nor* dialogue *were* yet understood.' 'Death or some worse misfortune soon *divide* them.' 'Not only his estate, his reputation too *have* suffered by his misconduct.' 'A long course of time, *with* a variety of accidents, *are* necessary to produce revolutions.'

A plural noun, joined by a preposition to a singular nominative case, has no effect on the verb; as, 'The general, *with* all his officers, has applied for redress.' This rule is often violated, as for example; 'The king, *with* the lords and commons, *form* an excellent constitution.' 'The side A, *with* the sides B and C, *compose* the triangle.' It ought to be *forms* and *composes*; but it would be much better to say, 'The king and the lords and commons,' 'The side A and the

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sides B and C,' in the plural, whenever both nouns are really the subject of the verb.

Observations. Verbs in the plural number have no distinction of persons; but when a plural verb has several nominative cases, and they are of different persons, the first person takes place of the second, and the second of the third in governing the plural pronoun; as, 'They, and thou, and *I* are attached to *our* country. *Thou* and he shared it between *you*.' Secondly, when a verb in the singular number is connected with nominative cases of different persons, it agrees with that person which is placed nearest it, as, 'Either thou or *I* am to blame;' 'Neither *I* nor *he* has done it,' &c. Thirdly, if the verb has both a singular and a plural nominative case, joined together distinctively, it may agree with either, unless the plural is placed next the verb, when it must also be plural; as, 'Neither they nor *I* was or *were* offended by it; Neither *I* nor *they* were offended by it.' It is therefore best in general to put the plural nominative last.

The pronoun following two or more singular nouns connected disjunctively, is either singular or plural according to its immediate application. Thus we say, 'Neither he nor *I* was satisfied with *our* reception, or with the reception given to us.' 'Either *he* or *I* must resign *our* post.' 'He as well as *I* must resign *his* post.' 'He with others must resign *his* post.' 'The general with his officers *has* applied for redress; but *they* have met with a repulse.'

RULE VII

A noun of multitude, in the singular number, may have the verb or pronoun agreeing with it either in the singular or plural; according as it conveys an idea of a multitude either as one whole, or as consisting of many individuals; as, 'The meeting *was* large: The parliament *is* dissolved: My people *do* not consider; *they* have not known me: The Council *were* divided in *their* sentiments.'

The following are instances of impropriety in this respect. 'The peasantry *goes* barefoot, and the middle sort *makes* use of wooden shoes.' 'The house of commons *were* of small weight.' 'Stephen's party *were* entirely broken up by the captivity of their leader.' 'An army of twenty-four thousand men *were* assembled.' 'There is no constitution so careless of *their* own defence,' &c.

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RULE VIII

Pronouns should agree with their antecedents, and the things which they represent, in gender and number; as, 'This is the friend *whom* I love;' 'That is a vice *which* I hate;' 'The king and queen had put on *their* robes,' &c.

The relative is of the same person as the antecedent, and the verb agrees with it accordingly; as 'Thou *who* lovest wisdom;' 'I *who* speak from experience.'

The following instances are improper. 'Each of the sexes should keep within *its* particular bounds, and content *themselves* with *their* advantages.' 'Can *any* one, on *their* entrance into the world, be secure that *they* shall not be deceived?' 'One should not think too favourably of *ourselves*.' 'He has one acquaintance *which* poisoned his principles.'

'O *thou* my voice inspire,
Who touch'd Isaiah's hallow'd lips with fire.'

POPE.

'What are thou, speak, *that* on designs unknown,
While others sleep, thus *range* the camp alone?'

Ibid.

Observations. The relative pronoun *that* is frequently applied to persons as well as things; as after the superlative degree, the adjective *same*, where *who* has been already used, or where a reference has been made to things as well as persons.

Instances: 'Charles XII of Sweden was one of the greatest madmen *that* the world ever saw.' 'He is the *same* man *that* we saw before.' '*Who that* has any sense of religion, would have argued thus?' 'The woman and *the estate, that* became his portion,' &c.

2. The relative is very frequently omitted in the objective case; as 'I am the person you were looking after,' *i.e. whom* you were looking after.

3. Many persons are apt to use the objective case of the personal pronouns instead of the demonstrative pronouns, *these* and *those*: as, 'Give me *them* books.' We may use either *they* and *them*, or *these* and *those*, when a relative pronoun immediately follows; but it is in general better to make use of the latter, and particularly as applied to things. '*Those* or *they who* find fault,' &c. '*Those which* are the most approved,' &c. We also use the demonstrative pronoun where any thing is more immediately pointed out, as '*Those* are *they*,' those meaning the persons *then seen*, *they* the persons *before mentioned*.

4. *What* is sometimes improperly used for *that*, as in the following

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sentence : 'They will never believe but *what* I have been entirely to blame.'

5. Some grammarians¹ have laid it down as a general rule, that the relative *who* cannot be applied without harshness to any thing, but proper names of persons, or the terms *man* and *woman*; in proof of which they give the following instances as improper : *The court who*, &c. *The cavalry who*, &c. *The cities who* aspired at liberty, &c. But if we say, *The courtiers who*, *The cavaliers who*, *The citizens who*, &c. we shall immediately perceive that the above rule is unfounded. We constantly use *who* as a relative, wherever a word expresses persons individually. We do not however speak in this manner of little children. Nor do we apply it to the names of persons when we speak of the names themselves, not of the persons; as, '*Howard*, which is another name for benevolence.'

In asking a question, *which* is used, when we want to know *who*, out of a certain number, did any thing; &c., as 'Which is it? Which of them said so?'

It should also be remarked, that whenever the noun is introduced, we always employ *which*; as, 'His early friend, *which friend* was his ruin;' '*Which person*, as I told you before, was nowhere to be found,' &c.

6. *It is*, and *it was*, are often used with a plural after them; as, '*It is they* who art the real authors of the mischief.' '*It is these* that early taint the female soul.' '*It was the heretics* who first began to rail.' The following sentence is not however to be justified by this construction: '*It is* wonderful, *the very few accidents* which happen from this practice.'

7. The distributive pronouns, *each*, *every*, *either*, agree with noun, pronouns, and verbs, of the singular number only; as, 'The king of Israel, and Jehosaphat the king of Judah, sat *each* on *his* throne:' '*Every tree* is known by *its* fruits.' *Exception*: In dividing a number into different portions, we may apply the distributive pronouns to each separate division; as, 'Every six months, every hundred years.'—The following phrases are improper: 'Let *each* esteem others better than *themselves*.' 'In proportion as *either* of these two qualities are wanting, the language is imperfect.' 'It is observable that *every one* of the letters *bear* date after his banishment.'²

The word *means* is used in the singular number, and we therefore say, 'This means, that means,' in all cases where one thing is intended;

¹ See Murray's Grammar.

² *Either* is often used improperly for *each*; as, 'On *either* side of the river stood the tree of life.' 'Proposals for a truce between the ladies of *either* party;' i.e. *both* parties.

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as, 'By this *means*, one great restraint from doing evil would be removed,' &c., &c. Where we speak of more *means* than one, we should use *these* and *those*; as, 'The scholars were attentive, industrious, and obedient; and by *these* means, *i.e.* by these *several* means, acquired knowledge.'

A *mean* is never used except for the middle term between two extremes, as in the mathematics. Some writers have attempted to introduce *mean* instead of *means*, wherever the latter is used singularly, as, 'This *mean*, that *mean*; by *the mean* of adversity,' &c. But this is extremely affected, and quite contrary to the uniform practice of the best writers and speakers.

When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, the relative and verb may agree with either, according to the sense; as, 'I am the general who *gives* the orders to-day,' *i.e.* I am the particular general appointed to do so; or I am the general who *give* the orders to-day; *i.e.* I who give the orders to-day am the general. In the latter clause of the following sentence there is a manifest solecism: 'I am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that *spreadeth* abroad the earth by *myself*.'

RULE IX

Every adjective relates to some substantive expressed or understood, or to what is considered as the nominative case of the verb; as, 'The twelve,' *i.e.* apostles; 'To err is *human*,' *i.e.* 'Error is *human*.'

Adjectives however often become substantives, and are construed as such; so we say, 'The chief *good*; *Evil*, be thou *my good*.'

1. Adjectives are sometimes improperly applied as adverbs: as, '*Indifferent* honest, *miserable* poor, *extreme* unwilling,' &c. 'He behaved himself *conformable* to that blessed example.' 'I shall endeavour to live *suitable* to a man in my station.' 'I cannot think so very *mean* of him.' 'He describes this river *agreeable* to the common reading.'¹ 'The assertions of this author are *easier* detected.' 'If one author has spoken *nobler* and *loftier* than another.'—When *exceedingly* is joined to another adverb or adjective ending in *ly*, we sometimes cut off the first termination; as, '*Exceeding* clearly, *exceeding* lovely.' Neither can we in general add the adverbial termination to adjectives ending in the same manner; as, 'O Liberty! thou goddess *heavenly* bright.' In these and such-like cases, a certain degree of inelegance is unavoidable, either in adhering to strict propriety or in departing from it. But the most common construction

¹ N.B.—We should say 'according to,' &c., because *according* is here construed as a preposition, and considered as indeclinable, though it is in reality a participle.

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is always the least objectionable. The adjective pronoun *such* is often used where it would be better to substitute an adverb; as, 'He was *such* an extravagant man;' 'She has *such* a bad temper,' for '*so* extravagant a man, *so* bad a temper.' *Such* properly expresses the kind, rather than the degree of any thing. But this distinction is confined to the singular number, and to the use of the indefinite article; for we cannot without stiffness say, 'I never saw *so* large trees before,' instead of '*such* large trees.' '*So* empty praise,' for '*Such* empty praise,' &c.

Adverbs are also improperly used for adjectives; as, 'They loved in a manner *agreeably* to the dictates of reason and religion.' 'The study of syntax should be *previously* to that of punctuation.'

2. Double comparatives should be avoided; such as 'A *worser* conduct,' 'On *lesser* hopes,' 'The *most straitest* sect,' 'A *more superior* work.'

Some writers object to such sentences as the following: 'The quarrel became *so universal* and national.' 'The *truest* happiness consists in the satisfaction of a good conscience.' 'On the *extremest* verge of the swift brook.' 'A *most sovereign* remedy.' 'The church of England is the *most perfect of all others*.' 'The vice of covetousness of *all others* enters *deepest*¹ into the soul.' We think, however, that these phrases are sanctioned not only by such high authority, but such constant use, that they have become parts of the language; and that to object to them is to introduce primness and formality under the pretence of propriety. The idioms of every language are in general the most valuable parts of it, because they express ideas which cannot be expressed *so well* in any other way. And the reason of this is, that they are either abbreviated methods of expressing things of constant recurrence, or have been invented to supply the defects of the general structure of language. To decide on the propriety of every phrase from a principle of *abstract* reasoning, besides unsettling the only acknowledged standard of propriety, would also be to cramp and mutilate the language, and render it unfit for the real purposes of life.

Simple adjectives admit of no inflection but that of the degrees of comparison; but when used absolutely, or when they supply the place of nouns, they have sometimes a genitive case, like pronouns; as, 'The *former's* phlegm was a check upon the *latter's* vivacity.' This is a point which depends on particular custom. We may say 'The *wicked's* boast,' or 'The boast of the wicked,' *i.e.* men; but we cannot say, 'The *bad's* boast,' for 'The boast of the bad, or of bad men.'

¹ It has been observed that *deepest* is not an adverb. But it might be said that *earliest*, *latest*, *bardest*, *quickest*, &c. are not adverbs, on the same principle.

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RULE X

The adjective is generally placed before the substantive, as, 'A *wise* man,' 'A *virtuous* woman.'

Exceptions. 1. When anything is expressly affirmed of another, the adjective is put after the verb, as, 'He is *wise*, She is *virtuous*;' or the adjective is sometimes put before the verb, and the noun after it, to give a greater emphasis; as, '*Great* is the Lord! Just and *true* are thy ways, thou king of saints!'

2. When something depends upon the adjective; as, 'A man *generous to his enemies*, Food *convenient for us*; A tree *three feet thick*.'

3. For the sake of emphasis we sometimes put the adjective after the substantive; as 'Alexander the *Great*; Lewis the *Bold*; Goodness *infinite*.'

4. When several adjectives belong to one substantive, or when an adverb precedes an adjective, we use sometimes one order, and sometimes the other; as we may say, 'A *modest, sensible* and *virtuous* woman, or a woman, *modest, sensible* and *virtuous*; An unaffectedly *modest* girl; or a girl unaffectedly *modest*.'

Lastly. When the adjective expresses any thing which another is *caused to be*, the adjective is put last, as, 'Vanity renders its possessor *despicable*;' or else before the verb in an exclamatory sentence; as, 'How *despicable* does vanity render its possessor!'

RULE XI

One substantive governs another, signifying a different thing, in the possessive or genitive case; as, 'My father's house; Man's happiness.'

One substantive governs another substantive, or a pronoun signifying the same thing, in the same case; as, 'George, king of Great Britain. The emperor Augustus,' &c. Words thus circumstanced are said to be in *apposition*.

1. The preposition *of* joined to a substantive is not always translatable into the possessive case. There are cases in which we can use the former where we cannot make use of the latter. Thus we say, 'A crown *of* gold'; but we cannot convert the expression into the possessive case, and say 'Gold's crown.'

2. If several nouns come together in the genitive case, either in apposition or connected by the conjunction *and*, the apostrophic *'s* is annexed to the last, and understood of the rest; as 'Alexander the coppersmith's wife; John and Eliza's books.' When any other conjunction is employed, or where a particular emphasis is to be laid, we repeat the possessive termination; 'They are John's as well as Eliza's'

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books.' 'He had the physician's, the surgeon's, and the apothecary's assistance.'

3. When any circumstances are added to a noun by means of a preposition (as when we describe a person's title or office), we generally put the sign of the genitive case after the word governed by the preposition; as, 'The duke *of* Bridgewater's canal'; 'The bishop *of* Landaff's excellent book.' But if the noun with these circumstances added has been already put in apposition to another noun, we then add the sign of the genitive case to the first noun, and the remainder of the sentence stands as before; as, 'These are David's psalms, the king *of* the Jewish people.' 'We staid a month at Lord Lyttleton's, the ornament *of* his country, and friend *of* every virtue.' Where an adjective is put after a noun as if in apposition, we may add the sign of the genitive to it; as, 'George the Third's reign.' But it would be better in this and other such cases to say 'The reign *of* George the Third,' &c.

4. We sometimes omit the governing noun after a genitive case, where what is meant is perfectly well understood; as, 'He is gone to the bookseller's,' *i.e.* shop; 'He is at a friend's,' *i.e.* house, &c.

5. Participles often govern a genitive case before them, where they do not take the form of nouns; as, 'A great deal depends on the student's *applying closely*.' 'That was the reason of *his dismissing* his servant so hastily.' Here the former part of the sentence relates immediately to the act of the person, not to the person himself; and to keep up that connection, it is necessary to consider the name of the person as governed by the participle *substantively*, though it still governs the adverb and noun after it like a verb.

RULE XII

One verb governs another that follows it, and depends upon it, in the infinitive mood; as 'Learn *to do* well; You should prepare *to meet* him.'

The preposition *to*, though generally used before the infinitive mood, is sometimes properly omitted, as after the following verbs: *bid, dare, need, make, see, hear, feel, let*, and some few others, as *observe, perceive*, &c. as well as after all the auxiliary verbs.

In the following passages *to* is improperly introduced. 'I have *observed* some satirists *to use*,' &c. 'To *see* so many *to make* so little conscience of sin.' 'I bid him *to do it*.'

It should be noticed that all of these verbs, except *let*, have the sign of the infinitive after them in the passive voice; as, 'He was *observed to do it*, seen *to do it*, bid *to do it*,' &c. But we say, 'He was *let go*.'

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Ought requires the preposition *to* after it. 'You *ought not walk*' is wrong. The omission of it in the following passages may be considered as a poetical license: 'To *wish him wrestle* with affection,' *Shakespear*. 'The loud ethereal trumpet from on high *'gan blow*,' *Milton*.

The infinitive mood is also often governed by adjectives, substantives, and participles; as, 'He is eager to learn; They have a desire to improve; He is endeavouring to persuade.'

RULE XIII

Verbs do not govern one another in the same tense, but in the tense which expresses the order of time between the different actions or things spoken of; as, 'I wish to go; I remember to have gone; He will wish that he had gone.'

The present infinitive may be applied to any action cotemporary with, or subsequent to, another: the perfect infinitive can only be applied to an action prior to another.

The following erroneous examples will show the force and extent of this rule. 'Last week I *intended to have written*.' It should be *to write*, because the action of writing must have been subsequent to the *intention* expressed by the governing verb. 'There were two circumstances which made it necessary for them *to have lost* no time.' 'I found him better than I expected *to have found* him.' 'From his biblical knowledge, he appears *to study* the Scriptures with great attention,' *to have studied* would be better. There is, however, no impropriety in the following sentence, as some grammarians of respectability seem to agree; 'I feared that I should have lost it, before I arrived at the city.' 'I feared that *I should have lost it*,' &c., 'I feared that *I should lose it*,' &c. are both proper. The loss which is dreaded may be considered either as subsequent to the fear, or as prior to a subsequent event, namely, the arrival at the city. The former mode of expression is indeed the least equivocal; for the latter may mean 'Before or *till* I arrived at the city, I feared that I should lose it.'

In the following sentences, 'Lord, that I *might* receive my sight'; 'If by any means I *might* attain unto the resurrection of the just'; the past tense *might* is used properly instead of the present tense *may*, as in the defective verbs forming what is called the potential mood, the past tense is appropriated to express not only past time, but remoteness and contingency of every kind.

'To wish to have written' is an improper mode of expression, because we cannot wish a thing *to have really been* otherwise than it has been; but we may wish that *it had been* otherwise, as this form of expression merely denotes the imaginary existence or possibility of an

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event, not its reality.—Again: the verb *To remember*, necessarily refers to a past object, though the remembrance may be considered as present. There seems therefore no impropriety in the following expression: ‘*I remember the family more than twenty years.*’

RULE XIV

Participles retain the government of verbs, unless they have an article prefixed to them, in which case they are construed like nouns; as, ‘These are the rules of grammar, by *observing which*, you may avoid mistakes’; or with the article, ‘by *the observing of which*, you may avoid mistakes.’

The following are examples of a wrong construction. ‘This was *a betraying the trust* reposed in him.’ It should be *of the trust*. ‘To prepare the way *by preaching of repentance.*’ By preaching repentance or *the preaching of repentance.* ‘By *the continual mortifying our* corrupt affections.’ ‘It is *an overvaluing ourselves*, to reduce everything to the narrow measure of our capacities.’ ‘Keeping *of one day* in seven.’ Wherever the article precedes the participle, the preposition should be inserted after it; wherever the article is not used, the preposition should be omitted.

Dr. Lowth’s rule with respect to the effect of the article is perfectly just; but he has stated the principle on which it is founded in a manner which is liable to objection. His words are, ‘This rule arises from the nature and idiom of our language, and from as plain a principle as any on which it is founded; namely, that a word which has the article before it, *and the Possessive Preposition of after it*, must be a noun, and if a noun, *it ought to follow the construction of a noun*, and not to have the regimen of a verb.’ The learned author would have said, that a word governed by the article before it, is a noun, and ought to have the possessive preposition *of after it*, in the same manner as a noun; for those to whom this argument is addressed do not deny that a participle with the article before it, *and the preposition after it*, follows the construction of a noun; but their mistake consists in not employing the preposition after the participle, though the article has gone before. In a word, it is not the insertion of the preposition which constitutes the noun (for then its omission would destroy it), but it is the use of the article which gives to the participle the construction of a noun, and thus requires the preposition after it.

1. Nouns and pronouns before the participle do not affect its construction, even though they are themselves affected by it as a noun. Thus we should always say, ‘Much depends on *their observing the rule*’; ‘His ruin was the consequence of *his neglecting good advice*’; instead

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of *observing of the rule, neglecting of good advice*, which are quite contrary to the best authority. Some writers think that the genitive case before participles necessarily affects their whole construction; but the very nature of a participle seems to be that it sometimes admits of an irregularity in its construction, doing at the same time a double office. Its merely changing its character, and being sometimes found in one class of words, sometimes in another, is what it has in common with the other parts of speech.—That the participle in these circumstances still retains the nature of a verb, may be inferred by its allowing the adverb to be joined with it, which a substantive cannot: thus we say, ‘*His performing his part well* is everything.’ ‘His ruin was the consequence of *his always neglecting* good advice.’ ‘It was owing to *the tutor’s speaking so harshly* to him.’ But if we substitute the substantives *performance, neglect, speech*, in the place of the participle, with or without the preposition, the construction will be absurd.

2. The participles *having, being*, and those of neuter verbs, which have only one subject, form a general exception to the above rule, whether compounded with others or not; ‘The being a good scholar was greatly in his favour.’ ‘The having a warm house over his head,’ not ‘The *having of* a warm house, or the *being of* a good scholar,’ in which construction the word *being* has a totally different meaning; as we say, ‘The *being* of a god.’ Instead of saying ‘The being a good scholar,’ we might say ‘*the continuing one*’ with the same construction: and in general the participles of all verbs which govern or are supposed to govern the same case after them as before them exclude the preposition, in the same manner as nouns which are put in apposition to each other.

3. Care should be taken not to use the past tense instead of the perfect participle, or *vice versâ*. The following instances of the violation of this rule frequently occur both in discourse and writing. ‘He *begun*, he *run*, he *drunk*, he had *drank*, he was *chose*, I have *eat*,’ &c. ‘Repeats verses *wrote* on glasses.’ ‘No civil broils *have* since his death *arose*.’ ‘A free constitution, when it has been *shook* by the iniquity of former administrations.’ ‘Philosophers have *mistook* the source of true happiness.’

4. We sometimes use the perfect participle where analogy might seem to require the present, or the present instead of the past; as, ‘I am much *mistaken*; It is *owing* to us; Nothing else is *wanting*,’ &c.

RULE XV

Adverbs have no government, though they require to be used with certain parts of speech only. Their force depends much on their

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position. They are generally placed before adjectives, after verbs active or neuter, or between the auxiliary and the verb; as, 'He made a *very elegant* harangue, he *spoke unaffectedly and forcibly*, and was *attentively heard* by the whole audience.'

In the following instances the adverb is not appropriately placed. 'He *only* spake three words,' instead of He spake *only three words*. 'Her bosom to the view was *only* bare,' instead of Her bosom *only*, &c.

The adverb is sometimes put at the end of a clause; as, 'He encouraged the English barons to carry their opposition *further*;' 'They compelled him to declare that he would abjure the realm *for ever*,' instead of *carry further their opposition, abjure for ever the realm*.

There used as an expletive always precedes the verb; as, '*There* is a person, *There appeared* an angel, *There goes a story*,' &c.

Where is often used without a reference to place which seems its more proper application; as, 'They framed a protestation, *where* they repeated all their grievances.' When there is an immediate reference to a substantive, it is always better to use *in which*; but *where* often refers to a whole clause by a very convenient ellipsis, for which we have no synonymous expression. *When* is used in the same manner; and in some cases indeed it is indifferent which we use; as, 'We sometimes use this elliptical form of expression *where* or *when* no obscurity can arise from it.'

We generally prefix a preposition to the adverbs *hence*, *whence*, *thence*; but this is to be avoided whenever it can be done without occasioning stiffness.

Hither, *thither*, *whither* are seldom used at present; we do not say, 'He came *hither*, He went *thither*,' but 'He came *here*, He went *there*.' The use of a distinct form of expression to signify motion is at least restricted to very solemn occasions.

Then and *when* are sometimes inelegantly used as nouns; as, '*Since when*, *since then*.' *Till then* is the most common, and therefore the least objectionable construction of this kind. *While* is not improperly used for the substantive, *time*, as this is its real and immediate import; its adverbial signification is secondary, so we say, 'A good *while*; It is *worth while*;' &c.

Never sometimes occurs in the following manner: 'Charm he *never* so wisely.' 'Ask me *never* so much dowry.' The meaning of which seems to be, 'Charm he so wisely as *none ever* charmed before.' 'Ask me so much dowry as was *never* asked before.' If this explanation be right, it is improper to employ *ever* in phrases so formed, though the latter word is sometimes used.

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RULE XVI

Two negatives in English imply an affirmation, or at least destroy one another; '*Nor* did he *not* perceive him;' 'His language is *not inelegant*.'—This form of expression is only pleasing when one of the negatives, as in the latter instance, makes part of another word. Double negatives are improperly used in the following sentences: '*Never* no author grew up to his imitator.' 'I *cannot by no means* allow him what his argument must prove.' 'Ariosto, Tasso, Galileo, *no more than* Raphael, were *not* born in republics.'

Double negatives to express a simple one were formerly much in use, but in this respect the idiom of the language has changed.

RULE XVII

Prepositions govern the objective case; as, 'I heard a good character *of her*.' '*From him* that is needy turn not away.' 'I gave the letter *to them*,' &c.

The preposition is sometimes understood; as, 'Give me the book,' instead of 'Give the book *to me*.' 'He was banished England,' *i.e.* '*from* England.' Where this is the case, the noun before which the preposition would have stood, is placed next the verb.

The preposition is often separated from the relative which it governs; as, 'He is an author *whom* I am much delighted *with*.' 'The world is too polite to shock authors with a truth, *which* generally their book-sellers are the first to inform them *of*.' The relative also is frequently understood in familiar conversation and writing, as, 'He is an author, I am much delighted with.' We often connect different prepositions with the same noun; as, 'It is not only different *from*, but directly contrary *to*, the intention of the donor.'—In like manner the same noun is sometimes governed both by a verb and a preposition; as, 'Though much prejudiced *against*, he was determined to *hear him* out patiently.'

In the following instances the nominative case is used instead of the objective. '*Who* servest thou *under*?' '*Who* do you speak *to*?' 'We are still much at a loss *who* civil power belongs *to*.' 'Now Margaret's curse is fallen on our heads, when she exclaimed *on* Hastings, *you, and I*.'

Different prepositions express different relations, as, 'We are said to converse with a person, *in* his room *upon* a subject,' &c. We shall here give a list of examples where an improper preposition has been used. It should be observed, however, that language has undergone a considerable revolution in this respect, and that a preposition might have been used with perfect propriety a hundred years ago, which would now

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be uncouth and awkward in the same situation. 'He is resolved *of* (on) going to the Persian court.' 'He was totally dependent *of*¹ the Papal crown.' 'They called *of* me this morning.' 'It is situation which decides *of* the fortune and characters of men.' 'A taste *of* (for) beauty.' 'A difficulty *of* (in) writing.' 'You have bestowed your favours *to* (on) the most deserving persons.' 'He accused the ministers *for* (of) betraying the Dutch.' 'Your prejudice *to* (against) my cause.' 'The English were a different people then *to* (from) what they are now.' 'In compliance *to* (with) his desires.' 'They have a great resemblance *with* (to) each other.' 'I dissent *with* (from) the Examiner.' 'He was made much *on* (of) at Argos.' 'Persons *on* (in) whom the parliament could confide.' 'If policy can prevail *upon* (over) force.' 'Such circumstances are fell *into* (under) their cognizance.' 'He could not forbear *from* appointing the pope' (forbear appointing). 'A strict observance *after* (of) times and fashions.' 'The opinion seems to gain ground *among* every body' (among all persons). 'The combat *between* thirty French *against* (and) twenty English.'—We generally use those prepositions after substantives, which we should use with the verbs they are derived from, as *To derogate from*; *a derogation from*; though not always; as we say, *averse to*. We speak of being disappointed *of* a thing when we do not get it; *in* it, when we have it.

The difference between the prepositions *in* and *at* seems to consist in this, that the one signifies *inclosure*, the other *contiguity*. So we consider a person as living *in* a large town or province, but we say that he resides *at* a small town, or *at* a seat in the country. So again we say of any one, That he touched *at* a certain place, that he arrived *at* Paris; where it may be remarked, that we consider rather the approach *to* a place, than a residence *in* it. Or *at* signifies the being in a smaller place or for a short time; *in* signifies a residence in a larger place, or for a longer time.

The preposition *in* or *on* is often understood before nouns expressing times: as 'This day, Next month,' for *on* this day, *in* next month.

The preposition is sometimes improperly omitted, as in the following instances: 'In the temper of mind he was then' (in). 'In the posture I lay' (in). 'And virgins smiled at what they blushed (at) before.'

RULE XVIII

Conjunctions connect the same cases of pronouns, but not the same moods or tenses of verbs; as, 'The master taught *her* and *me* to write:' 'He *was* once poor, but *is* now rich, and *may* soon be richer.'

¹ We still say *independent of*, *independently of*.

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‘Anger *may* glance into the breast of a wise man, but *will* rest only in the bosom of fools.’

Observation. Where the sense does not require it, it is best not to change the form of the verb when it is governed by the same nominative case, as is done in the following sentence: ‘We often overlook the blessings we possess, and *are searching* after those which are out of our reach.’ It ought to be, ‘and search after.’

2. Where the sense is the same, the mood or tense of the verb governed either by a conjunction or a relative pronoun ought to be the same. There is therefore an impropriety in the following sentences:

‘But oh! *’twas* little that her life
O’er earth and waters *bears* thy fame.’

PRIOR.

‘Him portion’d maids, apprentic’d orphans *blest*,
The young who *labour*, and the old who *rest*.’

POPE.

‘Fierce as he *mov’d*, his silver shafts *resound*.’

Ibid.

3. When the verb in the latter clause of a sentence does not readily coalesce with its nominative case in the first part, it is always better to repeat the nominative case, or the pronoun, whether the mood or tense is varied or not; as, ‘He not only made himself exceedingly ridiculous, but *he* gave a great deal of offence to the whole company.’ ‘He is thought to have acted wrong, but *he* does not think so himself.’

RULE XIX

Some conjunctions require the indicative, some the subjunctive mood after them. The latter ought to be used only when something doubtful or contingent is expressed; as, ‘*If I were* to write, he could not regard it.’ ‘He will not be pardoned *unless he repent*.’

If, though, unless, except, are generally used before the subjunctive mood, though only when something is stated hypothetically, as ‘*Though he slay* me, yet will I trust in him.’ But we should say, ‘*Though he is* poor, he is contented.’ In the latter instance we take the circumstance connected with the conjunction for granted, in the former we consider it as merely possible.

The following example will serve to illustrate the distinction between the indicative and subjunctive mood. ‘*Though he were* divinely inspired, and spoke as never man spoke; *though he were* endued with supernatural powers, and could, therefore, have confirmed the truth of what he uttered by miracles, yet he reasoned,’ &c. That our

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Saviour was divinely inspired, and endued with supernatural powers, is not here supposed to admit of the least doubt; the writer ought therefore to have said, 'Though he *was* divinely inspired, though he *was* endued,' &c.

Lest and *that* annexed to a command, always require the subjunctive mood: 'Let him that standeth, take heed *lest* he fall.' 'Take heed *that* thou *speak* not to Jacob.'

In the following examples *that*, expressed or understood, seems to be improperly accompanied with the subjunctive mood.

'So much she fears for William's life.

That Mary's fate she *dare* not mourn.'

'Would thro' the airy region stream so bright,

That birds would sing, and think it *were* not night.'

Conjunctions expressing merely a condition, an inference, a continuation, &c., never require the subjunctive mood.

The same conjunction is sometimes improperly made to govern both the indicative and the subjunctive mood in the same sentence; as, 'If there *be* but one body of legislators, it is no better than a tyranny; *if* there *are* only two, there will want a casting voice.'

Some conjunctions have their correspondent conjunctions belonging to them, so that in the subsequent member of the sentence, the latter depends upon the former; as, *Though—yet*, or *notwithstanding*; *whether—or*; *either—or*; *neither—nor*; *as—as*; *as—so*; *so—as*; *so—that*.

The conjunctions *or* and *nor* may in some cases be used indifferently, as 'The king, whose character was not sufficiently vigorous, *nor* decisive.' In this sentence *or* would perhaps have been better; but *nor* seems to repeat the negation more immediately, and therefore gives more emphasis to the expression.

The conjunctions and relative pronouns are not properly combined in the following instances: 'The relations are so uncertain *as that* (that) they require much examination.' 'There was no man so sanguine, *who did not apprehend* (as not to apprehend) some ill consequences.' 'This is no more *but* (than) to acknowledge his power.' 'The duke had not behaved with *that* loyalty *as he ought*' (with which he ought). '*Such* sharp replies *that* (as) cost him his life.' 'I can do *equally as well as* he.' The adverb *equally* is here quite superfluous. 'I must however be *so* just, *to own*' (so just *as* to own, or just *enough* to own). 'That (neither) all the application he could make, *nor* the king's interposition could prevail with her majesty.' 'The king *nor* the queen were *not* at all deceived.' 'France was then disposed to conclude a peace upon *such* terms, *as* (that) it was not worth the life

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of a grenadier to refuse them.' 'This is not *so* properly a consideration of justice, *but rather* (as) of prudence in the legislator.' 'No errors are *to* trivial, *but* (but that) they deserve to be mended.'

The conjunction *that* is very often properly omitted in familiar writing, as, 'I beg you would come to me.' Where any particular emphasis is required, or in studied compositions, the omission is generally improper.

RULE XX

When the qualities of different things are compared, the latter noun or pronoun is not governed by the conjunction *than* or *as*, but is governed by the verb or preposition, expressed or understood: as, 'Thou art wiser *than* I,' *i.e.* 'than I am.' 'They loved him more *than* me,' or 'than they loved me.' 'The sentiment is better expressed by Solomon *than* him,' *i.e.* 'than by him.'

The following instances may serve to caution the scholar against improprieties in this respect: 'You are a much greater loser *than* me by his death.' 'He suffers hourly more *than* me.' 'The sun upon the calmest sea appears not half so bright *as* *thee*.' The following sentence is also improper, as the pronoun depends upon the verb, not on the preposition understood. 'It was not the work of so eminent an author *as* *him* to whom it was at first attributed.' There is a particular exception to this rule in the relative pronoun *who*, which is always put in the objective case after *than*; as, 'Beelzebub *than* *whom*, Satan except, none higher sat.' Yet we should say, none higher sat *than* *he*.

When we make a double comparison of the same thing by the conjunctions *than* and *as* in the same sentences, one of them is often understood by an ellipsis; as, 'He was *more* beloved (than), but not so much admired *as* his rival.' This is a mode of expression interwoven into our language; and for which, on many occasions, no other can be substituted without circumlocution or formality.

Indeed the best test of the propriety of elliptical constructions is, their constantly recurring in writing and conversation. This, at once, shows that they are convenient, and prevents their being misunderstood, or occasioning any ambiguity. Whenever an ellipsis offends the ear, we may be sure that it is wrong for that reason. For it is in itself a departure from rigid and minute propriety; and the only arguments in its favour are, that it renders the communication of thought more rapid, easy, and agreeable.

RULE XXI

Interjections have sometimes a government of cases; as, *Ah* *me*, *woe* *me*, &c.

PART IV

PROSODY

Prosody consists of two parts; the former teaches the true pronunciation of words, comprising accent, quantity, emphasis, pause, and tone; and the latter, the laws of versification.

Accent

Accent is the laying of a peculiar stress of the voice on a certain letter or syllable in a word, that it may be better heard than the rest, or distinguished from them: as, in the word *presúme*, the stress of the voice must be on the letter *u*, and second syllable, *súme*, which takes the accent.

Quantity

The quantity of a syllable is that time which is occupied in pronouncing it. It is considered as long or short.

A vowel or syllable is long when the accent is on the vowel, which occasions it to be slowly joined in pronunciation to the following letter: as, '*Fáll, ball, mōōd, hōūse, fēature.*'

A syllable is short when the accent is on the consonant, which occasions the vowel to be quickly joined to the succeeding letter: as, '*ap't, bon'net, hun'ger.*'

A long syllable requires double the time of a short one in pronouncing it: thus, '*Mate*' and '*Note*' should be pronounced as slowly again as '*Māt*' and '*Nōt.*'

Emphasis

By emphasis is meant a stronger and fuller sound of voice, by which we distinguish some word or words on which we design to lay particular stress, and to show how it affects the rest of the sentence. Sometimes the emphatic words must be distinguished by a particular tone of voice as well as by a greater stress.

Pauses

Pauses or rests in speaking and reading, are a total cessation of the voice, during a perceptible, and, in many cases, a measurable space of time.

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Tones

Tones are different both from emphasis and pauses ; consisting in the modulation of the voice, the notes or variations of sound which we employ, in the expression of our sentiments.

Versification

Versification is the arrangement of a certain number and variety of syllables according to certain laws.

Rhyme is the correspondence of the last sound of one verse to the last sound or syllable of another. A perfect rhyme requires the sound of the vowel and concluding consonants of the last syllable to be the same in each verse, and the sound of the consonant beginning the syllable to be different ; or else one syllable should begin with a consonant, and the other with a vowel. Hart, dart ; fires ire, are perfect rhymes.

PART V

PUNCTUATION

Is the art of dividing a written composition into sentences, or parts of sentences, by points or stops, for the purpose of marking the different pauses which the sense and an accurate pronunciation require.

The comma represents the shortest pause; the semicolon a pause double that of the comma; the colon one double that of the semicolon; and the period one double that of the colon.

The points are marked in the following manner: The comma , the semicolon ; the colon : the period .

Comma

The comma usually separates those parts of a sentence, which, though very closely connected in sense, require a pause between them: as, 'I remember, with gratitude, his love and services.' 'Charles is beloved, esteemed, and respected.'

Semicolon

The semicolon is used for dividing a compound sentence into two or more parts, not so closely connected as those which are separated by a comma, nor yet so little dependent on each other as those which are distinguished by a colon: as, 'Straws swim on the surface; but pearls lie at the bottom.'

Colon

The colon is used to divide a sentence into two or more parts, less connected than those which are separated by a semicolon; but not so independent as separate distinct sentences; as, 'Do not flatter yourselves with the hope of perfect happiness: there is no such thing in the world.'

Period

When a sentence is complete and independent, and not connected in construction with the following sentence, it is marked with a period: as, 'Fear God. Honour the king. Have charity towards all men.'

Besides the points which mark the pauses in discourse, there are

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others that denote a different modulation of voice ; in correspondence with the sense. These are,

The interrogative point, ?

The exclamation point, !

The parenthesis, ()

As Are you sincere ?

'How excellent is a grateful heart !'

'Know then this truth (enough for man to know),
Virtue alone is happiness below.'

The following characters are also frequently used in composition :

An apostrophe, marked thus, ' : as 'tho', judg'd.'

am

A caret marked thus, ^ : as 'I ^ diligent.'

A hyphen, which is thus marked, - : as, 'Lap-dog, to-morrow.'

The acute accent, marked thus, ' : as, 'Fan'cy.' The grave accent, thus, ` : as, 'Fa'vour.'

The proper mark to distinguish a long syllable is this, ¯ : as, 'Rōsy ;' and a short one this, ˇ : as, 'Fōlly.' This last mark is called a breve.

A diæresis, thus marked, ¨, shows that two vowels form separate syllables : as, 'Crëator.'

A section is thus marked, §.

A paragraph thus, ¶

A quotation has two inverted commas at the beginning, and two direct ones at the end, of a phrase or passage : as,

"The proper study of mankind is man."

Crotchets or brackets serve to inclose a particular word or sentence. They are marked thus, []

An index, or hand,  points out a remarkable passage.

A brace { unites three poetical lines ; or connects a number of words, in prose, with one common term.

An asterisk, or little star, *, directs the reader to some note in the margin.

An ellipsis is thus marked — ; as, 'K—g,' for king.

An obelisk, which is marked thus, †, and parallels thus, ||, together with the letters of the alphabet, and figures, are used as references to the margin.

CAPITALS

The following words should begin with capitals :

1. The first word of every book, chapter, letter, paragraph, &c.
2. The first word after a period, and frequently after the notes of interrogation and exclamation.

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3. The names of the Deity ; as, God, Jehovah, the Supreme Being, &c.
4. Proper names of persons, places, ships, &c.
5. Adjectives derived from the proper names of places, as, Grecian, Roman, English, &c.
6. The first word of an example, and of a quotation, in a direct form : as, ‘ Always remember this ancient maxim ; “ Know thyself.” ’
7. The first word of every line in poetry.
8. The pronoun I, and the interjection O !
9. Words of particular importance : as, the Reformation, the Restoration, the Revolution.

APPENDIX No. I

A List, or Praxis, of Words showing the various Uses of the Letters of the Alphabet, and of their simple Combinations.

A. Call, wall, hall. Barrel, fancy, shall. Far, are, farm, father, grass. Name, rarely, bason, nation. Rational, (*ul*) passionate, (*et*).

Aa. Baal. Balaam. Ae. Ænigma, Cæsar, Ætna.

Ai. Pail, tail. Said, again, fountain, Britain, (*an*). Au. Taught, naught. Aunt, flaunt, gauntlet. Hautboy. Laurel, laudanum. Aw. Bawl, awl. Ay. Pay, day, away.

B. Bread, number, disturb. Bdelium, debtor, subtle, thumb. Climb, tomb, comb.

C. Cart, cottage, curious, craft, cloth. Centre, civil, cymbal, mercy. Ocean, social. Victim, flaccid. Czar, victuals.

Ch. Church, chin, charter. Chymist, scheme, distich, Christ. Chagrin, chaise, chevalier. Arch, archer, arch-enemy, arch-bishop. Arch-angel, archives. Schedule, schism, yacht.

D. Death, bandage, kindred, obedient.

E. Scheme, here, glebe, me, she. Men, bed, clemency. Exertion, faster, slower, lucre, acre. Open, syllable, little. Clerk, serjeant. Pretty, England, catastrophe, epitome. Where, there. Rage, blithe, pine, cane.

Ea. Appear, beaver, breathe. Breath, meadow, treasure. Bear, break, great. Learn, heard, yearn. Eau. Beau, flambeau. Beauty.

Ei. Deign, vein, neighbour, either, neither. Seize, deceit, receive. Foreign, sovereign, forfeit. Height, sleight. Eo. People. Leopard, jeopardy. Dungeon, sturgeon, puncheon. Eu, ew. Feud, deuce, few, new. Ey. Bey, grey, convey. Key. Pulley, alley, valley, barley.

F. Fancy, muffin, mischief. Of.

G. Go, gay, gun, get, gew-gaw, finger. Giant, genius. Ægypt.

Gn. Gnash, gnaw, foreign. Resign, impugn, impregn. Gh. Ghost. Aghast. Burgher. Right, high, plough. Laugh, cough, tough.

H. Hat, horse, hill. Heir, honest, honour, herb, hospital, hostler, hour, humble, humour. Rhetoric, rheumatism. Messiah, Pharaoh.

I. Light, hind, fine, thine. Fin, thin, give, live. Flirt, dirt, firm. Machine, magazine.

Ia. Filial, genial. Carriage, marriage, parliament. Ie. Grief, believe, grenadier. Die, fie. Sieve. Ieu. Adieu, purlieu. Io.

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Violet, Priory. Bagnio. Iou. Various, serious. Bilious, precious, factious.

J. Jest, judge. Hallelujah.

K. King, skirt, kick. Knife, knell, knock. Pickle, sucker, pocket.

L. Liquid, quarrel. Half, talk, walk. *Le final*. Table, rabble.

M. Monument, murmur. Comptroller, accomptant.

N. Nathan, noble. Thanks, banquet, singing. Hymn, solemn, kiln.

O. Note, bone, over, Homer. Not, hot, Horace. For, horn, lord, froth. Son, come, none, attorney. Move, behove, to, who. Poniard.

Oa. Boat, coat, throat. Broad, groat. Oe. Doe, sloe, foe. Fœtus, æconomy. Oi. Boil, spoil, join, point. Oo. Moon, soon, food, moor. Wool, good, foot. Blood, flood, soot. Door, floor. Ou. Hound, pound. Enough, trouble, journey, injurious, luxurious, bounteous, &c. Soup, youth, tournament, bourn. Though, mourn, poultice, shoulder. Cough, ought, brought, thought, trough. Ow. Brown, dowry, shower. Mow, show, blown, bestowed. Oy. Boy, joy.

P. Past, plump. Cup-board. Psalter. Ptolemy, tempt, presumption.

Ph. Philip, philosophy. Nephew, Stephen. Apophthegm, phthysical.

Qu. Quadrant, quire. Conquer, liquor.

R. Rome, regard, error. Re. Sepulchre, theatre.

S. Saint, sinner, sister, hissing, vexations, rebus. Nasal, dismal, exercise, his, was. Isle, demesne, viscount.

T. Take, tempt. Nature, Virtue, (*tyoo*). Salvation, (*shun*). Question, christian (*schun*).

Th. Thus, nether, heathen. Thing, think, breath. Thomas, Thames, asthma.

U. Rule, Runic, truth. Pulc, Punic, useful. Full, pull. Trull, skull, run, buzzard, unto. Business. Bury, burial.

Ua. Assuage, antiquary. Guardian. Ue. Quench, quere, guerdon. Cue, hue, ague. Guest. Oblique, catalogue, prorogue.

Ui. Guide, disguise. Guilt, guinea. Languid, extinguish. Juice, fruit, bruise. Suit, pursuit. Suite. Uo. Quote, quondam. Uy. Obloquy, soliloquy (*wi* short). Buy (*bi* long).

V. Vain, vanity, love.

W. Water, William. Answer, sword, wry, wrap, wrong, wreck, &c. What, whither. Who, whole. Draw, saw, knew, vowel, brow, how. Know, low, blow, crow, &c.

X. Xerxes, Xenophon. Example, exist. Exercise, excel.

Y. Young, York, yes, year. Rhyme, system, fancy, justify.

Z. Frozen, Zoroaster.

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APPENDIX No. II

Nouns, Adjectives, and Verbs, to be declined, compared, and conjugated.

Write in the plural number the following nouns : Apple, plum, orange, bush, tree, plant, convenience, disorder, novice, beginning, defeat, protuberance.

Write the following substantives in the plural number : Cry, fly, cherry, fancy, glory, duty, boy, folly, play, lily, toy, conveniency.

Write the following nouns in the possessive case singular : Boy, girl, man, woman, lake, sea, church, lass, beauty, bee, sister, branch.

Write the following in the plural number : Loaf, sheaf, self, muff, knife, stuff, wife, staff, wolf, half, calf, shelf, life.

Write the following in the genitive case plural : Brother, child, man, woman, foot, tooth, ox, mouse, goose, penny.

Write the following nouns in the nominative and possessive cases plural : Wife, chief, die, staff, city, river, proof, archer, master, crutch, tooth, mouth, baker, distaff.

Write the possessive singular and plural of the pronouns He, she, it, who, and other.

Write the possessive pronouns, as they are put absolutely or before nouns, derived from the personal pronouns I, we, thou, ye, he, she, it, they.

Write the objective cases, singular and plural, of the pronouns I, thou, he, she, it, and who.

Compare the following adjectives : Fair, grave, bright, long, short, tall, white, deep, strong, poor, rich, great.

Compare the following adjectives : Amiable, moderate, disinterested, favourable, grateful, studious, attentive, negligent, industrious, perplexing.

Write the following adjectives in the comparative degree : Near, far, little, low, good, indifferent, bad, worthy, convenient.

Write the following adjectives in the superlative degree : Feeble, ignoble, polite, handsome, good, ardent, bad, base, little, strong, late, near, content.

Conjugate the following verbs in the indicative mood, present tense : Beat, gain, read, eat, walk, desire, interpose.

Conjugate the following verbs in the subjunctive mood, past tense : Drive, prepare, starve, omit, indulge, demonstrate.

Conjugate the following verbs in the imperative mood : Believe, depart, invent, give, abolish, contrive.

Write the following verbs in the infinitive mood, present, and present perfect tenses : Grow, decrease, live, prospect, separate, incommode.

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Write the present, perfect, and compound participles, of the following verbs : Confess, disturb, please, know, begin, sit, set, eat, lie, lay.

Conjugate the following verbs in the indicative mood, present and present perfect tenses of the passive voice : Honour, abase, amuse, slight, enlighten, displease, envelop, bereave.

Conjugate the following verbs in the indicative mood, pluperfect, and first future tenses : Fly, contrive, know, devise, choose, come, see, go, eat, grow, bring, forsake.

Write the following verbs in the present and past tenses of the subjunctive moods : Know, shake, heat, keep, give, blow, bestow, beseech.

Write the following verbs in the indicative mood, past, and second future tenses, of the passive voice : Slay, draw, crown, throw, defeat, grind, hear, divert.

Write the following verbs in the second and third persons singular of all the tenses in the indicative and subjunctive moods : Approve, condemn, mourn, freeze, know, arise, drive, blow, investigate.

Form the following verbs in the infinitive and imperative moods, with their participles, all in the passive voice : Embrace, draw, defeat, smite.

APPENDIX No. III

Exercises in Parsing as it respects Etymology alone. Etymological Parsing Table.

What part of speech ?

1. *An article.* What kind ? Why ?
2. *A substantive.* Common or proper ? What Number ? Case ? Why ?
3. *An adjective.* What degree of comparison ? To what does it belong ? Why an adjective ?
4. *A pronoun.* What kind ? Person ? Gender ? Number ? Case ? Why ?
5. *A verb.* What kind ? Mood ? Tense ? Number ? Person ? Why ? If a participle ? Why ? Active or passive ?
6. *An adverb.* Why is it an adverb ?
7. *A preposition.* Why a preposition ?
8. *A conjunction.* Why ?
9. *An interjection.* Why ?

Specimen of Etymological Parsing.

‘ Hope animates us.’

Hope is a common substantive of the third person in the singular number and the nominative case, or the subject of the following verb.

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(*Decline the substantive.*) *Animates* is a regular verb active, indicative mood, present tense, third person singular. (*Repeat the present tense, the past tense, and the perfect participle ; and sometimes conjugate the verb entirely.*) *Us* is a personal pronoun, first person plural, and in the objective case. (*Decline the pronoun.*)

‘A peaceful mind is virtue’s reward.’

A is the indefinite article. *Peaceful* is an adjective. (*Repeat the degrees of comparison.*) *Mind* is a common substantive, of the third person, in the singular number, and the subject of the verb. (*Decline the substantive.*) *Is* is an irregular verb neuter, indicative mood, present tense, and the third person singular. (*Repeat the present tense, the past tense, and the participle ; and occasionally conjugate the verb entirely.*) *Virtue’s* is a common substantive of the third person, in the singular number, and the possessive case. (*Decline the substantive.*) *Reward* is a common substantive, of the third person, in the singular number, and is the simple noun without any variation of case, put in apposition to ‘mind,’ after the verb ‘is.’

APPENDIX No. IV

Exercises in Parsing, as it respects both Etymology and Syntax.
Syntactical Parsing Table.

1. *Article.* Why is it the definite article? Why the indefinite? Why omitted? Why repeated?
2. *Substantive.* Why is it in the possessive case? Why the subject of the verb? Why the object? Why in apposition? Why is the apostrophic *s* omitted?
3. *Adjective.* What is its substantive? Why in the comparative degree, &c.? Why placed after its substantive? Why omitted? Why repeated?
4. *Pronoun.* What is its antecedent? Why is it in the singular, why in the plural number? Why of the masculine, why of the feminine, why of the neuter gender? Why of the first, of the second, or of the third person? Why is it the nominative case? Why the possessive? Why the objective? Why omitted? Why repeated?
5. *Verb.* What is its nominative case or subject? What case does it govern? Why is it in the singular? why in the plural number? Why in the first person? &c. Why is it in the infinitive mood? Why in the subjunctive? &c. Why in this particular tense? What relation has it to another verb in point of time? Why do participles govern the noun without a preposition? Why is the verb omitted? Why repeated?

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6. *Adverb.* What is its proper situation? Why is the double negative used? Why rejected?

7. *Preposition.* What case does it govern? Which is the word governed? Why this preposition? Why omitted? Why repeated?

8. *Conjunction.* What moods tenses, or cases does it connect? And why? What mood does it require? Why omitted? Why repeated?

6. *Interjection.* Why does the nominative case follow it? Why the objective? Why omitted? Why repeated?

Specimen of Syntactical Parsing.

‘Vice degrades us.’

Vice is a common substantive, of the third person, in the singular number, and the nominative case or subject of the verb. *Degrades* is a regular verb active, indicative mood, present tense, third person singular, agreeing with its nominative ‘vice.’ *Us* is a personal pronoun, first person plural, in the objective case, and governed by the active verb ‘degrades.’

‘He who lives virtuously prepares for all events.’

He is a personal pronoun, of the third person, singular number, and masculine gender. *Who* is a relative pronoun, which has for its antecedent ‘he,’ with which it agrees in gender and number. *Lives* a regular verb neuter, indicative mood, present tense, third person singular, agreeing with its nominative ‘who.’ *Virtuously* is an adverb of quality. *Prepares* a regular verb neuter, indicative mood, present tense, third person singular, agreeing with its nominative ‘he.’ *For* is a preposition. *All* is an adjective pronoun, of the indefinite kind, the plural number, and belongs to its substantive ‘events,’ with which it agrees. *Events* is a common substantive of the third person in the plural number, and is the simple noun without any variation of case.

‘If folly entice thee, reject its allurements.’

If is a copulative conjunction. *Folly* is a common substantive of the third person, in the singular number. *Entice* is a regular verb active, subjunctive mood, present tense, third person singular, and is governed by the conjunction ‘if.’ *Thee* is a personal pronoun, of the second person singular, in the objective case, governed by the active verb ‘entice.’ *Reject* is a regular active verb, imperative mood, second person singular, and agrees with its subject ‘thou,’ understood. *Its* is a personal pronoun,¹ third person, singular number, and of the neuter gender, to agree with its substantive ‘folly.’ It is in the possessive case, governed by the noun ‘allurements.’ *Allurements* is a common

¹ Or possessive pronoun.

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substantive of the third person, in the plural number, and is the simple noun governed by the verb 'reject.'

Select Sentences for Parsing.

It is wiser to prevent a quarrel beforehand, than to revenge it afterwards.

No revenge is more heroic, than that which torments envy by doing good.

A man may have a thousand intimate acquaintances, and not a friend among them all. If you have one friend, think yourself happy.

When once you profess yourself a friend, endeavour to be always such. He can never have any true friends, that will be often changing them.

When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we leave them.

It is as great a point of wisdom to hide ignorance, as to discover knowledge.

Pitch upon that course of life which is the most excellent; and habit will render it the most delightful.

Custom is the plague of wise men, and the idol of fools.

No man was ever cast down with the injuries of fortune, unless he had before suffered himself to be deceived by her favours.

None more impatiently suffer injuries than those that are most forward in doing them.

By taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy; but in passing it over, he is superior.

Some would be thought to do great things, who are but tools and instruments; like the fool who fancied he played upon the organ, when he only blew the bellows.

He who wants good sense is unhappy in having learning; for he has thereby the more ways of exposing himself.

The coin that is most current among mankind is flattery; the only benefit of which is, that by hearing what we are not, we may be instructed what we ought to be.

A good word is an easy obligation; but not to speak ill requires only our silence, which costs us nothing.

Censure is the tax a man pays to the public for being eminent.

To endeavour to work upon the vulgar with fine sense, is like attempting to hew blocks of marble with a razor.

Every person insensibly fixes upon some degree of refinement in his discourse, some measure of thought which he thinks worth exhibiting. It is wise to fix this pretty high, although it occasions one to talk the less.

THE END.

PROSPECTUS OF A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

An eight-page pamphlet printed in 1809 with the following title: 'Proposals for Publishing, in One Large Volume, Quarto (Price 1*l.* 10*s.* to Subscribers), A HISTORY OF ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY: containing an Account of the Rise and Progress of modern Metaphysics, an Analysis of the Systems of the most celebrated Writers who have treated on the Subject, and an Examination of the principal Arguments by which they are supported. By the Author of An Essay on the Principles of Human Action, and An Abridgement of the Light of Nature Pursued.' There followed 'Contents,' here given in the notes, and 'Plan of the Work,' the essay of which the text is reproduced. The pamphlet was printed by R. Taylor and Co., Shoe-lane. The only copy known is that in the Windham collection in the British Museum.

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THE design of the work which is here offered to the notice of the public will be, first and more immediately, to give a clear, condensed, and satisfactory account of the principal English philosophers who have treated on moral and metaphysical subjects from the time of Lord Bacon to the present day. In this part of his subject the writer will attempt to show what the real opinions of the most celebrated writers were, and the steps by which they arrived at them, to trace the connection, or point out the differences, between their several systems, to discover the peculiar bias and turn of their minds, and in what their true strength or weakness lay.—Men's opinions and reasonings depend more on the character and temper of their minds than we are apt to conceive. Not only their prejudices and passions, and the light in which they have been accustomed to view things, influence them much more than the nature of the things themselves; but a great deal depends on the very cast of their understandings, disposing them to imbibe certain prejudices, and confining them to a certain range of thought.

Secondly, it will be the writer's object, besides reporting the opinions of others, to act as judge or umpire between them, to distinguish (as far as he is able) the boundaries of true and false philosophy, and try if he cannot lay the foundation of a system more conformable to reason and experience, and, in its practical results at least, approaching nearer to the common sense of mankind, than the one which has been generally received by the most knowing persons who have attended to such subjects within the last century; I mean the material, or *modern*, philosophy, as it has been called. This is indeed a bold undertaking, and I could wish that it had fallen into abler hands. My only pretensions to execute it properly are, an early familiar acquaintance with most of the subjects to be treated of, and a long and patient habit of thinking, which has been, in truth, the business of my life.

According to this philosophy, as I understand it, the mind itself is nothing, and external impressions everything. All thought is to be resolved into *sensation*, all morality into the *love of pleasure*, and all

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action into *mechanical* impulse. These three propositions, taken together, embrace almost every question relating to the human mind ; and in their different ramifications and intersections form a net, not unlike that used by the enchanters of old, which, whosoever has once thrown over him, will find all further efforts vain, and his attempts to reason freely on any subject in which his own nature is concerned, baffled and confounded in every direction.

It will be my business to explain at large hereafter, how this false system of philosophy has been gradually growing up to its present height ever since the time of Lord Bacon, from a wrong interpretation of the word *experience*, confining it to a knowledge of things without us ; whereas it in fact includes all knowledge, relating to objects either within or out of the mind, of which we have any direct and positive evidence. Physical experience is indeed the foundation and the test of that part of philosophy which relates to physical objects ; further, physical analogy is the only rule by which we can extend and apply our immediate knowledge, or reason on the nature of the different objects around us. But to say that physical experiment is either the test, or source, or guide, of that other part of philosophy which relates to our internal perceptions, that we are to look in external nature for the form, the substance, the colour, the very life and being of whatever exists in our own minds, or that we can only infer the laws which regulate the phænomena of the mind from those which regulate the phænomena of matter, is to confound two things essentially distinct. Our knowledge of mental phænomena from consciousness, reflection, or observation of their correspondent signs in others is the true basis of metaphysical inquiry, as the knowledge of *facts* is the only solid basis of natural philosophy. To argue otherwise is to assert that the best method of ascertaining the properties of air is by making experiments on mineral substances. It is assuming the very point in dispute, (namely, the strict affinity between mind and matter, insomuch that we may always judge of the one by the other) on no better foundation than an unmeaning and palpable play of words.

Lord Bacon was undoubtedly a great man, indeed one of the greatest that have adorned this or any other country. He was a man of a clear and active spirit, of a most fertile genius, of vast designs, of general knowledge, and of profound wisdom. He united the powers of imagination and understanding (as they are generally called) in a greater degree than almost any other writer. He was certainly one of the strongest instances of those men who by the rare privilege of their nature are at once poets and philosophers, and see equally into both worlds—the material and visible, and the incorporeal and invisible forms of things. The school-men and their followers attended to nothing

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but the latter. They seem to have alike disregarded both kinds of experience, that relating to external objects, or our own internal feelings. From the imperfect state of knowledge they had few facts to go by; and, intoxicated with the novelty of their vain distinctions, they would be tempted to despise the clearest and most obvious suggestions of their own minds. Hence arose 'their logomachies'—their everlasting word-fights, their sharp disputes, their captious, bootless controversies. As Lord Bacon expresses it, 'they were made fierce with dark keeping,' signifying that their angry and unintelligible contests with one another were in consequence of their not having really any distinct objects to engage their attention. They built altogether on their own whims and fancies; and, buoyed up by their specific levity, they mounted in their airy disputations in endless flights and circles, clamouring like birds of prey, till they equally lost sight of truth and nature. This great man therefore did an essential service to philosophy in wishing to recall men's attention to facts and experience which had been almost entirely neglected; and so, by incorporating the abstract with the concrete, and general notions with individual objects, to give to our reasonings that solidity and firmness which they must otherwise always want. He did nothing but insist on the necessity of experience. He laid the most stress upon this, because it was the most needed at the time, particularly in natural science; and from the wider field that is open to it there, as well as the prodigious success it has met with, this latter sense of the word, in which it is tantamount to physical experiment, has so far engrossed the whole of our attention, that mind has, for a good while past, been in some danger of being overlaid by matter. We run from one error into another: and as we were wrong at first, so, in altering our course, we have faced about into the opposite extreme. We despised experience altogether before: now we would have nothing but experience, and that of the grossest kind. We have, it is true, gained much by not consulting the suggestions of our own minds in questions where they could inform us of nothing, namely, in the laws and phænomena of the material world; and we have hastily concluded (reversing the rule) that the only way to arrive at the knowledge of ourselves also, was to lay aside the dictates of our own consciousness, thoughts, and feelings, as deceitful and insufficient guides, though they are the only means by which we can obtain the least light upon the subject.—We seem to have resigned the natural use of our understandings, and to have given up our own existence as a nonentity. We look for our thoughts and the distinguishing properties of our minds in some image of them in matter, as we look to see our faces in a glass. We no longer decide physical problems by logical dilemmas, but we decide questions of logic

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by the evidence of the senses. Instead of putting our reason and invention to the rack indifferently upon all subjects, whether we have any knowledge of them or not, we have adopted the easier method of suspending the use of our faculties altogether, and settling all controversies by means of 'four champions fierce,—hot, cold, moist, and dry,' who with a few more of the retainers and hangers-on of matter determine all questions relating to the nature of man and the limits of the human understanding very learnedly. That which we seek, however, namely the nature of the mind, and the laws by which we think, feel, and act, we must discover in the mind itself, or not at all. The mind has laws, powers, and principles of its own, and is not the mere puppet of matter. This original bias in favour of mechanical reasoning and physical experiment, which took its rise from the previous total neglect of them in matters where they were strictly necessary, was strengthened by the powerful aid of Hobbes, who was indeed the father of the modern philosophy. His strong mind and body appear to have resisted all impressions but those which were derived from the downright blows of matter. All his ideas seemed to be 'like substances in his brain : ' what was not a solid, tangible, distinct, palpable object, was to him nothing. The external image pressed so close upon his mind that it destroyed all power of consciousness, and left no room for attention to anything but itself. He was by nature a materialist. Locke assisted greatly in giving popularity to the same scheme, as well by espousing many of Hobbes's metaphysical principles, as by the doubtful resistance which he made to the rest. And it has of late received its last polish and roundness in the hands of some French philosophers, as Condillac and others.

Having thus explained in a general way the grounds of my dissent from this system of philosophy, and shown that they do not militate against the true basis of all philosophy, experience, in any rational sense of the word, I shall proceed to state some of the principles which it would be my object to establish in the progress of the work. And,

I. I should endeavour to show that *the mind itself is not material* ; or that the phænomena of thought and feeling do not originate in the common properties of what is called matter.

II. That *the understanding or intellectual power of the mind is entirely distinct from simple perception or sensation*. By the understanding I mean that faculty which perceives the *relations* of things, which combines, compares, and distinguishes our different impressions, and by which we are enabled, besides being sensible to the successive impulses and fluxional parts of objects, to consider them in reference to one another, or understand their connections, forms, and masses. Without this power we should not only be incapable of judging or reasoning on

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any subject, that is, of perceiving the relations between a variety of objects, but we could never have so much as a single *idea* of any object whatever, since there is no object which does not consist of a number of parts arranged in a certain manner. But of this arrangement the parts themselves cannot be conscious. Ideas are the offspring of the understanding, not of the senses.—The whole of Mr. Locke's Essay is unhappily founded on a supposition that ideas are but copies of sensible impressions, into which he was led very much by considering particular given objects as simple ideas; and thus by including the forming power of the mind in simple perception, we, first of all, contrived to do without the *name* of the understanding, and soon after it became the fashion to discard the *thing*, the whole process of thought and reason, or what are called the operations of the mind, being resolved into the more refined pulsations of matter.

III. That the power of abstraction is a necessary consequence of the limitation of the comprehending power of the mind: since if it were a previous condition of our having the ideas of things that we should comprehend distinctly *all* the particulars of which they are composed, we could have no ideas at all. The same reasoning by which it has been attempted to prove that we have no abstract ideas, would prove that we have no particular ones. Perfect and absolute distinctness would require not only the knowledge of all the individual objects in a class, but of all the parts of each object, which is impossible. For there is no one of those objects, called individuals (as a tree, a house, a man, &c.) but it consists of an infinite number of parts. Now that the mind gives a distinct attention to all these, or determines exactly within itself what each of them is, before it can have any notion of the general result, *viz.* of that particular object, is what no one on reflection will maintain: yet it must have this perfect and detailed knowledge, or an imperfect and abstract one. To deny that we can have any knowledge or conception of things without clearly apprehending every different circumstance belonging to them, is to exclude all ideas from the mind. It is only by passing over their differences, taking them in the gross, and attending to the general effect of a number of undistinguished, and undistinguishable impressions that we ever arrive at those just notions of objects, on which all our after-knowledge is built. The knowledge of every finite being rests in generals: and the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more or less general, of leaving out more or fewer circumstances.

IV. That reason is a distinct source of knowledge or inlet of truth, over and above *experience*.

V. That the principle of association does not account for all our ideas, feelings, and actions.

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VI. That there is a principle of natural benevolence in the human mind : for that the idea of absolute selfishness, or of the mind's being affected solely by the actual impressions of things upon itself, is inconsistent not only with all desire of the good of others, but of our own future good, the only object of a rational and practical self-interest.—For a fuller proof of this, and the foregoing proposition, the writer begs to refer to the Essay formerly named.

VII. That the love of pleasure or happiness is not the only principle of action, but that there are others necessarily implied in the nature of man as an active and intelligent being. The love of truth is one of these. There is a fitness or congruity of actions and objects to the mind independent of their connection with pleasure or pain, for a capacity of pleasure and pain does not constitute the whole of our faculties. Hence that class of motives, distinguished by the ancients under the names of the *τὸ κέρειον*, or *honestum*, and comprehending the decency and propriety of actions, as well as their utility.

VIII. That moral obligation is not, as it has been strangely defined to be, the strongest motive, which would justify any action whatever. It always, I conceive, expresses the hold or power (be it stronger or weaker) which certain given motives have over the mind, or the ties by which men are bound to their duty. It has its foundation in the moral and rational nature of man, or in that principle—call it reason, conscience, moral sense, what you will—which, without any reference to our own interests, passions, and pursuits, approves of certain actions and sentiments as right, and condemns others as wrong. To act right is to act in conformity to this standard.

IX. That the mind is not a mechanical, but a rational and voluntary agent. Or in other words, motives do not impel the will immediately, absolutely, and irresistibly, but by means of the understanding which determines the choice of the object, the means of pursuing it, and the degree of force necessary to accomplish it. That is, the mind itself is a real agent, or one cause that actuates the will. In this consists its long-contested freedom. It is *free*, in as far as it is not the slave of external impressions, physical impulses, or blind senseless motives. It is free, as the body is free, when it is not subject to a power out of itself, though its operations still depend on certain powers and principles within itself. It is not thrust upon any actions without its own consent and concurrence. This does not imply that actions are without a cause, but that *that* cause is not a mechanical one. The term Necessity generally means something more than the connection between cause and effect, *viz.* a particular sort and degree of power, or an external force, and one that admits of no controul, in which sense it is not applicable to the human mind. I cannot express what I would

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say on this subject in any manner so well as in the words of a late celebrated writer.

‘That we are indeed mechanical and dependent beings, I need no other proof than my own feelings; and from the same feelings I learn with equal conviction that we are not merely such; that there is a power within which struggles against the force and bias of that mechanism, commands its motion, and by frequent practice reduces it to that ready obedience which we call habit; and all this in conformity to a preconceived opinion (no matter whether right or wrong), to that least material of all agents, a thought.’—*Gray’s Letters*.

X. That the idea of power is inseparable from activity. We do not get this idea from the outward changes which take place in matter, but from the exertion of it in ourselves. Whoever has stretched out his hand to an object must have had the feeling of power: and to insist on a formal definition of this idea as necessary to understand it, is like asking the meaning of pleasure and pain, which have never yet been denied to exist, though I do not know that any one has explained them.

The same general theory might be applied to illustrate various other subjects, such as those relating to genius, taste, feeling, the boundaries of speculative and practical reason, the influence of opinion on manners, &c., questions which seem to stand in need of some illustration.

This slight sketch may, it is hoped, convey a sufficient idea of the work, to enable those who are versed in such subjects to determine how far it is entitled to the public attention, at least as to its design. Without pretending to much originality, I believe it possible to deduce from preceding writers all the materials of a sound philosophy, and to show that the advantages which the advocates of the modern system have had over their opponents have not been so much in the solidity of their reasonings, as in the novelty of their opinions, aided by that alertness and confidence which men always have in attacking any common and long-established principle. For the defence which is set up is always imputed to prejudice. There is, however, no prejudice so strong as that which is founded on a supposed superiority to prejudice. But be this as it may, most of the topics have been completely exhausted, and it requires perhaps little more than a careful review of the different arguments to see on which side the truth lies. The effects of novelty have had time to wear off, and we have been pretty well weaned from our prejudices. It is only by looking back on the mistakes into which we have been led by our too great obstinacy in maintaining received opinions, or our too great eagerness in getting rid of them, that we can hope to hit upon the golden mean; or that the history of philosophy is ever likely to become anything but a tissue of errors and contradictions.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Five of the six papers which follow formed part of the contents of 'Literary Remains of the late William Hazlitt. With a Notice of his Life, by his Son, and Thoughts on his Genius and Writings, by E. L. Bulwer, Esq., M.P., and Mr. Sergeant Talfourd, M.P. In Two Volumes. London. Saunders and Otley, Conduit Street, 1836.' The other—'On Abstract Ideas'—was first published in 1836 in the second edition of *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action* (see Bibliographical Note, Vol. I.). For the order of the papers in the present edition, and certain minor alterations in the text, see the Introductory Note to the Lectures at the end of the volume.

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ON THE WRITINGS OF HOBBS

IN the following Lectures I shall attempt to give some account of the rise and progress of modern metaphysics, to state the opinions of the principal writers who have treated on the subject, from the time of Lord Bacon to the present day, and to examine the arguments by which they are supported. In the first place, it will be my object to shew what the real conclusions of the most celebrated authors were, and the steps by which they arrived at them : to trace the connexion or point out the difference between their several systems, as well as to inquire into the peculiar bias and turn of their minds, and in what their true strength or weakness lay. This will undoubtedly be best done by an immediate reference to their works whenever the nature of the subject admits of it, or whenever their mode of reasoning is not so loose and desultory as to render the quotation of particular passages a useless as well as endless labour. In the History of English Philosophy, of which I published a prospectus some time ago, I intended to have gone regularly through with all the writers of any considerable note who fell within the limits of my plan, and to have given a detailed analysis of their several subjects and arguments. But this would lead to much greater length and minuteness of inquiry than seems consistent with my present object, and would besides, I am afraid, prove (what Hobbes, speaking of these subjects in general, calls) 'but dry discourse.' To avoid this as much as possible, I shall pass over all those writers who have not been distinguished either by the boldness of their opinions, or the logical precision of their arguments. Indeed I shall confine my attention more particularly to those who have made themselves conspicuous by deviating from the beaten track, and who have struck out some original discovery or brilliant paradox ; whose metaphysical systems trench the closest on morality, or whose speculations, by the interest as well as novelty attached to them, have become topics of general conversation.

Secondly, besides stating the opinions of others, one principal object which I shall have in view will be to act as judge or umpire between them, to distinguish, as far as I am able, the boundaries of true and false philosophy, and to try if I cannot lay the foundation of a system more conformable to reason and experience, and, in its

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practical results at least, approaching nearer to the common sense of mankind, than the one which has been generally received by the most knowing persons who have attended to such subjects within the last century; I mean the material or *modern* philosophy, as it has been called. According to this philosophy, as I understand it, all thought is to be resolved into sensation, all morality into the love of pleasure, and all action into mechanical impulse. These three propositions, taken together, embrace almost every question relating to the human mind, and in their different ramifications and intersections form a net, not unlike that used by the enchanter of old, which, whosoever has once thrown over him, will find all his efforts to escape vain, and his attempts to reason freely on any subject in which his own nature is concerned, baffled and confounded in every direction.

This system, which first rose at the suggestion of Lord Bacon, on the ruins of the school-philosophy, has been gradually growing up to its present height ever since, from a wrong interpretation of the word *experience*, confining it to a knowledge of things without us; whereas it in fact includes all knowledge relating to objects either within or out of the mind, of which we have any direct and positive evidence. We only know that we ourselves exist, the most certain of all truths, from the experience of what passes within ourselves. Strictly speaking, all other facts of which we are not immediately conscious, are so in a secondary and subordinate sense only. Physical experience is indeed the foundation and the test of that part of philosophy which relates to physical objects: further, physical analogy is the only rule by which we can extend and apply our immediate knowledge, or infer the effects to be produced by the different objects around us. But to say that physical experiment is either the test or source or guide of that other part of philosophy which relates to our internal perceptions, that we are to look to external nature for the form, the substance, the colour, the very life and being of whatever exists in our minds, or that we can only infer the laws which regulate the phenomena of the mind from those which regulate the phenomena of matter, is to confound two things entirely distinct. Our knowledge of mental phenomena from consciousness, reflection, or observation of their correspondent signs in others is the true basis of metaphysical inquiry, as the knowledge of *facts*, commonly so called, is the only solid basis of natural philosophy.

To say that the operations of the mind and the operations of matter are in reality the same, so that we may always make the one exponents of the other, is to assume the very point in dispute, not only without any evidence, but in defiance of every appearance to the contrary. Lord Bacon was undoubtedly a great man, indeed one of

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the greatest that have adorned this or any other country. He was a man of a clear and active spirit, of a most fertile genius, of vast designs, of general knowledge, and of profound wisdom. He united the powers of imagination and understanding in a greater degree than almost any other writer. He was one of the strongest instances of those men, who by the rare privilege of their nature are at once poets and philosophers, and see equally into both worlds. The schoolmen and their followers attended to nothing but essences and species, to laboured analyses and artificial deductions. They seem to have alike disregarded both kinds of experience, that relating to external objects, and that relating to the observation of our own internal feelings. From the imperfect state of knowledge, they had not a sufficient number of facts to guide them in their experimental researches; and intoxicated with the novelty of their vain distinctions, taught by rote, they would be tempted to despise the clearest and most obvious suggestions of their own minds. Subtile, restless, and self-sufficient, they thought that truth was only made to be disputed about, and existed no where but in their demonstrations and syllogisms. Hence arose their 'logomachy'—their everlasting word-fights, their sharp debates, their captious, bootless controversies.

As Lord Bacon expresses it, 'they were made fierce with dark keeping,' signifying that their angry and unintelligible contests with one another were owing to their not having any distinct objects to engage their attention. They built altogether on their own whims and fancies, and buoyed up by their specific levity, they mounted in their airy disputations in endless flights and circles, clamouring like birds of prey, till they equally lost sight of truth and nature. This great man therefore intended an essential service to philosophy, in wishing to recall the attention to facts and 'experience' which had been almost entirely neglected; and thus, by incorporating the abstract with the concrete, and general reasoning with individual observation, to give to our conclusions that solidity and firmness which they must otherwise always want. He did nothing but insist on the necessity of 'experience,' more particularly in natural science; and from the wider field that is open to it there, as well as the prodigious success it has met with, this latter application of the word, in which it is tantamount to physical experiment, has so far engrossed the whole of our attention, that mind has for a good while past been in some danger of being overlaid by matter. We run from one error into another; and as we were wrong at first, so in altering our course, we have turned about to the opposite extreme. We despised 'experience' altogether before; now we would have nothing but 'experience,' and that of the grossest kind.

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We have, it is true, gained much by not consulting the suggestions of our own minds in questions where they inform us of nothing; namely, in the particular laws and phenomena of the natural world; and we have hastily concluded, reversing the rule, that the best way to arrive at the knowledge of ourselves also, was to lay aside the dictates of our own consciousness, thoughts, and feelings, as deceitful and insufficient guides, though they are the only means by which we can obtain the least light upon the subject. We seem to have resigned the natural use of our understandings, and to have given up our own existence as a nonentity. We look for our thoughts and the distinguishing properties of our minds in some image of them in matter, as we look to see our faces in a glass. We no longer decide physical problems by logical dilemmas, but we decide questions of logic by the evidences of the senses. Instead of putting our reason and invention to the rack indifferently on all questions, whether we have any previous knowledge of them or not, we have adopted the easier method of suspending the use of our faculties altogether, and settling tedious controversies by means of 'four champions fierce—hot, cold, moist and dry,' who with a few more of the retainers and hangers on of matter determine all questions relating to the nature of man and the limits of the human understanding very learnedly. That which we seek however, namely, the nature of the mind and the laws by which we think, feel, and act, we must discover in the mind itself or not at all. The mind has laws, powers, and principles of its own, and is not the mere puppet of matter. This general bias in favour of mechanical reasoning and physical experiment, which was the consequence of the previous total neglect of them in matters where they were strictly necessary, was strengthened by the powerful aid of Hobbes, who was indeed the father of the modern philosophy. His strong mind and body appear to have resisted all impressions but those which were derived from the downright blows of matter: all his ideas seemed to lie like substances in his brain: what was not a solid, tangible, distinct, palpable object was to him nothing. The external image pressed so close upon his mind that it destroyed the power of consciousness, and left no room for attention to any thing but itself. He was by nature a materialist. Locke assisted greatly in giving popularity to the same scheme, as well by espousing many of Hobbes's metaphysical principles as by the doubtful resistance which he made to the rest. And it has been perfected and has received its last polish and roundness in the hands of some French philosophers, as Condillac and others. It has been generally supposed that Mr. Locke was the first person who, in his 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' established the modern metaphysical system on a solid and immoveable basis. This

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is a great mistake. The system, such as it is, existed entire in all its general principles in Hobbes before him ; this was never unequivocally or explicitly avowed by the author of the ' Essay on the Human Understanding.' Locke merely endeavoured to accommodate Hobbes's leading principle to the more popular opinions of the time ; and all that succeeding writers have done to improve upon his system, and clear it of inconsistent and extraneous matter, has only tended to reduce it back to the purity and simplicity in which it is to be found in Hobbes. The immediate and professed object of both these writers is indeed the same, namely, to account for our ideas and the formation of the human understanding from sensible impressions. But in the execution of this design, Mr. Locke has deviated widely and at almost every step from his predecessor. This difference would almost unavoidably arise from the natural character of their minds, which were the most opposite conceivable. Hobbes had the utmost reliance on himself, and was impatient of the least doubt or contradiction. He saw from the beginning to the end of his system. He is always therefore on firm ground, and never once swerves from his object. He is at no pains to remove objections, or soften consequences. Granting his first principle, all the rest follows of course. There is an air of grandeur in the stern confidence with which he stands alone in the world of his own opinions, regardless of his contemporaries, and conscious that he is the founder of a new race of thinkers. Locke, on the other hand, was a man, who without the same comprehensive grasp of thought had a greater deference for the opinions of others, and was of a much more cautious and circumspect turn of mind. He could not but meet with many things in the peremptory assertions of Hobbes that must make him pause, that he would be at a loss to reconcile to an attentive observation of what passed in his own mind, and that would equally shock the prevailing notions both of the learned and the ignorant. He was therefore led to consider the different objections to the system which had been left unanswered and unnoticed, to make a compromise between the received doctrines, and the violent paradoxes contained in the ' Leviathan ' and the ' Treatise of Human Nature ;' or to admit these last with so many qualifications, with so much circumlocution and preparation, and after such an appearance of the most mature and candid examination, and of willingness to be convinced on the other side of the question, as to obviate the offensive and harsh effect which accompanies the abrupt dogmatism of the original author. It was perhaps necessary that the opinions of Hobbes should undergo this sort of metamorphosis before they could gain a hearing : as the direct rays of the sun must be blunted and refracted by passing through some denser medium in order to

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be borne by common eyes. So sheathed and softened, their sharp, unpleasant points taken off, his doctrines almost immediately met with a favourable reception, and became popular. The general principle being once established without its particular consequences, and the public mind assured, it was soon found an easy task to point out the inconsistency of Mr. Locke's reasoning in many respects, and to give a more decided tone to his philosophical system. Berkeley was one of the first who tried the experiment of pushing his principles into the verge of paradox on the question of abstract ideas, which he has done with admirable dexterity and clearness, but without going beyond the explicitness of Hobbes on the same question. Subsequent writers added different chapters to supply the deficiencies of the *Essay*, which, with scarcely a single exception, may be found essentially comprized in that institute and digest of modern philosophy, our author's '*Leviathan*.'

In thus giving the praise of originality and force of mind to Hobbes, and regarding Locke merely as his follower, I may be thought to venture on dangerous ground, or to lay unhallowed hands on a reputation which is dear to every lover of truth. But if something is due to fame, something is also due to justice. I confess however, that having brought this charge against the '*Essay on the Human Understanding*,' I am bound to make it good in the fullest manner; otherwise, I shall be inexcusable.

What I therefore propose in the remainder of the present Lecture is to shew that Mr. Locke was not really the founder of the modern system of philosophy as it respects the human mind; and I shall think that I have sufficiently established this point, if I can make it appear, both that the principle itself on which that system rests, and all the striking consequences which have been deduced from it, are to be found in the writings of Hobbes, more clearly, decidedly, and forcibly expressed than they are in the '*Essay on the Human Understanding*.' When I speak of the principle of the modern metaphysical system, I mean the assumption that the operations of the intellect are only a continuation of the impulses existing in matter, or that all the thoughts and conceptions of the mind are nothing more nor less than various modifications of the original impressions of things on a being endued with sensation or simple perception. This system considers ideas merely as they are caused by external objects, acting on the organs of sense, and tries to account for them on that hypothesis solely. It is upon this principle of excluding the understanding as a distinct faculty or power from all share in its own operations, that the whole of Hobbes's reasoning proceeds. Let us see what he makes of it.

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The first part of the 'Leviathan,' entitled 'Of Man,' begins in this manner :

CHAPTER I.—OF SENSE.—'Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them, first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us ; which is commonly called an *object* : Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of man's body ; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

'The Original of them all is that which we call SENSE : For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.

'The cause of sense is the external body or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately as in the taste and touch, or mediately as in seeing, hearing, and smelling : which pressure by the mediation of nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain and Heart, causeth there a resistance or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself : which endeavour, because *outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense : and consisteth to the eye, in a light or colour figured ; to the ear, in a sound ; to the nostril, in an odour ; to the tongue and palate, in a savour, and to the rest of the body in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities, as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called *sensible* are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they any thing else but divers motions ; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking as dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye maketh us fancy a light, and pressing the ear produceth a din, so do the bodies also we see or hear produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we see they are : where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another, and though at some certain distance, the real and very object seems invested with the fancy it begets in us ; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy ; caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

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‘ But the Philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine ; and say, For the cause of vision, that the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a *visible species* (in English), a *visible shew*, *apparition*, *aspect*, or *being seen* ; the receiving whereof into the eye, is *seeing*. And for the cause of *hearing*, that the thing heard sendeth forth an *audible species*, that is, an *audible aspect*, or *audible being seen* ; which, entering at the ear, maketh *hearing*. Nay, for the cause of *understanding* also, they say the thing understood sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is an *intelligible being seen* ; which coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this as disapproving the use of universities : but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them ; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.’—*Leviathan*, p. 4.

Thus far our author. It is evident that in this account he has laid the foundation of Berkeley’s ideal system, though he does not seem any where to have gone the whole length of that doctrine. He has entered more at large into this point in the ‘ Discourse of Human Nature,’ published in 1640, ten years before the ‘ *Leviathan* ’ ; and as the subject is curious, and treated in a very decisive way, I will quote the concluding passage, which is a recapitulation of the rest.

‘ As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object as hath been described ; so neither is sound in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is, that as a man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by multiplication of echoes, which echoes are sounds as well as the original, and not being in one and the same place, cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them. And to proceed to the rest of the senses, it is apparent enough that the smell and taste of the same thing are not the same to every man, and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted, but in the men. So likewise the heat we feel from the fire is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the heat which is in the fire : for our heat is pleasure or pain, according as it is great or moderate ; but in the coal there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last proposition is proved ; *viz.* That as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from other senses, the subject of their inherence is not in the object, but in the sentient. And from hence also it followeth that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they be not there, but are seeming and apparitions only : the things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense, which also is to

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be by sense corrected : for as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object ; so also sense telleth me when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.'—*Human Nature*, chap. ii. p. 9.

The second chapter of the 'Leviathan' contains an account of the manner in which our ideas are generated, and is as follows :

'That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same (namely, that nothing can change itself) is not so easily assented to. For men measure not only other men, but all other things by themselves ; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord ; little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schools say, heavy bodies fall downward out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them : ascribing appetite and knowledge of what is good for their conservation (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.

'When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally : and whatsoever hindereth it, cannot in an instant, but in time and by degrees quite extinguish it. And as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after ; so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man then, when he sees, hears, &c. For after the object is removed or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call *imagination*, from the image made in seeing ; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy* ; which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination is therefore nothing but *decaying sense* ; and is found in man and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.

'The decay of sense in men waking is an obscuring of it in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars, which stars do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible, therefore the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it

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made in us remain ; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak ; as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it follows, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any objects the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved : so that distance of time and of place hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as voices grow weak and inarticulate, so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak ; and we lose (for example) of cities we have seen many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy itself) we call *Imagination*, as I said before : but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old and past, it is called *Memory*. So that imagination and memory are but one thing which for divers considerations hath divers names. Much memory or memory of many things is called *Experience*.

‘ Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times, the former (which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense) is *simple imagination* ; as when one imagineth a man or horse which he hath seen before. The other is *compounded*, as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man ; as when a man conceives himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which happeneth often to them which are much taken with the reading of Romaunts) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind.

‘ There be also other imaginations that rise in man, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense : as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after ; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark (though awake) have the image of lines and angles before his eyes : which kind of fancy hath no particular name ; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men's discourse.

‘ The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams : and these also (as all other imaginations) have been before, either totally or by parcels in the sense, and because the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as

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not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination; and therefore no dream but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man's body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often, nor constantly think of the same persons, places, subjects, and actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts dreaming, as at other times; and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts,—I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dream not; though when I dream, I think myself awake.'—*Leviathan*, pp. 4, 5, 6.

The concluding paragraph of this Chapter is remarkable.

'The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call *Understanding*: and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call or rating of his master, and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter.'—Page 8.

As in the first two chapters Mr. Hobbes endeavours to shew that all our thoughts, considered singly or in themselves, have their origin in sensation, so in the next chapter, he resolves all their combinations or connexions one with another into the principle of association, or the coexistence of their sensible impressions.

'By consequence or train of thoughts,' he says, 'I understand that succession of one thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from discourse in words) *mental discourse*.'

'When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after it is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense in whole or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof

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we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in sense: and those motions that succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next. Only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.'—Page 9.

The comprehension and precision with which the law of association is here unfolded as the key to every movement of the mind, and as regulating every wandering thought, cannot be too much admired; it is enough to say that Hartley, who certainly understood more of the power of association than any other man, has added nothing to this short passage, as far as relates to the succession of ideas. He has indeed extended its application in unravelling the fine web of our affections and feelings, by shewing how one idea transfers the feeling of pleasure or pain to others associated with it, which is not here noticed. Whether this principle really has all the extent and efficacy ascribed to it by either of these writers will be made the subject of a future inquiry. How well our author understood the question, and how much it had assumed a consistent and systematic form in his mind will appear from the instances he brings in illustration of this intricate and at the time almost unthought-of subject.

'The train of thoughts or mental discourse is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself as the end and scope of some desire or other passion; in which case the thoughts are said to wander and seem impertinent one to another as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not only without company, but also without care of any thing: though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony, as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man, or in tune to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oftentimes perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thoughts of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies;

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the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick.

'The second' [that is the second sort of association] 'is more constant, as being regulated by some desire, and design. For the impression made by such things as we desire or fear, is strong and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return; so strong it is sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of what we aim at: and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean, and so continually till we come to some beginning within our own power.'

He adds,—'This train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: one, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes or means that produce it; and this is common to man and beast. The other is when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced: that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking or the faculty of invention, which the Latins call *sagacitas* and *solertia*, a finding out of the causes of some effect, present or past; or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows, which kind of thoughts is called foresight, and prudence or providence; and sometimes wisdom; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past than another; by so much also he is more prudent; and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience; but not with certainty enough, and though it be called prudence when the event answereth our expectation, yet in its own nature it is but

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presumption ; for the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come : from him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser ; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at ; for he hath most signs to guess by.'—Page 10.

After this account he immediately adds,—

'There is no other act of man's mind that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired, and increased by study and industry ; and of most men learned by instruction and discipline ; and proceed all from the invention of words and speech : for besides sense and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion, though by the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.'—Page 11.

The conclusion of this chapter in which the author treats of the limits of the imagination is too important, and has laid the foundation of too many speculations, to be passed over. 'Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea, or conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude ; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named ; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability : and therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible and his greatness and power are inconceivable) but that we may honour him. And because whatsoever we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man, therefore, can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place, and indued with some determinate magnitude, and which may be divided into parts ; not that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time ; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once : for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident to sense ; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all), from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolmen.'—Page 11.

By the extracts which I shall next borrow from his account of language and reasoning, it will appear that our author not only threw out the first hints of the modern system, which reduces all reasoning

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and understanding to the mechanism of language, but that by a very high kind of abstraction, he carried it to perfection at once. The whole race of plodding commentators, or dashing paradox-mongers since his time have not advanced a step beyond him. I shall give this part somewhat at large, both because the question is intricate in itself, and as it will serve as a specimen of his general mode of writing, in which dry sarcasm, keen observation, extensive thought, and the most rigid logic conveyed in a concise and masterly style, are all brought to bear upon the same object.

‘The invention of printing,’ he says, ‘though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say, was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, King of Phœnicia. A profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many and distant regions of the earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them; but the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of speech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexions; whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the scripture goeth no farther in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood, and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of: for I do not find any thing in the scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words and speech, as, general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which are useful; and least of all, of entity, intentionality, quiddity, and other insignificant words of the school.

‘The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of names, and the connexion of them. Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing; as *Peter, John, this man, this tree*: and some are

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common to many things; *man, horse, tree*; every of which though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things: in respect of all which together, it is called an universal; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many. By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example: a man that hath no use of speech at all, that is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it: but if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three and that that was all for which he named it a triangle, will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms: every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule; discharges our mental reckoning of time and place; delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places. But the use of words in registering our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as *one, two, and three*, may observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say *one, one*; but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use, and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeds, that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he hath done: much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the

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reckoning whereof is necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.'—*Leviathan*, chap. iv., pp. 12, 14.

The same train of reasoning occurs in the 'Discourse of Human Nature,' with some variation in the expression.

'By the advantage of names it is that we are capable of science, which beasts for want of them are not; nor man, without the use of them; for as a beast misseeth not one or two out of her many young ones, for want of those names of order, *one*, *two*, and *three*, and which we call *number*; so neither would a man without repeating orally or mentally those words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him. Seeing there be many conceptions of one and the same thing, and that for every conception we give it a several name, it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of *just*, *valiant*, *strong*, *comely*, &c. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellations: as to all things we *see* we give the name of *visible*. Those names we give to many, are called universal to them all: as the name of *man* to every particular of mankind. Such appellations as we give to one only thing, we call individual, or singular; as *Socrates* and other proper names, or by circumlocution, *He that writ the Iliads*, for *Homer*.

'The universality of one name to many things hath been the cause that men think the *things* are themselves universal: and so seriously contend that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, *viz.* *Man in general*, deceiving themselves by taking the universal or general appellation for the thing it signifieth. For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say of a man in general, he meaneth no more but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are or have been or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the king or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain therefore there is nothing universal but names, which are therefore called indefinite, because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth, as when we say, *This man*, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or in some such way.'—*Human Nature*, chap. v. pp. 25, 26.

We shall have occasion to see, in the course of this inquiry, how exactly Berkeley's account of the process of abstraction, in con-

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tradition to Locke's opinion, corresponds in every particular with this passage of our author. To return to his account of truth, reason, &c.

'When two names are joined together into a consequence or affirmation, by the help of this little verb, *is*, as thus: *a man is a living creature*; if the latter name, *living creature*, signify all that the former name, *man*, signifieth, then the affirmation or consequence is true; otherwise false. For True and False are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood. Error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

'Seeing, then, that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly: or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs. And therefore in Geometry (which is the only science that it has pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind) men begin at settling the significations of their words, which settling of significations they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors, and either to correct them when they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the errors of definition multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities which they at last see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from the beginning. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not, and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books, as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names, lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science, and in wrong or no definitions lies the first abuse, from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make them that take their instruction from the authority of books and not from their own meditations, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of

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language, so they become more wise or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, a Thomas Aquinas, or any other doctor whatsoever.

' Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account, and be added one thing to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money *rationes*, and accounting, *ratiocinatio*, and that which we in bills or books of accounts call *items*, they call *nomina*, or names; and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the word *ratio* to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, λογος for both speech and reason, not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reason without speech: and the act of reasoning they call syllogism, which signifieth summing up (or putting together) the consequences of one saying to another. For reason is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying them, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men.

' And as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves may, often err, and cast up false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions: not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art. But no one man's reason, nor the reason of any number of men makes the certainty: no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And, therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator or judge, so it is in all debates of what kind soever: and when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men as it is in play, after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies, betraying their want of right reason by the claim they lay to it.

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‘When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things (as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it), if that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called error, to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an absurdity or senseless speech. For error is but a deception in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come, of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call absurd, insignificant, and nonsense. And, therefore, if a man should talk to me of a *round quadrangle*, or *accidents of bread in cheese*, or *immaterial substances*, or of a *free subject*, a *free will*, or any *free* but free from being hindered by opposition; I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.’—Chap. iv. v., pp. 15, 18, &c.

The account of the passions and affections which follows next in order, is the same in almost every particular as that which is given in modern treatises on this subject, except that Mr. Hobbes seems to make curiosity or the desire of knowledge, an original passion of the mind, peculiar to man. From this part I shall only quote two passages, and then proceed to his treatise on the ‘*Doctrine of Necessity*,’ which will conclude my account of this author.

The first passage is the one from which Locke has copied his famous definition of the difference between wit and judgment. After observing (Chap. viii.) that the difference of men’s talents does not depend on natural capacity, which, he says, is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little from one another, or from brutes, that it is not worth the reckoning, he goes on :

‘This difference of quickness in imagining is caused by the difference of men’s passions, that love and dislike, some one thing, some another, and therefore some men’s thoughts run one way, some another, and are held to and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another or in what they be unlike—those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a good wit, by which is meant on this occasion a good fancy. But they that observe their differences and dissimilitudes, which is called distinguishing and discerning and judging

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between thing and thing, in case such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good judgment; and particularly, in matter of conversation and business, wherein times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this virtue is called discretion. The former, that is, fancy, without the help of judgment, is not commended for a virtue, but the latter, which is judgment or discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy,' p. 32. This definition, which Locke took entire from our author without acknowledgment, and which has been so often referred to, is evidently false, for as Harris, the author of 'Hermes,' has very well observed, the finding out the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right ones would upon the principle here stated, be a piece of wit instead of an act of the understanding or judgment, and 'Euclid's Elements' a collection of epigrams.¹ The other passage which I propose to quote chiefly as an instance of our author's power of imagination, is as follows. In speaking of the degree of madness, as in fanatics and others, he says:

'Though the effect of folly in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired be not always visible in one man, by any very extravagant action that proceedeth from such passion, yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what greater argument of madness can there be than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom, all their lifetime before, they have been protected and secured from injury. And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity, so also though we perceive no great unquietness in one

¹ The passage in Locke is as follows:

'If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts, in this of having them unconfused and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists in a great measure the exactness of judgment and clearness of reason, which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment, or deepest reason. For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting them together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment on the contrary lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another.'—*Locke's Essay*, vol. i. p. 143.

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or two men, yet we may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation.' Even Mr. Burke did not disdain to borrow one of Hobbes's images. The author of the 'Leviathan' compares those who attempt to reform a decayed commonwealth to 'the foolish daughters of Pelias who desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man.'

I think this is better expressed than the same allusion in Burke, which is I dare say well known to my readers.

I shall not here enter into the doctrine of Liberty and Necessity, which Hobbes has stated with great force and precision as a general question of cause and effect, and without any particular reference to his mechanical theory of the mind, as I shall fully investigate this subject in another Lecture.

I have thus taken a review of the metaphysical writings of Hobbes, as far as was necessary to establish what I at first proposed, namely, the general conformity, and almost entire coincidence between his opinions, and the principles of the modern system of philosophy. The praise of originality at least, of boldness and vigour of mind, belongs to him. The strength of reason which his application of a general principle to explain almost all the phenomena of human nature implies, can hardly be surpassed. The truth of the system is another question, which I shall hereafter proceed to consider.

I will first, however, distinctly enumerate the leading principles of this philosophy, as they are to be found in Hobbes, and in the latest writers of the same School. They are, I conceive, as follows :

1. That all our ideas are derived from external objects, by means of the senses alone.

2. That as nothing exists out of the mind but matter and motion, so it is itself with all its operations nothing but matter and motion.

3. That thoughts are single, or that we can think of only one object at a time. In other words, that there is no comprehensive power or faculty of understanding in the mind.

4. That we have no general or abstract ideas.

5. That the only principle of connexion between one thought and another is association, or their previous connexion in sense.

6. That reason and understanding depend entirely on the mechanism of language.

- 7 and 8. That the sense of pleasure and pain is the sole spring of action, and self-interest the source of all our affections.

9. That the mind acts from a mechanical or physical necessity, over which it has no controul, and consequently is not a moral or

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accountable agent.—The manner of stating and reasoning upon this point is the only circumstance of importance in which modern writers differ from Hobbes.

10. That there is no difference in the natural capacities of men, the mind being originally passive to all impressions alike, and becoming whatever it is from circumstances.

All of these positions it is my intention to oppose to the utmost of my ability. Except the first, they are most or all of them either denied or doubtfully admitted by Locke. And as it is his admission of the first principle which has opened a door, directly or indirectly, to all the rest, I shall devote the next Lecture to an examination of the account which he gives of the origin of our ideas from sensation.

It may perhaps be thought, that the neglect into which Hobbes's metaphysical opinions have fallen was originally owing to the obloquy excited by the misanthropy and despotical tendency of his political writings. But it seems to me that he has been almost as hardly dealt with in the one case as in the other.

As to his principles of government, this may at least be said for them, that they are in form and appearance very much the same with those detailed long after in Rousseau's 'Social Contract,' and evidently suggested the plan of that work, which has never been considered as a defence of tyranny. The author indeed requires an absolute submission in the subject to the laws, but then it is to be in consequence of his own consent to obey them. Every man is at least *supposed* to be his own lawgiver.

Secondly, as to the misanthropy with which he is charged, for having made fear the actual foundation and cement of civil society, he has I think made his own apology very satisfactorily in these words :

'It may seem strange to some man that hath not well weighed these things, that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another ; and he may therefore, not trusting to the inference made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself—when taking a journey he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied ; when going to sleep he locks his doors ; when even in his house, he locks his chests, and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed to revenge all injuries that shall be done him ;—what opinion, I say, he has of his fellow subjects when he rides armed, of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors, and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not then accuse mankind as much by his actions as I do by my words ? Yet neither of us accuse man's nature in it.'—*Leviathan*, p. 62.

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It is true the bond of civil government, according to his account, is very different from Burke's '*soft collar of social esteem*,' and takes away the sentimental part of politics. But I confess I see nothing liberal in this 'order of thoughts,' as Hobbes elsewhere expresses it, 'the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge and the gallows,' which is nevertheless a good description of the nature and end of political institutions.

The true reason of the fate which this author's writings met with was that his views of things were too original and comprehensive to be immediately understood, without passing through the hands of several successive generations of commentators and interpreters. Ignorance of another's meaning is a sufficient cause of fear, and fear produces hatred: hence arose the rancour and suspicion of his adversaries, who, to quote some fine lines of Spenser,

— 'Stood all astonied like a sort of steers
'Mongst whom some beast of strange and foreign race
Unawares is chanced, far straying from his peers :
So did their ghastly gaze betray their hidden fears.'

ON LOCKE'S 'ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING'

THIS work owes its present rank among philosophical productions, to its embodiment of the great principle first brought forward by Hobbes. All its author's attempts to modify this principle or reconcile it to common notions have been gradually exploded, and have given place to the more severe and logical deductions of Hobbes from the same general principle. Mr. Locke took the faculties of the mind as he found them in himself and others, and endeavoured to account for them on a *new principle*. By this compromise with candour and common sense, he prepared the way for the introduction of the principle, which being once established, very soon overturned all the trite opinions and vulgar prejudices which were improperly associated with it. There was in fact no place for them in the new system.

The great defect with which the 'Essay on the Human Understanding' is chargeable is, that there is not really a word about the nature of the understanding in it, nor any attempt to shew what it is or whether it is or is not any thing, distinct from the faculty of simple perception. The operations of thinking, comparing, discerning, reasoning, willing, and the like, which Mr. Locke ascribes to it, are the operations of nothing, or of I know not what. All the force of

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his mind seems to have been so bent on exploding innate ideas, and tracing our thoughts to their external source, that he either forgot or had not leisure to examine what the internal principle of all thought is. He took for his basis a bad simile—that the mind is like a blank sheet of paper, originally void of all characters whatever; for this, though true as far as relates to innate ideas, that is, to any impressions actually existing in it, is not true of the mind itself, which is not like a sheet of paper, the passive receiver and retainer of the impressions made upon it. The inference from this simile has however been that the understanding is nothing in itself, nor the cause of any thing; never acting, but always acted upon; that it is but a convenient repository for the straggling images of things, a sort of empty room into which ideas are conveyed from without through the doors of the senses, as you would carry goods into an unfurnished lodging; and hence it has been found necessary by succeeding writers to get rid of those different faculties and operations which Mr. Locke elsewhere allows to belong to the mind, but which are in truth only compatible with the active powers and independent nature of the understanding. I will first state Mr. Locke's account of the origin of our ideas in his own words, and will then endeavour to shew in what that account is defective; that is, what other act or faculty of the mind I conceive to be necessary to the formation of our ideas, besides sensation or simple perception. After employing eighty pages in a very laborious, and for the most part sensible refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas, which was popular at the time, but which Hobbes has not deigned to notice, their impossibility being implied in the general principle that all our ideas are derived from the senses, Mr. Locke proceeds in the second book to treat of Ideas, and their origin. He then says:

‘Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, such as those expressed by the words, *whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness*, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired how he comes by them. I know it is a received doctrine that men have native ideas and original characters stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already: but I suppose what I have said will be much more easily admitted when I have shewn whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind, for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes

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it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, in an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. . . .

‘First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

‘Secondly, the other fountain from whence experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got: which operations when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without: and such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. . . . These two I say, *viz.* external, material things, as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.’

‘The understanding,’ proceeds Mr. Locke, ‘seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain

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all our whole stock of ideas : and that we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in one of these two ways.'—*Essay*, vol. I, p. 84.

Again, page 150, he says :

'I pretend not to teach but to inquire, and therefore cannot but confess here again, that external and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet, wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without : would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.'

This account of the origin of every thing that exists in the mind differs from the simplicity of Hobbes's system, and of the modern philosophy, in supposing that there is another distinct source of ideas, besides sensation, namely, reflection on the operations of our own minds. I confess this addition appears to me to be very awkwardly and inartificially made. For, in the first place, it is obvious to remark that in most at least, if not all the instances enumerated by the author, the operations themselves are the proper and immediate sources of our ideas, not this kind of reflection on them, which seems to be nothing but the repetition or recollection of the first conscious impression, the perception of a perception. For example, Mr. Locke includes among operations of our own minds 'some sort of passions arising from our ideas,' *i.e.* as he explains it, the sense of pleasure and pain. Now it is surely a little preposterous to make, not the original feeling itself, but the after consideration or reflection on that feeling, the source of our idea of pleasure or pain. In this sense, reflection must be the source of all our ideas, whether of external objects, or the operations of our own minds, for in the same sense it may be argued, that the first impression of a sensible object is not the source of the idea we have of it, till the soul comes to reflect on and consider that original impression. But it might be said with equal propriety, that we have one source of ideas, *viz.* sensation, and another source of ideas, *viz.* ideas. From the view which Mr. Locke has here taken of the subject, though the passions, or the satisfaction and uneasiness attending certain things are ranked among the operations of the mind, yet it is not quite clear whether we are supposed to have any consciousness of them or not ; whether they are not as remote from any thing like perception, as the lifeless objects without us, till coming to be afterwards reflected on and taken notice of by

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the mind, they furnish the understanding with a new set of ideas. The same reasoning may be applied to the other operations of perception, thinking, &c. for it seems to me that the original act of perceiving or thinking is the source of my idea of those mental operations, just as the first impression of any sensible object is the source of my idea of that object. Not sensation and reflection, therefore, but sensation and the operations of our own minds are more properly the sources of our ideas, that is, these two furnish materials for our reflection. I should not have dwelt so long upon this distinction, which may be thought of little importance in itself, but that I believe it has led to most of the errors of the 'Essay.' For in consequence of separating the operations of the mind in a manner from the mind itself, and making them exist only as objects for its contemplation, Mr. Locke has been satisfied with considering those operations as acting upon the mind like external things, not as emanating from it. Thus, by a general formula, all our ideas of every kind are represented as communicated to the mind by something foreign to it, instead of growing out of, and being a part of its own nature and essence.

Secondly, another objection to this division of our ideas into those of sensation and reflection is, that it does not differ in any decisive manner from the more simple statement of Hobbes and others, who derive all our ideas from sensation. For by sensation these writers do not understand merely the external image, but the perception or feeling which accompanies it, and they contend that all our other ideas are continuations, modifications, or different arrangements of the original impressions, produced by objects on the senses. Now there is nothing in the extract above given to disprove this statement : and if so, the original hypothesis will remain in its full force. Indeed Mr. Locke himself does not seem to have made up his mind, whether it were so or not. For though he speaks of the mind as furnishing the understanding with ideas, and with the materials of reason and knowledge, and enumerates and explains the several operations of the mind in comparing, distinguishing, &c. yet he elsewhere speaks of ideas as existing in the understanding like pictures in a gallery, or as if the whole process of the intellect were resolvable into the power of receiving, retaining, carrying, and transposing the gross materials furnished by the senses. In this case, I think the simplest way at once is to make sensation the foundation of all our other ideas and faculties. For my own part, the reason why I cannot assent to this doctrine is, that I believe there is another act or faculty of the mind implied in all our ideas, for which neither sensation nor any of its modes can ever account, and which I shall here proceed to explain.

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The principle which I shall attempt to prove is, that ideas are the offspring of the understanding, not of the senses. By a sensation is meant the perception produced by the impression of the several parts of an outward object, each by itself, on the correspondent parts of an organised sentient being: by an idea I mean the conception produced by a number of these together on the same conscious principle. Besides the succession or juxta-position of different sensible impressions, I suppose that there is a common principle of thought, a superintending faculty, which alone perceives the relations of things, and enables us to comprehend their connexions, forms, and masses. This faculty is properly the understanding, and it is by means of this faculty that man indeed becomes a reasonable soul. What has led more than any thing else to the exclusion of the understanding as a distinct faculty of the mind, and to the principle of resolving the acts of judging, reasoning, &c., into mere association, or succession of ideas, has been the considering ideas themselves, or those particular objects which are marked by one name, or strike at once upon the senses, as *simple things*. Mr. Locke, it is true, has avoided this error as far as relates to our ideas of substances, but he reckons among simple ideas of the qualities of things several ideas, which are evidently complex, such as extension, figure, motion, and number. Hence, having laid in a certain stock of ideas without the necessity of the understanding, it was thought an easy matter to build up the whole structure of the human mind without it, as we build a house with stones. The method, therefore, which I shall take to establish the point I have in view, will be by shewing that there is no one of these simple ideas, or ideas of particular things, which are made the foundation of all the rest, that is not itself an aggregate of many things, or that can subsist a moment but in the understanding. I can conceive of a being endued with the power of sensation, or simple perception, so as to receive the direct impressions of things, and also with memory, so as to retain them for any length of time, as they were severally and unconnectedly presented, yet without the smallest degree of understanding, or without ever having so much as a single thought. The state of such a being would be that of animal life, and something more with the addition of memory, but it would not amount to intellect; which implies, besides actual, living impressions, the power of perceiving their relations to one another, of comparing and contrasting them, and of regarding the different parts of any object as making one whole. Without this 'discourse of reason,' this surrounding and forming power, we could never have the idea of a single object, as of a table or a chair, a blade of grass, or a grain of sand. Every one of these includes a certain configuration, hardness, colour,

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&c., *i.e.* ideas of different things, received by different senses, which must be put together by the understanding before they can be referred to any particular thing, or considered as one idea. Without this faculty, all our ideas would be necessarily decomposed, and crumbled down into their original elements and fluxional parts. We could assuredly never carry on a chain of reasoning on any subject, for the very links of which this chain must consist would be ground to powder. There would be an infinite divisibility in the impressions of the mind, as well as in the objects of matter. There would be a total want of union, fellowship, and mutual intelligence between them, for each impression must remain absolutely simple and distinct, unknown to, and unconscious of the rest, shut up in the narrow cell of its own individuality. No two of these atomic impressions could ever club together to form even a sensible point, much less should we be able to arrive at any of the larger masses, or nominal descriptions of things. The most that sensation could possibly do for us, would be to furnish us with the ideas of what Mr. Locke calls the simple qualities of objects, as of colour or pressure, though not as a general notion or diffused feeling; for it is certain that no one idea could ever contain more than the tinge of a single ray of light, or the puncture of a single particle of matter. Let us, however, for a moment suppose that the several parts of objects are to be considered as individual things, or ideal units; and then see whether, without the cementing power of the understanding, we shall be able to conceive of them as forming a complete whole, or any one entire object. Thus we may have a notion of the legs and arms of a chair as so many distinct, positive things; but without the power of perceiving them together in their several proportions and situations, we could not have the idea of a chair as one thing, or as a piece of furniture, intended for a particular use. It is the mind (if I may be allowed such an expression) that makes up the idea of the chair, and fits it together: that is in this case the cabinet-maker, who unites the loose, disjointed parts, and makes them one firm and well-compacted object. I might instance to the same purpose a statue. Will any one say, that if the head and limbs and different parts of a fine statue were to be taken asunder, broken in pieces, and strewed about the floor, and first shewn to him in that state, he would have the same idea of the beauty, proportions, posture, and effect of the whole, as if he had seen it in its original state? But the idea which such a person might have of the statue in this way would be completeness and harmony itself, compared with any idea which could result from the sensible impression of the several parts. For he might still in fancy piece together the broken, mutilated fragments, prop up the limbs, set the head upon the shoulders, and

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make out a crazy image of the whole ; but without the understanding reacting on the senses, and informing the eye with judgment and knowledge, there would be no possibility whatever of comparing the different impressions received : no one part could have the slightest reference to any other part or to the whole ; there would be no principle of cohesion left : we might have an infinite number of microscopic impressions and fractions of ideas, but there being nothing to unite them together, the most perfect grace and symmetry would be only one mass of unmeaning, unconscious confusion. All nature, all objects, all parts of all objects would be equally 'without form and void.' *The mind alone is formative*, to use the expression of a great German writer ; or it is that alone which by its pervading and elastic energy unfolds and expands our ideas, that gives order and consistency to them, that assigns to every part its proper place, and fixes it there, and that frames the idea of the whole. Or, in other words, it is the understanding alone that perceives relation, but every object is made up of relation. In short, there is no object or idea which does not consist of a number of parts arranged in a certain manner, but of this arrangement the parts themselves cannot be sensible. To make each part conscious of its relation to the rest is to suppose an infinite number of intellects instead of one ; and to say that a knowledge or perception of each part separately, without a reference to the rest, can produce a conception of the whole ; that is, that a knowledge where no two impressions are or ever can be compared, can include a comparison between them and many others, is a contradiction and an absurdity.

It may be said perhaps, that not the sensation excited by any of the parts of an object separately, but the sum of our sensations, excited by all the parts, produces our idea of the whole. But it is not possible that in a given number of impressions, where the mind never has perception of more than a single part, there should be contained notwithstanding a view of the whole at once. For as a single part cannot of itself represent the whole object, so neither can this part by being actually joined to others, which by the supposition are never perceived to be joined with it, produce that idea, any more than if those other parts had no existence. If the impression of the parts of an object, absolutely and individually considered, were the same thing as the idea of the object, any number of actual impressions, arranged in any manner whatever, would necessarily be the same object. But this is contrary to all fact. For then a curve line, consisting of the same number of points, would not be distinguishable from a straight one, nor a square from a triangle of the same dimensions, and so on. In a being endued only with a power of sensation,

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and supposed to be simple and undivided, there could be no room for more than an individual impression at once. Our sensations must always succeed each other. One thought must have completely passed away, before another could supply its place. Our ideas would leave no traces of themselves, like the bubbles that rise and disappear on the water, or the snow that melts as it falls. There would be nothing in their fugitive, momentary existence to bind them together. Ere we could stop to compare any one impression with any other, it would be lost for ever in the dark abyss of time. Nothing could be connected with any thing else, either co-existing with it, or going before or after it. If on the other hand, we suppose any merely sentient being to be extended and compounded, or to be capable of receiving more than one impression at once, we shall yet gain little by it. Such a sentient being will be nothing but a number of distinct sentient beings. For as in the former instance, no two impressions could co-exist together, so in the latter, though they existed together, there could be no sort of communication between them. They would be absolutely cut off from and exclusive of each other. The mind in attending to any one must be wholly absorbed by it, and insensible of the rest. Our sensations would to every rational purpose be placed as completely out of the sphere of each other's consciousness, as if they were parcel of another intellect, or floated in the region of the moon. That any number of detached, unconnected, actual sensations, impressed on different sentient beings, would not of themselves imply a conception of any one entire object is what every one is ready to grant:—it would be equally clear, that this idea could not arise from the impression of the different parts of an object on the different parts of the same organized, extended, sentient substance, but that in this case we involuntarily transfer our own consciousness to a being incapable of it, and identify these distinct sensible impressions in the same common intellect.

It is strange that Mr. Locke should rank among simple ideas that of number, which he defines to be the idea of unity repeated. But how this idea of successive or distinct units can ever give the idea of repetition unless the former instances are borne in mind, I cannot conceive. There might be a transition from one unit to another, but no addition or aggregate formed. As well might we suppose that a body of an inch diameter by shifting from place to place might enlarge its dimensions to a foot or a mile, as that a succession of units, perceived separately, should produce the complex idea of number. The natural fool that Mr. Hobbes speaks of, may be supposed to observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one: but he could never know what hour it strikes, according to Mr. Hobbes,

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without the use of those names of order, one, two, three, &c. nor according to my notion, without the help of that orderly understanding which first invented those names, and comprehends their meaning. On the material hypothesis, the mind can have but one idea at a time, and the idea of number could never enter into it.

Though Mr. Locke constantly supposes the mind to perceive relations, and explains its operations in reasoning, comparing, &c. on this principle, there is but one place in his work, in which he seems to have been upon the point of discovering that this principle is at the bottom of all our ideas whatever. He says, in the beginning of his chapter on Power, which he classes among simple ideas, and which in my opinion has a much more simple source than that which he assigns to it,—‘I confess power includes in it *some kind of relation* (a relation to action or change), as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not? For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly: and sensible qualities, as colours and smells, what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception? and if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include some kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power I think may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances.’—*Essay*, vol. i. p. 234. That is to say, in other words, the idea of power, which is confessedly complex according to Mr. Locke, as depending on the changes we observe produced in one thing by another, is to pass for a simple idea, because it has as good a right to this denomination as other complex ideas, which are usually classed as simple ones. It is thus that the inquiring mind seems to be always hovering on the brink of truth, but that timidity or indolence, or prejudice, which is both combined, makes us shrink back, unwilling to trust ourselves to the fathomless abyss.

I have thus endeavoured to give some account of what I mean by the understanding, as the principle which is the foundation not only of judgment, reason, choice, and deliberate action, but is included in every idea of the mind, or conception even of sensible objects. I am aware that what I have said may be looked upon as rhapsody and extravagance by the strictest sect of those who are called philosophers. The understanding has been set aside as an awkward incumbrance, since it was conceived practicable to carry on the whole business of

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thought and reason by a succession of external images and sensible points. The fine network of the mind itself, the cords that bind and hold our scattered perceptions together, and form the means of communication between them, are dissolved and vanish before the clear light of modern metaphysics, as the gossamer is dissipated by the sun. The adepts in this system smile at the contradictions involved in the supposition of perceiving the relations between different things, and say that this implies the absurdity that the mind may have two ideas at once, which is with them impossible. Now I shall only contend that if the mind cannot have two ideas at the same time, it can never have any, since all the ideas we know of consist of more than one : and though the consciousness we have of attending to different objects at once, when we compare, judge, reason, will, &c., has been resolved into a deception of the mind in mistaking a rapid succession of objects for one general impression, yet it will hardly be pretended that we deceive ourselves in thinking we have any ideas at all. Mr. Horne Tooke, who is certainly one of the ablest commentators on the doctrines of that school, says that it is as absurd to talk of a complex idea as of a complex star, meaning that our ideas are as perfectly distinct from, and have as little to do with one another, as the stars that compose a constellation. Other writers, to avoid the seeming contradiction of supposing the mind to divide its attention between different objects, have suggested the instant of its passing from one to the other as the true point of comparison between them ; or that the time when it had an idea of both together, was the time when it had an idea of neither. As it was evident that while the mind was entirely taken up with one idea, it could not have any knowledge of another which did not yet exist, or had passed away, and as both impressions cannot be supposed to co-exist in the same conscious understanding (for on this system there is no such faculty), this short, precious interval, this moment of leisure from both, this lucky vacancy of thought, is pitched upon as that in which the mind performs all its functions, and contemplates its various ideas in their absence, as from some vantage ground the traveller stops to survey the country on both sides of him. To such absurdities are ingenious men driven by setting up argument against fact, and denying the most obvious truths for which they cannot account, like the sophist who denied the existence of motion, because he could not understand its nature. It might be deemed a sufficient answer to those who build systems and lay down formal propositions on the principle that the mind can comprehend but one idea at a time, to say that they consequently can have no meaning in what they write, since when they begin a sentence they cannot have the least idea of what will be the

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end of it, and by the time they get to the end of it must totally forget the beginning. 'Peace to all such!'

To shew, however, that I am not quite singular in my notions on this subject of consciousness, and to remove, as I think, every shadow of doubt upon it, I beg leave to refer my readers to two passages, the one in Rousseau, and the other in Abraham Tucker, in support of the almost obsolete prejudice which I have here endeavoured to defend. The one is an argument to prove that judgment and sensation are not the same, in the Vicar's profession of faith in 'Emilius,' and the other is the chapter on the independent existence of mind in the 'Light of Nature Pursued.'

The passage in Rousseau seems evidently to have been intended as an answer to the maxim of Helvetius that *to feel is to judge*, and to his reasoning on this maxim, which is as follows:—

'The question being reduced within these limits, I shall examine at present whether the act of the mind in judging is any thing more than a sensation. When I judge of the size or colour of the objects around me, it is evident that the judgment formed of the different impressions, which these objects make upon my senses, is properly only a sensation: that I may say indiscriminately, either I *judge*, or I *feel*, that of two objects, the one which I call *a yard* makes upon me a different impression from another which I call *a foot*: that the colour called *red*, produces a different effect upon the sight from that which I call *yellow*; and I conclude that in this case to judge is only to feel or perceive by the senses. But it may be said, let us suppose that any one desires to know whether strength of body is preferable to mere bulk; are we certain that we can decide this point by means of the senses alone? Most undoubtedly, I reply: for in order to my coming to a decision on the subject, my memory must first retrace to me successively the different situations in which I may happen most frequently to find myself in the course of my life. In this case, then, to judge is to see that in these different situations strength will be oftener an advantage to me than size. But it may be retorted, when the question is to decide whether in a king justice is preferable to mercy, is it conceivable that the conclusion here formed depends entirely on sensation? The affirmative has undoubtedly at first sight the air of a paradox: nevertheless, in order to establish its truth, we will presuppose in any one a knowledge of what is meant by good and evil, and also of the principle that one action is worse than another, according as it is more injurious to the well-being of society. On this supposition, what method ought the orator or poet to take, in order to show most clearly that justice, preferable in a king to mercy, preserves the greatest number of citizens to the state?

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'The orator will present three several pictures to the imagination of his supposed hearer : in the first he will represent a just king, who condemns and gives orders for the execution of a criminal ; in the second, will be seen the good king, who opens the doors of his dungeon, and strikes off the chains of the same criminal ; in the third picture, the criminal himself will be the principal figure, who, armed with a poniard, on his escape from his cell hastens to assassinate fifty of his fellow-citizens. But who is there that at the sight of these three pictures will not instantly perceive that justice which, by the death of a single individual, saves the lives of fifty persons, is preferable to mercy ? Nevertheless, this judgment is really nothing but a sensation. In fact, if from the habit of connecting certain ideas with certain words, the sound of these words may, as experience demonstrates, excite in us almost the same sensations which we should feel from the actual presence of the objects, it is evident that from the contemplation of these three pictures, to judge that in a king justice is preferable to mercy, is to feel and see that in the first picture a single citizen is sacrificed, while in the third fifty are massacred ; whence I conclude that every act of the judgment is only a sensation.'—*Helvetius on the Mind*, p. 12.

On this statement I may be permitted to remark that as the author affirms that sensation is the same thing as judgment, so he seems to conceive that the assertion of any proposition is the same thing as the proof of it. He supposes three several pictures to be presented to a man of understanding, and that from an attentive contemplation and comparison of the different objects and events contained in them, he comes to a judgment or conclusion, *viz.* *That justice is preferable to mercy.* 'Nevertheless,' he says, 'this judgment is really nothing but a sensation.' This is all the proof he brings ; and perhaps, considering the language and country in which this celebrated author wrote, it is reasoning good enough. Do I say this with any view to throw contempt on that lively, ingenious, gay, social, and polished people ? No ; but philosophy is not their *forte* : they are not in earnest in these remote speculations. In order duly to appreciate their writings, we must consider them not as the dictates of the understanding, but as the effects of constitution. Otherwise we shall do them great injustice. They pursue truth, like all other things, as far as it is agreeable ; they reason for their amusement ; they engage in abstruse questions to vary the topics of conversation. Whatever does not answer this purpose is banished out of books and society as a morose and cynical philosophy. To obtrude the dark and difficult parts of a question, or to enter into an elaborate investigation of them, is considered as a piece of ill-manners. Those writers, therefore,

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have been the most popular among the French who have supplied their readers with the greatest number of dazzling conclusions founded on the most slight and superficial evidence, whose reasonings could be applied to every thing, because they explained nothing, and who most effectually kept out of sight every thing true or profound or interesting in a question. Who would ever think of plunging into abstruse, metaphysical inquiries concerning the nature of the understanding, when he may with entire ease to himself and satisfaction to others solve all the phenomena of the mind by repeating in three words, *Juger est sentir*. As it was the object of the school-philosophy, by a jargon of technical distinctions, to sharpen the eagerness of debate and give birth to endless verbal controversies, so the modern system, transferring philosophy from the cloistered hall to the toilette and the drawing-room, is calculated, by a set of portable phrases, as familiar and as current as the forms of salutation, to silence every difference of opinion, and to produce an euthanasia of all thought. I have made these remarks not to prejudice the question, but to prevent the prejudice arising on the other side, from seeing the writers of a whole nation, not deficient in natural talents or in acquired advantages, agree in delivering the most puerile absurdities as profound and oracular truths.

The train of thought into which the author has fallen in the passage above cited is pretty obvious. Having undertaken to prove that the ideas of justice and mercy are mere sensations, and that the conclusion that justice is preferable to mercy is also a mere sensation, in order to shew the possibility of this he conjures up the ideas of a good and a bad king, of a criminal, a prison, chains, a dagger, and fifty citizens massacred before the eyes of the spectator, which form the subject of three imaginary pictures, and which are in general considered as so many sensible objects. All these sensible objects he supposes to be implied in, and to be the materials out of which we frame the judgment or conclusion, that justice is better than mercy; and therefore he infers that there is nothing else implied in or necessary to that judgment, and that consequently it is nothing but a sensation. Having succeeded in resolving the compound and general ideas of justice and mercy, good and evil, into a number of sensible appearances, his imagination is entirely occupied with the novelty of the objects before him, and he drops altogether the consideration, whether the combination and comparison of these several objects or sensations which is absolutely necessary to their forming the moral ideas or inference spoken of, is not the act of some other faculty. In short, the principle that a judgment is nothing but a sensation, is not only a perfectly gratuitous assertion, but an assertion either without

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meaning, or a palpable contradiction. For the single objects presented in the foregoing metaphysical pictures, and which are supposed to constitute the judgment, are not one sensation, but many. Now if it be meant that these single objects, as they are perceived separately, or successively, one by one, without the intervention of any reflex act of the mind combining and comparing them together, constitute of themselves the judgment, 'that justice is preferable to mercy,' this is to say, in so many words, that the mind forms a comparison between things without comparing them, and judges of their relations without perceiving them. On the other hand, if it be meant to include the acts of the mind in comparing, judging, inferring, &c. in the term *sensation*, then the proposition that judgment or sensation are the same, will be nothing but an idle and insignificant abuse of words, and will only prove that if to the sensation, or perception of particular objects we add the faculty of comparing and judging, nothing farther will be necessary for it to compare and judge. I shall therefore dismiss this well-known maxim as no better than a misnomer, as an attempt to shorten the labour of thought by the interposition of an unmeaning phrase, and to confound all the distinctions of the understanding by an equivocal.

It will not be amiss in this place to transcribe a passage from the *Logic of the Abbé Condillac* (a work which may be regarded as the quintessence of slender thought, and of the art of substituting words for things) to shew how far the doctrine of the origin of all our ideas from sensation may be carried, and what an imbecility it produces in the mind, and deadness to any but external objects. The design of the passage is to prove that morality is a visible thing. This however is a work of supererogation, even on the principle supposed: for it is not necessary to refer morality to any thing visible or audible, or to any other of the senses, but the sense of pleasure and pain; our feelings of this kind being allowed to come from, and make a part of our original sensations. But this system is not an improvement on reason, but a progression in superficiality and absurdity, a vast vacuity, where 'fluttering its pennons vain, the mind drops down ten thousand fathoms deep.'

'Moral ideas,' says my author, 'seem to elude the senses: they at least elude the senses of those philosophers who deny that our knowledge proceeds from sensation. They would gladly know of what colour virtue is, or of what colour vice is. I answer that virtue consists in the habitual performance of good actions, as vice consists in the habitual performance of bad ones. Now these habits and these actions are visible.'

'What, then, is the morality of actions a thing which falls under

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the cognizance of the senses ! Wherefore should it not ? Morality depends solely on the conformity between our actions and the laws ; but these actions are visible, and the laws are so equally, since they are certain conventions made by men.

‘ But it will be said, if the laws are only things of convention, they must be altogether arbitrary. They may indeed be sometimes arbitrary ; there are but too many such laws ; but those which determine whether our actions are good or bad, are not so, nor can they be so. They are the work of man, it is true, because they are conventions which we have made ; nevertheless, we alone have not made them : nature made them as well as we, she dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make others. The wants and the faculties of man being given, the laws which are to regulate his conduct must necessarily follow : and though we enacted them, God who has created us with such wants and such faculties, is in truth our sole legislator. In obeying the laws which are conformable to our nature, we render obedience to him who is the author of our nature ; and this is that which perfects the mortality of actions.’—Page 56.

For a work entitled Logic, there are a pleasant number of contradictions in this passage. To pass over many of them, if the laws here spoken of are such merely in consequence of their being visible, then all visible objects are laws, and all laws are equally moral. But no ! there are some arbitrary laws. Now if the goodness of the laws depends on their conformity to our wants and faculties, neither of these are visible, any more than God who is said to be our only law-giver. So that ‘ the latter end of this system of law and divinity forgets the beginning.’ That those actions are moral which are conformable to a moral law, and that those laws are moral, which are agreeable to our nature and wants, may be readily admitted : but I cannot myself think that this conformity is an object of the senses, or that the true features of morality can ever be discerned but by the eye of the understanding. The friends of morality, it seems, according to our author, are not to despair, or to suppose that the distinctions of right and wrong are banished entirely out of the material system. They only become more clear and legible than ever ; we are still right in asserting virtue to have a real existence, namely, on paper, and in supposing that we have some idea of it, as consisting of the letters of the alphabet. Almost in the same manner, Mr. Horne Tooke very gravely defines the essence of *law* and *just*, from the etymology of these words, to consist in their being something *laid down*, and something *ordered* (*jussum*) ; and when pressed by the difficulty that there are many things laid down and ordered which are neither laws nor just, he makes answer that their obligation

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depends on a higher species of law and justice, to wit, a law which is no where laid down, and a justice which is no where ordered, except indeed by the nature of things, on which the etymology of these two words does not seem to throw any light.

On all the other points of the modern metaphysical system, such as the nature of abstraction, judgment and reasoning, the materiality of the soul, free-will, the association of ideas, &c. Mr. Locke either halts between two opinions, or else takes the common-place side of the question. The motion of the system, which bears his name and which by this very delay gained all that it wanted to become popular, was retrograde in him, not progressive. The extracts I am about to give from his work will I think establish this point. They will at the same time shew him to be a man of strong practical sense, of much serious thought and inquiry, and considerable freedom of opinion, and a real lover of truth, though not so bold and systematic a reasoner, or so great a dealer in paradoxes as some others. Moderation, caution, a wish to examine every side of a question, and an unwillingness to decide till after the most mature and circumspect investigation, and then only according to the clearness of the evidence, seem to have been the characteristics of his mind, none of which denote the daring innovator, or maker of a system. What there is of system in his work is Hobbes's, as I have already shewn : the deviations from its common sense and general observation are his own. There is throughout his reasoning the same contempt for the schoolmen, and the same preference of native, rustic reason to learned authority : the same notion of the necessity for reforming the system of philosophy, and of the possibility of doing this by a more exact use of words : there is the same dissatisfaction with the prevailing system, but he at the same time entertained doubts of his own. What he wanted was confidence and decision. The prolixity and ambiguity of his style seem to have arisen from this source : for he is never weary of examining and re-examining the same objection, and he states his arguments with so many limitations and with such a variety of expression to prevent misapprehension, that it is often difficult to guess at his real meaning. There is it must be confessed a sort of heaviness about him, a want of clearness and connexion, which in spite of all his pains, and the real plodding strength of his mind he was never able to overcome. To return to his account of complex ideas : the beginning of his observations on this subject is as follows :

‘ We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea which does not consist wholly

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of them. But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three.

'1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; in which way it gets all its ideas of *relations*. 3. The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called *abstraction*: and thus all its general ideas are made. This shews man's power to be much about the same in the material and intellectual world: for the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly to separate them.'—Vol. i. p. 151.

The first great point which Mr. Locke labours to prove in his Essay, is that there are no innate ideas, which he seems to have established very fully and clearly, if indeed so obvious a truth required any formal demonstration. His chief proofs are from the case of a man born blind, who has no idea of colours, and from the ignorance which children and idiots have of those first principles and universal maxims, which some philosophers and theologians, confounding the faculties of the mind with actual impressions, had supposed to be legibly engraven on the mind by the hand of its author. For the supposing the understanding to be a distinct faculty of the mind no more proves our ideas to be innate, than the allowing perception to be a distinct original faculty of the mind, which everybody does, proves that there must be innate sensations. These two positions have, however, been sometimes considered as convertible by the partisans on both sides of the question; the one arguing from the existence of the soul and the power of thought to the positive perception of certain truths, and the others concluding that by denying any original inherent impressions, they had overturned the supposition of the different faculties and powers which must be in the mind, to account for the first production or subsequent modification of sensation or of thought. For instance, it has been made a consequence of the doctrine that there were no innate ideas, that there could be no such thing as genius, or an original difference of capacity; as if the capacity were not perfectly distinct from the actual impressions by the very theory itself, and as if there might not be a difference in the capacity of acquiring ideas as all experience shews, though none

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in the knowledge acquired, because this capacity had never yet been exerted. As well might we argue that of two houses that are just built one is as commodious and capacious as the other, as well fitted for the reception of guests and the disposal of furniture, because at present neither of them is furnished or inhabited.

The following passages will shew the manner in which our author treats this part of his subject :

‘The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackamoor it is afraid of : that the wormseed or mustard it refuses is not the apple or sugar it cries for ; this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of : but will any one say it is by virtue of this principle, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge ? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths ? He that will say, children join these several abstract speculations with their sucking bottles and their rattles, may perhaps with justice be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth than one of that age. Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them, yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate : it being impossible, that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing else. Since if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts ; there being nothing a truth in the mind which it has never thought on.

‘That the general maxims we are discoursing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved. But there is this farther argument against their being innate, that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them. And it is in my opinion a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom if they were innate, they must need exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people being of all others the least corrupted by custom or borrowed opinion, learning or education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written

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there ; one might reasonably imagine that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. One would think according to these men's principles that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should in those who have no reserves, no acts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found ? What universal principle of knowledge ? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age ; and a young savage has perhaps his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will I fear find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions [as that which is, is ; and that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be] are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning, where disputes are frequent : these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge.'

I do not know that Mr. Locke has sufficiently distinguished between two things which I cannot very well express otherwise than by a turn of words, namely, an innate knowledge of principles, and innate principles of knowledge. His arguments seem to me conclusive against the one, but not against the other, for I think that there are certain general principles or forms of thinking, something like the moulds in which any thing is cast, according to which our ideas follow one another in a certain order, though the knowledge, *i.e.* perception of what these principles are, and the forming them into distinct propositions is the result of experience. It is true, the child distinguishes between its nurse and the blackamoor, between bitter and sweet : what hinders it from confounding them ? The ideas of *same* and *different* are not included in these ideas themselves, nor are they peculiar to any of them, but general terms. What then determines the child to annex them uniformly to certain things and not to others ? It is plain then, that our ideas are not at liberty to run into clusters as

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they please or as it happens, but are regulated by certain laws, to which they must conform ; or that the manner in which we conceive of things does not depend simply on the particular nature of the things, but on the general nature of the understanding. Mr. Locke is clear for certain innate practical principles or general tendencies regulating all our actions, namely, the love of pleasure, and aversion to pain. He does not however admit, as I can find, of any thing similar to the operations of the understanding. The analogy, notwithstanding, holds exactly the same in both cases. For the child is no more conscious of any such general practical principle regulating all his desires, than of any speculative principle regulating his notion of things : he gets the idea of both from experience of their effects ; but I think that if there were no such principles in the mind itself, previous to the actual impression of objects, and merely developed or called into action by them, we must be perfectly indifferent both to the reception of pleasure and pain, as we should feel no more repugnance to admit one conclusion than another, however absurd or contradictory. The necessity we are under of perceiving certain agreements or disagreements between our ideas is as much, and in the same sense, the foundation of judgment and reasoning, as the general desire of happiness and aversion to misery is the foundation of morality.

This property of the understanding, by which certain judgments naturally follow certain perceptions, and are followed by other judgments, is the faculty of reason, of order and proportion in the mind, and is indeed nothing but the understanding acting by rule or necessity. The long controversy between Locke and Leibnitz with respect to innate ideas turned upon the distinction here stated, innate ideas being thus referred not to the actual impressions of objects, but to the forms or moulds existing in the mind, and in which those impressions are cast. Leibnitz contended that there was a germ or principle of truth, a pre-established harmony between its innate faculties and its acquired ideas, implied in the essence of the mind itself. According to the one it was like a piece of free stone, which the mason hews with equal ease in all directions, and into any shape, as circumstances require : according to the other, it resembles a piece of marble strongly ingrained, with the figure of a man, or other animal, inclosed in it, and which the sculptor has only to separate from the surrounding mass.

I will add one more passage to draw the attention of my readers to this intricate subject, and to show that the difficulties surrounding it were not completely cleared up or even apprehended by the author of the 'Essay.'

'Hath a child,' he says, 'an idea of impossibility and identity,

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before it has of white or black, sweet or sour? Or is it from the knowledge of this principle that it concludes that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of *Impossibile est idem esse et non esse* that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger, or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never had? Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? The names *impossibility* and *identity* stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them.

'If identity (to instance in that alone) be a native impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles; I would gladly be resolved by one of seven or seventy years old, Whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same man, though they lived several ages asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby perhaps it will appear that our idea of sameness is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not so clear and distinct as to be universally known and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For I suppose every one's idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousand others of his followers have: and which then shall be true, which innate? Or are these two different ideas of identity both innate?'—Page 60.

Two things are obvious to remark on this passage. First, it seems clear that the child, before it can pronounce that one thing is or is not the same as another, must have the idea of what *same* is, *i.e.* of identity: or it would be impossible for it to know what is or is not the same. This idea, then, is necessarily included in or the result of the first comparison it is able to make between any two of its impressions as alike or unlike. Secondly, the difficulty of determining the question proposed by Mr. Locke does not arise from the meaning of the word *identity*, but of the word *man*. For if this is once clear and settled, there will be no great effort of the understanding required to determine whether a man is the same or not. They define him to be a creature consisting of body and soul, and it is plain that if one of

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these, the body, is altered, the man is not the same. The whole question, therefore, here seems to turn on deciding what qualities are essential to the idea of man, so that by keeping or leaving out some, he will or will not retain his identity, in the practical and moral sense of the term. It is the complex and general idea of man that the child wants, not that of identity or sameness which is reflected to it from every object it meets, and which it perceives to agree or disagree with some other.

In a note to one of the chapters on Innate Ideas, there is some account of the controversy between our author and the Bishop of Worcester (Stillingfleet) on the question whether the idea of a God be innate and universal. The Bishop is anxious to have the universal belief in a Deity understood in a strict sense, while Mr. Locke thinks it must be reduced to a very great and decided majority, there being instances of whole nations without this idea. 'This,' he says, 'is all the universal consent which truth of matter-of-fact will allow; and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a God. I would crave leave to ask your lordship, were there ever in the world any atheists or no? For if any one deny a God, such a perfect universality of consent is destroyed, and if nobody does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince atheists?'—Page 63. This is the acutest turn he has any where given to an argument.

The concluding passage of his account of innate ideas is worth quoting. It is a good description of the true spirit of philosophy, inclining a little too much to self-opinion, from which, perhaps, it is not easily separable:

'What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing discourse; truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due respect to other men's opinions; but after all the greatest reverence is due to truth; and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, *in the consideration of things themselves*, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men's to find it. For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes, as to know by other men's understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason,

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so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrey, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man; but nobody ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends: what he believes only and takes upon trust, are but shreds, which however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.'—Page 80.

In treating of the origin of our ideas, Mr. Locke labours to prove that men think not always:—thinking, according to him, being to the soul what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. In this opinion he may, as far as I know, be right: but I think his proof of it drawn from the effects of sleep fails. The reason why I think so is that I was never awakened suddenly but I found myself dreaming, though in the interval required to awake gradually from sleep we frequently forget our dreams before we are quite awake, the impressions which objects have time to make upon our bodies taking place of and obliterating the faint traces of our sleeping thoughts. The common notion that the mind is then most awake when the body is asleep, deserves the contempt with which Mr. Locke treats it. It is one of the absurdities of *common sense*, which is not entirely free from them any more than philosophy. Those who can find any argument in favour of the immaterial nature and independent powers of the soul in the sublime flights which it takes when emancipated from the intrusion of sensible objects must have finer dreams than I have. It would be well for this opinion if we could regularly forget the next morning the smart repartees, magnificent sentiments and profound remarks we so often dream we make. The singular significance which in sleep we attach to absolute nonsense seems to arise from the very impotence of our efforts, as we fancy that we can fly because we cannot move at all. In sleep, indeed, the forms of imagination assume the appearance of reality, but this advantage they seem to owe chiefly to what Hobbes calls the silence of sense. That sleep, however, consists wholly in this silence of sense (not affecting the mind itself) is so far from being true, that it is not even necessary to it.

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Persons who walk in their sleep, as I know from experience, get out of bed with their eyes open, see and feel the objects about them, open the window, and leisurely survey the opposite trees and houses, long before they recollect where they are, or before the fresh air and the regular succession of known objects dispel the drowsy phantoms of the night. The only essential difference between our sleeping and waking thoughts I believe is, that in sleep the comprehensive faculty flags and droops; so that being unable to consider many things at once or to retain a succession of ideas in mind, we confound things together, and pass from one object to another without order or connexion, any single circumstance in which they agree being sufficient to make us associate them together or substitute one for the other. Our thoughts are, as it were, disentangled from the circumstances and consequences which at other times clog their motions: they are let loose, and left at liberty to wander in any direction that chance presents. The greatest singularity observable in dreams is the faculty of holding a dialogue with ourselves, as if we were really and effectually two persons. We make a remark, and then expect the answer, which we are to give ourselves, with the same gravity of attention, and hear it with the same surprise as if it were really spoken by another person. We are played upon by puppets of our own moving. We are staggered in an argument by an unforeseen objection, or alarmed at a sudden piece of information of which we have no apprehension till it seems to proceed from the mouth of some one with whom we fancy ourselves conversing. We have in fact no idea of what the question will be that we put to ourselves, till the moment of its birth.

Mr. Locke in treating of our sensations as effects of the impressions of the qualities of things, distinguishes these qualities according to the usual opinion into primary and secondary. The former he considers as really and in themselves the same as they appear to our senses: the other as merely the effects produced by certain objects on the mind and not existing out of it. As this question forms one of the common-places of metaphysical inquiry, I shall give some account of it in his own words.

‘The qualities that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts.

‘First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts; these are in them whether we perceive them or no; and we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself: these I call primary qualities.

‘Secondly, The power that is in any body by reason of its insensible primary qualities to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called sensible qualities.

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'Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called powers.

'The first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no : and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend. The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

'But though these two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally thought otherwise of. For the second sort, *viz.* the powers to produce several ideas in us by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us : but the third sort are called and esteemed barely powers. For example, the ideas of heat or light, which we receive by our eye or touch from the sun are commonly thought real qualities, existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by *powers* in it : whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities : whereby it is enabled in the one case so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat ; and in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid. The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct colours, sounds, &c., containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of those primary qualities which appear not to our senses to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine

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that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves. But in the other case, in the operation of bodies, changing the qualities, one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For though receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality *in* the sun, yet when we see wax or a fair face receive change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine that to be the perception or resemblance of any thing in the sun, because we find not those different colours in the sun itself. For our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find so such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. But ourselves not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of some thing in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.'—Vol. i. page 127.

From the secondary qualities later writers, as Hume and Berkeley, have proceeded to the primary ones, and have endeavoured to shew that they have not a real existence out of the mind, any more than the others. Hume says, 'The fundamental principle of the modern philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold,' &c.; and Bishop Berkeley has made use of the same principle to banish the least particle of matter out of the universe. What Hume has said is merely taken from Berkeley, from whom his opinions are generally borrowed. As I do not know that I shall have a better opportunity, I will here state Berkeley's arguments against the existence of these primary qualities, or his *ideal* system, in his own words. I will only first observe, on the argument against the existence of the secondary qualities of things, from their different effects in different circumstances and on different persons, which Hume considers as the only solid one, but which Berkeley thinks more doubtful, seems to me no argument at all; for that an object changes its colour, or food its taste, is in consequence of distance or of the interposition of another object, or of the indisposition of the organ, and does not prove that the object has not a particular colour, or the food a particular taste, but that colour is combined with and altered by the colour of the air, and that taste is combined with and altered by another

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taste in the mouth or stomach. The logical inference is merely that one object has not the same sensible qualities as another, or, as Berkeley has remarked, that we do not know what the true or natural qualities of any object are.

'It is evident,' says Bishop Berkeley, 'to any one who takes a survey of the objects of Human Knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination; either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, &c. and of all these more and less, either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours: the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence, having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name *apple*. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, &c.

'2. But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows and perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, &c. about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind*, *spirit*, *soul*, or *myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived, for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

'3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every body will allow; and to me it is no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term *exist*, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists; *i.e.* I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study, I should say it existed, meaning thereby, that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, *i.e.* it was smelt; there was a sound, *i.e.* it was

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heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

'4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what, I pray you, do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

'5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word, the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far I will not deny I can abstract, if that may be properly called *abstraction* which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel any thing without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be extracted from each other.

'6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such, I take this important

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one to be, *viz.* that all the choir of heaven, and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their *esse* is to be perceived or known; that consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes.

'7. From what has been said, it is evident there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives. But for the fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered, the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, &c.; *i.e.* the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that, therefore, wherein colour, figure, &c. exist must perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or *substratum* of those ideas.

'8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea, a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible: hard or soft, like something which is intangible, and so of the rest.

'9. Some there are who make a distinction between *primary* and *secondary* qualities; by the former, they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter, they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of any thing existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or

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images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance, which they call *matter*. By matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, useless substance, in which extension, figure, motion, &c. do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called *matter* or *corporeal substance* involves a contradiction in it, insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity; but because the tenet of the existence of matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious, than omit any thing that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.

‘10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, &c. do not, which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on, and are occasioned by the different size, texture, motion, &c. of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to form an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, *i.e.* in the mind, and no where else.

‘11. Again, *great* and *small*, *swift* and *slow*, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind, is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general and motion in general. Thus we see how much the tenet of extended, moveable substances, existing without the mind, depends on that strange doctrine of *abstract*

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ideas. And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of matter, or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of *materia prima*, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension, solidity cannot be conceived; since, therefore, it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

' 12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without it, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number, as the mind views it with different aspects. Thus the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understandings, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say *one* book, *one* page, *one* line, &c., all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others; and in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

' 13. Unity, I know, some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word *unity* I do not find, and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflection.¹ To say no more, it is an *abstract idea*.

' 14. I shall farther add, that after the same manner as modern philosophers prove colours, tastes, &c., to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatever. Thus for instance, it is said, that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand, seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue, that figure and

¹ This relates to what Mr. Locke says of unity, whom all succeeding writers have made a point of bringing forward on all occasions, merely for the purpose of differing from him. They set him up as the standard, or *ne plus ultra* of profound wisdom, and yet they always contrive to go beyond him. I will just add, by the bye, on this argument about number, that the fair way of putting it is by asking whether one combination of ideas is not different from another, or whether one foot or one inch is the same with thirty-six feet, or thirty-six inches, not whether one foot is the same as thirty-six inches. Otherwise there will remain a real distinction of number, both in idea and in fact.

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extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of any thing settled and determinate without the mind? Again, 'tis proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered, the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever, or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say, that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any external alteration?

'15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours, tastes, &c. exist only in the mind, and he will find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension, colour, &c. in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the foregoing arguments plainly show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.'—*Principles of Human Knowledge*, pp. 54, &c.

Again, he says, page 58:—

'But though it were possible that solid, figured movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains, therefore, that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But I do not see what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas. I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas, since it is granted they are produced

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sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in the same order we see them in at present, without their concurrence. But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise, and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said, for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they, by their own confession, are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced, since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason why we should suppose matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

‘But say what we can, some one perhaps might be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so, assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see and hear, and feel, doth exist, *i.e.* is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being: but I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of any thing which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic, and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable, nor are there any principles more opposite to scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference between real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it, and you’ll be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said, and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing or without the mind, any more than its idea.’

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Now with regard to this system, whatever we may think of the solidity of the foundation, the superstructure is as light and elegant as possible. There is a peculiar character in the metaphysical writings of Berkeley which is to be found no where else. With all the closeness and subtilty of the deepest reflection, they combine the ease and vivacity of a common essay : so that the most violent paradoxes and elaborate distinctions are rendered familiar by the simplicity of the style. His writings shew that he had thought with the utmost intensity on almost every subject, yet he has the same careless freedom of manner as if he had never thought at all. He is never entangled in the labyrinth of his own thoughts, and the buoyancy of his spirit surmounts every objection with a singular felicity, as if his mind had wings. It is perhaps worth remarking that the 'Principles of Human Knowledge' were published in 1710, at a time when the author was only five-and-twenty, as was the 'Essay on Vision,' the greatest by far of all his works, and the most complete example of elaborate analytical reasoning and particular induction joined together that perhaps ever existed. It is also generally free from that air of paradox and fanciful hypothesis which runs through his other writings.¹ I mention this the more because I believe that the greatest efforts of intellect have almost always been made while the passions are in their greatest vigour, and before hope loses its hold on the heart, and is the elastic spring which animates all our thoughts.

On the reasoning I have just quoted I will make one or two remarks without pretending to enter into the real difficulties of the question. First, it seems to me that the argument against the existence of the secondary qualities, drawn from the various effects produced by them on different minds or in different circumstances, which Hume mentions as the only solid one, and which Berkeley thinks more doubtful, is no argument at all. That an object at a distance, for example, does not look like the same object near is in consequence of the interposition of the air, which gives it a different hue; the logical inference merely is that one object has not the same sensible qualities as another, or as Berkeley has remarked, since the effect depends upon the combination and reaction of a number of things, that we do not know what the true or natural qualities of each object are.

2. The proof of the non-existence of the primary qualities or of matter altogether, as inconceivable by the mind, goes upon the sup-

¹ The two men of the greatest ability in modern times as metaphysicians, that is, with the greatest power of seeing things in the abstract, and of pursuing a principle into all its consequences, are in my opinion Hobbes and Berkeley : after them come Hume and Hartley. Compared with these Locke was a mere common practical man : of the four, I think Hobbes was at the head, as the others only worked out the materials with which he furnished them.

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position that what is different cannot be the same. 'An idea,' says Berkeley, 'can be like nothing but an idea, a perception like nothing but a perception.' But it might be proved in this manner that a print cannot resemble a picture, because that which has colour cannot be represented by any thing without colour. That as far as our ideas are perceptions they do not resemble any thing in matter is true, but no one ever supposed that in this respect there was any resemblance between them, or that matter thought. That they cannot be alike in any thing does not seem to me proved by this mode of reasoning: for that our ideas of things are not mere perceptions is evident from this, that they are different among themselves, that is, have other distinguishing qualities besides being perceived.

3. Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter not merely as the object or archetype, but as the cause of our sensations, is founded on the notion that we have a right to reject every general conclusion in which there is the least flaw or difficulty. Common sense is brought to the bar, like an old offender, and condemned upon the slightest shadow of evidence. If the vulgar system is vulnerable in any part, it is taken for granted that it ought to be discarded, to make room for a perfectly rational and philosophical account, the sufficiency of the understanding being never once doubted. But all this severe logic and scrutiny into the perfect connexion of our ideas vanishes, when the author comes to explain the cause of our external impressions, or to find a substitute for matter. This, he says, is God or an all-powerful spirit, and yet he affirms that we have no more idea of spirit than of matter, and consequently the one ought upon this theory to pass for a nonentity as much as the other.

'We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of those ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from what has been said. It must therefore be a substance, but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance. It remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.

'A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit. For all ideas whatever being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us by way of image or likeness that which acts. Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered,

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let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas, is absolutely impossible.' That is to say, matter is here excluded from being the cause or in any way the occasion of our ideas, because we know not what it is, and the inference is, that the cause of our ideas must be spirit, of which we are equally ignorant. The reasoning might have been reversed. But it is thus that philosophy seems to be in general nothing else but 'reason pandering will.' The literal conclusion from the foregoing argument is, that there is nothing in the universe but one-self, nor even that, but only the present idea : all other words must signify nothing.

To return to Mr. Locke. He has treated on the same question in the second volume, but without advancing any thing remarkable on it, and it is the only place in which he loses his temper, and substitutes ridicule for argument.

In the chapter on Perception, there are some observations on the manner in which our judgments alter the impressions of sensible objects, which are well worth notice, and shew that the author was well acquainted with what may be called the practical processes of the human mind.

He says, p. 130, 'We are farther to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often in grown people altered by the judgment without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, *e.g.* gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies, the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes ; so that from that which truly is variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured ; as is evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since : and it is this : "Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal and nigh of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the

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other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man made to see : Quere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube ? ” To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, “ No. For though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet attained the experience that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so ; or that a protuberant angle in the cube that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.” I agree ’ (says Mr. Locke) ‘ with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem ; and am of opinion that the blind man at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them ; though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my reader as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he has not the least use of, or help from them, and the rather, because this observing gentleman farther adds, that having upon the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.’ Mr. Locke then adds other instances to the same effect, as ‘ That a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. How frequently do we in a day cover our eyes with our eyelids, without at all perceiving that we are in the dark ! Men that by custom have got the use of a by-word do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds, which though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe : and therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other without our taking notice of it.’

On the problem above stated, which has been often made a subject of dispute, I shall only remark that the answer given to it, with which Mr. Locke agrees, is directly repugnant to his doctrine of the real existence of the primary qualities of matter, namely figure and extension. For it is plain, that if there is any thing in external objects answering to their ideas in our minds, the ideas we have of those qualities and which are conveyed by different senses, must be like one another. If the ideas of figure as a visible and tangible thing have no resemblance to themselves, it is ridiculous to suppose

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that they can coincide with any thing out of them in nature. Secondly, it appears to me that the mind must recognise a certain similarity between the impressions of different senses in this case. For instance, the sudden change or discontinuity of the sensation, produced by the sharp angles of the cube, is something common to both ideas, and if so, must afford a means of comparing them together. Berkeley, in his 'Essay on Vision,' goes so far as to deny that there is any intuitive analogy between the ideas of number as conveyed by different senses, and asserts that the distinction between the two legs of a statue, for instance, as perceived by the touch or by the sight, would not imply any idea of like or same. I grant this consequence to be true, on the principle maintained by him that there are no abstract ideas in the mind, for on this principle there can be no idea answering to the words *same* or *different*, but then this argument would destroy all kind of coincidence not only between ideas of different senses, but between repeated impressions of the same sense. The 'Essay on Vision,' of which I have already spoken, apparently originated in the problem here inserted, and is a more complete exemplification of the effects of association with respect to objects of sight than is to be found even in Hartley's account of this subject.

Mr. Locke's account of the distinction between wit and understanding I have already noticed; his explanation of the difference between idiots and madmen has been often referred to, and is as follows :

'The defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason : whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning ; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths ; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles : for, by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man, fancying himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience : others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam, if either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly ; the disorderly jumbling together of ideas is in some more, and some less. In short,

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herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen : that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them : but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.'

Mr. Locke's account of Liberty and Necessity, contained in his chapter 'On Power,' will be commented upon in another Lecture. It is one which has been more found fault with than any other part of his work, I think without reason. He seems evidently to have admitted the definition of necessity, but not the name, which is not much to be wondered at, considering the improper use to which it is liable, and which can scarce be separated from it in the closest reasoning, much less as a term of general signification : in other words, he denies the power of the mind to act without a cause or motive, or, in any manner, in any circumstances, from mere indifference and absolute self-motion ; but he at the same time denies the inference which has been drawn from this principle, that the mind is not an agent at all, but altogether subject to external force, or blind impulse.

Mr. Locke, in treating of complex ideas, divides them into three sorts, those of modes, substances, and relations.

First, 'Modes,' he says, 'I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances : such are the ideas signified by the words *triangle*, *gratitude*, *murder*, &c. Of these modes there are two sorts. 1. There are some which are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other, as a *dozen* or *score*, which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together, and these I call simple modes. 2. There are others, compounded of simple ideas of several kinds put together, to make one complex one ; e.g. *beauty*, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder ; *theft*, which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds, and these I call *mixed modes*.'

With respect to modes, the author endeavours to shew, I think improperly, that as they are put together arbitrarily by the mind, according to circumstances, that they have no real existence in nature, and that the ideas we form of them are always correct. Neither of these consequences will be found to follow : *i.e.* the circumstances and actions which constitute theft do actually exist without the mind and are necessary to that idea, though it is arbitrary in me according to the occasion or the purpose in view, to think of that collection of ideas or

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another, which shall constitute robbery; that is, I may add or leave out the circumstance of violence, as it happens; secondly, I may, without being aware of it, add or leave out some circumstance necessary to the combination of ideas spoken of, and thus confuse one idea with another, and not merely miscal, as Mr. Locke supposes, but misconceive the mode in question. We then merely miscal when though we give a wrong name to a thing, the idea is kept perfectly distinct and clear from other ideas, otherwise we confound both names and things. But it will not be contended, that the ideas of theft, robbery, and fraud, for instance, are always kept clear in every one's mind, so that he is at no loss ever to define them, or can immediately in all cases refer any action to the class to which it belongs. Every collection of ideas which the mind puts together is undoubtedly that collection and no other; but in forming the ideas of mixed modes, the mind does something more than this, or it supposes one collection of ideas to be the same as another which it has had at a former time, and gives a certain name to, and in this supposition it often errs.

On this subject, the author is a good deal puzzled with the question, how it is possible for the mind ever to confound one idea with another? It is indeed a puzzling question, but the answer which he gives to it in resolving it into a mistake of words, is very unsatisfactory. For there is no more reason why we should mistake one name or sign of an idea for another, than why we should mistake the ideas themselves. If every circumstance belonging to our ideas was necessarily clear and self-evident to the mind, the sign affixed to it, which is one of those circumstances, would be so too, and we find that in those things with which we have a thorough acquaintance, we never confound one name with another, or if we should, it does not disturb the idea, and is of no consequence.

Among the second sort of complex ideas Mr. Locke classes those of substances. These, he says, 'are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct, particular things, subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first or chief. Thus, if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility and fusibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the power of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of substances also there are two sorts of ideas; one of single substances, as they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men or a flock of sheep: which collective

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ideas of several substances are as much each of them one single idea as that of a man or an unit.' He then adds, 'and the third sort of complex ideas is that which we call relative, which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another.' This last sort of ideas seems to me the only ones that are perfectly simple and indivisible: things themselves are always complex. Mr. Locke considers rightly that we know nothing of the nature of substance, and that we can only define it as an abstract idea of some thing, that supports accidents or connects different sensible qualities together. For this modest confession of his own ignorance he was however called to a very severe account by the learned of the time, Bishop Stillingfleet and others, who thought they knew more of the matter, and could penetrate the essence of things. The 'Essay on the Human Understanding' is swelled out with repeated and long extracts from this controversy, and they are not the least valuable part of the work, as they shew to what shifts men can be driven, to defend systematically not truth but their own opinion, who become blind and obstinate by implicit faith, and who by adhering to every established prejudice drive others into all the absurdities of paradox.

Mr. Locke's own account of our ideas of substance is a good deal spun out, and is enriched with as many illustrations from the qualities of gold, as if he had been candidate for the place of assay-master of the mint. The chapter 'On Identity' is perhaps the best reasoned and the most full of thought and observation of any in the Essay: though the author sets out with an observation which seems to augur differently. For after explaining identity as it relates to individuality, or implies that a thing is the same with itself, he says, 'From what has been said it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the *principium individuationis*: and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.' He then, very wisely quitting this principle which would certainly be of no use to him, proceeds directly to account for the identity of different things from a continuance, not of the same substance, but of the same essence, or of the characteristic properties of any thing, carried on in succession; as a river is the same while it flows through the same channel, or an oak while it retains the same organization, and a man while he retains the same life and continued consciousness.

In the chapter entitled 'Of true and false Ideas,' the author supposes truth to depend on some mental or verbal proposition, and does not, like Hobbes and the modern metaphysical writers, make it consist entirely in a form of words. In the last chapter of the first volume he treats of the association of ideas. This chapter was

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added after the first edition of the work, and he confesses that the subject was something new to him. He has treated it in that mixed way of observation and reasoning, in which the peculiar force of his mind lay. The account he has given of it does not form a system, but the fragments of a system, something like the French memoirs that are to serve for the materials of a history. He does not appear to have laid down any general theorem on the subject, or to have been aware of the possibility of applying this principle to account in a plausible manner for the whole chain of our thoughts and feelings, as Hobbes and Hartley have done. Sound, practical, good sense, and a kind of discursive observation, neither grovelling in vulgar commonplace, nor soaring into the regions of paradox, are in fact the general characteristics of his mind, which has not been understood by his admirers and commentators. A short passage will suffice to shew his manner of considering this doctrine of association.

‘Many children,’ he says, ‘imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after: and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which though ever so clean and commodious they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive: and who is there that has not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person, not otherwise superior to him, but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person? And he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them. Instances of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it: it is of a young gentleman, who having learned to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learned: the idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with all the turns and steps of his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance exceedingly well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that, or some such other trunk, had its due position in the room.’

The following passage approaches the nearest to the statement of a general principle:

‘This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance: and hence it comes

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in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, educations, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body: all which seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set agoing continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his finger moves orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his inattentive thoughts be elsewhere a-wandering. Whether the natural cause of these ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of the fingers, be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever by this instance it appears to be so; but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas. That there are such associations of them made by custom in the minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to this perhaps might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly and produce as regular effects as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the strength of the first impression or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I say, most of the antipathies, I do not say all; for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded though perhaps early impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed.'

The former part of this passage, relating to the dancing of the animal spirits, the Abbé Condillac in his 'Logic' has paraphrased with a self-sufficiency, an assumption of originality, and a smoothness of flippancy, peculiar almost to himself.

On the subject of materialism, Mr. Locke seems to have had two opinions; the first, that as far as we can discern, the properties of

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mind and matter are utterly distinct and irreconcilable ; the second, that God might for aught we know be able to superadd to matter a faculty of thinking : either the one or the other of these opinions must be without meaning. In speaking of the difficulties attending both sides of this question, he has, however, offered one of the best moral cautions against precipitancy of judgment and impatience of inquiry to be found in any author. He says, (vol. ii. p. 203 :) ‘ He that considers how hardly sensation is in our thoughts reconcilable to extended matter, or existence to any thing that hath no extension at all, will confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge : and he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul’s materiality. Since on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended substance, or a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with themselves ; who because of the unconceivableness of some thing they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. This serves not only to shew the weakness and scantiness of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments, which drawn from our own views may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the question ; but do not at all thereby help us to truth, by running into the opposite opinion, which on examination will be found clogged with equal difficulties.’

Mr. Locke has not, I think, himself enough attended to this admirable caution in his adoption of the common argument to demonstrate the existence of God *à priori*, towards which I conceive not the slightest advances can be made in this method. For the axiom that every thing must have a cause can never be made to infer the existence of a first cause, that is, of something without a cause. It is equally impossible for the human mind to conceive of the beginning of existence, or to pass from nothing to something, either by the help of an infinite series of finite existences, or by the infinite duration of one simple, absolute existence. Those who wish to see how far human ingenuity can push a complete confusion of ideas into the verge of the strictest logical demonstration and self-evident truth, may find all that they want in Dr. Clarke’s celebrated work on the ‘ Attributes,’ which contains more logical acuteness and more power of scholastic disputation than any other work that I know of in modern

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times. Hartley has lost himself in the same endless labyrinth of finite and infinite series. And Locke's statement of this question is only better, because it is shorter, and goes straight forward, without stopping to answer difficulties.

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I SHALL in this Lecture state Mr. Locke's account of generalization, abstraction, and reasoning, as contrasted with the modern one, and then endeavour to defend the existence of these faculties, or acts of the mind from the objections urged against them by Hume, Berkeley, Condillac, and others, which are in truth merely repetitions of what Hobbes has said on the subject. I must premise, however, that I do not think it possible ever to arrive at a demonstration of generals or abstractions by beginning in Mr. Locke's method with particular ones: this faculty of abstraction is by most considered as a sort of artificial refinement upon our other ideas, as an excrescence, no ways contained in the common impressions of things, nor scarcely necessary to the common purposes of life, and it is by Mr. Locke altogether denied to be among the faculties of brutes. It is the ornament and top addition of the mind of man, which proceeding from simple sensations upwards, is gradually sublimed into the abstract notions of things; 'from the root springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves more airy, last the bright consummate flower.' On the other hand, I conceive that all our notions from first to last, are strictly speaking, general and abstract, not absolute and particular; and that to have a perfectly distinct idea of any one individual thing, or concrete existence, either as to the parts of which it is composed, or the differences belonging to it, or the circumstances connected with it, would imply an unlimited power of comprehension in the human mind, which is impossible. All particular things consist of, and lead to, an infinite number of other things. Abstraction is a consequence of the limitation of the comprehensive faculty, and mixes itself more or less with every act of the mind of whatever kind, and in every moment of its existence. There is no idea of an individual object, which consists of a single impression, but of a number of impressions massed together: there is no idea of a particular quality of an object, which is perfectly simple, or which is not the result of a number of impressions of the same sort classed together by the mind without attending to their particular differences. Every idea of an object is, therefore, in a strict sense an imperfect and general notion of an aggregate: of a house, or tree, as well as of a city, or forest: of a grain of sand

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as well as of the universe. Every idea of a sensible quality, as of the whiteness of the sheet of paper before me, or the hardness of the table on which I lean, implies the same power of generalization, of connecting several impressions into one sort, as the most refined and abstract idea of virtue and justice, of motion, or extension, or space of time, or being itself. This view of the subject is not, I confess, very obvious at first sight, and it will be more easily understood after I have stated the arguments of others on this difficult question. The concise account of the nature of abstract ideas is that which Mr. Locke has given, as follows. 'All things that exist being particular, it may be perhaps thought reasonable that words which ought to be conformed to things should be so too, I mean in their signification : but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms, which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity.' 'First, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary in the applications of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with ; every bird and beast we see, every tree and plant that affect the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads, much less to call every leaf of plants or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name. Secondly, if it were possible, it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would not in vain heap up names of particular things that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood, which is then only done, when by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind who hears it, the idea I apply to it in mine when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone have the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant, intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice. Thirdly, granting this feasible, which I think it is not, yet a distinct name of every particular thing

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would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge ; which though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views, to which things reduced into sorts under general names are properly subservient. These with the names belonging to them come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires, and therefore in these men have for the most part stopped. But yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names ; and these distinct individuals have distinct denominations. Besides persons, countries, cities, rivers, mountains, and other like distinctions of place have usually found particular names, and that for the same reason ; and I doubt not but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one as familiarly as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. And therefore we see amongst jockies, horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants, because amongst them there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse, when he is out of sight. The next thing to be considered is how general words came to be made. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for ? Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas, and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one, each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea is (as we call it) of that sort.

‘ But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not, perhaps, be amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from their first infancy. There is nothing more evident than that the ideas of the persons children converse with, are like the persons themselves, only particulars. The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in the mind and like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first give rise to are confined to these individuals, and the names of *nurse* and *mamma* which the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great many other things in the world, that in some

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common agreements of shape, and several other properties resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in, and to that they give with others the name *Man*, for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain what is common to them all. By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to more general names and notions. For observing that several things that differ from their idea of man, and therefore cannot be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension; which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the name *man*, and retaining only a body with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name *animal*. That this is the way that men first formed general ideas and general names to them, I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a man's self or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their mind in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are anything else but *such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular existences*, will I fear be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect and then tell me, wherein does his idea of *man* differ from that of Paul and Peter, or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual; and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names *man* and *horse*, leaving out those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea and giving the name *animal* to it, one has a more general term that comprehends with man several other creatures.

‘Leave out of the idea of animal sense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one under the more comprehensive word *vivens*. And not to dwell upon these particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to *body*, *substance*, and at last to *being*, thing, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude: this

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whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which this is constant and invariable, that every more general term stands for such an idea as is but a part of any of those contained under it.'

The author adds, 'It is plain by what has been said, that general and universal belong not only to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it, for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things, but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their significations are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put in to of signifying many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them.' See p. 15, vol. 2.

Mr. Locke at first here evidently supposes that we have ideas answering to general terms, *i.e.* certain ideas of such particulars as a number of things are found to agree in, or that there are some common qualities by retaining which and only leaving out what is peculiar and foreign, without adding anything new, we get at the general notion. He afterwards to all appearance reduces these general notions to mere signs or sounds with which several particular ideas are associated, but which do not correspond to any common properties or general nature really inhering in these particular things. In the same manner he continues to take different sides of the question, when he comes to treat of genera, and species, when his antipathy to the word *essence* constantly drives him back into the notion that all our ideas of essences are mere terms, and the want of solidity in that opinion again as constantly disposes him to admit a real difference in the sorts of things, besides the difference of the names we give to them. For immediately after affirming that the abstract essences of things are the workmanship of the understanding, he adds, 'I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature, in the production of things makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, I think we may say, the sorting of them by names is the workmanship of the understanding taking occasion from the similitude

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it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas, and set them up as patterns in forms (for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification), to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that class. For when we say this is a *man*, that a *horse*, &c. what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made these names the signs? And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind, which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exist,' &c. For my own part I must confess that I agree with the Bishop of Worcester on this occasion, who asks, 'What is it that makes Peter, James, and John real men? Is it the attributing the general name to them? No, certainly, but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them. They take their denomination of being men from that common nature or essence which is in them.' On the opposite system it is not the nature of the thing which determines the imposition of the name, but the imposition of the name which determines the nature of the thing; or giving them the name makes Peter, James, and John men, as in the opinion of some divines Baptism makes them Christians. That there is a real difference in things and ideas, answering to their general names, appears evident from this single observation, that if it were not so, we could never know how to apply these general names, and we could no more distinguish between a man and a horse than we could tell at first sight, that one man's proper name was John and another's Thomas. The puzzle about genera and species, in this view of the question, seems to arise from a very obvious transposition of ideas. Because the abstracting or separating these general ideas from particular circumstances is the workmanship of the understanding, it has therefore been inferred that the ideas themselves are so too, and that they exist no where but in the mind which perceives them.

But I would fain ask, in the account which Mr. Locke gives of the abstract ideas of *animal* for example, whether body, sense, and motion, as they exist in different individuals, have not a general nature, or something common in all those individuals. If *body* in one case expresses the same thing, or same idea, as *body* in another, their generals belong to things and ideas, as well as to names; if *body* in one case expresses quite a different thing in one [from] what it does in another, then it is not easy to imagine what determines the mind to apply the name to these different things, or on what foundation Mr. Locke's definition rests. Extreme opinions were not in general the side on which Mr. Locke erred; and, on the present occasion,

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he has qualified his opposition to the prevailing system in such a manner, that it is difficult to say in what point he admitted or rejected it. He evidently, in the general scope of this argument, admits the reality of abstract ideas in the mind, though he denies the existence of real sorts or natures of things of the mind to correspond to them : for the expressions which intimate any doubt of the former are occasional and parenthetical, and his acknowledgment that there is something in nature which guides and determines the mind in the sorting of things and giving names to them is equally extorted from him. There is none of this doubt and perplexity in the minds of his French commentators ; none of this suspicion of error and anxious desire to correct it ; no lurking objections arise to stagger their confidence in themselves ; it is all the same light airy self-complacency ; not a speck is to be seen in the clear sky of their metaphysics, not a cloud obscures the sparkling current of their thoughts. In the logic of Condillac, the whole question of abstract ideas, of genera and species, and of the nature of reasoning as founded upon them, is settled and cleared from all difficulties, past, present, and to come, with as little expence of thought, time, and trouble, as possible. The Abbé demonstrates with ease. ‘General ideas,’ he says, ‘of which we have explained the formation, are a part of the aggregate idea of each of the individuals to which they correspond, and they are considered, for this reason, as so many partial or imperfect ideas. The idea of man, for instance, makes part of the complex ideas of Peter and Paul, since it is equally to be found in both. There is no such thing as man in general. This partial idea has then no reality out of the mind, but it has one in the mind, where it exists separately from the aggregate or individual ideas of which it is a part. All our general ideas are then so many abstract ideas, and you see that we form them only in consequence of taking from each individual idea that which is common to all.

‘But what, in truth, is the reality which a general and abstract idea has in the mind ? It is nothing but a name : or, if it is anything more, it necessarily ceases to be abstract, and general. When, for example, I think of a *man*, I consider this word as a common denomination, in which case, it is very evident, that my idea is in some sort circumscribed within this name, that it does not extend to anything beyond it, and that consequently it is nothing but the name itself. If, on the contrary, thinking of man in general, I contemplate anything in this word, besides the mere denomination, it can only be by representing myself to some one man ; and a man can no more be man in general, or in the abstract in my mind, than in nature. Abstract ideas are therefore only denominations. If we will absolutely

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think that they are something else, we shall only resemble a painter who should obstinately persist in painting the figure of a man in general, and who would still paint only individuals. This observation concerning abstract and general ideas, demonstrates that their clearness depends entirely on the order in which we have arranged the denominations of classes; and that, consequently, to determine this sort of ideas, there is only one means, which is to construct a language properly.

'This confirms what we have already demonstrated, how necessary words are to us: for if we had no general terms, we should have no abstract ideas, we should have neither *genera*, nor *species*, and without *genera* and *species*, we could reason upon nothing. But if we reason only by means of words this is a new proof that we can only reason well or ill, according as the language, in which we reason, is well or ill made. The analysis of our thoughts can only enable us to reason in proportion as by instructing us how to class our abstract ideas, it enables us how to form our language correctly, and the whole art of reasoning is thus reduced to the art of well speaking.'

What in this supremacy of words is to be the criterion of well speaking the Abbé does not say.

'To speak, to reason, to form general or abstract ideas, are then in fact the same thing: and this truth, simple as it is, might pass for a discovery. Certainly, men in general have not had any notion of it; this is evident from the manner in which they speak and reason; it is evident from the abuse which they make of abstract ideas; finally, it is evident from the difficulties which those persons confessedly find in conceiving of abstract ideas who have so little in speaking of them.

'The art of reasoning resolves into the construction of languages, only because the order of our ideas itself depends entirely on the subordination that subsists between the names given to *genera* and *species*; and as we arrive at new ideas only by forming new classes, it follows that we can only determine or define our ideas by determining their classes. In this case we should reason well, because we should be guided by analogy in our conclusions as well as in the acceptation of words.

'Convinced, therefore, that classes or sorts of things are pure denominations, we shall never think of supposing that there exist in nature *genera* or *species*; and we shall understand by these words nothing but a certain mode of classing things according to the relations which they have to ourselves and to one another. We shall be sensible that we can only discover those relations, and not what the things truly are.'

Berkeley handled his subjects with little tenderness, and he has perfectly anatomised this subject of abstract ideas. In choosing to

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answer the objections to this doctrine as stated by him, I shall not be accused of wishing to encounter a mean adversary. I can only trust to the goodness of my cause. I hope I shall be excused for going at some length into the argument, because it is one of the most difficult and complicated in itself, and is of the most extensive application to other questions relating to the human understanding. If we can come to any satisfactory issue to it, it will be worth the pains of enquiry.

'It is agreed on all hands,' says this author, 'that the quantities or modes of things do never really exist in each of them, apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But we are told the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight, an object, extended, coloured, and moved. This mixed idea the mind resolving into its simple constituent parts, and viewing each by itself exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension, but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour, exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive both of colour and extension. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure, or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another, it considers apart, or singles out by itself that which is most common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, line, surface, or solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense, that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that which only is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract, which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, &c. And in like manner by considering motion abstractedly, not only the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed, which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

'And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities, or modes, so does it by the precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compound beings, which include several co-existent qualities :—for example, the mind having observed, that Peter, James, John, &c., resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape, and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded

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idea it has of Peter, James, &c., that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all ; and so makes an abstract idea wherein the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely, and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it, to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said, we come by the abstract idea of man, or if you please humanity, or human nature ; 'tis true, there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour, wherein all men partake ; so there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these ; and so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, not all, of the complex idea, man, the mind leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all living creatures, frames the idea of animals, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also, all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. By *Body* is meant body without any particular shape, or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering of hair, feathers, or scales, &c. nor yet naked ; hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness, being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea ; upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither in walking, nor flying, nor creeping, it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is, it is not easy to conceive.

‘Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell : for myself I dare be confident I have it not. I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper part of a man joined to the body of a horse ; I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself, abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye, I imagine, it must have some particular shape, and colour. Likewise, the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny ; a strait, or a crooked ; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described : and it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear, and the like may be said of other abstract general ideas whatsoever : to be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which,

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though they are united in some objects, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately those qualities, which it is impossible should exist so separated :—or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation of abstraction ; and there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case.

‘The generality of men, which are simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study ; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the man of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteemed philosopher, who no doubt has given it very much, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast.’

The author here quotes a passage from Mr. Locke on the subject, which it is not necessary to give, and afterwards his opinion that words become general by being made signs of general ideas. He then proceeds :—‘To this I cannot assent, being of opinion that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind.

‘If we will annex a meaning to our words and speak only of what we can only conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas *of the same sort*. To make this plain by example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws for instance a black line of an inch in length : this which is in itself a particular line, is nevertheless, with regard to its signification, general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever, so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or in other words of a line in general ; and, as that particular line becomes general, by being made a sign, so the name *line*, which taken absolutely, is particular, by being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.’

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'To give the reader a clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, which is as follows:—"Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some skill and pains to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the abstract, comprehensive, and difficult), for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 'Tis true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste it can to them, for the convenience of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both of which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfections, at least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.'"—After laughing at this description of the general idea of a triangle, which is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once, Berkeley adds, 'Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming of them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequences should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is so familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know at what time it is, men are employed in surmounting that difficulty and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such pains-taking; it therefore remains to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate of their sugar plums, and rattles, and

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the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first packed together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds general abstract ideas, and annexed them to every common name they make use of.

‘It is I know a point much insisted on that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully assent. But then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction, in the manner premised; universality, as far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature and conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified, or represented by it. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have seen it first demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all?’

‘For because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to every other with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles, rectangular triangle, are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection argues to all other triangles, which have neither a right angle, nor two equal sides. It seems, therefore, that to be certain this proposition is universally true we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally represented.’ To which I answer, that though the idea I have in view, whilst I make the demonstration, be, for instance, that of an isosceles, not a regular triangle, whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness soever. And that neither because the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true, the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proofs of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of these is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and for all the others the demonstrations have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any oblique angular, or scalenon, which I had demonstrated of a particular right angled, equicrural, triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle.’ The author then adds some further remarks on the use of abstract terms and

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concludes—‘ May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a *good thing*, though we have not an idea of what it is? or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of a particular evil likely to befall us, and yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? ’—Introduction to Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 31.

Hume, who has taken up Berkeley’s arguments on this subject, and affirms that the doctrine of abstract ideas implies the flattest of all contradictions, that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, has enlarged a good deal on this last topic of the manner in which words may be supposed to excite general ideas. His words are these : ‘ Where we have found a resemblance between any two objects that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever differences may appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it with its particular circumstances and proportions. But as the same word is supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals that are different in many respects from the idea which is immediately present to the mind, the word not being able to revive the idea of all these individuals, only *touches* the soul, if I may be allowed so to speak, and revives that custom, which we have acquired by surveying them. They are not in reality present to the mind, but only in power, nor do we draw them out distinctly in the imagination, but keep ourselves in readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present design or necessity. The word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have occasion.’ Treatise of Human Nature, p. 43, 4. The author afterwards adds, with his usual candour, that this account does not perfectly satisfy him, but he relies principally on the logical demonstration of the impossibilities of abstract ideas just before given.

I confess it does not seem an easy matter to recover the argument in this state of it; however, I will attempt it. What I shall endeavour will not be so much to answer the foregoing reasoning as to prove that in a strict sense all ideas whatever are mere abstractions, and can be nothing else; that some of the most clear, distinct, and positive ideas of particular objects are made up of numberless inconsistencies; and that, as Hume expresses it, they do touch the soul, and are not drawn distinctly in the imagination, &c. Though I shall not be able to point out distinctly the fallacy of the foregoing reasonings, I hope to make it appear that there must be something wrong in

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the premises, and that the nature of thought and ideas is quite different from what is here supposed. I may be allowed to set off one paradox against another, and as these writers affirm that all abstract ideas are particular images, so I shall try to prove that all particular images are abstract ideas. If it can be made to appear that our ideas of particular things themselves are not particular, it may be easily granted that those which are in general allowed to be abstract, are all so. The existence of abstract and complex ideas in the mind has been disputed for the same reason, that is, in falsely attributing individuality, or absolute unity, to the objects of sense. While each thing or object was said to be absolutely one and simple, there was found to be no reach, compass, or expansion of mind, to comprehend it; and, on the other hand, there was no room on the same supposition for the doctrine of abstraction, for there is no abstracting from absolute unity. That which is one positive, indivisible thing, must remain entire as this, or cease to exist. There is no alternative between individuality and nothing. As long as we are determined to consider any one thing or idea, as the knot of a chain, or the figure of a man, or any thing else, as one individual, it must, as it were, go together: we can take nothing away without destroying it altogether. I have already shewn that there is no one object which does not consist of a number of parts and relations, or which does not require a comprehensive faculty in the mind in order to conceive of it. Now abstraction is a necessary consequence of the limitation of this power of the mind, and if it were a previous condition of our having the ideas of things that we should comprehend distinctly all the particulars of which they are composed, we could have no ideas at all. An imperfectly comprehended [thing] is a general idea. But the mind perfectly comprehends the whole of no one object. That is, it has not an absolute and distinct knowledge of all its parts or differences, and consequently all our ideas are abstractions, that is a general and confused result from a number of undistinguished, and undistinguishable impressions, for there is no possible medium between a perfectly distinct comprehension of all the particulars, which is impossible, or that imperfect and confused one, that properly constitutes a general notion in the one case or the other. To explain this more particularly. In looking at any object, as a house on the opposite side of the way, it is supposed that the impression I have of it is a perfectly distinct, precise, or definite idea, in which abstraction has no concern. And the general idea of a house, it is said, is rather a mere word, or must reduce itself to some such positive, individual image as that conveyed by the sight of a particular house, it being impossible that it should be made up of the confused, imperfect, and undistinguishable impres-

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sions of several different objects of the same kind. Now it appears to me the easiest thing in the world to shew that this sensible image of a particular house, into which the general is to be resolved for greater clearness, is itself but a confused and vague notion, or numberless inconsistencies packed together; not one precise individual thing, or any number of things, distinctly perceived. For I would ask of any one who thinks his senses furnish him with these infallible and perfect conceptions of things, free from all contradiction and perplexity, whether he has a precise knowledge of all the circumstance of the object prescribed to him. For instance, is the knowledge which he has that the house before him is larger than another near it, in consequence of his intently considering all the bricks of which it is composed, or can he tell that it contains a greater number of windows than another, without distinctly counting them? Let us suppose, however, that he does. But this will not be enough unless he has also a distinct perception of the numbers and the size of the panes of glass in each window, or of any mark, stain, or dirt in each separate brick. Otherwise his idea of each of these particulars will still be general, and his most substantial knowledge built on shadows; that is, composed of a number of parts, of the parts of which he has no knowledge. If objects were what mankind in general suppose them, single things, we could have no notion of them but what was particular, for by leaving out any thing we should leave out the whole object, which is but one thing. We may also be said to have a particular knowledge of things in proportion to the number of parts we distinguish in them. But the real foundation of all our knowledge, is and must be general, that is, a mere confused impression or effect of feeling produced by a number of things, for there is no object which does not consist of an infinite number of parts, and we have not an infinite number of distinct ideas answering to them. Yet it cannot be denied that we have some knowledge of things, that they make some impression on us, and this knowledge, this impression, must therefore be an abstract one, the natural result of a limited understanding, which is variously affected by a number of things at the same time, but which is not susceptible of itself to [an] infinite number of modifications. If it should be said that the sensible image of the house is still one, as being one impression, or given result, I answer, that the most abstract ideas of a house, and the imperfect recollection of a number of houses, is in the same sense one, and a real idea, distinct from that of a tree, though far from being a particular image. Again, it is said, that in conceiving of the idea of man in general, we must conceive a man, a particular sign or figure. I would ask first is this to be understood merely of his height, or of his form in general?

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If the latter, it would imply that we have, wherever we pronounce the word *man*, no ideas at all, or a distinct conception of a man with a head and limbs of a certain extent and proportion, of every turn in each feature, of every variety in the formation of each part, as well as of its distance from every other part, a knowledge which no sculptor or painter ever had of any one figure of which he was the most perfect master, for it would be a knowledge of an infinite number of lines drawn in all directions from every part of the body, with their precise length and terminations. Those who have consigned this business of abstraction over to the senses with a view to make the whole matter plain and easy, have not been aware of what they have been doing. They supposed with the vulgar that it was only necessary to open the eyes in order to see, and that the images produced by outward objects are completely defined, and unalterable things, in which there can be no dimness and confusion. These speculators had no thought but they saw as much of a landscape as Poussin, and knew as much about a face that was before them as Titian or Vandyke would have done. This is a great mistake; the having particular and absolute ideas of things is not only difficult, but impossible. The ablest painters have never been able to give more than one part of nature, in abstracted views of things. The most laborious artists never finished to perfection any one part of an object, or had ever any more than a confused, vague, uncertain notion of the shape of the mouth or nose, or the colour of an eye. Ask a logician, or any common man, and he will no doubt tell you that a face is a face, a nose is a nose, a tree is a tree, and that he can see what it is as well as another. Ask a painter and he will tell you otherwise. Secondly, when it is asserted that we must necessarily have the idea of a particular sign, when we think of any in general, all that is intended by it is, I believe, that we must think of a particular height. This idea it is supposed must be particular and determinate, just as we must draw a line with a piece of chalk, or make a mark with the slides of a measuring rule, in one place and not in the other. I think it may be shewn that this view of the question is also utterly fallacious, and out of the order of our ideas. The height of the individual is thus resolved with the ideas of the lines terminating or defining it, and the intermediate space of which it properly consists is entirely forgotten. For let us take any given height of a man, whether tall, short, or middle-sized, and let that height be as visible as you please, I would ask whether the actual height to which it amounts, does not consist of a number of other lengths: as if it be a tall man, the length will be six feet, and each of these feet will consist of so many inches, and those inches will be again made up of decimals, and those

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decimals of other subordinate parts, which must be all distinctly placed, and added together before the sum total which they compose can be pretended to be a distinct particular, or individual idea; I can only understand by a particular thing either one precise individual, or a precise number of individuals.

Instead of its being true that all general ideas of extension are deducible to particular positive extension, the reverse proposition is I think demonstrable: that all particular extensions, the most positive and distinct, are never any thing else than a more or less vague notion of extension in general. In any given visible object we have always the general idea of something extended, and never of the precise length; for the precise length as it is thought to be is necessarily composed of a number of lengths too many, and too minute, to be necessarily attended to, or jointly conceived by the mind, and at last loses itself in the infinite divisibility of matter. What sort of distinctness or individual can therefore be found in any visible image, or object of sense, I cannot well conceive: it seems to me like seeking for certainty in the dancing of insects in the evening sun, or for fixedness or rest in the motions of the sea. All particulars are thought nothing but generals, more or less defined by circumstances, but never perfectly so; in this all our knowledge both begins and ends, and if we think to exclude all generality from our ideas of things, we must be content to remain in utter ignorance. The proof that our ideas of particular things are not themselves particular, is the uncertainty and difficulty we have only in comparing them with one another. In looking at a line an inch long, I have a certain general impression of it, so that I can tell it is shorter than another, three or four times as long, drawn on the same sheet of paper; but I cannot immediately tell that it is shorter than one only a tenth or twentieth of an inch longer. The idea which I have of it is therefore not an exact one. In looking at a window I cannot precisely tell the number of panes of glass it contains, yet I can easily say whether they are few or many, whether the window is large or small. Now if all our ideas were made up of particulars, we never could pronounce generally whether there were few or many of these panes of glass, but we should know the precise number, or at least pitch on some precise number in our minds, and this we could not help knowing. There must be either 5, 10, 20, or 30; for it is in vain to urge that the idea in my mind is a floating one, and shifts from one of them to another, so that I cannot tell the moment after which it was; but what is this imperfect recollection but a confused contradictory and abstract idea? Here is a plain dilemma: it is a fact that we have some idea of a number of objects presented to us. It is also a fact

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that we do not know the precise number, nor can we assign any number confidently whether right or wrong. Whether this idea is but an abstract and general one it seems hard to say. Those who contend that we cannot have an idea of a man in general, without conceiving of some particular man, seem to have little reason, since the most particular idea we can form of a man, either in imagination or from the actual impression, is but a general idea. Those who say we cannot conceive of an army of men without conceiving of the individuals composing it, ought to go a step further, and affirm that we must represent to ourselves the features, form, complexion, size, posture, and dress, with every other circumstance belonging to each individual.

We must admit the notion of abstraction, first or last, unless any one will contend for this infinite refinement in our ideas of things, or assert that we have no idea at all. For the same process takes place in it, and is absolutely necessary to our most particular notions of things, as well as our most general, namely, that of abstracting from particulars, or of passing over the minute differences of things, taking them in the gross, and attending to the general effect of a number of distinguished and distinguishable impressions. It is thus we arrive at our first notion of things, and thus that all our after knowledge is acquired. The knowledge upon which our ideas rest is general, and the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more or less general, of leaving out more or fewer circumstances, and more or fewer objects, perceived either at once or in succession, and forming either a particular whole, aggregate, or a class of things. It may be asked farther whether our ideas of things, however abstract in general, with respect to the objects they represent, are not in their own nature, and absolute existence particular. To this hard question I shall return the best answer I can.

1. It is sufficient to the present purpose that ideas are general in their representation, however particular in themselves. Each idea is something in itself, and not another idea. This is equally true of the most abstract or particular ideas of things. The abstract idea of a man is the abstract idea of a man, not the abstract idea of a horse, nor the particular one of any given individual man. It is characterized by general properties, and distinguished by general circumstances, and is neither a mere word without any idea, nor a particular image of one thing; so the idea of a particular man, though still only a general result from a number of particulars is sufficiently positive for the actual purposes of thought, and distinguishable from that other general result or impression which institutes the idea of a particular horse, for instance.

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2. That our general notions are any otherwise particular than as they are the same with themselves, and different from one another, is more than I know. I must demur on this question, whatever others may do. Whatever contradictions are involved in the one side of it, those on the other seem as great. For it is not easy to imagine any thing more absurd than the supposition that the idea of a line for instance is precisely, and to a hair's breadth or to the utmost possible exactness, of a certain length, when neither the precise number nor the precise proportion of the parts composing this line are at all known. It is like saying that we cast up an account to the utmost degree of nicety, when not one of the items is known, but as of an average conjecture or in round numbers. We generally estimate our notion of a particular extension by the point or matter at all terminating it, and it seems as if this did not admit of an ambiguity, or variation. But in fact all ideas are a calculation of particulars, and when the parts are only known in gross, the sum total, or resulting idea can only be so too. The smallest division of which our notions are susceptible is a general idea. In the progress of the understanding, we never begin from absolute unity but always from something that is more. How then it is possible that these general conceptions should form a whole always commensurate to a precise number of absolute unity I cannot conceive, any more than how it is possible to express a fraction in whole numbers. The two things are incompatible. As to any thing like conscious individuality, *i.e.* that which assigneth limits to our ideas, we know they have it not.

3. I would observe that ideas, as far as they are distinct and particular, seem to involve a greater contradiction than when they are confused and general. For, in proportion to their distinctness, must be the number of different acts of the mind excited at the same time; *i.e.* in proportion to the individuality of the image or idea, if I may so express myself, the thought ceases to be individual, inasmuch as the simplicity of the attention is thus necessarily broken and divided into a number of different actions, which yet are all united in the same conscious feeling, or there could be no connexion between them. How then we should ever be able to conceive of things distinctly, clearly, and particularly, seems the wonder: not how different impressions acting at once on the mind should be confused, and as it were massed together, in a general feeling, for want of sufficient activity in the intellectual faculties to give form and a distinct place to all that throng of objects which at all times solicit the attention. Let any one make the experiment of counting a flock of sheep driven fast by him, and he will soon find his imagination unable to keep pace with the rapid succession of objects, and his idea of particular number

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slide into the general idea of multitude ; not that because there are more objects than he possibly can count, he will think there are many, or that the word flock will present to his mind a mere name, without any particulars corresponding to it. Every act of the attention, every object we see or think of, presents a proof of the same kind.

4. I conceive that the mind has not been fairly dealt with in this and other similar questions of the same sort. Matter alone seems to have the privilege of presenting difficulties, and contradictions at every turn ; but the moment any thing of this kind is observed in the understanding, all the petulance of logicians is up in arms, and the mind is made the mark on which they vent all the modes and figures of their impertinence. Let us take an example from some of these self-evident matters of fact, which contain at least as many, and as great contradictions, as any in the most abstruse metaphysical doctrine, such as in extension, motion, and the curve of lines. Now as to the first of these, extension : if we suppose it to be made up of points, which are in themselves without extension, but by their combination produce it, we must suppose two unextended things, when joined together, to become extended, which is like supposing, that by adding together several nothings, we can arrive at something. On the other hand, if we suppose the ultimate parts of which extension is composed, to be themselves extended, we then attribute extension to that which is indivisible, or affirm a thing to consist of parts, and to have none, at the same time. The old argument against the possibility of motion is well known : it was said that the body moving must either be in the place where it was, or in that into which it was passing. Now, if it was in either of these, or in any one place, it must be at rest ; and as it could not be in both at once, it followed that a body moving could exist no where, or that there was no such thing as motion in nature. Again, a curve line is described mathematically by a point moving, but always out of a strait line. Now, a strait line is the nearest between any two points. But that a body should move forward, and not move strait forward to the next point to which it is going, seems to imply no less an absurdity than the affirming that a thing never moves in the direction in which it is going, but always out of it ; for, if it moves in the same direction, the smallest moment of time, this is not a curve, but a strait line ; and if it does not continue to move in the same direction at all, it seems utterly inconceivable that it should make any progress, or move either in a curve or a strait line. Yet any one who, on the strength of the contradiction involved in the ideas of extension, motion, or curve lines, should severally deny or disbelieve any one of them, would be thought to want common sense. I think there are certain facts of the mind which are equally evident

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and unaccountable. Those who contend that the one are to be admitted, and the other not, because the one are the objects of sense, and the other not, do not deserve any serious answer. It is as much a fact, that I remember having seen the sun yesterday, as that I see it to-day, and both of them are much more certain facts than that there is any such body as the sun really existing out of the mind.

I will now return to Berkeley, and endeavour to answer his chief objections to the doctrine of abstract ideas. First, then, I conceive that he has himself virtually given up the question, when he allows that the mind may be affected with the promise of a good thing, or terrified by the apprehension of danger, without thinking of any particular good or evil that is likely to befall us. What this idea of good or evil, which is not particular, can be, other than abstract, I cannot conceive; and to say that it is not an idea, but a mere feeling excited by custom, is an answer very little to the purpose. For this feeling, this custom, is itself a general impression, and could not, without a power of abstraction in the mind, think, without a power of being acted upon by a number of different impulses of pleasure and pain, concurring to produce a general effect, abstracted from the particular feelings themselves, or the objects first exciting them. All abstract ideas are several impressions of the same kind, and are merely customary affections of the mind, not distinct images of things. But if it be said that the word *idea* properly signifies an image, and must be something distinct, then I answer, first, that this would only restrict the use of the word *idea* to particular things, and not affect the real question in dispute, and secondly, that there is no such thing as a distinct and particular image in the mind. The manner in which Berkeley explains the nature of mathematical demonstrations, according to his system, shews its utter inadequateness to any purposes of general reasoning, and is a plain confession of the necessity of abstract ideas. For all the answer he gives to the question, how can we know any proposition to be true in general, from having found it so in a particular instance, comes to this, that though the diagram we have in view includes a number of particulars, yet we know the principle to be true generally, because *there is not the least mention made of these particulars in the proof of the proposition*. But I would ask also, whether there is not the least thought of them in the mind? The truth is, that the mind upon Berkeley's principle must think of the particular right angled, isosceles triangle in question, or it can have no idea at all, for it has no general idea of a triangle to which it can apply the name generally. If we suppose that there is any such general form, or notion to which the other particular circumstances are merely super-added, and which may be left standing, though they are taken away,

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we then run immediately to all the absurdities of abstraction, which he so much wishes to avoid. If we then demonstrate the proposition of the particular diagram before us, as of a determinate size, shape, &c., this demonstration cannot hold good generally. If we are supposed to omit all these particular circumstances in our minds, then we either demonstrate the proposition of the general and abstract idea of a triangle, or of no idea at all; for after the particulars are omitted, or not attended to by the mind, the only idea remaining must be a general one. Farther, that on which I am willing to rest the whole controversy, is the following remark, *viz.* that without the general idea of a line or triangle, there could be no particular one; that is, no idea of any one line or triangle, as of the same form, or as any way related to any other, so that there could be no common measure or line to connect any of our thoughts or reasoning together into a general conclusion. For to take the former instance as the most simple. When we speak of any particular extension, it is evident that we understand something which is not particular. Besides what is peculiar to it, it must have something which is not peculiar to it, but general, to merit the common appellation. Berkeley says, 'An idea which in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas *of the same sort.*' I do request that the import of these last words may be attended to. Do they suggest any idea or none; if they mean any thing, it must be something more than the particular ideas which are said to be of the same sort, *i.e.* some general notion of them. But this will involve all the absurdities of abstraction. If there is any thing in the mind besides these particular ideas themselves—any thing that compares or contrasts them, that refers to this or that belief, this comparison or classifying can be nothing but a perception of a general nature in which these things agree, or the general resemblance which the mind perceives between the several impressions. If there is no such comparison or perception of resemblance, or idea of abstract qualities, then there can be no idea answering to the words 'of the same sort;' but these particular ideas will be left standing by themselves, absolutely unconnected. As far as our ideas are merely particular, *i.e.* are negations of other ideas, so far they must be perfectly distinct from each other: there can be nothing between them to blend or associate them together. Each separate idea would be surrounded with a *chevaux de frise* of its own, in a state of irreconcilable antipathy to every other idea, and the fair form of nature would present nothing but a number of discordant atoms. A particular line would no more represent another line, than it would represent a point: one colour could no more resemble another colour, or suggest its idea, than it

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could that of a sound, or a smell; there could be no clue to make us class different shades of the same colour under one general name, any more than the most opposite: one triangle would be as distinct from another, as from a square or a cube, and so through the whole system of art and nature. There must be a mutual leaning, a greater proximity between some ideas than others: a common point to which they tend, that is a common quality: a general nature, in which they are identified: or there could not be in the mind more ideas of same or like, or different, or judgment, or reasoning, or truth, or falsehood, than in the stones in the fields, or the sands of the seashore. The idea of classing things implies only the same sort of general comparison, or abstract idea of likeness, that is necessary to the idea of any simple sensible quality of an object. In both cases, we only contemplate a number of things as alike or under the same general notion, without attending to their actual differences. Take the idea, for instance, of a slab of white marble. As long as only one such piece of marble is considered, it is supposed to be a particular object, and its whiteness is supposed to be perceived by the mind as a simple sensible quality. If, on the contrary, several such slabs of marble are presented to the mind, this is commonly considered as producing a general idea of marble and of whiteness. But this idea of whiteness, not as a quality of a particular thing, but as a common quality of different things, is rejected by the moderns as implying the supposition, that several different ideas can coalesce in the same general notion, which amounts, they say, to the contradiction that a thing may be the same, and different at the same time. Now I would affirm whatever there is absurd or inconceivable in this latter case applies equally to the former. For what possible idea can any man form of a slab of white marble, in any other way than that of abstraction? Is the idea of its whiteness as a sensible quality the idea of a point? Is it one single impression? This Berkeley and others deny, for they say there can be no idea of colour without extension, or of quality without quantity. If there are in this object several impressions of colour, I would ask are they all distinctly perceived? Are they all the same? Or if not, are all their differences perceived by the mind, before it possibly can be impressed with the general idea of a certain sensible quality, or that the object before it is white? Is the mind aware of even the slightest stain in this object, of every thing that may happen to vary it? Yet, if the idea falls anything short of this minute and perfect knowledge, it can only be an imperfect and general notion. That is, a number of differences must be massed together in a common feeling of likeness, and a number of separate parts make up the idea of a given object. Yet this is all that is implied in forming the ideas of whiteness in

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general, as belonging to several objects, or of colour, or extension, or any other idea whatever, drawn from numberless objects, impressed at numberless times. If particular objects or qualities were single things, there would then be some precise limit between them and abstract or general ideas, but as the most particular object, or qualities, as well as the most general combinations and classes of things are necessarily confused and mixed results, and nothing more than a number of impressions, never distinctly analyzed by the mind, there can be no general reasoning to disprove abstracted ideas in the common sense of the word.

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THE modern system of philosophy has one great advantage, which makes it difficult to attack it with any hopes of success, namely, that it is not founded on any of the prevailing opinions or natural feelings of mankind. It rests upon a single principle—its boasted superiority over all prejudice. Unsupported by facts or reason, it is by this circumstance alone enabled to trample upon every dictate of the understanding, or feeling of the heart, as weak and vulgar prejudices. In this alone it is secure and invulnerable. To this it owes its giant power and dreaded name. Let the contradictions and fallacies contained in the system be proved over and over again, still the answer is ready:—all the objections made to it are resolved into *prejudice*. Destitute of every other support, it staggers our faith in received opinions by the hardihood of its assertions, and derives its claim to implicit credence by the boldness of its defiance of all established authority. Common sense is brought to the bar like an old offender, and condemned without a hearing. Under the shelter of this presumption there is no absurdity so great as not to be advanced with impunity. There is no hypothesis, however gratuitous, however inadequate, or however unfounded, that is not held up as the true one, if it is but contrary to all observation and experience. The grossest credulity succeeds to the most extravagant scepticism. From being the slaves of authority we become the dupes of paradox. Every opinion which is so absurd as never to have been affirmed before is converted into an undeniable truth. Whoever dares to question it, unawed by the authority on the one hand, and undazzled by the novelty on the other, is considered as a person of a narrow and bigoted understanding, and as relinquishing all claim to the exercise of his reason. We are effectually deterred from protesting against any of these ‘wise saws and modern instances’ by the dread of being mixed

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up with the vulgar, and we dare not avoid the common feelings of humanity lest we should be ridiculed as the dupes of self-love, or of the whining cant of moralists. There is however no bigotry so blind as that which is founded on a supposed exemption from all prejudice. The mind in this case identifies every opinion of its own with reason itself : and regarding the objections made to it as proceeding from a jaundiced and distorted view of the case, it converts them into the strongest confirmations of the depth and comprehensiveness of its own views. There are accordingly no people so little capable of reasoning as those who make the loudest pretensions to it : and having assumed the name of Philosophers, are astonished that any one should call their title in question.

I have been led to make these observations from reading Helvetius's account of self-love, which is nothing but a series of misrepresentations and assumptions of the question, and which can only have imposed upon his readers from that tone of confidence and alertness which men always have in attacking a received and long-established principle, and a tacit and involuntary feeling that boldness of opinion implies strength and independence of mind. A few examples will shew that this censure is well-founded. 'What,' says this author in the beginning of his view of the question,—'what is the human understanding? It is the assemblage of his ideas. To what sort of understanding do we give the name of talent? To the understanding concentrated upon a single subject ; that is to say to a large assemblage of ideas of the same kind.

'Now if there are no innate ideas, human understanding and genius are only acquired ; and both one and the other have the following faculties for their principles :

'1. Physical sensibility ; without which we could receive no sensations.

'2. Memory, that is to say, the faculty of recalling the sensations received.

'3. The interest which we have in comparing our sensations together, that is to say, in observing with attention the resemblances and differences, the agreements and disagreements of several objects amongst them. It is this interest which fixes the attention, and in minds commonly well-organized, is the efficient cause of understanding.'

It is added in a note, 'To judge, according to M. Rousseau, is not to feel. The proof of his opinion is that we have a faculty or power which enables us to compare objects. Now this power according to him cannot be the effect of physical sensibility. But,' continues Helvetius, 'if Rousseau had more profoundly considered the question,

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he would have perceived that this power (or faculty of understanding) is no other than the interest itself which we have to compare these objects, and that this interest takes its rise in the feeling of self-love, which is the immediate effect of physical sensibility.' This is the author's account of the understanding. It is bold and decided, but it is not on that account either more or less true. It comes to this; that the faculty or power of understanding is owing to the use we have for such a faculty; or that we have a power of comparing our sensations, because we have an interest in comparing them, and that therefore this power is nothing but the effect of physical sensibility. So that a man before he has any understanding, feeling the want of it, supplies himself with this very necessary faculty by an act of the will, and out of pure friendly regard to himself. 'The interest or desire to fly might at this rate supply us with a pair of wings, or an effort of curiosity might furnish us with a new sense, or an effort of self-interest might enable a man to be in two places at once. All these consequences might very easily follow, if we were only satisfied to believe any extravagance of assertion, and to use words systematically without either connexion or meaning.

The whole of this writer's argument against the existence of a benevolent principle in the mind is founded either on a play of words, or an arbitrary substitution of one feeling for another. He has confounded, and does not even seem to have been aware of the distinction between, self-love, considered as a rational principle of action, or the voluntary and deliberate pursuit of our own good as such, and that immediate interest or gratification which the mind may have in the pursuit of any object either relating to ourselves or others. He sometimes evidently considers the former of these, that is, a deliberating, calculating, conscious selfishness, as the only rational principle of action, and treats all other feelings as romance and folly, or even denies their existence; while at other times he contends that the most disinterested generosity, patriotism, and love of fame, are equally and in the strictest sense self-love, because the pursuit of these objects is connected with and tends immediately and intentionally to the gratification of the individual who has an attachment to them.

After stating the sentiment of Rousseau, that without an innate and abstract sense of right and wrong we should not see the just man and the true citizen consult the public good to his own prejudice, Helvetius goes on thus:—'No one, I reply, has ever been found to promote the public good when it injured his own interest. The patriot who risks his life to crown himself with glory, to gain the public esteem, and to deliver his country from slavery, yields to the feeling which is most agreeable to him. Why should he not place his happi-

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ness in the exercise of virtue, in the acquisition of public respect, and in the pleasure consequent upon this respect? For what reason, in a word, should he not expose his life for his country, when the sailor and soldier, the one at sea, and the other in the trenches, daily expose theirs for a shilling? The virtuous man who seems to sacrifice his own good to that of the public is only governed by a sentiment of noble self-interest. Why should M. Rousseau deny here that interest is the exclusive and universal motive of action, when he himself admits it in a thousand places of his work? The author then quotes the following passage from Rousseau's 'Emilius' in support of his doctrine:—'A man may indeed pretend to prefer my interest to his own: however plausibly he colours over this falsehood, I am quite sure it is one.' But I would ask why, on the principle just stated by Helvetius, he should not prefer another to himself, 'if it is agreeable to him'? Why should he not place his happiness in the exercise of friendship? Why should he not risk his life for his friend, as well as the patriot for his country, or as the soldier or sailor for a shilling a day? What is become, all of a sudden, of that noble self-interest which identifies us with our country and our kind? Is it quite forgot? Has it evaporated with a breath? Is there nothing of it left? When any instances are brought, or supposed, of the sacrifice of private interest to principle, or virtue, or passion, it is immediately pretended that these instances are not at all inconsistent with the grand universal principle of self-interest, which embraces all the sentiments and affections of the human mind, even the most heroic and disinterested. But the moment these instances are out of sight and the evasion is no longer necessary, this expansive principle shrinks into its own natural littleness again; and excludes all regard to the good of others as romantic and idle folly. All those instances of virtue which are at one moment perfectly compatible with this 'universal principle of action' are the next moment said to be incompatible with it, and the author after his little rhetorical glozings on the extensive views and generous sacrifices of self-interest, immediately descends into the vulgar proverb that 'the misfortunes of others are but a dream.' To proceed: Helvetius says (p. 14):

'What we understand by goodness or the moral sense in man, is his benevolence towards others: and this benevolence we always find in proportion to the utility they are of to him. I prefer my fellow-citizens to strangers, and my friend to my fellow-citizens. The welfare of my friend is reflected upon me. If he becomes more rich and more powerful, I partake of his riches and his power. Benevolence towards others is nothing, then, but the effect of love to ourselves.'

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The inference here stated, that benevolence is merely a reflection from self-love, is founded on the assumption that we always feel for others in proportion to the advantage they are of to us, and this assumption is a false one. That the habitual or known connexion between our own welfare and that of others, is one great source of our attachment to them, one bond of society, is what I do not wish to deny: the question is whether it is the only one in the mind, or whether benevolence has not a natural basis of its own to rest upon, as well as self-love. Grant this, and the actual effects which we observe in human life will follow from both principles combined: but to say that our attachment to others is in the exact ratio of our obligations to them, is contrary to all we know of human nature. I would ask whether the affection of a mother for her child is owing to the good received or bestowed; to the child's power of conferring benefits, or its standing in need of assistance? Are not the fatigues which the mother undergoes for the child, its helpless condition, its little vexations, its sufferings from ill health or accidents, additional ties upon maternal tenderness, which by increasing the attention to the wants of the child and anxiety to supply them, produce a proportionable interest in an attachment to its welfare? Helvetius justly observes that we prefer a friend to a stranger, but the reason which he assigns for it, that our interests and pleasures are more closely allied, is not the only one. We participate in the successes of our friends, it is true, but we also participate in their distresses and disappointments, and it is not always found that this lessens our regard for them. Benevolence, therefore, is not a mere physical reflection from self-love. His account of friendship agrees exactly with that which the grave historian of Jonathan Wild has given of the friendship between his hero and Count La Ruse: 'Mutual interest, the greatest of all purposes, was the cement of this alliance, which nothing of consequence but superior interest was capable of dissolving.'

The mechanical principle of association, understood in a strict sense, will not account for the multifarious and mixed nature of our affections, and if we do not understand it in a strict sense it will then only be another name for sympathy, imagination, or any thing else.

'What then in truth,' proceeds this author, 'is the natural goodness, or moral sense, so much extolled by the English? What distinct idea can we form of such a sense, or on what evidence found its existence? If we allow a moral sense, why not allow an algebraical or chemical sense? Nothing is more absurd than this theological philosophy of Shaftesbury, and yet most of the English are as much delighted with it as the French formerly were with their music. It is not the same with other nations. No foreigner can understand

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the one or hear the other. It is a film on the eye of the English, which it is necessary to remove in order that they may see.

‘According to their philosophy, a man in a state of indifference sitting in his elbow chair, desires the good of others : but in as far as he is different, man desires and can desire nothing. A state of desire and indifference is incompatible. These philosophers repeat in vain that the moral sense is implanted in man, and makes him at a certain time disposed to compassionate the sufferings of his fellows. This system is in fact nothing more than the system of innate ideas overturned by Locke. For my part, I can form an idea of my five senses, and of the organs which constitute them : but I confess that I have no more idea of a moral sense than of a moral elephant and castle. The enthusiasts for “moral beauty” are ignorant of the contempt in which these nations are held by all those who, either in the character of statesmen, officers of police, or men of the world, have an opportunity of knowing what human nature is.’—Page 15.

In reply to the dogmatical question with which this passage begins —‘What distinct idea can be given of the moral sense?’—I answer for myself, the following very explicit one : namely, that it is the natural preference of good to evil, arising from the conception or idea formed of them in the understanding. Those who assert a moral sense, affirm that there is a faculty of some sort or other inseparable from the nature of a rational and intelligent being, that enables us to form a conception of good and evil, or of the feelings of pleasure and pain generally speaking, which ideas so formed have a natural tendency to excite certain affections and actions.

Those, on the other hand, who deny a moral sense, or any thing equivalent to it, must affirm either that we can form no idea whatever of the feelings of others, or of good and evil generally speaking, or that these ideas have no possible influence over the mind, except from their connexion with physical impressions, memory, habit, self-interest, or some other motive, quite distinct from the ideas themselves. But I have already shewn that without the co-operation of rational motives, there could be neither habit, nor self-interest, nor voluntary action of any kind. The moral is therefore nothing but the application of the understanding to the feelings or ideas of good. The question, consequently, whether there is a moral sense, is reducible to this : whether the mind can understand or conceive, or be affected by, any thing beyond its own physical or mechanical feelings. If it can, then there is something in man besides his five senses and the organs which compose them, for these can give him no thought, conception, or sympathy with any thing beyond himself, or even with himself beyond the present moment. The actions, and events, and feelings

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of human life, the passions and pursuits of men, could no more go on without the interference of the understanding than without an original principle of physical sensibility. Neither the one nor the other explains the whole economy of our moral nature, but that is no reason why both are not essential and integrant parts of it. The five senses and the organs which compose them will not account for the science of morality, let it be as imperfect as it may, any more than for the science of algebra or chemistry in the different degrees in which they are possessed by different men. The point is not whether reason is furnishing us with a perfect and infallible rule of action, absolute over any other motive or passion, but whether it is any rule at all, whether it has any possible influence over our moral feelings. According to Helvetius, the moral sense is either a word without meaning, or it must signify one of our five senses: that is, impressions not actually affecting one or other of these are to him absolutely nothing. It is strange that after this he should propose to take the film from the eyes of those who ridiculously fancy that they have other ideas. It is as if a blind man should undertake to undeceive those who can see, with respect to certain chemical notions, called objects of sight. In confirmation of his theory, he refers the romantic admirers of moral beauty to the opinion of certain classes and professions of men, whose visual ray has been purged, and who, it should seem, possess a sort of second sight into human nature, namely, ministers of state, officers of police, and men of business. Either this argument is a satire on these characters, or on the understanding of his readers. If these respectable, and, I dare say, very well-meaning persons, are by the narrowness of their occupations and views, precluded from any general knowledge of human nature, or the virtues of the human heart, it is an uncivil irony to propose them as consummate judges of the abstract nature of man. If, on the other hand, in spite of their employment, they retain the same notions and liberality of feeling as other men, there is no reason to suppose that they would subscribe to the sentiment of our author, that morality 'is an affair of the five senses:' a proposition which any minister of state, or police officer, or man of the world, possessed of the least common sense, would treat with as much contempt and incredulity as Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. Our author's observation, that the notion of a moral sense or natural disposition to sympathize with others, is only the doctrine of innate ideas in disguise, is another misconception of the nature of the question. The actual feeling of compassion is not, as he says, innate; but this no more proves that the disposition to compassion or benevolence is not innate, than the fact that the ideas or feelings of pleasure and pain are not innate and born with us, proves that physical sensibility is not an

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original faculty of the mind. Moral sensibility, or the capacity of being affected by the ideas of certain objects, is as much a part of our nature as physical sensibility, or the capacity of being affected in a certain manner by the objects themselves. Helvetius says, physical sensibility is the only quality essential to the nature of man, I answer, that physical sensibility is *not* the only quality essential to the nature of man. To shew how senseless and insignificant is this kind of reasoning, I will refer back to Helvetius's concise profession of his metaphysical faith, which is that he can form an idea of the five senses and of the organs of them, but of nothing else. Now, I may ask, how he comes by this *idea*? Which of his senses or which of the organs of them is it that gives him an idea of the other four? Has the eye an action of words, or the ear of colours, or either of the impressions of taste, smell, or feeling? Which of them is the common sense? or if none, must we not suppose some superintending faculty to which all the other impressions are subject, and which alone can give him an idea of his own senses or their organs? Another instance of the utter want of logical and consecutive reasoning which characterizes the French philosophers, might be given in their singular proof of the selfishness of the human mind from the incompatibility of a state of desire and a state of indifference. The English philosophers are charged with representing a man in a state of indifference, 'seated in his arm-chair,' as desiring the good of others. This arm-chair it should seem, no less than his state of indifference, presents certain insurmountable barriers to his desires, which they cannot pass so as to affect him with the slightest concern for any thing beyond it. So far as a man is indifferent to every thing, he cannot it is true desire any thing. All that follows from this is, that so far as he desires the good of others he is not in a state of indifference.

That a man cannot desire an object and not desire it at the same time requires no proof. But what ought to have been proved, and what was meant to be so, is that a man in a state of indifference to the welfare of others on his own account, cannot desire it for their sake, and this is what is not proved by the truism mentioned. The general maxim, that I cannot desire any object as long as I am indifferent to it, cannot be made to show that self-interest is the only motive that can make me pass from the one state into the other. By indifference, as used by the writers here ridiculed, in a popular sense, is evidently meant the want of personal or physical interest in any object, and to say that this necessarily implies the want of every other kind of interest in it, of all rational desire of the good of others, is a meagre assumption of the point in dispute. It is strange that these pretenders to philosophy choose to insult the English writers for

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daring to wear the plain, homely, useful, national garb of philosophy, while their most glossy and most fashionable suits are made up of the shreds and patches stolen from our countryman Hobbes, disguised with a few spangles, tinselled lace, and tagged points of their own.

Helvetius's paraphrase of Hobbes's maxim, that 'pity is only another name for self-love,' is as follows :

'What then do I feel in the presence of an object of compassion? A strong emotion. What causes this emotion? The recollection of the sufferings to which man is subject, and to which I am myself liable. It is this consideration that disturbs, that torments me, and so long as the unfortunate sufferer continues in my presence I am affected with melancholy sensations. Have I relieved him,—do I no longer see him? A calm is insensibly restored to my breast, because in proportion to the distance to which he is removed, the remembrance of the evils which his sight recalled is gradually effaced. When I was concerned for him, then, I was concerned only for myself. What are, in fact, the sufferings which I compassionate the most? They are those not only which I have felt myself, but those which I may still feel. Those evils the more present to my memory impress me more strongly. My sympathy with the sufferings of another is always in exact proportion to my fear of being exposed to the same sufferings myself. I would willingly, if it were possible, destroy the very germ of my own sufferings in him, and thus be released from the apprehension of the like evils to myself in time to come. The love of others is never any thing more in the human mind than the effect of love to ourselves, and consequently of our physical sensibility.'—Vol. ii. page 20.

To this I answer as follows :—What do I feel in the presence of an object of compassion? A strong emotion. What causes this emotion? Not, certainly, the general recollection of the sufferings to which man in general is subject, or to which I myself may be exposed. It is not this remote and accidental reflection, which has no particular reference to the object before me, but a strong sense of the sufferings of the particular person, excited by his immediate presence, which affects me with compassion, and impels me to his relief. The relief I afford him, or the absence of the object, lessens my uneasiness, either by the contemplation of the diminution of his sufferings, to which I have contributed, or by diverting my mind from the consideration of his sufferings. Neither the relief afforded, nor the absence of the object could produce this effect, if the strong emotion which I experience did not relate to the particular object. It is the fate of the individual, and of him only, which I am contemplating, and my sympathy accordingly rises and falls with it, or as my attention

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is more or less fixed upon it. A total alteration in the situation of the individual produces a total change in my feelings with respect to him, which could not be the case, if my compassion depended wholly on my sense of my own security, or the general condition of human nature. In feeling compassion for another, therefore, it was not for myself that I was concerned, but for the sufferer : my feelings were, in a manner, bound up with his, and I forgot for the moment both myself and others. But do I not compassionate most those evils which I have felt myself? Yes; because from my own knowledge of them I have a more lively sense of what others must suffer from them : just in the same manner I dread those evils most with respect to myself in time to come. For those evils which I have not experienced, I feel, for that reason, less sympathy in respect to others, and less dread with reference to myself in time to come. Neither do I always feel for others in proportion as I dread the same feelings myself. The memory of my past sufferings cannot excite my disposition to relieve those of others, and the imaginary apprehension of my own *future* sufferings can only tend to produce voluntary action on the same principle as my imagination of those of others. I do not wish to prevent their sufferings as the germ or cause of mine, but because they are of the same nature as mine. Benevolence, therefore, is not the effect of self-love, though it is the effect of our physical sensibility, combined with our other faculties. I will in this place insert the reply of Bishop Butler (a true philosopher) to the same argument in Hobbes, in a note to one of his sermons.

‘ If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as good-will in one man towards another (for the question is not concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning the affection itself), let it be observed, that *whether man be thus or otherwise constituted, what is the inward frame in this particular* is a mere question of fact or natural history, not proveable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the same way other facts or historical matters are : by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions, respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognizable by one or the other ; by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions, inquiring whether these do not suppose and prove the matter in question so far as it is capable of proof. And, lastly, by the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of benevolence amongst men, may be as strongly and plainly proved in all these ways, as it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this affection in our nature. And should any one think fit to assert, that resentment in the mind of man was absolutely nothing but reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what

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is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways than those in which it may be shown, that there is such a thing in *some degree as real good-will* in man towards man.

‘There being manifestly this appearance of men’s substituting others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method to solve it; and tell you it is *not another* you are at all concerned about, but your *self only*, when you feel the affection called compassion; *i.e.* there is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot reconcile with the general account they think fit to give of things; they therefore, instead of *that* manifest fact, substitute *another*, which is reconcilable to their own scheme. For does not every body by compassion mean an affection the object of which is another in distress? Instead of this, but designing to have it mistaken for this, they speak of an affection or passion, the object of which is ourselves, or danger to ourselves. Suppose a person to be in real danger, and by some means or other to have forgot it; any trifling accident, any sound might alarm him, recall the danger to his remembrance, and renew his fears: but it is almost too grossly ridiculous (though it is to show an absurdity) to speak of that sound or accident as an object of compassion; and yet, according to Mr. Hobbes, our greatest friend in distress is no more to us, no more the object of compassion or of any affection in our heart. Neither the one nor the other raises any emotion in our mind, but only the thoughts of our liableness to calamity, and the fear of it: and both equally do this.

‘There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon sight of persons in distress: real sorrow and concern for the misery of our fellow-creatures; some degree of satisfaction from a consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and, as the mind passes on from one thing to another, it is not unnatural from such an occasion to reflect upon our own liableness to the same or other calamities. The two last frequently accompany the first, but it is the first *only* which is properly compassion, of which the distressed are the object, and which directly carries us with calmness and thought to their assistance. Any one of these, from various and complicated reasons, may in particular cases prevail over the other two; and there are, I suppose, instances where the bare *sight* of distress, without our feeling any compassion for it, may be the occasion of either or both of the two latter.’

I shall proceed to examine the objection to the doctrine of benevolence, on the supposition that our sympathy when it exists is really a part of our interest. This objection was long ago stated by Hobbes,

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Rochefoucault, and Mandeville, and has been adopted and glossed over by Helvetius. It is pretended, then, that in wishing to relieve the distresses of others we only desire to remove the uneasiness which pity creates in our mind ; that all our actions are unavoidably selfish, as they all arise from the feeling of pleasure or pain existing in the mind of the individual, and that whether we intend our own good or that of others, the immediate gratification connected with the idea of any object is the sole motive which determines us to the pursuit of it.

First, this objection does not at all affect the main question in dispute. For if it is allowed that the idea of the pleasures or pains of others excites an immediate interest in the mind, if we feel sorrow and anxiety for their imaginary distresses exactly in the same way that we do for our own, and are impelled to action by the same principle, whether the action has for its object our own good, or that of others ; in a word, if we sympathize with others as we do with ourselves, the nature of man as a voluntary agent must be the same, whether we choose to call this principle self-love, or benevolence, or whatever refinements we may introduce into our manner of explaining it. The relation of man to himself and others as a moral agent is plainly determined, whether a rational pursuit of his own future welfare and that of others is the real or only the ostensible motive of his actions. Were it not that our feelings are so strongly attached to names, the rest would be a question more of speculative curiosity than practice. All that, commonly speaking, is meant by the most disinterested benevolence is this immediate sympathy with the feelings of others, as by self-love is meant the same kind of attachment to our own future interests. For if by self-love we understand any thing beyond the impulse of the present moment, any thing different from inclination, let the object be what it will, this can no more be a mechanical thing than the most refined and comprehensive benevolence. Self-love, used in the sense which the above objection implies, must therefore mean some thing very different from an exclusive principle of deliberate, calculating selfishness, rendering us indifferent to every thing but our own advantage, or from the love of physical pleasure or aversion to physical pain, which could produce no interest in any but sensible impressions. In a word, it expresses merely any inclination of the mind be it to what it will, and does not at all determine or limit the object of pursuit. Supposing, therefore, that our most generous feelings and actions were so far equivocal, the object only bearing a show of disinterestedness, the secret motive being always selfish, this would be no reason for rejecting the common use of the term *disinterested benevolence*, which expresses nothing more than an immediate reference of our actions to the good of others, as self-love

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expresses a conscious reference of them to our own good as means to an end. This is the proper meaning of the terms. If we denominate our actions not from the object in view, but from the inclination of the individual, there will be an end at once, both of 'selfishness' and 'benevolence.'

But farther, I deny that there is any foundation for the objection itself, or any reason for resolving the feelings of compassion or our voluntary motives in general into a principle of mechanical self-love. That the motive to action exists in the mind of the person who acts, is what no one can deny, or I suppose ever meant to deny. The passion excited and the impression producing it must necessarily affect the individual. There must always be some one to feel and act, or there could evidently be no such thing as feeling or action. If therefore it had ever been implied as a condition in the love of others, that this love should not be felt by the person who loves them, this would be to say that he must love them and not love them at the same time, which is too palpable an absurdity to be thought of for a moment. It could never, I say, be imagined that in order to feel for others, we must in reality feel nothing, or that benevolence, to exist at all, must exist no where. This kind of reasoning is therefore the most arrant trifling. To call my motives or feelings selfish, because they are felt by myself, is an abuse of all language: it might just as well be said that my idea of the Monument is a selfish idea, or an idea of myself, because it is I who perceive it. By a selfish feeling must be meant, therefore, a feeling, not which belongs to myself (for that all feelings do, as is understood by every one), but which *relates* to myself, and in this sense benevolence is not a selfish feeling. It is the individual who feels both for himself and others; but by self-love is meant that he feels only for himself; for it is presumed that the word *self* has some meaning in it, and it would have absolutely none at all, if nothing more were intended by it than any object or impression existing in the mind. It therefore becomes necessary to set limits to the meaning of the terms. If we except the burlesque interpretation of the word just noticed, self-love can mean only one of these three things. 1. The conscious pursuit of our own good as such; 2. The love of physical pleasure and aversion to physical pain; 3. The gratification derived from our sympathy with others. If all our actions do not proceed from one of these three principles, they are all resolvable into self-love.

First, then, self-love may properly signify, as already explained, the love or affection excited by the idea of our own interest, and the conscious pursuit of it as a general, remote, ideal object. In this sense, that is, considered with respect to the proposed end of our actions, I have shewn sufficiently that there is no exclusive principle

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of self-love in the human mind which constantly impels us, as a set purpose, to pursue our own advantage and nothing but that.

Secondly, any being would be strictly a selfish agent, all whose impulses were excited by mere physical pleasure or pain, and who had no sense or imagination, or anxiety about any thing but its own bodily feelings. Such a being could have no idea beyond its actual, momentary existence, and would be equally incapable of rational self-love or benevolence. But it is allowed on all hands that the wants and desires of the human mind are not confined within the limits of his bodily sensations.

Thirdly, it is said that though man is not merely a physical agent, but is naturally capable of being influenced by imagination and sympathy, yet that this does not prove him to be possessed of any degree of disinterestedness or real good-will to others; since he pursues the good of others only from its contributing to his own gratification; that is, not for their sakes, but for his own, which is still selfishness. That is, the indulgence of certain affections necessarily tends, without our thinking of it, to our own immediate gratification, and the impulse to prolong a state of pleasurable feeling and put a stop to whatever gives the mind the least uneasiness, is the real spring and over-ruling principle of our actions. If our benevolence and sympathy with others arose out of and was entirely regulated by this principle of self-gratification, then these might indeed be with justice regarded as the ostensible accidental motives of our actions, as the form or vehicle which served only to transmit the efficacy of any other hidden principle, as the mask and cover of selfishness. But the supposition itself is the absurdest that can well be conceived. Self-love and sympathy are inconsistent. The instant we no longer suppose man to be a physical agent, and allow him to have ideas of things out of himself and to be influenced by them, that is, to be endued with sympathy at all, he must necessarily cease to be a merely selfish agent. The instant he is supposed to conceive and to be affected by the ideas of other things, he cannot be wholly governed by what relates to himself. The terms 'selfish' and 'natural agent' are a contradiction. For the one expression implies that the mind is actuated solely by the impulse of self-love, and the other that it is in the power and under the control of other motives. If our sympathy with others does not always originate in the pleasure with which it is accompanied to ourselves, or does not cease the moment it becomes troublesome to us, then man is not entirely and necessarily the creature of self-love. He is under another law and another necessity, and in spite of himself is forced out of the direct line of his own interest, both future and present, by other principles inseparable from his nature as an intelligent

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being. Our sympathy therefore is not the servile, ready tool of our self-love, but this latter principle is itself subservient to and over-ruled by the former ; that is, an attachment to others is a real independent principle of human action. What I wish to state is this : that the mind neither constantly aims at nor tends to its own individual interest. That in benevolence, compassion, friendship, &c. the mind does aim at its good, is what every one must acknowledge. The only sense then in which our sympathy with others can be construed into self-love, must be that the mind is so constituted that without forethought or any reflection in itself, or when seeming most occupied with others, it is still governed by the same universal feeling of which it is wholly unconscious ; and that we indulge in compassion, &c. only because and in as far as it coincides with our own immediate gratification. If it could be shewn that the current of our desires always runs the same way, either with or without knowledge, I should confess that this would be a strong presumption of what has been called the falsity of human virtue. But it is not true that such is the natural disposition of the mind. It is not so constructed as to receive no impressions but those which gratify its desire of happiness, or to throw off every the least uneasiness relating to others, like oil from water. It is not true that the feelings of others have no natural hold upon the mind but by their connexion with self-interest. Nothing can be more evident than that we do not on any occasion blindly consult the interest of the moment ; there is no instinctive unerring bias to our own good, which, in the midst of contrary motives and doubtful appearances, puts aside all other impulses and guides them but to its own purposes. It is against all experience to say that in giving way to the feelings of sympathy, any more than to those of rational self-interest (for the argument is the same in both cases), I always yield to that impulse which is accompanied with most pleasure at the time. It is true that I yield to the strongest impulse, but not that my strongest impulse is to pleasure. The idea, for instance, of the relief I may afford to a person in extreme distress, is not necessarily accompanied by a correspondent degree of pleasurable sensation to counterbalance the painful sensation his immediate distress occasions in my mind. It is certain that sometimes the one and sometimes the other may prevail without altering my purpose in the least. I am led to persevere in it by the idea of what are the sufferings, and that it is in my power to alleviate them : though that idea is not always the most agreeable contemplation I could have. Those who voluntarily perform the most painful duties of friendship or humanity do not do them from the immediate gratification arising therefrom ; it is as easy to turn away from a beggar as to relieve him ; and if the

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mind were not actuated by a sense of truth, and of the real consequences of its actions, we should uniformly listen to the distresses of others with the same sort of feeling as we go to see a tragedy, only because we calculate that the pleasure is greater than the pain. But I appeal to every one whether this is a true account of human nature. There is indeed a false and bastard kind of feeling commonly called sensibility, which is governed altogether by this reaction of pity on our own minds, and which instead of disproving only serves more strongly to distinguish the true. Upon the theory here stated the mind is supposed to be imperceptibly attached to or to fly from every idea or impression simply as it affects it with pleasure or pain : all other impulses are carried into effect or remain powerless according as they touch this great spring of human affection, which determines every other movement and operation of the mind. Why then do we not reject at first every tendency to what may give us pain ? Why do we sympathise with the distresses of others at all ?

‘ The jealous God at sight of human ties,
Spreads his light wings and in a moment flies.’

Why does not our self-love in like manner, if it is so perfectly indifferent and unconcerned a principle as it is represented, immediately disentangle itself from every feeling or idea which it finds becoming painful to it ? It should seem we are first impelled by self-love to feel uneasiness at another's sufferings, in order that the same principle of tender concern for ourselves may afterwards impel us to get rid of that uneasiness by endeavouring to remove the suffering which is the cause of it. In desiring to relieve the distress of another, it is pretended that our only wish is to remove the uneasiness it occasions us : do we also feel this uneasiness in the first instance for the same reason, or from regard to ourselves ! It is absurd to say that in compassionating others I am only occupied with my own pain or uneasiness, since this very uneasiness arises from my compassion. It is to take the effect for the cause. One half of the process, namely, our connecting the sense of pain with the idea of it, has evidently nothing to do with self-love : nor do I see any more reason for ascribing the active impulse which follows to this principle, since it does not tend to remove the idea of the object as it gives *me* pain, or as it actually affects *myself*, but as it is supposed to affect another. Self, mere positive self, is entirely forgotten, both practically and consciously. The effort of the mind is not to remove the idea or the immediate feeling of pain as an abstract impression of the individual, but as it represents the pain which another feels, and is connected with the idea of another's pain. So long then as this imaginary idea of what

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another feels excites my sympathy with him, as it fixes my attention on his sufferings, however painful, as it impels me to his relief, and to employ the necessary means for that purpose, at the expense of my ease and satisfaction, that is, so long as I am interested for others, it is not true that my only concern is for myself, or that I am governed solely by the principles of self-interest. Abstract our sympathy as it were from itself, and resolve it into another principle, and it will no longer produce the effects which we constantly see it produce wherever it exists. Let us suppose, for a moment, that the sensations of others were embodied by some means or other with our own, that we felt for them exactly as for ourselves, would not this give us a real sympathy in them, and extend our interest and identity beyond ourselves? Would the motives and principles by which we are actuated be the same as before? But the imagination, though not in the same degree, produces the same effects: it modifies and overrules the impulses of self-love, and binds us to the interests of others as to our own. If the imagination gives us an artificial interest in the welfare of others, if it determines my feelings and actions, and if it even for a moment draws them off from the pursuit of an abstract principle of self-interest, then it cannot be maintained that self-love and benevolence are the same. The motives that give birth to our social affections are by means of the understanding as much regulated by the feelings of others as if we had a real communication and sympathy with them, and are swayed by an impulse altogether foreign to self-love. If it should be said, that after all we are as selfish as we can be, and that the modifications and restrictions of the principle of self-love are only a necessary consequence of the nature of a thinking being, I answer, that this is the very point I wish to establish; or that it is downright nonsense to talk of a principle of entire selfishness in connexion with a power of reflection, that is, with a mind capable of perceiving the consequences of things beyond itself, and of being affected by them.

Should any desperate metaphysician persist in affirming that my love of others is still the love of myself, because the impression exciting my sympathy must exist in my mind, and so be a part of myself, I would answer that this is using words without affixing any distinct meaning to them. The love or affection excited by any general idea existing in my mind, can no more be said to be the love of myself, than the idea of another person is the idea of myself, because it is I who perceive it. This method of reasoning, however, will not go a great way to prove the doctrine of an abstract principle of self-interest; for, by the same rule, it would follow that in hating another person I hate myself. Indeed, upon this principle, the whole structure of

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language is a continued absurdity. It is pretended by a violent assumption, that benevolence is only a desire to prolong the idea of another's pleasure in one's own mind, because the idea exists there : malevolence must, therefore, be a disposition to prolong the idea of pain in one's own mind for the same reason, that is, to injure one-self, for by this philosophy no one can have a single idea which does not refer to, nor any impulse which does not originate in, self. But the love of others cannot be built on the love of self, considering this last as the effect of 'physical sensibility;' and the moment we resolve self-love into the rational pursuit of a remote object, it has been shown that the same reasoning applies to both, and that the love of others has the same necessary foundation in the human mind as the love of ourselves.

I have endeavoured to prove that there is no real, physical, or essential difference between the motives by which we are naturally impelled to the pursuit of our own welfare and that of others. The truth of this paradox, great as it seems, may be brought to a very fair test : namely, the being able to demonstrate that the doctrine of self-interest, as it is commonly understood, is in the nature of things an absolute impossibility ; and, the being able to account for that hypothesis,—that is, for the common feeling and motives of men from habits, and a confused association of ideas aided by the use of language. If others cannot answer my reasons, and if I can account for their prejudices, I should not be justified in hastily relinquishing my opinion, merely on account of its singularity. It may not be improper briefly to recapitulate the former argument as far as it proceeded. I am far from denying that there is a difference between real or physical impulses and ideal motives, but I contend that this distinction is quite beside the present purpose. For self-love properly relates to action, and all action relates to the future, and all future objects are ideal, and the interest we take in all such objects, and the motives to the pursuit of them, are ideal too. The distinction between self-love and benevolence, therefore, as separate principles of action, cannot be founded on the difference between real and imaginary objects, between physical and rational motives, inasmuch as the motives and objects of the one and the other are equally ideal things. Whether we voluntarily pursue our own good or that of another, we must inevitably pursue that which is at a distance from us, something out of ourselves, abstracted from the being that acts and wills, and that is incompatible always with our present sensation or physical existence. Self-love, therefore, as the actuating principle of the mind, must imply the efficacy and operation of the imagination of the remote ideas of things, as connected with voluntary action, and the most refined benevolence,

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the greatest sacrifices of natural affection, of sincerity, of friendship, or humanity, can imply nothing more. The notion of the necessity of actual objects or impressions as the motives to action could not so easily have gained ground as an article of philosophical faith, but from a perverse distinction of the use of the idea to abstract definitions or external forms, having no reference to the feelings or passions ; and again from associating the word *imagination* with merely fictitious situations and events such as never have a real existence, and which consequently do not admit of action. If then self-love, even the most gross and palpable, can only subsist in a rational and intellectual nature, not circumscribed within the narrow limits of animal life, or of the ignorant present time, but capable of giving life and interest to the forms of its own creatures, to the unreal mockeries of future things, to that shadow of itself which the imagination sends before ; is it not the height of absurdity to stop here, and poorly and pitifully to suppose that this pervading power must bow down and worship this idol of its own making, and become its blind and servile drudge, and that it cannot extend its creatures as widely around it, as it projects them forward, that it cannot breathe into all other forms the breath of life, and endow even sympathy with vital warmth, and diffuse the soul of morality through all the relations and sentiments of human life ? Take away the real, physical, mechanical principle of self-interest, and it will have no basis to rest upon, but that which it has in common with every principle of natural justice or humanity. That there is no real, physical, or mechanical principle of selfishness in the mind, has been abundantly proved. All that remains is, to shew how the continued identity of the individual with himself has given rise to the notion of self-interest, which after what has been premised will not be a very difficult task. What I shall attempt to shew will be, that individuality expresses not either absolute unity or real identity, but properly such a particular relation between a number of things as produces an immediate or continued connexion between them, and a correspondent marked separation between them and other things. Now, in coexisting things, one part may by means of this communication mutually act and be acted upon by others, but where the connexion is continued, or in successive identity of the individual, though what follows may depend intimately on what has gone before, that is, be acted upon by it, it cannot react upon it ; that is, the identity of the individual with itself can only relate practically to its connexion with its past, and not with its future self.

Every human being is distinguished from every other human being both numerically and characteristically. He must be numerically distinct by the supposition, or he would not be another individual,

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but the same. There is, however, no contradiction in supposing two individuals to possess the same absolute properties: but then these original properties must be differently modified afterwards from the necessary difference of their situations, unless we conceive them both to occupy the same relative situation in two distinct systems, corresponding exactly with each other. In fact, every one is found to differ essentially from every one else; if not in original qualities, in the circumstances and events of their lives, and consequently in their ideas and characters. In thinking of a number of individuals, I conceive of them all as differing in various ways from one another as well as from myself. They differ in size, in complexion, in features, in the expression of their countenances, in age, in occupation, in manners, in knowledge, in temper, in power. It is this perception or apprehension of their real differences that first enables me to distinguish the several individuals of the species from each other, and that seems to give rise to the most obvious idea of individuality, as representing, first, positive number, and, secondly, the sum of the differences between one being and another, as they really exist, in a greater or less degree in nature, or as they would appear to exist to an impartial spectator, or to a perfectly intelligent mind. But *I* am not in reality more different from others than any one individual is from any other individual, neither do I in fact suppose myself to differ really from them otherwise than as they differ from each other. What is it then that makes the difference seem greater *to me*, or that makes me feel a greater change in passing from my own idea to that of another person, than in passing from the idea of another person to that of any one else? Neither my existing as a separate being, nor my differing from others, is of itself sufficient to account for the idea of self, since I might equally perceive others to exist and compare their actual differences without ever having this idea.

Farther, individuality is sometimes used to express not so much the absolute difference or distinction between one individual and another, as a relation or comparison of that individual with itself, whereby we tacitly affirm that it is in some way or other the same with itself, or one idea. Now in one sense it is true of all existences whatever that they are literally the same with themselves; that is, they are what they are, and not something else. Each thing is itself, is that individual thing, and no other; and each combination of things is that combination, and no other. So also each individual conscious being is necessarily the same with himself; or in other words, that combination of ideas which represents any individual person is that combination of ideas, and not a different one. This literal and verbal is the only true and absolute identity which can be affirmed of any

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individual; which, it is plain, does not arise from a comparison of the different parts or successive impressions composing the general idea one with another, but each with itself or all of them taken together with the whole. I cannot help thinking that some idea of this kind is frequently at the bottom of the perplexity which is felt by most people who are not metaphysicians (not to mention those who are), when they are told that man is not always the same with himself, their notion of identity being that he must always be what he is. He is the same with himself, in as far as he is not another. When they say that the man is the same being in general, they do not really mean that he is the same at twenty that he is at sixty, but their general idea of him includes both these extremes, and therefore the same man, that is, the same collective idea, is both the one and the other. This however is but a rude logic. Not well understanding the process of distinguishing the same individual into different metaphysical sections, to compare, collate, and set one against the other (so awkwardly do we at first apply ourselves to the analytical art), to get rid of the difficulty the mind produces a double individual, part real and part imaginary, or repeats the same idea twice over; in which case it is a contradiction to suppose that the one does not correspond exactly with the other in all its parts. There is no other absolute identity in the case. All individuals (or all that we name such) are aggregates, and aggregates of dissimilar things. Here, then, the question is not how we distinguish one individual from another, or a number of things from a number of other things, which distinction is a matter of absolute truth, but how we come to confound a number of things together, and consider many things as the same, which cannot be strictly true. This idea must then merely relate to such a connexion between a number of things as determines the mind to consider them as one whole, each part having a much nearer and more lasting connexion with the rest than with any thing else not included in the same collective idea. (It is obvious that the want of this close affinity and intimate connexion between any number of things is what so far produces a correspondent distinction and separation between one individual and another.) The eye is not the same thing as the ear; it is a contradiction to call it so. Yet both are parts of the same body, which contains these and infinite other distinctions. The reason of this is, that all the parts of the eye have evidently a distinct nature, a separate use, a greater mutual dependence on one another than on those of the ear; at the same time that there is a considerable connexion between the eye and the ear, as parts of the same body and organs of the same mind. Similarity is in general but a subordinate circumstance in determining this relation. For the eye is certainly

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more like the same organ in another individual, than the different organs of sight and hearing are like one another in the same individual. Yet we do not, in making up the imaginary individual, associate our ideas according to this analogy, which would answer no more purpose than the things themselves would, so separated and so united ; but we think of them in that order in which they are mechanically connected together in nature, and in which alone they can serve to any practical purpose. However, it seems hardly possible to define the different degrees or kinds of identity in the same thing by any general rule. The nature of the thing will best point out the sense in which it is to be the same. Individuality may relate either to absolute unity, to the identity or similarity of the parts of any thing, or to an extraordinary degree of connexion between things neither the same, nor similar. This last sense principally determines the positive use of the word, at least with respect to man and other organized beings. Indeed, the term is hardly ever applied in common language to other things.

To insist on the first circumstance, namely, absolute unity, as essential to individuality, would be to destroy all individuality ; for it would lead to the supposition of as many distinct individuals as there are thoughts, feelings, actions, and properties in the same being. Each thought would be a separate consciousness, each organ a different system. Each thought is a distinct thing in nature ; but the individual is composed of numberless thoughts and various faculties, and contradictory passions, and mixed habits, all curiously woven, and blended together in the same conscious being.

But to proceed to a more particular account of the origin of the idea of self, which is the connexion of a being with itself. This can only be known in the first instance from reflecting on what passes in our own minds. I should say that individuality in this sense does not arise either from the absolute simplicity of the mind, or from its identity with itself, or from its diversity from other minds, which are not in the least necessary to it, but from the peculiar and intimate connexion which subsists between the several faculties and perceptions of the same thinking being constituted as man is ; so that, as the subject of his own reflection or consciousness, the same things impressed on any of his faculties produce a quite different effect upon him from what they would do, if they were impressed in the same way on any other being. The sense of personality seems then to depend entirely on the particular consciousness which the mind has of its own operations, sensations, or ideas. Self is nothing but the limits of the mind's consciousness ; as far as that reaches it extends, and where that can go no further, it ceases. The mind is one, from the confined

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sphere in which it acts; or because it is not all things. It is nearer and more present to itself than to other minds. What passes within it, what acts upon it immediately from without, of this it cannot help being conscious; and this consciousness is continued in it afterwards, more or less perfectly. All that does not come within this sphere of personal consciousness, all that has never come within it, is equally without the verge of self; for that word relates solely to the difference of the manner, or the different degrees of force and certainty with which, from the imperfect and limited nature of our faculties, certain things affect us as they act immediately upon ourselves, and are supposed to act upon others. Hence it is evident that personality itself cannot extend to futurity; for the whole of this idea depends on the peculiar force and directness with which certain impulses act upon the mind. It is by comparing the knowledge I have of my own impressions, ideas, feelings, powers, &c. with my knowledge of the same or similar impressions, ideas, &c. in others, and with this still more imperfect conception that I form of what passes in their minds when this is supposed to be entirely different from what passes in my own, that I acquire the general notion of self. If I could form no idea of any thing passing in the minds of others, or if my ideas of their thoughts and feelings were perfect representation, *i.e.* mere conscious repetitions of them, all personal distinction would be lost either in pure sensation or in perfect universal sympathy. In the one case it would be impossible for me to prefer myself to others, as I should be the sole object of my own consciousness; and in the other case I must love all others as myself, because I should then be nothing more than a part of a whole, of which all others would be equally members with myself. This distinction, however, subsists as necessarily and completely between myself and those who most nearly resemble me, as between myself and those whose characters and properties are the very opposite to mine. Indeed, the distinction itself becomes marked and intelligible in proportion as the objects or impressions themselves are intrinsically the same, as then it is impossible to mistake the true principle on which it is founded, namely, the want of any direct communication between the feelings of one being and those of another. This will shew why the difference between ourselves and others appears greater to us than that between other individuals, though it is not really so.

Considering mankind in this two-fold relation, as they are to themselves, or as they appear to one another, as the subjects of their own thoughts, or the thoughts of others, we shall find the origin of that wide and absolute distinction which the mind feels in comparing itself with others, to be confined to two faculties, *viz.*, sensation, or rather

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consciousness, and memory. To avoid an endless subtilty of distinction, I have not given here any account of consciousness in general ; but the same reasoning will apply to both. The operation of both these faculties is of a perfectly exclusive and individual nature, and so far as their operation extends (but no farther) is man a personal, or if you will, a selfish being. The sensation excited in me by a piece of red-hot iron striking against any part of my body is simple, absolute, terminating as it were in itself, not representing any thing beyond itself, nor capable of being represented by any other sensation, or communicated to any other being. The same kind of sensation may be indeed excited in another by the same means, but this sensation will not imply any reference to, or consciousness of mine ; there is no communication between my nerves and another's brain, by which he can be affected with my sensations as I am myself. The only notice or perception which another can have of this sensation in me, or which I can have of a similar sensation in another, is by means of the imagination. I can form an imaginary idea of that pain as existing out of myself ; but I can only feel it as a sensation when it is actually impressed on myself. Any impression made on another can neither be the cause nor object of sensation to me. Again, the impression or idea left in my mind by this sensation and afterwards excited either by seeing iron in the same state, or by any other means, is properly an idea of memory. This recollection necessarily refers to some previous impression in my own mind, and only exists in consequence of that impression, or of the continued connexion of the same mind with itself ; it cannot be derived from any impression made on another. My thoughts have a particular mechanical dependence only on my own previous thoughts or sensations. I do not remember the feelings of any one but myself. I may, indeed, remember the objects which must have caused such and such feelings in others, or the outward signs of passion which accompanied them. These, however, are but the recollections of my own immediate impressions of what I saw, and I can only form an idea of the feelings themselves by means of the imagination. But, though we take away all power of imagination from the human mind, my own feelings must leave behind them certain traces, or representations of themselves retaining the same general properties, and having the same intimate connexion with the conscious principle. On the other hand, if I wish to anticipate my own future feelings, whatever these may be, I must do so by means of the same faculty by which I conceive of those of others, whether past or future. I have no distinct or separate faculty on which the events and feelings of my future being are impressed before hand, and which shows, as in an enchanted mirror, to me, and me alone, the

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reversed picture of my future life. It is absurd to suppose that the feelings which I am to have hereafter, should excite certain correspondent impressions of themselves before they have existed, or act mechanically upon my mind by a secret sympathy. The romantic sympathies of lovers, the exploded dreams of judicial astrology, the feats of magic, do not equal the solid, substantial absurdity of this doctrine of self-interest, which attributes to that which is not and has not been, a mechanical operation and a reality in nature. I can only abstract myself from this present being, and take an interest in my future being, in the same sense and manner in which I can go out of myself entirely, and enter into the minds and feelings of others. In short, there neither is nor can be any principle belonging to the individual that antecedently identifies his future events with his present sensation, or that reflects the impression of his future feelings backwards with the same kind of consciousness that his past feelings are transmitted forward through the channels of memory. The size of the river as well as its taste depends on the water that has already fallen into it. I cannot roll back its course, nor is the stream next the source affected by the water which falls into it afterwards, yet we call both the same river. Such is the nature of personal identity. It is founded on the continued connexion of cause and effect, and awaits their gradual progress, and does not consist in a preposterous and wilful unsettling of the natural order of things. There is an illustration of this argument, which, however quaint or singular it may appear, I rather choose to give than omit any thing which may serve to make my meaning clear and intelligible. Suppose then a number of men employed to cast a mound into the sea. As far as it has gone, the workmen pass backwards and forwards on it: it stands firm in its place, and though it advances further and further from the shore, it is still joined to it. A man's personal identity and self-interest have just the same principle and extent, and can reach no farther than his actual existence. But if any man of a metaphysical turn, seeing that the pier was not yet finished, but was to be continued to a certain point, and in a certain direction, should take it into his head to insist that what was already built, and what was to be built were the same pier, that the one must therefore afford as good footing as the other, and should accordingly walk over the pier-head on the solid foundation of his metaphysical hypothesis—he would act a great deal more ridiculously, but would not argue a whit more absurdly than those who found a principle of absolute self-interest on a man's future identity with his present being. But, say you, the comparison does not hold in this, that a man can extend his thoughts (and that very wisely too), beyond the present moment, whereas in the other case he cannot

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move a single step forwards. Grant it. This will only show that the mind has wings as well as feet, which is a sufficient answer to the selfish hypothesis.

If the foregoing account be true (and for my part, the only perplexity that crosses my mind in thinking of it arises from the utter impossibility of conceiving of the contrary supposition), it will follow that those faculties which may be said to constitute self, and the operations of which convey that idea to the mind, draw all their materials from the past and present. But all voluntary action, as I have before largely shewn, must relate solely and exclusively to the future. That is, all those impressions or ideas with which selfish, or more properly speaking, personal feelings must be naturally connected are just those which have nothing to do at all with the motives to action in the pursuit either of our own interest, or that of others. If indeed it were possible for the human mind to alter the present or the past, so as either to recal what was past, or to give it a still greater reality, to make it exist over again, and in some more emphatical sense, then man might, with some pretence of reason, be supposed naturally incapable of being impelled to the pursuit of any *past* or *present* object but from the mechanical excitement of personal motives. It might in this case be pretended that the impulses of imagination and sympathy are of too light, unsubstantial, and remote a creation to influence our real conduct, and that nothing is worthy of the concern of a wise man in which he has not this direct, unavoidable, and home-felt interest. This is, however, too absurd a supposition to be dwelt on for a moment. The only proper objects of voluntary action are (by necessity) future events: these can excite no possible interest in the mind but by the aid of the imagination: and these make the same direct appeal to that faculty, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, as the eye receives with equal directness the impression of our own external form or that of others. It will be easy to perceive by this train of reasoning how, notwithstanding the contradiction involved in the supposition of a generally absolute self-interest, the mind comes to feel a deep and habitual conviction of the truth of this principle. Finding in itself a continued consciousness of its past impressions, it is naturally enough disposed to transfer the same sort of identity and consciousness to the whole of its being. The objects of imagination and of the senses are, as it were, perpetually playing into one another's hands, and shifting characters, so that we lose our reckoning, and do not think it worth while to mark where the one ends and the other begins. As our actual being is constantly passing into our future being, and carries the internal feeling of consciousness along with it, we seem to be already identified with our future being

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in this permanent part of our nature, and to feel by a mutual impulse the same necessary sympathy with our future selves that we know we shall have with our past selves. We take the tablets of memory, reverse them, and stamp the image of self on that which as yet possesses nothing but the name. It is no wonder then that the imagination, constantly disregarding the progress of time, when its course is marked out along the straight unbroken line of individuality, should confound the necessary differences of things, and convert a distant object into a present reality. 'The interest which is hereafter to be felt by this continued conscious being, this indefinite unit, called *me*, seems necessarily to affect me in every state of my existence—' thrills in each nerve, and lives along the line.' In the first place we abstract the successive modifications of our being, and *particular* temporary interests, into one simple nature and general principle of self-interest, and then make use of this nominal abstraction as an artificial medium to compel those particular actual interests into the closest affinity and union with each other, as different lines meeting in the same centre must have a mutual communication with each other. On the contrary, as I always remain perfectly distinct from others (the interest which I take in their former or present feelings being like that which I take in their future feelings, never any thing more than the effect of imagination and sympathy), the same illusion and transposition of ideas cannot take place with regard to these; namely, the confounding a physical impulse with the rational motives to action. Indeed the uniform nature of my feelings with regard to others (my interest in their welfare having always the same source and sympathy) seems by analogy to confirm the supposition of a similar simplicity in my relation to myself, and of a positive, natural, absolute interest in whatever belongs to that self, not confined to my actual existence, but extending over the whole of my being. Every sensation that I feel, or that afterwards recurs vividly to my memory strengthens the sense of self, which increased strength in the mechanical feeling is indirectly transferred to the general idea, and to my remote, future, imaginary interest; whereas our sympathy with the feelings of others being always imaginary, standing only on its own basis, having no sensible interest to support it, no restless mechanical impulse to urge it on, the ties by which we are bound to others hang loose upon us: the interest we take in their welfare seems to be something foreign to our own bosoms, to be transient, arbitrary, and directly opposed to that necessary, unalienable interest we are supposed to have in whatever conduces to our own well being.

There is another consideration (and that probably the principal one) to be taken into the account in explaining the origin and growth

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of our selfish habits, which is perfectly consistent with the foregoing theory, and evidently arises out of it. There is naturally, then, no essential difference between the motives by which I am impelled to the pursuit of my own good or that of others : but though there is not a difference in kind, there is one in degree. We know better what our own future feelings will be than what those of others will be in a like case. We can apply the materials afforded us by experience with less difficulty and more in a mass in making out the picture of our future pleasures and pains, without frittering them away or destroying their original sharpnesses : in a word, we can imagine them more plainly, and must therefore be more interested in them. This facility in passing from the recollection of my former impressions to the anticipation of my future ones makes the transition almost imperceptible, and gives to the latter an apparent reality and presentness to the imagination, to a degree in which the feelings of others can scarcely ever be brought home to us. It is chiefly from this greater readiness and certainty with which we can look forward into our own minds than out of us into those of other men, that that strong and uneasy attachment to self, which often comes at last to overpower every generous feeling, takes its rise ; not, as I think I have shewn, from any natural and impenetrable hardness of the human heart, or necessary absorption of all its thoughts and purposes in a blind exclusive feeling of self-interest. It confirms this account, that we constantly are found to feel for others in proportion as we know from long acquaintance with the turn of their minds, and events of their lives, ' the hair-breadth scapes ' of their travelling history, or ' some disastrous stroke which their youth suffered,' what the real nature of their feelings is ; and that we have in general the strongest attachment to our immediate relatives and friends, who from this intercommunity of thoughts and feelings may more truly be said to be a part of ourselves than from even the ties of blood. Moreover, a man must be employed more usually in providing for his own wants and his own feelings than those of others. In like manner he is employed in providing for the immediate welfare of his family and connexions much more than in providing for the welfare of those who are not bound by any positive ties. And we accordingly find that the attention, time, and pains bestowed on these several objects give him a proportionable degree of anxiety about, and attachment to his own interest, and that of those connected with him ; but it would be absurd to conclude that his affections are therefore circumscribed by a natural necessity within certain impassable limits, either in the one case or the other. It should not be forgotten here that this absurd opinion has been very commonly referred to the effects of natural

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affection as it has been called, as well as of self-interest; parental and filial affection being supposed to be originally implanted in the mind by the ties of nature, and to move round the centre of self-interest in an orbit of their own, within the circle of our families and friends. This general connexion between the habitual pursuit of any object and our interest in it, will account for the well-known observation, that the affection of parents to children is the strongest of all others, frequently overpowering self-love itself. This fact does not seem easily reconcilable to the doctrine that the social affections are all of them ultimately to be deduced from association, or the reputed connexion of immediate selfish gratification with the idea of some other person. If this were strictly the case we must feel the strongest attachment to those from whom we had received, instead of those to whom we had done, the greatest number of kindnesses, or where the greatest quantity of actual enjoyment had been associated with an indifferent idea. Junius has remarked that friendship is not conciliated by the power of conferring benefits, but by the equality with which they are received and may be returned.

I have hitherto purposely avoided saying any thing on the subject of our physical appetites and the manner in which they may be thought to affect the principle of the foregoing reasonings. They evidently seem, at first sight, to contradict the general conclusion which I have endeavoured to establish, as they all of them tend either exclusively or principally to the gratification of the individual, and at the same time refer to some future or imaginary object, as the source of this gratification. The impulse which they give to the will is mechanical, and yet this impulse, blind as it is, constantly tends to and coalesces with the pursuit of some rational end. That is, here is an end aimed at, the desire and regular pursuit of a known good, and all this produced by motives evidently mechanical, and which never impel the mind but in a selfish direction: it makes no difference in the question whether the active impulse proceed directly from the desire of positive enjoyment, or a wish to get rid of some positive uneasiness. I should say then that, setting aside what is of a purely physical nature in the case, the influence of appetite over our volitions may be accounted for consistently enough with the foregoing hypothesis, from the natural effects of a particularly irritable state of bodily feeling, rendering the idea of that which will heighten and gratify its susceptibility of pleasurable feeling, or remove some painful feeling, proportionably vivid, and the object of a more vehement desire than can be excited by the same idea, when the body is supposed to be in a state of indifference, or only ordinary sensibility to that particular kind of gratification. Thus the imaginary desire is sharpened by

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constantly receiving supplies of pungency, from the irritation of bodily feeling, and its direction is at the same time determined according to the bias of this new impulse ; first, indirectly by having the attention fixed on our own immediate sensation ; secondly, because that particular gratification, the desire of which is increased by the pressure of physical appetite, must be referred primarily and by way of distinction to the same being, by whom the want of it is felt, that is, to myself. As the actual uneasiness which appetite implies can only be excited by the irritable state of my own body, so neither can the desire of the correspondent gratification subsist in that intense degree, which properly constitutes appetite, except when it tends to relieve that very same uneasiness by which it was excited, as in the case of hunger. There is in the first place the strong mechanical action of the nervous and muscular systems co-operating with the rational desire of my own belief, and forcing it its own way. Secondly, this state of uneasiness grows more and more violent, the longer the relief which it requires is withheld from it : hunger takes no denial, it hearkens to no compromise, is soothed by no flattery, tired out by no delay. It grows more importunate every moment, its demands become larger the less they are attended to. The first impulse which the general love of personal ease receives from bodily pain will give it the advantage over my disposition to sympathize with others in the same situation with myself, and this difference will be increasing every moment, till the pain is removed. Thus, if I at first, either through compassion or by an effort of the will, am regardless of my own wants, and wholly bent upon satisfying the more pressing wants of my companions, yet this effort will at length become too great, and I shall be incapable of attending to any thing but the violence of my own sensations, or the means of alleviating them. It would be easy to shew from many things that mere appetite (generally, at least, in reasonable beings) is but the fragment of a self-moving machine, but a sort of half organ, a subordinate instrument even in the accomplishment of its own purposes ; that it does little or nothing without the aid of another faculty to inform and direct it. Before the impulses of appetite can be converted into the regular pursuit of a given object, they must first be communicated to the understanding, and modify the will through that. Consequently, as the desire of the ultimate gratification of the appetite is not the same with the appetite itself, that is mere physical uneasiness, but an indirect result of its communication to the thinking or imaginative principle, the influence of appetite over the will must depend on the extraordinary degree of force and vividness which it gives to the idea of a particular object ; and we accordingly find that the same cause which irritates the desire

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of selfish gratification, increases our sensibility to the same desires and gratification in others, where they are consistent with our own, and where the violence of the physical impulse does not overpower every other consideration.

ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

IN this Lecture I shall give the best account I can of the question concerning liberty and necessity from the writings of others, and afterwards add a few remarks of my own on the explanation of the terms employed in this controversy. Of Mr. Hobbes's discourse on this subject, I should be nearly disposed to say with Gassendi, when another work of his, '*De Cive*,' was presented to him, 'This treatise, though small in bulk, is in my judgment the very marrow of philosophy.' In order to give a clear and satisfactory view of the question, I shall be obliged to repeat some things I have before stated, for which the importance of the subject as well as other circumstances will, I hope, be a sufficient excuse.

The doctrine of necessity is stated by this author with great force and precision as a general question of cause and effect, and with scarcely any particular reference to his mechanical theory of the mind. From this naked simple view of the matter, I cannot consistently with truth withhold my full and entire assent. The groundwork, the pure basis of the doctrine, is in my opinion incontestable; it cannot be denied without overturning all the rules of science, as well as the plainest dictates of the understanding: whoever attacks it there in its stronghold, will only injure the cause he espouses. It is that rock upon which whoever falls will be dashed to pieces. But though I cannot pretend to undermine the foundation, yet I may attempt to shake some parts of the superstructure, and to clear away the crust of materialism which has grown over it. In my opinion, the representations which have commonly been given of the subject by the writers on both sides of the argument are almost equally erroneous, and their opposite conclusions built on an equal misconception of the true principle of necessity. By the principle of moral or philosophical necessity is meant then that the mind is invariably governed by certain laws which determine all its operations; or in other words, that the regular succession of cause and effect is not confined to mere matter, while the impulses of the will are left quite unaccounted for, self-caused, perfectly contingent and fantastical. We in general attribute those things to chance the causes of which

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we do not understand, both in mind and matter. But as there is a greater latitude and inconstancy in the one than in the other, inso-much that we can hardly ever predict with certainty the effect of particular motives on the mind, the opinion of chance, arbitrary inclination, or self-determination had gained much deeper root with respect to the operations of mind than to those of matter. The fallacy of this opinion Hobbes has exposed in a masterly, and I think unanswerable manner, and without running into those paradoxical conclusions from the first position which later necessarians have deduced from it. He affirms that necessity is perfectly consistent with human liberty; that is, that the most strict and inviolable connexion of cause and effect does not prevent the full, free, and unrestrained development of certain powers in the agent, or take away the distinction between the nature of virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, but is the foundation of all moral reasoning. Except Dr. Jonathan Edwards, he is the only professed necessarian that I know of who has not been led, by the customary use of language, to quit the original definition of the term, and to slide from a philosophical into a vulgar and practical necessity. But I will state his reasoning in his own words, which are the best. They are as follows:

‘My opinion about Liberty and Necessity.

‘*First*, I conceive that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or abstaining necessarily follows the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequences thereof to himself; as, for example, in sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge; in sudden fear, the thought of escape; also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberateth not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary, because these actions that *follow immediately* the last appetite are voluntary, are here: where is only one appetite that one is the last.

‘*Secondly*, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it; and to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it both good and evil; from whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

‘*Thirdly*, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we

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call the will, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called intentions, and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the intentions change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those actions which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election, is the same thing; and that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.

Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner: liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments, and though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that, therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing; so that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause (for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it); hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to

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produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.

‘*Lastly*, I hold that the ordinary definition of a free agent, namely, that a free agent, is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is to say necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow.

‘MY REASONS.—For the first five points, wherein it is explicated—1. what spontaneity is; 2. what deliberation is; 3. what will, propension and appetite are; 4. what a free-agent is; 5. what liberty is; there can no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is spontaneous: a man deliberates: such is his will: that agent or that action is free. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that deliberation is the consideration of the good or evil sequels of an action to come; that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate action (or else nothing is meant by it); that will is the last act of our deliberation; that a free-agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments. But, to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that hath not marked his own meaning by those words? or how can it be proved that eternity is not *nunc stans* to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind? Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never, but was eternal.

‘For the seventh point, which is, that all events have necessary causes, it is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing (for example) “ames ace” upon a pair of dice, and see if

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it must not have been necessary before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather: 'tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. If, therefore, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true *determinate*, but *indeterminate*, which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true *titirice*, but neither of them, *tu patulice*.

'The last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it; or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an agent it can work, and if it work there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient, and if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before. And thus you see how the inconveniences, which it is objected must follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroyeth both the decrees and the prescience of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have liberty as hath been affirmed

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from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass, and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be, as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass. This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it.'

The letter from which the foregoing extract is taken is addressed to the Marquis of Newcastle, and dated at Rouen in 1651, twenty years before the publication of Spinoza's most exact and beautiful demonstration of the same principle. Some of Hobbes' antagonists had charged him with having borrowed his arguments from Marsennus, a French author; to which in one of his controversial tracts Hobbes replies with some contempt, that this Marsennus had heard him talk on the subject when he was in Paris, and had borrowed them from him. Dr. Priestley has done justice to Hobbes on this question of necessity, and I suspect more than justice in denying that the Stoics were acquainted with the same principle. At any rate, the modern commentators on the subject (and Dr. Priestley among them) have added nothing to it but absurdities, from which our author's logic protected him; for he seldom reasoned wrong but when he reasoned from wrong premises. As this question is one of the most interesting in the history of philosophy, I shall perhaps be excused for adding one more extract (of considerable length) to prove that Hobbes is not, in this instance, chargeable with the practical inferences which have been made from his doctrine. In answer to the objections of Bishop Bramhall, with whom he had a controversy on the subject, he says:

'Of the arguments from reason, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno's beating of his man, which is therefore called *Argumentum Baculinum*, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this: Zeno held that all actions were necessary: his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer.

'The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion.

'The first inconvenience, he says, is this, that the laws which prohibit any action will be unjust.

'2. That all consultations are vain.

'3. That admonitions to men of understanding are of no more use than to children, fools, and madmen.

'4. That praise, dispraise, reward and punishment are in vain.

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'5 and 6. That counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines are in vain.'

Hobbe's answer to these conclusions is I think quite satisfactory. He says—

'To which arguments his Lordship, expecting I should answer by saying, "the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means," adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words, "*Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?*" Wherein his Lordship says right: but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer:

'First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass that not the necessity, but the will to break the law maketh the action unjust, because the law regardeth the will and no other antecedent cause of action, and to let pass that no law can possibly be unjust, inasmuch as every man maketh (by his consent) the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself;—I say, what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may be justly punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from stealing? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice, and consequently 'tis no injustice to make such a law. The intention of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for what is past and not to be undone; but to make him and others just that else would not be so; and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come. Insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent would justify his killing in the sight of God.

'Secondly, I deny that it maketh consultations to be vain. 'Tis the consultation that causeth a man and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluoussness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: "If I must do this rather than that, I shall do it though I consult not at all;" which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: "If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day." If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily requisite as

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a means to bring it to pass ; and therefore when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what cause it shall be chosen, which cause for the most part is deliberation or consultation ; and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if *more* and *less* had any place in necessity.

'The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that admonitions are in vain : for admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

'The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good ; good, I say, for me or for some body else, or for the state and commonwealth ? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me or him or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity ? Things may therefore be necessary, and yet praiseworthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, when he says that he was good by nature, *et quia aliter esse non potuit*.

'To the last objection, that counsels, arts, arms, instruments, books, study, medicines, and the like would be superfluous, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, *if the effect shall come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes*, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts, arms, &c. are the causes of those effects.'—Page 291.

'His Lordship's third argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely, impiety, and negligence of religious duties, as repentance and zeal to God's service, &c. To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights or the impatience of meditation, or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things ; I must, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety, and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer,

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I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the necessity of events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in two things: one that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his power as we can (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power). The other is that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called *cultus*, or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God's eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible, which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart? Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship; so that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds, external and internal, and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and, again, though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remaineth still the cause of joy. So that the necessity of the acting taketh away neither of those parts of repentance—grief for the error, and joy for returning.'—*Tripes*, p. 292.

The author afterwards properly defines a moral agent to be one that acts from deliberation, choice, or will, not from indifference; and, speaking of the supposed inconsistency between choice and necessity, adds:

'Commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he doth not choose this that of necessity chooses it, but they might as well say, fire doth not burn, because it burns of necessity.'

The general question is thus stated by Mr. Hobbes in the beginning of his treatise: the point is not, he says, 'whether a man can be a free agent; that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will, but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say—I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. In fine, that freedom which men commonly find in books, that which the poets chaunt in the theatres, and the shepherds

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on the mountains, that which the pastors teach in the pulpits, and the doctors in the universities, and that which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man hath freedom to do if he will, but whether he hath freedom to will is a question neither the bishop nor they ever thought on.'

All in which I differ from Hobbes is, that I think there is a real freedom of choice and will, as well as of action, in the sense of the author, that is, not a freedom from necessity or causes in either case, but a liberty in any given agent to exert certain powers without being controlled or impeded in their exercise by another agent.

Helvetius says, 'It is true we can form a tolerably distinct idea of the word *liberty*, understood in a common sense. A man is free who is neither loaded with irons, nor confined in prison, nor intimidated like the slave by the dread of chastisement: in this sense, the liberty of a man consists in the free exercise of his power: I say of his power, because it would be ridiculous to mistake for a want of liberty the incapacity we are under to pierce the clouds like the eagle, to live under the water like the whale, or to become king, emperor, or pope. We have so far a sufficiently clear idea of the word. But this is no longer the case when we come to apply liberty to the will. What must this liberty then mean? We can only understand by it a free power of willing or not willing a thing: but this power would imply that there may be a will without motives, and consequently an effect without a cause. A philosophical treatise on the liberty of the will would be a treatise of effects without a cause.'—*Helvetius on the Mind*, p. 44.

Now I cannot perceive why there is any more difficulty in annexing a meaning to the word liberty, as it relates to the faculties of the mind than as it relates to those of the body, or why a treatise of the one should be a treatise of effects without a cause any more than of the other. If the distinction between liberty and necessity is lost in this case, it is not because liberty but because necessity can have no place in the will, or because we cannot easily put a padlock on the mind. If the prisoner who has his chains struck off, walks or runs, dances or leaps, is this an instance of an effect without a cause, because it is an effect of liberty, or of what Helvetius calls the free exercise of his power? Not that he can exert this power without means or motives, that is, without ground to move on, or limbs to move with, or breath to draw, or will to impel him, but 'with all these means and appliances to boot' he has a power to do certain things which his chains deprived him of the liberty of doing, but which the striking them off restores to him again. Why then, if liberty does not in its common sense signify an effect without a cause, but the free exercise

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of a power, did it not signify the same thing or something similar as applied to the mind? Has the mind no powers, or are they necessarily impeded and hindered from operating? My notion of a free agent, I confess, is not that represented by Mr. Hobbes, namely, one that when all things necessary to produce the effect are present can nevertheless not produce it; but I believe a free agent of whatever kind, is one which where all things necessary to produce the effect are present, can produce it; its own operation not being hindered by any thing else. The body is said to be free when it has the power to obey the direction of the will: so the will may be said to be free when it has the power to obey the dictates of the understanding. The absurdity of the libertarians is in supposing that liberty of action and liberty of will have the same identical source, *viz.* the will; or that as it is the will that moves the body, so it is the will that moves itself in order to be free.

Mr. Locke's chapter 'On Power,' in the first volume of the Essay, contains his account of liberty and necessity, and has been more found fault with than any other part of his work; I think without reason. He seems evidently to have admitted the definition of necessity, though he has avoided the name, which is not much to be wondered at, considering the misconception to which it is liable, and which can scarcely be separated from it in the closest reasoning, much less as a term of general signification. In other words, he denies the power of the mind to act without a cause or motive, or, in any manner in any circumstances, from mere indifferency and absolute self motion; but he at the same time rejects the inference which has been drawn from this principle, that the mind is not an agent at all, but entirely subject to external force or blind impulse. What he has said is little more than an expansion of Hobbes's general description of practical liberty, 'that it is a power to do, if we will.' Thus, according to Mr. Locke, it would not be so absurd to give a restive horse the spur or the whip to make him go straight forward on a plain road, as it would be in order to make him leap up a precipice a hundred feet high. The one the horse has a power or liberty to do if he will, the other he has no power to do at any rate. That is, here are two sorts of impediments, one that may be overcome, and which it is right to take means to overcome, and another which cannot be overcome, and which it is therefore absurd to meddle with. To say that these two necessities are in effect the same, is an abuse of language; yet for not lumping them together in the dashing style of our modern wholesale dealers in paradox, Mr. Locke has been made the subject of endless abuse and contumely. The difference between them, as stated by this author with great force and earnestness of feeling, in truth constitutes all that men in

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general mean when they talk of freedom of will, and make it, as in this sense it is, the ground-work of morality. There are certain powers which the mind has of governing not only the actions of the body, but of regulating its own thoughts and desires, and it is to make us exert these powers that all the distinctions, rules and sanctions of morality have been established. It must be ridiculous to attempt to make us do, what upon the face of the thing it was known we could not do; yet it is on this literal and unqualified interpretation of the term, as implying a flat impossibility of the contrary, an utter incapacity and helplessness in the mind, a concurrence of causes foreign to the will itself, and irresistible in their effect, and with which it must therefore be in vain to contend, that most of the consequences from the doctrine of necessity have been built; such as that reward and punishment are absurd and improper, that virtue and vice are words without a meaning, that the assassin is no more a moral or accountable agent than the dagger which he uses, and many others of the same stamp. The sword and the assassin would be equally moral and accountable agents, if they were both equally accessible to moral motives, that is, to reward and punishment, praise and blame, &c.; but they are not. This seems to be a distinction of great pith and moment. It is said to be a mere difference of words; at least it makes all the difference whether such motives as reward and punishment, praise and blame, should be applied or not, and this one should think was a difference of practice. It is objected, indeed, that still both are equally necessary agents. But this appears to me to be a confusion of words. It is in vain to exhort flame not to burn, or to be angry with poison for working: and it would be equally in vain to exhort men to certain actions or to resent others, if exhortation and resentment had no more effect upon them, that is, if they were really governed by the same sort of blind, physical, unreasoning, unresisting necessity. In fact, the latest necessarians have abandoned the true, original, philosophical meaning of the term, in which it implies no more than the connexion between cause and effect, and have substituted for it the prejudiced notion of their adversaries, who confound it with mechanical necessity, 'fixed fate, foreknowledge absolute,' or the unconditional *fiat* of omnipotence.

The following extracts which I shall condense as much as I can consistently with the nature of the argument, will shew the view which Mr. Locke has taken of this subject. I would only observe, by the by, that I so far agree with Hobbes and differ from Mr. Locke, in thinking that liberty in the most extended and abstract sense is applicable to material as well as voluntary agents; moral liberty, *i.e.* freedom of will evidently is not, because such agents have no such faculty.

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'All the actions that we have any idea of,' says my author, 'reducing themselves to these two, *viz.* thinking and moving, so far as a man has a power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power, wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind, directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. Where any particular action is not in the power of the agent, to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be volition, there may be will, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.

'A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think; and consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest or *vice versâ*; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent, but both its motion and rest come under our idea of necessity, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling, yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, no body thinks he has in this liberty, every one pities him as acting by necessity and constraint.'

Here I will just stop to observe that the stanch sticklers for necessity, who make up by an excess of zeal for their want of knowledge, would read this passage with a smile of self-complacent contempt, and remark profoundly that whether the man struck his friend on purpose, or from a convulsive motion, he was equally under necessity, and the object of pity. Now whether he is an object of pity, I shall not dispute; but I conceive he is also an object of anger in the one case which he is not in the other, because anger will prevent a man's striking you again, but will not cure him of St. Vitus's dance. It is to this sort of indiscriminate, blind, senseless necessity which neutralizes all things and actions, and under the pretence of establishing the operation of causes, destroys the distinction between the different degrees and kinds of necessity, to which I do not profess myself a convert.

To return.—'As it is in the motions of the body,' proceeds Mr.

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Locke, 'so it is in the thoughts of our minds : where any one is such, that we have power to take it up or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. Yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations. And sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts, as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear any of these motions of the body without, or of the mind within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as free again.'

'But freedom,' says my author, 'unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn ; and it passes for a good plea that a man is not free at all, if he is not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this farther question, whether a man be free to will ? And as to that I imagine that a man in respect of willing, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently [that is, immediately] to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest ; for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or non-existence following perfectly the determination of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action ; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other, *i.e.* prefer the one to the other, since one of them must necessarily follow.'—Page 246.

This seems to be the weak part of Mr. Locke's reasoning, and is the only place, as I remember, where he has considered the certainty of the event as inconsistent with the practical liberty for which he contends. At this rate, it must be given up altogether : there can be no such thing as liberty. For in all cases whatever, one determination must happen rather than another. In all cases whatever, we must choose either one way or another, or suspend our choice. Suspense and deliberation, as Helvetius and others have justly remarked, are in this sense equally necessary with precipitation of judgment. The actual or final event is in both cases the necessary consequence of preceding causes, but that does not destroy freedom of choice in either case, if the event depends upon the exercise of choice, whether the time allowed for the mind to choose in, be longer or shorter. If by liberty be meant the uncertainty of the event, then liberty is a non-entity : but if it be supposed to relate to the concurrence of certain powers of an agent in the production of that event, then it is as true and as real

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a thing as the necessity to which it is thus opposed, and which consists in the exclusion of certain powers possessed by an agent from operating in the producing of any event. At the same time it must be granted, that the power of deliberation is the most valuable privilege of our rational nature, and the great enlargement of the discursive faculty of the will. Mr. Locke seems only to have erred in mistaking a difference of degree or extent for one of kind. The practical truth of the distinction is undeniable. His words are :—

‘The mind having in most cases, as is evident from experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has ; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness : whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. For during the suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, we have an opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do ; and when upon due examination we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness ; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. This seems to me the source of all liberty ; in this seems to consist that which is (I think improperly) called *free-will*.’—*Essay*, vol. i. p. 264.

Moral liberty, it should seem then, all the liberty which a man has or which he wants, does not after all consist in a power of indifferency, or in a power of choosing, without regard to motives, but in a power of exciting his reason and of obeying it. There are two general positions advanced by the author in the course of this inquiry, to neither of which I can agree ; namely, that action always proceeds from uneasiness, and that we are perfect judges of present good and evil. With respect to the first, it is true indeed that nothing can be an object of desire till we suffer uneasiness from the want of it, but it is just as true, that the want of any thing does not cause uneasiness in the mind, unless it is first an object of desire, or unless the prospect of it gives us pleasure. As to the second position, that we cannot be deceived in judging of our actual sensations, it would be true, if the sensation and the judgment formed upon it were the same, but they neither are nor can be. Let any person smell to a rose, and look at a beautiful prospect or hear a fine piece of music at the same instant, and try to determine which of them gives him most pleasure. If he has the least doubt or hesitation, the principle laid down by

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Mr. Locke cannot pass for an axiom. From not accurately distinguishing between sensation and judgment, some writers have been led to confound good and evil with pleasure and pain. Good or evil is properly that which gives the mind pleasure or pain on reflection, that is, which excites rational approbation or disapprobation. To consider these two things as either the same or in any regular proportion to each other, is I think to betray a very superficial acquaintance with human nature. Yet in defiance of the necessary distinction between the faculties by which we feel and by which we judge, these moralists have laid it down as a fundamental rule that all pleasures which are so in themselves are equally good and commendable; yet as these ideas relate solely to the reflex impression made by certain things on the understanding, to insist that we shall judge of them by an appeal to the senses, is unwisely to overturn the principle of the division of labour among our faculties, and to force one to do the office of another. For this there seems no more reason than for attempting to hear with our fingers, to see a sound, or feel a colour.

‘Oh! who can paint a sunbeam to the blind;
Or make him feel a shadow with his mind.’

Yet the absurdity of the attempt arises only from the inaptitude of the organ to the object.

Among simple ideas Mr. Locke reckons that of power. It were to be wished that he had given it as simple a source as possible, *viz.* the feeling we have of it in our own minds, which he sometimes seems half inclined to do, instead of referring it to our observation of the successive changes which take place in matter. It is by this means alone, that is, by making it an original idea derived from within, like the sense of pleasure or pain, and quite distinct from the visible composition and decomposition of other objects, that we can avoid being driven into an absolute scepticism with regard to cause and effect. For Hume has, I think, demonstrated that in the mere mechanical series of sensible appearances, there is nothing to suggest this idea, or point out the indissoluble connexion of one event with another, any more than in the flies of a summer. We get this idea solely from the exertion of muscular or voluntary power in ourselves: who ever has stretched forth his hand to an object, must have the idea of power. Under the idea of power I include all that relates to what we call force, energy, weakness, effort, ease, difficulty, impossibility, &c. Accordingly, I should conceive that no man of strong passions, or great muscular activity, would ever give up the idea of power. Hume, who seems to have discarded it with the least compunction, was an easy, indolent, good-tempered man, who did not care to stir out of

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his armchair; a languid, Epicurean philosopher, of a reasonable corpulency, who was hurried away by no violent passions, or intense desires, but looked on most things with the same eye of listlessness and indifference. He was one of the subtlest and most metaphysical of all metaphysicians. And perhaps he was so for the reason here stated. The Scotch in general are not metaphysicians: they have in fact always a purpose, they aim at a particular point, they are determined upon something beforehand. This gives a hardness and rigidity to their understandings, and takes away that tremulous sensibility to every slight and wandering impression which is necessary to complete the fine balance of the mind, and enable us to follow all the infinite fluctuations of thought through their nicest distinctions.

To return to the doctrine of necessity. I shall refer to the authority of but one more writer, who has indeed exhausted the subject, and anticipated what few remarks I had to offer upon it: I mean Jonathan Edwards, in his treatise on the Will. This work, setting aside its Calvinistic tendency with which I have nothing to do, is one of the most closely reasoned, elaborate, acute, serious, and sensible among modern productions. No metaphysician can read it without feeling a wish to have been the author of it. The gravity of the matter and the earnestness of the manner are alike admirable. His reasoning is not of that kind, which consists in having a smart answer for every trite objection, but in attaining true and satisfactory solutions of things perceived in all their difficulty and in all their force, and in every variety of connexion. He evidently writes to satisfy his own mind and the minds of those, who like himself are intent upon the pursuit of truth for its own sake. There is not an evasion or ambiguity in his whole book, nor a wish to produce any but thorough conviction. He does not therefore lead his readers into a labyrinth of words, or entangle them among the forms of logic, or mount the airy heights of abstraction, but descends into the plain, and mingles with the business and feelings of mankind, and grapples with common sense, and subdues it to the force of true reason. All philosophy depends no less on deep and real feeling than on power of thought. I happen to have Edwards's 'Inquiry concerning Freewill,' and Dr. Priestley's 'Illustrations of Philosophical Necessity,' bound up in the same volume: and I confess that the difference in the manner of these two writers is rather striking. The plodding, persevering, scrupulous accuracy of the one, and the easy, cavalier, verbal fluency of the other, form a complete contrast. Dr. Priestley's whole aim seems to be to evade the difficulties of his subject, Edwards's to answer them. The one is employed according to Berkeley's allegory, in flinging dust in the eyes of his adversaries, while the other is taking

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true pains in digging into the mine of knowledge. All Dr. Priestley's arguments on this subject are mere hacknied common-places. He had in reality no opinion of his own, and truth, I conceive, never takes very deep root in those minds on which it is merely engrafted. He uniformly adopted the vantage ground of every question, and borrowed those arguments which he found most easy to be wielded, and of most service in that kind of busy intellectual warfare to which he was habituated. He was an able controversialist, not a philosophical reasoner.

Dr. Priestley states in his 'Illustrations' and in his letter to Dr. Horsley, that the difference between physical and moral necessity is merely verbal. He says, speaking of the connexion between cause and effect in the mind, 'Give me the thing and I will readily give up the name.' It appears to me that Dr. Priestley was quite as much attached to the name as to the thing, and that the philosophical principle of necessity, without its unpopular title, would have afforded him but little satisfaction. Now the obnoxiousness of the name, and in my opinion, almost all the difficulty and repugnance which the generality of men find in admitting the doctrine, arises from the ambiguity lurking under the term necessity, which includes both kinds of necessity, moral and physical, and with which Dr. Priestley delights to probe the prejudices of his adversaries, thinking the differences of moral and physical necessity a mere question of words, and that provided there are any laws or any causes operating upon the mind, it is of no sort of consequence what those laws or causes are. It is the same inability to distinguish between one cause and another which creates the vulgar prejudice against necessity, and which is exposed in a very satisfactory manner by the author of the 'Inquiry into the Will.' He says, in a letter written expressly to vindicate himself from having confounded moral with physical necessity, 'On the contrary, I have largely declared that the connexion between antecedent things and consequent ones which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of *necessity* improperly; and that all such terms as *must*, *cannot*, *impossible*, *unable*, *irresistible*, *unavoidable*, *invincible*, &c. when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their use in common speech; and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more properly called *certainity* than *necessity*. I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice in persons' minds, arising from an insensible habitual perversion and misapplication of such-like terms, that they are ready to think that to suppose a certain

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connexion of men's volitions without any foregoing motives or inclinations, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong irrefragable chain of causes and effects as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the East is from the West. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms *necessary*, *must*, &c. the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with liberty, is not broken, and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former curvity again and again.'

The reasoning in the 'Inquiry' to which the author here refers, in justification of himself, is as follows:

'Men in their first use of such phrases as these, *must*, *cannot*, *unavoidable*, *irresistible*, &c. use them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraining a natural necessity or impossibility, or some necessity that the will has nothing to do in. A thing is said to be *necessary*, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be *impossible* to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass and endeavour it, but all our desires and endeavours are in vain. And that is said to be *irresistible*, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance and endeavour to the contrary. And we are said to be *unable* to do a thing, when our utmost supposable desires and endeavours to do it are insufficient. All men find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things which cannot be done which they desire to do; and innumerable things, which they are averse to, that must be; they cannot avoid them, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity which men so soon and so often find, and which so greatly affects them in innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed; and it is to signify such a necessity that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used in the common affairs of life; and not to signify any such metaphysical, speculative and abstract notion as that connexion [between cause and effect] in the nature and course of things, to signify which they who employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed those terms, for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of such phrases entirely different from this, or from the one in which they are used in the controversy

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about liberty and necessity. And it being a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified by these terms in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse persons, and free them from all fault or blame, hence our idea of excusableness or faultlessness is tied to these phrases by a strong habit, which grows up with us;—or if we use the words as terms of art in another sense, yet unless we are exceeding circumspect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner: this habitual connexion of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses whenever we pretend to use the terms in that manner.’—Pages 20, 21, 290, &c.

‘It follows that when the aforesaid terms are used in cases wherein no opposition, or insufficient will or endeavour is or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case (as that of willing or choosing) excludes any such opposition, will, or endeavour, these terms are then not used in their proper signification, but quite beside their use in common speech.’—Pages 21, 22.

The author has, I think, in these passages, laid open the source of most of the confusion on the subject in question. For this double meaning lurking under the word necessity has been the chief reason why persons, who were guided more by their own feelings and the customary associations of language than by formal definitions, have altogether rejected the doctrine; while persons of a more logical turn, who could not deny the truth of the abstract principle, have yet in their explanations of it, and inferences from it, fallen into the same vulgar error as their opponents. The partisans for necessity have given up their common sense, as they supposed, to their reason, while the advocates for liberty rejected a demonstrable truth from a dread of its consequences; and both have been the dupes of a word. I have been the more ready to appeal to this writer’s authority, because he is allowed on all hands to be one of the most strict, severe, and logical of all necessarians. What he has said on the subject of free-will, as consisting in perfect contingence, independent of all motive, or as implying an absolute beginning of action without any precedent determining cause, might, one would imagine, have been sufficient, even if Hobbes’s reasonings had not, to banish that opinion out of the world. He has followed it through all its windings, and detected it in all its varying shades, with equal patience and sagacity. He sums up the absurdities of this notion of liberty, or of mere absolute self-will, in these words:

‘The following things are all essential to it, *viz.* that an action should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a

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cause and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and design; that it should be the beginning of motion and exertion, and yet be consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, also have its original from something else; that it is what the mind causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent, according to its choice, or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair. So that an act of the will [determining itself by its own free-will], according to their metaphysical account of it, is something of which there is no idea, it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning. If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, "He had been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and yet had a sire and a dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite and was hungry before it had a being; that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased: that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost; and this though he had neither head nor tail;" it would be no impudence at all to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.'—Page 281 of the *Inquiry*.

The author seems to have hit upon the source of this erroneous account of free-will, with his usual truth of feeling. He says, almost immediately after:—'The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion of action, when applied to volition, as though it were essential to this internal action that the agent should be self-determined in it, and that the will should be the cause of it, was probably this: that according to the sense of mankind, and the common use of language, it is so with respect to men's external actions; which are what originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, are called *actions*. Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their wills are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are done; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that *that* also must be

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determined by the will; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not considering the contradiction it implies.'—*Ibid.*, page 286.

I shall proceed to state as briefly as I can my own notions of liberty and necessity, as far as they any way differ from the foregoing account.

First, then, I conceive that if by necessity be understood and only understood the connexion of cause and effect, or the constant dependence of one thing on another, in the human mind as well as in matter, that according to this interpretation all things are equally certain and necessary. On the other hand, if by liberty be meant any thing opposite to this connexion of cause and effect: that is, a positive beginning of any action or motion out of nothing, or out of a state of indifference, or from itself, I believe that there is no such thing as liberty in the mind any more than in matter. All things have their preceding determining causes, and nothing is, but what must be in the precise given circumstances. This has been demonstrated over and over again, and the contrary supposition reduced to a manifest absurdity in every possible way by Hobbes, Hume, Hartley, Edwards, Priestley, and others.

But, secondly, I conceive that the question does not stop here, because certain ideas have been annexed to these terms of liberty and necessity, both by the learned and by common men, which have nothing at all to do with the affirmation or denial of the simple connexion between cause and effect. What I shall therefore attempt will be to point out a few instances of the misapplication of the term to prove a necessity not included in the certainty of the event, and to disprove liberty in a sense in which it does not interfere with that certainty, or with philosophical necessity: that is, I shall attempt to shew in what sense, in conformity with the general law to which all things are by their nature subject, man is an agent, a free agent, a moral and accountable agent; that is, deserving of reward and punishment, praise and blame, &c. Now by an agent I mean any thing that acts or has a power to operate, that is, to produce effects; by a free agent I mean one that is not hindered from acting; by a moral and accountable agent I mean one that acts from will, and is influenced by motives; by reward and punishment I mean what every one does; by praise and blame I mean our approbation or disapprobation of any agent that is conscious of our sentiments towards him, or that is capable of reflecting on his own conduct, and of being affected by what others think of it. If by an agent be meant the beginner of action, or one that produces an effect of itself, there can be no such thing; but if by an agent be meant one that contributes to an effect, there is such a thing as an agent; and the more any thing

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contributes to an effect and determines it to be this or that, the more it is an agent. If by freedom be meant a freedom from causes, or necessity in the abstract, there can be no freedom in this sense, but there may be and is a freedom from certain causes and from certain kinds and degrees of necessity ; that is, from physical causes, or compulsion, and from absolute, unconditional necessity. If all things are equally necessary, that do not spring out of nothing, then indeed the distinction between liberty and necessity must be in all cases absurd. Again, by free-will I do not mean the power or liberty to act without motives, but with motives. The mind cannot act without an occasion or ground for acting, but this does not shew that it is no agent at all, or that it is not a free agent ; that is, that its action is restrained or hindered by the action of any thing else. The intellectual and voluntary powers are free, just as the corporeal are, namely, when they are free to produce certain effects, which, if excited, they can produce, as the body is free when it can move in consequence of the mind's direction ; it is no longer free when though the same reason exists for its moving, it is hindered by something else from obeying the impulse. In short, liberty is this : the power in any agent in given circumstances to operate in a certain manner, if left to itself ; or perhaps more unequivocally, opportunity given to any agent to exert certain powers to produce an effect, when nothing but those powers and the absence of impediments is wanting to produce it. To be free is to possess all the requisites for acting in one's-self, and in the circumstances, and not to be counteracted. Again, if moral good and evil are supposed to be something self-created, then they are merely fictions of the mind ; but if we suppose an agent to be entitled to praise or blame, reward or punishment, not because he is a self-willed, but a voluntary agent, that is to say, a being possessing certain powers and habitually and with determination exerting them to certain purposes, then there will be a foundation for this distinction in nature. To the idea of moral responsibility, it is not necessary that the agent should be the sole or absolutely first cause of the evil, for example, but that he should be one real, determining cause of it, and while he remains what he is, the same effects will follow. An agent is the author of any evil, when without him, that is, without something peculiar and essential to his disposition and character, it would not exist.

1. Every thing is an agent that is any way necessary or conducing to an effect. The doctrine of second causes does not destroy agency. It no more proves that those causes do not act because something has acted before them, than that they do not exist, because something has existed before them. The theological writers on this side of the question affirm, I think improperly, that God or the first cause is the

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sole agent in the universe, to which all second causes are to be referred as instruments, having no real efficacy of their own. If so, all events are produced immediately by the divine agency, that is, all second causes are parts of the divine essence, and in all that we see or hear or feel, we must conceive of something far more deeply inter-fused, a spirit and a motion that impels all thinking things, all objects of all thought, and breathes through all things. This doctrine is that of Spinoza : but upon this supposition second causes, as the immediate operation of the Deity, are and must be real and efficient. On the other hand, if to exclude this system of pantheism, we consider the things and appearances about us as merely natural, still what are called second causes must be real and efficient causes, or they could not produce their effects. If nothing can operate but the first cause, then whatever produces effects is the Deity : but if this conclusion be thought objectionable, then we must allow other causes of events to be really and truly such in themselves : for from that which is no cause, which has no power, any more than nothing, nothing can follow. All second causes, that is, all things that exist, are, therefore, either parts of the Deity or parts of nature, and in neither case can they be absolutely insignificant, worthless, null, and of no account. Dr. Priestley is for having men refer all the good in the universe to God as the author of it, and all the evil that takes place to man or to second causes. I cannot think that this is sound philosophy nor practical wisdom. The necessarians have evidently borrowed their notions of agency and second causes from the advocates for liberty : for taking up the same unfounded assumption of the libertarians, that action is the absolute beginning of motion, and that any thing short of this is no action at all, and finding that the will was not a cause in the absurd sense supposed by their adversaries, they have concluded that it was no cause at all ; not considering whether a cause might not be more properly defined [as] that which produces an effect in consistency with other things than [as] that which produces it independently of them. Action then in any sense of the word is the same as co-operation. It may be asked, whether this account does not destroy the distinction between active and passive. I answer that it does, if by active be meant unconnected action, and by passive connected action ; but not else. That is, if by action be understood the positive determinate tendency or the additional impulse to the production of any effect, and by passiveness an indifference in any agent to this or that motion, except as it is acted upon by, and transmits the efficacy of other causes, this distinction will remain as broad and palpable as ever. Any thing is so far active as it modifies and re-acts upon the original impulse ; it is passive in as far as it neither adds to, nor takes from that

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original impulse, but merely has a power of receiving and continuing it. This I take to be the practical and philosophical meaning of the terms. This distinction, therefore, applies equally to matter and mind. The explosion of gunpowder cannot be attributed entirely or principally to the spark which ignites it, because the effect is increased a thousand-fold by the inherent qualities of the gunpowder. The motion communicated by one body to another in void space is considered as the mere passive result of the former, because the effect in the second agent is simply the continuation of what it was in the first. So it is in the mind. Motives do not act upon it simply or absolutely; but according to the dictates of the understanding or the bias of the will. At one time we yield to any idle inclination that happens to prevail, and at others resist to the utmost the strongest motives. That is, the mind is itself an agent, one chief determining cause of our volitions. It is on the view taken by the mind of motives, on our disposition to attend to or neglect them, to compare and weigh them, that their effect depends. But the necessarians have always delighted to illustrate the operations of the mind in volition by referring to the impulse communicated by one billiard-ball to another, or to different weights in a pair of scales. Both which illustrations are as little applicable as possible, because in neither of them is there supposed to be the least activity of action; that is, the least capacity to resist or increase or alter the impressed force in the thing acted upon. That is, the mind in these similes is requisite as a merely passive agent, by which I mean a thing perfectly indifferent and nugatory, a mere cypher without any character of its own, that is neither good nor bad, neither deserving of praise nor blame; a chameleon, colourless kind of thing, the sport of external impulses and accidental circumstances, or of a necessity in which it has itself no share. Thus the responsibility of the mind has been taken from it, and transferred to outward circumstances, and all characters in themselves rendered alike indifferent. This is the necessary consequence of abstracting the influence of motives from the mind on which and by which they act. I prefer exceedingly to the modern instances of a couple of billiard-balls, or a pair of scales, the illustration of Chrysophus, the stoic in Cicero, who says, '*Ille igitur qui protrusit cylindrum dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit: sic visum objectum imprimet quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed assensio erit in potestate nostrâ.*' That is, suppose I push against a heavy body; if it be square it will not move: if it be cylindrical it will. What the difference of form is to the stone, the difference of disposition is to the mind. In fact, the necessarians, to maintain this doctrine of the nullity of second causes, have been forced to consider every thing as a

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succession of simple impulses passing from hand to hand : so that there being no fixed point, no resting-place for the imagination, we are perpetually obliged to shift the cause from one object to another : every thing has to be accounted for, and referred back to something else, and in this ceaseless whirl of fleeting causes all ideas of power or agency seem to slide from under us. Lest the mind should prove refractory, to the laws ascribed to it, they thought it most prudent to deprive it of all activity and power of resistance. They were very absurdly afraid that without this their whole scheme might be overturned, as if though the mind were freed from being the servile drudge of external impulses, it would not still follow the bent of its own nature. The above distinction will, I conceive, set the mind free from one of the shackles imposed on it by the necessarians, namely, that imbecility, helplessness, and indifference, which they have super-added to the regular connexion of cause and effect, though it makes no essential part of it. The mind, according to the advocates for free-will, is a perfectly detached, unconnected, independent cause : according to the necessarians, it is no cause at all : neither branch of the antithesis is true.

2. According to the definition of liberty above given, freedom, that is free agency, is applicable to mind as well as to matter. Free will does not, because will does not, belong to it. By a free agent, I understand, with Hobbes, one that is not hindered from acting according to his natural or determinate bias. The body is free when it can obey the impulse of the mind ; so also a billiard-ball might be said to be free while it is not fixed to the table, or hindered from being impelled by the stroke of the mace. In the same sense, the water, as Mr. Hobbes observes, is said to descend freely along the channel of the river, while no obstacle intercepts its progress. But though necessarians allow liberty to the body, and to inanimate things, they deny that it is in any sense applicable to the mind or will.

ON TOOKE'S 'DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY'

I would class the merits of Mr. Tooke's work under three heads : the etymological, the grammatical, and the philosophical. The etymological part is excellent, the grammatical part indifferent, and the philosophical part to the last degree despicable ; it is downright, unqualified, unredeemed nonsense. As Mr. Tooke himself says that all metaphysical reasoning is nonsense, it is scarcely rude to say that *his* metaphysical reasoning is so. It appears to me to be 'mere midsummer madness.' He ought not indeed to have meddled with logic

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or metaphysics after such a declaration; he ought to have supposed that he laboured under some natural defect in this respect, as a man who finds no harmony in any tune that is played to him, may without much modesty conclude that he has no ear for music.

The opinion which I have here advanced of this writer's merits as a general reasoner may seem a bold one; but the proof of it is not difficult; it is as easy as transcribing. I have only to take a few passages in which he has applied etymology to the illustration of moral and metaphysical truth, to make his undistinguishing admirers blush, not for their idol, but for the weakness and bounded faculties of human nature.

Mr. Tooke lays it down as a maxim, that the mind has neither complex nor abstract ideas. He was in some things a zealot, and his zeal had led him to believe that his system of etymology would in some way or other establish this metaphysical principle, and overturn the established notions of law, morality, philosophy, and divinity. The full development and execution of this project is reserved for a future volume, but there are perpetual hints and intimations of it in the two first, something like the aerial music and flying noises in Prospero's island. The author seems constantly in his own mind on the point of detecting all imposture and delusion with the Ithuriel spear of etymology, but he as constantly draws back, and postpones his triumph. The second volume of the 'Diversions' consists chiefly of about two thousand instances of the etymology of words, to prove that there can be no abstract ideas: scarcely one of which two thousand meanings is anything else but a more abstract idea than the word was in general supposed to convey: for example, the word *loaf* commonly stands for a pretty substantial, solid, tangible kind of an idea, and is not suspected of any latent, very refined, abstracted meaning. The author shews, on the contrary, that the word has no such palpable, positive meaning, as the particular object to which we apply it, but merely signifies something, any thing, raised or *lifted* up. A singular method, surely, of reducing all general and abstract signs to individual, physical objects! Yet we find this tiresome catalogue of derivations concluded in this manner.

'And on this subject of *subaudition* I will at present exercise your patience no farther: for my own begins to flag. You have now instances of my doctrine in, I suppose, about a thousand words. Their number may be easily increased. But I trust these are sufficient to discard that imagined operation of the mind, which has been termed *abstraction*: and to prove that what we call by that name, is merely one of the contrivances of language, for the purpose of more speedy communication.'—Page 396, vol. ii.

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How a thousand instances of words, signifying a common quality or abstract idea, with something understood (*subauditum*), can be supposed to discard that imagined operation of the mind called abstraction, or in what subaudition differs from abstraction, or whether there is not something *subintellectum*, as well as *subauditum*,—that is, certain circumstances left out by the mind for the necessary progress of thought, as well as in language, for its more speedy communication,—it is not easy to guess. This farcical mummerly, this inexplicable dumb show, this emphatical insignificance, neither admits nor deserves any answer.

The only places in the work in which this wary reasoner has fairly committed himself, and given an intelligible explanation of his mode of applying his system to general questions, are in his account of the words, *right and wrong, just and unjust*, in his list of metaphysical nonentities, demonstrated to be such because they are expressed by the past participles of certain verbs, and in his definition of 'Truth.' These, therefore, I shall give as specimens, and I hope they will be quite satisfactory. 'The 'Diversions of Purley,' it should be observed, is supposed to be carried on in a dialogue between the author and Sir Francis Burdett.

'Enough, enough,' says Burdett, 'innumerable instances of the same may, I grant you, be given from all our ancient authors. But does this import us any thing?'

'Tooke. Surely, much, if it shall lead us to the clear understanding of the words we use in discourse. For as far as we "know not our own meaning," as far as "our purposes are not endowed with words to make them known," so far we "gabble like things most brutish." But the importance rises higher, when we reflect upon the application of words to metaphysics. And when I say metaphysics, you will be pleased to remember that all general reasoning, all politics, law, morality, and divinity, are merely metaphysics.' [What is this general reasoning of Mr. Tooke's?]

'Well,' replies his pupil, 'you have satisfied me that wrong, however written, whether wrang, wrong or wrung, like the Italian *torto* and the French *tort*, is merely the past tense or participle of the verb to wring; and has merely that meaning.

'Tooke. True; it means wrung or wrested from the *right* or *ordered* line of conduct. Right is no other than *rectum*, the past participle of the Latin verb *regere*. The Italian *dritto*, and the French *droit*, are no other than the past participle *directum*. In the same manner our English word *just* is the past participle of the verb *jubere* (*jussum*).

'BURDETT. What, then, is law?'

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'TOOKE. It is merely the past participle *lag*, of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb *legan*, *ponere*; and it means something or anything *laid down* as a rule of conduct. Thus when a man demands his *right*, he only asks that which it is *ordered* he shall have. A *right* conduct is that which is ordered. A *right* line is that which is ordered or directed, not a random extension, but the shortest between two points. A *right* and *just* action is such a one as is ordered and commanded. The right hand is that which custom, and those who have brought us up, have ordered or directed us to use in preference, when one hand only is employed, and the left hand is that which is *lieved* or left.

'BURDETT. Surely the word *right* is sometimes used in some other sense. And see, in this newspaper before us, M. Portalis, contending for the *concordat*, says:—"The multitude are much more impressed with what they are *commanded* to obey, than with what is proved to them to be *right* and *just*." This will be complete nonsense, if *right* and *just* mean *ordered* and *commanded*.

'TOOKE. I will not undertake to make sense of the arguments of M. Portalis. The whole of his speech is a piece of wretched mummery, employed to bring back again to France the more wretched mummery of pope and popery. Writers on such subjects are not very anxious about the meaning of their words. Ambiguity and equivocation are their strongholds. Explanation would undo them.

'BURDETT. Well, but Mr. Locke uses the word in a manner hardly to be reconciled with your account of it. He says:—"God has a right to do it, we are his creatures."

'TOOKE. It appears to me highly improper to say, that God has a right, as it is also to say that God is just. For nothing is ordered, directed, or commanded concerning God. The expressions are inapplicable to the Deity: though they are common, and those who use them have the best intentions. They are applicable only to men, to whom alone language belongs, and of whose sensations only words are the representations; to men, who are by nature the subjects of orders and commands, and whose chief merit is obedience.

'BURDETT. Every thing, then, that is ordered and commanded is right and just.

'TOOKE. Surely; for that is only affirming that what is ordered and commanded is—ordered and commanded.

'BURDETT. These sentiments do not appear to have made you very conspicuous for obedience. There are not a few passages, I believe, in your life, where you have opposed what was ordered and commanded. Upon your own principles, was that *right*?

'TOOKE. Perfectly.

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'BURDETT. How now! was it ordered and commanded that you should oppose what was ordered and commanded! Can the same thing be at the same time both right and wrong?

'TOOKE. Travel back to the island of Melinda, and you will find the difficulty most easily solved. A thing may be at the same time both *right* and *wrong*, as well as *right* and *left*. It may be commanded to be done, and commanded not to be done. The law, *i.e.* that which is laid down, may be different by different authorities.

'I have always been most obedient when most taxed with disobedience. But my right hand is not the right hand of Melinda. The right I revere is not the right adored by sycophants, the *jus vagum*, the capricious command of princes or ministers. I follow the law of God (which is laid down by him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the laws of human nature: which, without any testimony, we know must proceed from God, and upon these are founded the rights of man, or what is ordered for man.'

On this passage I will observe that I think it would be difficult for Mr. Tooke himself to find a more precious instance of unmeaning jargon in the writings of any school-divine. Mr. Tooke first pretends gravely to define the essence of *law* and *just* from the etymology of those words, by saying that they are something *laid down* and something *ordered*; and when pressed by the difficulty that there are many things laid down and many things ordered which are neither 'law' nor 'just,' makes answer that their obligation depends on a higher species of law and justice, to wit, a law which is no where laid down, and a justice which is no where ordered, except indeed by the nature of things, on which the etymology of these two words does not seem to throw much light. At one time, it seems quite demonstrable that the essence of all law, right, and justice consists in its being ordered or communicated by words: the very idea is absurd, unless we conceive of it as some thing either spoken or written in a book; and yet the very next moment this fastidious reasoner sets up the unwritten, uncommunicated law of God, which he says must conform to the laws of human nature, as the rule of his conduct, and as paramount to all other positive orders and commands whatever. What is this original law of God or nature, which Mr. Tooke sets up as the rule of right? Is it the good of the whole, or self-interest? Is it the voice of reason, or conscience, or the moral sense? Here then we have to set out afresh in our pursuit, and to grope our way as well as we can through the old labyrinth of morality, divinity, and metaphysics. This new-invented patent-lamp of etymology goes out just as it is beginning to grow dark, and as the path becomes intricate.

Neither can I at all see why our author should quarrel with

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M. Portalis for using these words in their common sense. He affirms that the whole of this gentleman's speech is a piece of wretched mummery, that his distinction between what is right and what is commanded is a senseless ambiguity, and that explanation would undo him. Yet he himself, two pages after, discovers that this distinction has a real meaning in it, and that he has acted upon it all his life. 'The one,' he says, 'is the *jus vagum*, the capricious command of princes; the other is the law of God and nature.' It is not impossible but M. Portalis might have given quite as profound an explanation of his own meaning. Junius's sarcasm did not, it seems, entirely cure Mr. Tooke 'of the little sneering sophistries of a collegian.'

Mr. Tooke next makes strange havoc with a whole host of metaphysical agents; like Sir Richard Blackmore,

'Undoes creation at a jerk,
And of redemption makes damn'd work.'

'Rebelling angels, the forbidden tree,
Heaven, hell, earth, chaos, all'—

are weighed in the balance and found wanting. We cannot say with Marvell, that the argument

'Holds us a while misdoubting his intent,
That he would ruin (for I saw him strong)
The sacred truths to fable and old song.
(So Sampson groped the temple's posts in spite)
The world o'erwhelming to revenge his sight.'

For Mr. Tooke leaves us in no doubt about his intent. All these sacred truths are, according to him, so many falsehoods, which by taking possession of certain adjectives and participles, have palmed themselves upon the world as realities, but which, by spelling their names backwards, he proposes to exorcise and reduce to their original nothingness again. Here follows a list of them which he has strung together, as a warning to all other pseudo-substantives. It is rather strange, by the bye, that the author should have resorted to this mode of argument, since he affirms that adjectives are the names of things, as well as substantives; and laughs at Dr. South for saying that they are the names of nothing.

'These words, these participles and adjectives,' says Mr. Tooke, 'not understood as such, have caused a metaphysical jargon and a false morality, which can only be dissipated by etymology. And when they come to be examined you will find that the ridicule which Dr. Conyers Middleton has so justly bestowed upon the papists for their absurd coinage of saints, is equally applicable to ourselves and to

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all other metaphysicians ; whose moral deities, moral causes, and moral qualities are not less ridiculously coined and imposed upon their followers.

Fate	Substance
Destiny	Fiend
Luck	Angel
Lot	Apostle
Chance	Saint
Accident	Spirit
Heaven	True
Hell	False
Providence	Desert
Prudence	Merit
Innocence	Fault, &c. &c.

as well as *just*, *right*, and *wrong*, are all merely participles poetically embodied and substantiated by those who use them.

'So Church, for instance (*Dominicum aliquid*) is an adjective; and formerly a most wicked one: whose misinterpretation caused more slaughter and pillage of mankind than all the other cheats together.'

Sir Francis says, 'Something of this sort I can easily perceive, but not to the extent you carry it. I see that those sham deities, Fate and Destiny, aliquid *fatum*, quelque chose *destinée*, are merely the past participles of *fari* and *destiner*. That Chance ("high arbiter," as Milton calls him) and his twin-brother Accident are merely the participles of *escheoir*, *cheoir*, and *cadere*. And that to say, it befell me by chance or by accident, is absurdly saying it befell me by falling.

'I agree with you, that Providence, Prudence, Innocence, Substance, and all the rest of that tribe of qualities (in *ence* and *ance*) are merely the neuter plurals of the present participles of *ordere*, *nocere*, *stare*, &c. &c. That Angel, Saint, Spirit, are the past participles of *αγγελλειν*, *sanciri*, *spirare*. That the Italian *cucolo*, a cuckoo, gives us the verb to *cucol*, and its past participle *cuckold*.'

And what if it does: will Mr. Tooke therefore pretend to say that there is no such thing? This is indeed turning etymology to a good account. It is clearing off old scores with a vengeance, and establishing morality on an entirely new basis. For my own part, I can only say of the whole of the reasoning of this author, with Voltaire's *Candide*, '*la tête me tourne : on ne sait où l'on est.*' Whether any or all of those metaphysical beings enumerated by Mr. Tooke do

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or do not exist, what their nature or qualities are, whether modes, relatives, substances, I shall not here undertake to determine, but I do conceive that none of these questions can be resolved in any way by inquiring whether the names denoting them are not the past participles of certain verbs. A shorter method would I think be to say at once that all metaphysical and moral terms, whether participles or not, are but names, that names are not things, and that therefore the things themselves have no existence. It is upon this philosophical principle that the heroical Jonathan Wild proceeds in his definition of the word Honour, for after losing himself to no purpose in the common metaphysical jargon on the subject, and in moral causes and qualities, he comes at last to this clear and unembarrassed conclusion, —‘That honour consists in the word *honour*, and nothing else.’

I will only give one instance more of this reformed system of logic and metaphysics.

‘BURDETT. I still wish for an explanation of one word more: which on account of its extreme importance ought not to be omitted. What is Truth? You know when Pilate had asked the same question, he went out and would not stay for an answer, and from that time to this no answer has been given. And from that time to this mankind have been wrangling and tearing each other to pieces for the truth, without once considering the meaning of the word.

‘TOOKE. This word will give us no trouble. Like the other words, *true* is also a past participle of the Saxon verb *treotuan*, confidere, to think, to believe firmly, to be thoroughly persuaded of, to trow. *True*, as we now write it, or *trew*, as it was formerly written, means simply and merely that which is trowed, and instead of its being a rare commodity upon earth, except only in words, there is nothing but truth in the world.

‘That every man, in his communication with others, should speak that which he troweth, is of so great importance to mankind, that it ought not to surprise us, if we find the most extravagant and exaggerated praises bestowed upon truth. But truth supposes mankind; for whom and by whom alone the word is formed, and to whom only it is applicable. If no man, no truth. There is therefore no such thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting truth; unless mankind, such as they are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth. For the truth of one person may be opposite to the truth of another. To speak truth may be a vice as well as a virtue; for there are many occasions when it ought not to be spoken. If you reject my explanation, find out if you can some other possible meaning of the word, or content yourself with Johnson, by saying that *true*

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is not false, and *false* is—not true. For so he explains the words.’—Vol. ii. p. 407.

In a note the author adds, ‘Mr. Locke, in the second book of his Essay, chapter xxxii., treats of *true* and *false* ideas, and is much distressed throughout the whole chapter, because he had not in his mind any determinate meaning of the word *true*. If that excellent man had himself followed the advice which he gave to his disputing friends concerning the word *liquor*; if he had followed his own rule, previously to writing about *true* and *false* ideas, and had determined what meaning he applied to *true*, *being*, *thing*, *real*, *right*, *wrong*, he could not have written the above chapter, which exceedingly distresses the reader, who searches for a meaning where there is none to be found.’

Whether Mr. Locke would have been satisfied with Mr. Tooke’s account of these words, I cannot say. I know that I am not. I do not think it the true one. It is therefore not the true one. Mr. Tooke thinks it is, and therefore it is the true one. Which of us is right? That what a man thinks, he thinks, and that if he speaks what he thinks, he speaks truth in one principal sense of the word, is what does not require much illustration; but whether what he thinks is true or false, whether his opinion is right or wrong, or whether there is not another possible and actual meaning of the terms besides that given by Mr. Tooke, is the old difficulty, which remains just where it was before, in spite of etymology.

The application of the theory of language to the philosophy of the mind, Mr. Tooke has reserved for a volume by itself: the principle, however, which he means to establish, he has very explicitly laid down in the beginning of his first volume. ‘The business of the mind,’ he says, ‘as far as it concerns language, appears to me to be very simple. It extends no farther than to receive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of language. The greatest part of Mr. Locke’s Essay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the *composition*, *abstraction*, *complexity*, *generalization*, *relation*, &c. of ideas, does indeed merely concern language. If he had been sooner aware of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge, he would not have talked of the composition of ideas; but would have seen that the only composition was in the terms; and consequently that it was as improper to talk of a complex idea as of a complex star. It is an easy matter, upon Mr. Locke’s own principles and a physical consideration of the senses and the mind, to prove the impossibility of the composition of ideas; and that they are not ideas, but merely terms which are general and abstract.’—Vol. i. pp. 39, 51, &c.

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Now I grant that Mr. Locke's own principles, and a physical consideration of the mind, do lead to the conclusion here stated, that is, to an absurdity; and it is from thence I have endeavoured to shew more than once that those principles, and the considering the mind as a physical thing, are themselves absurd. How a term can be complex otherwise than from the complexity of its meaning, that is, of the idea attached to it, is difficult to understand.

As to the other position, that we have no general ideas, but that it is the terms only that are general and abstract, Mr. Tooke has borrowed this piece of philosophy from Mr. Locke, who borrowed it from Hobbes. 'Universality,' says Mr. Locke, as quoted by our author, 'belongs not to things, which are all of them particular in their existence. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into of signifying or representing many particulars.' I have, however, before shewn how very loose, uncertain, and wavering, Mr. Locke's reasoning on this subject is, though I cannot agree with Mr. Tooke that it is therefore '*very different from that incomparable author's usual method of proceeding.*' There is one question which may be asked with respect to this statement, which, if fairly answered, will, perhaps, decide the point in dispute: *viz.* if there is no general nature in things, or if we have no general idea of what they have in common or the same, how is it that we know when to apply the same general terms to different particulars, which on this principle will have nothing left to connect them together in the mind? For example, take the words, *a white horse*. Now say they, it is the terms which are general or common, but we have no general or abstract idea corresponding to them. But if we had no general idea of *white*, nor any general idea of *a horse*, we should have nothing more to guide us in applying this phrase to any but the first horse, than in applying the terms of an unknown tongue to their respective objects. For it is the idea of something general or common between the several objects which can alone determine us in assigning the same name to things which, considered as particulars, or setting aside that general nature, are perfectly distinct and independent. Without this link in the mind, this general perception of the qualities of things, the terms *a white horse* could no more be applied, and would, in fact, be no more applicable to animals of this description generally, than to any other animal. In short, what is it that 'puts the same common name into a capacity of signifying many particulars,' but that those particulars are, and are conceived to be of the same kind? That is, general terms necessarily imply a class of things and ideas. Language without this would be reduced to a heap of proper names: and we should be just as much

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at a loss to name any object generally, from its agreement with others, as to know whether we should call the first man we met in the street by the name of John or Thomas. The existence and use of general terms is alone a sufficient proof of the power of abstraction in the human mind; nor is it possible to give even a plausible account of language without it. But Mr. Tooke has on all possible occasions sacrificed common sense to a false philosophy and epigrammatic logic. In opposition to this author's assertion, that we have neither complex nor abstract ideas, I think it may be proved to a demonstration that we have no others. If our ideas were absolutely simple and individual, we could have no idea of any of those objects which in this erring, half-thinking philosophy are called individual, as a table or a chair, a blade of grass, or a grain of sand. For every one of these includes a certain configuration, hardness, colour, &c. *i.e.* ideas of different things, and received by different senses, which must be put together by the understanding before they can be referred to any particular thing, or form one idea. Without the cementing power of the mind, all our ideas would be necessarily decomposed and crumbled down into their original elements and flexional parts. We could indeed never carry on a chain of reasoning on any subject, for the very links of which this chain must consist, would be ground to powder. No two of these atomic impressions could ever club together to form even a sensible point, much less should we be able ever to arrive at any of the larger masses, or nominal descriptions of things. All nature, all objects, all parts of all objects would be equally 'without form and void.' *The mind alone is formative*, to borrow the expression of a celebrated German writer, or it is that alone which by its pervading and elastic energy unfolds and expands our ideas, that gives order and consistency to them, that assigns to every part its proper place, and that constructs the idea of the whole. Ideas are the offspring of the understanding, not of the senses. In other words, it is the understanding alone that perceives relation, but every object is made up of a bundle of relations. In short, there is no object or idea which does not consist of a number of parts arranged in a certain manner, but of this arrangement the parts themselves cannot be conscious. A 'physical consideration of the senses and the mind' can never therefore account for our ideas, even of sensible objects. Mr. Locke's own principles do indeed exclude all power of understanding from the human mind. The manner in which Hobbes and Berkeley have explained the nature of mathematical demonstration upon this system shews its utter inadequacy to any of the purposes of general reasoning, and is a plain confession of the necessity of abstract ideas. Mr. Hume considers the principle that abstraction is not an

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operation of the mind, but of language, as one of the most capital discoveries of modern philosophy, and attributes it to Bishop Berkeley. Berkeley has however only adopted the arguments and indeed almost the very words of Hobbes. The latter author in the passage which has been already quoted says, 'By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was consequent not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight and the angles three, and that that was all for which he named it a triangle, will boldly conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms: *Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right ones.* And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered as an universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind saving the first, and makes that which was found true *here and now* to be true *in all times and places*.'—*Leviathan*, p. 14.

Bishop Berkeley gives the same view of the nature of abstract reasoning in the introduction to his 'Principles of Human Knowledge.' 'But here,' he says, 'it will be demanded how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle, which agrees equally to all. To which I answer, that though the idea I have in view, whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle, whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle nor the equality nor the determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. 'Tis true, the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there's not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same

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length ; which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any oblique angular or scalenon, which I had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle.'—Page 34.

This answer does not appear to me satisfactory. It amounts to this, that though the diagram we have in view includes a number of particular circumstances, not applicable to other cases, yet we know the principle to be true generally, because *there is not the least mention made of these particulars in the proof of the proposition.*

When it is asserted that we must necessarily have the idea of a particular size whenever we think of a man in general, all that is intended I believe is that we must think of a particular height. This idea it is supposed must be particular and determinate, just as we must draw a line with a piece of chalk, or make a mark with the slider of a measuring instrument in one place and not in another. I think it may be shown that this view of the question is also extremely fallacious and an inversion of the order of our ideas. The height of the individual is thus resolved into the consideration of the lines terminating or defining it, and the intermediate space of which it properly consists is entirely overlooked. For let us take any given height of a man, whether tall, short, or middle-sized, and let that height be as visible as you please, I would ask whether the actual length to which it amounts does not consist of a number of other lengths, as if it be a tall man, the length will be six feet, and each of these feet will consist of as many inches, and those inches will be again made up of decimals, and those decimals of other subordinate and infinitesimal parts, which must be all distinctly perceived and added together before the sum total which they compose can be pretended to be a distinct, particular, or individual idea. In any given visible object we have always a gross, general idea of something extended, and never of the precise length ; for this precise length as it is thought to be is necessarily composed of a number of lengths too many and too minute to be separately attended to or jointly conceived by the mind, and at last loses itself in the infinite divisibility of matter. What sort of distinctness or individuality can therefore be found in any visible image or object of sense, I cannot well conceive : it seems to me like seeking for certainty in the dancing of insects in the evening sun, or for fixedness and rest in the motions of the sea. All particulars are nothing but generals, more or less defined according to circumstances, but never perfectly so. The knowledge of any finite being rests in generals, and if we think to exclude all generality from

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our ideas of things, as implying a want of perfect truth and clearness, we must be constrained to remain in utter ignorance. Let any one try the experiment of counting a flock of sheep driven past by him, and he will soon find his imagination unable to keep pace with the rapid succession of objects; and his idea of a particular number slide into the general notion of multitude: not that because there are more objects than he can possibly count he will think there are none, or that the word *flock* will present to his mind a mere name without any idea corresponding to it. Every act of the attention, every object we see or think of, offers a proof of the same kind.

The application of this view of the subject to explain the difference between the synthetical and analytical faculties, between generalization and abstraction in the proper acceptance of this last word, between common sense or feeling and understanding or reason, demands a separate essay.

I do not think it possible ever to arrive at the truth upon these, or to prove the existence of general or abstract ideas, by beginning in Mr. Locke's method with particular ones. This faculty of abstraction or generalization (to use the words indifferently) is indeed by most considered as a sort of artificial refinement upon our other ideas, as an excrescence, no ways contained in the common impressions of things, nor scarcely necessary to the common purposes of life; and is by Mr. Locke altogether denied to be among the faculties of brutes. It is the ornament and top-addition of the mind of man which proceeding from simple sensation upwards, is gradually sublimed into the abstract notions of things: 'so from the root springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves more airy, last the bright consummate flower.' On the other hand, I imagine that all our notions from first to last are, strictly speaking, general and abstract, not absolute and particular, and that this faculty mixes itself more or less with every act of the mind, and in every moment of its existence.

Lastly, I conceive that the mind has not been fairly dealt with in this and other questions of the same kind. The difficulty belonging to the notion of abstraction or comprehension it is perhaps impossible ever to clear up: but that is no reason why we should discard those operations from the human mind any more than we should deny the existence of motion, extension, or curved lines in nature, because we cannot explain them. Matter alone seems to have the privilege of presenting difficulties and contradictions at any time, which pass current under the name of *facts*; but the moment any thing of this kind is observed in the understanding, all the petulance of logicians is up in arms. The mind is made the mark on which they vent all the modes and figures of their impertinence; and metaphysical truth has

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in this respect fared like the milk-white hind, the emblem of pure faith, in Dryden's fable, which

' Has oft been chased
With Scythian shafts and many winged wounds
Aimed at her heart, was often forced to fly,
And doomed to death, though fated not to die.'

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A NEW AND IMPROVED GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH TONGUE

Written at Winterslow in 1809. A letter of November 23 from Godwin to Constable, asking for the latter's interest with *The Edinburgh Review*, shows the book to have been published at that date (*Life*, p. 121). Lamb records its appearance, in a letter of January 2, 1810 to Manning, adding, 'Godwin sells it bound up with a treatise of his own on language, but the *grey mare is the better horse*.' (*Letters*, ed. Lucas, 1912, I. 432.) Hazlitt nowhere in his later works alludes to his authorship of this school book, but he repeats its principles in the article on Horne Tooke in *The Spirit of the Age*, and again in an *Atlas* paper of 1829, 'English Grammar.' The subject was one of those of which he proposed to make 'a little volume of outlines or elements' for Constable's *Miscellany* in 1828 (see *Life*, p. 397, and a later volume of the present edition).

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2. *Edward Baldwin*. 'Mr. William Godwin, a gentleman well known to the public by his various writings, but who in worldly circumstances partakes of the usual fate of authors, has lately digested a plan for providing for himself and family by entering into the business of a bookseller, principally in the mode of supplying books for schools and young persons. He has composed several books in prosecution of this plan under the feigned name of Edward Baldwin, an expedient to which he felt himself obliged to have recourse in consequence of the prejudices which have been industriously circulated against him.' From Godwin's subscription list of his bookselling business (1808), composed by himself. (Kegan Paul, *William Godwin*, 1876, II. 160.)
5. *Mr. Horne Tooke*. See vol. I., note to p. 128, and *The Spirit of the Age*.
7. *Lowth, Murray, &c.* Robert Lowth (1710-87) whose *A Short Introduction to English Grammar* was published in 1762; Lindley Murray (1745-1826), whose *English Grammar* was first published in 1795 and went into nearly fifty editions before 1816, in which year there was a corrected edition, of which a popular abridgement was even more successful.
9. *David Booth*. David Booth (1766-1846) published an *Introduction to an Analytical Dictionary of the English Language* in 1806. Only one volume of the Dictionary itself was published (1835).
28. Note. '*At his command*,' etc. *Paradise Lost*, VI. 781.
35. *We often address absent persons*. The reader will be interested in applying this principle to passages of *Liber Amoris* and the essays.
36. '*At whose sighs*,' etc. *Paradise Lost*, IV. 35.
'*One stupendous whole*,' etc. *Essay on Man*, I. 267.
37. Note. The reader will perhaps not require the warning that the etymology here is Horne Tooke's.
39. *Devis*. Ellin Devis's *The Accidence; or First Rudiments of English Grammar* (5th edition, 1786).

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40. *The prefix of the infinitive mood.* Horne Tooke again.
50. Note. '*Thou, Stella,*' etc. Swift, *To Stella*.
59. '*If they were to rain mitres,*' etc. 'Shower down thy mitres, if it seem good unto thy Divine Providence, upon those heads which are aching for them.' *A Sentimental Journey*. The Passport: The Hotel at Paris.
61. Mr. Locke calls. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III. Chap. vii. § 1.
68. Salmon. Nicholas Salmon's *The First Principles of English Grammar* (1798).
73. Note. *The dependence of one part of a sentence on another.* Substituted for 'the independence' in text.
77. '*All their works,*' etc. Cf. *St. Matthew*, xxiii. 5.
'*For not to have been dipt,*' etc. *Ruines of Time*, 428.
'*Scotland and thee,*' etc. *Upon the Death of the Viscount of Dundee*.
78. '*Whose own example,*' etc. *Essay on Criticism*, 679-80.
79. '*'Tis be the obstructed paths,*' etc. *Messiah*, 41.
'*O thou that,*' etc. *Paradise Lost*, IV. 32.
81. '*These equal syllables,*' etc. *Essay on Criticism*, 344-5.
'*The sick and weak,*' etc. *Messiah*, 15.
'*No sigh, no murmur,*' etc. *Ibid.*, 45.
'*Nor needs,*' etc. *On Mr. John Fletcher's Works*.
'*What drops,*' etc. *Paradise Lost*, v. 23.
84. '*O thou my voice inspire,*' etc. *Messiah*, 5-6.
'*What art thou,*' etc. *Iliad*, x. 90-1.
86. *The most common construction is always the least objectionable.* Hazlitt's general principle. Cf. 'On Familiar Style' in *Table-Talk*.
87. *The idioms of every language are in general the most valuable parts of it.* Note as above.
90. '*To wish him wrestle,*' etc. *Much Ado About Nothing*, III. 1. 42.
'*The loud ethereal trumpet,*' etc. *Paradise Lost*, VI. 60.
94. '*Now Margaret's curse,*' etc. *Richard III.*, III. 3. 15.
96. '*But oh! 'twas little,*' etc. *An Ode presented to the King*.
'*Him portion'd maids,*' etc. *Moral Essays*, Ep. III. 267.
'*Fierce as he mov'd,*' etc. *Iliad*, I. 64. Cf. *Lectures on the English Poets*: 'In the translation of the *Iliad* . . . he continually changes the tenses in the same sentence for the purposes of the rhyme, which shews either a want of technical resources, or great inattention to punctilious exactness.'
97. '*So much the fears,*' etc. Prior, *An Ode presented to the King*.
110. *Select Sentences for Parsing.* The whole of these 'select sentences' are taken by Hazlitt from William Enfield's *The Speaker: or, Miscellaneous Pieces, selected from the Best English Writers, and disposed under proper heads, with a view to facilitate the improvement of Youth in Reading and Speaking*, Chaps. I. to VI. Hazlitt used the work as a school book (*Life*, p. 6).

PROSPECTUS OF A HISTORY OF ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

First reprinted in *New Writings: Second Series*.

The 'Contents' of this work, as set out in the prospectus (see Bibliographical Note), were to have been as follows:

'Chapter I. Introductory. On the Systems of the Ancients, of Plato and Aristotle.—On the School-Philosophy.—The Attempts made to reform it by Roger Bacon. Ch. II. On the character and writings of Lord Bacon.—On the
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writers immediately succeeding him, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Sir Kenelm Digby, and others.—Account of Descartes. Ch. III. On Hobbes, the father of the modern philosophy.—The opposition his doctrines met with from Lord Clarendon, the Duchess of Newcastle, &c.—On the Spiritual Writers, Cudworth, Boyle.—Incidental notice of Malebranche. Ch. IV. On Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.—His use of the words Idea and Association.—His obligations to Hobbes, and how far he differs from him.—His controversy with Leibnitz. Ch. V. On other Writers nearly of the same period, Clarke, Butler, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Bolingbroke. Ch. VI. On Berkeley and Hume.—Moral Theories of Adam Smith and Hutcheson.—Ch. VII. On Hartley and his followers.—The controversy between Price and Priestley.—Edwards on Freewill.—The Scotch school, Reid, Beattie, Dugald Stewart, &c. Ch. VIII. On Helvetius, Condillac, and other French philosophers.—Rousseau not a favourer of the modern system.—Ch. IX. On those Writers who have treated of the philosophy of language, Harris, Monboddo, Horne Tooke, &c. Ch. X. General view of the subject.—Use of such studies, and the true method of pursuing them.—Philosophy little more than common sense *well understood*.—On the effects which modern systems of philosophy have had in matters of taste, criticism, and on the state of public opinion in general.'

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114. l. 5 from bottom. 'Certainly' cancelled by pen in the Windham copy.
 115. '*Their logomachies*.' Cf. 'Which you seem to place amongst your Logomachies, or logical notions.' Baxter, *Controversial Works*.
 'They were made fierce,' etc. *Advancement of Learning*, I. iv. 6.
 116. '*Four champions fierce*,' etc. *Paradise Lost*, II. 898.
 'Like substances in his brain.' Cf. vol. I. p. 147 and note.
Condillac and others. The French exponents of the 'modern philosophy,' studied by Hazlitt instead of the curriculum while at the Unitarian College at Hackney, comprise outstandingly—Etienne de Condillac (1715-80), whose *Traité des Sensations* appeared in 1754; Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-71), author of the celebrated *De L'Esprit* (1758); and Baron D'Holbach (1723-89), author of the *Système de la Nature*, published 1770.
 118. *The essay formerly named*. That is, Hazlitt's first book, *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action*, named in the preliminaries given in the Bibliographical Note.
 119. *Gray's Letters*. To Stonehewer, August 18, 1758.

LECTURES ON ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

Hazlitt's first course of public lectures—consisting of the materials of the *History of English Philosophy*, for which his prospectus had failed to gain the necessary support—was delivered at the Russell Institution, Great Coram Street, Brunswick Square, from January to April 1812. Crabb Robinson attended the course (see the present editor's *Life*, pp. 136-45), which consisted of ten Lectures, of which only a defective text survives. In printing five of the lectures in *Literary Remains* (see Bibliographical Note) Hazlitt's son said: 'I found them with other papers in an old hamper which many years ago he stuffed confusedly full of MSS. and odd volumes of books, and left in the care of some lodging-house people, by whom it was thrown into a cellar, so damp that even the covers of some of the books were fast mouldering when I first looked over the collection. The injury to the MSS. may be imagined. Some of the Lectures indeed, to my deep regret, are altogether missing, burnt probably by the ignorant people of the house; and I have had the greatest difficulty in preparing those which remain for the press.' In a letter of January 1821 Hazlitt offered

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John Scott for *The London Magazine* 'the articles on Modern Philosophy, eight in number, at five guineas apiece' (*Life*, p. 309). This would presumably give us the date at which the MSS. were put on one side, after a certain amount of preparation for their proposed magazine publication. In the present text the term 'Lecture' has been restored, in place of the substituted 'Essay' as in *Literary Remains*; certain resulting, and other obvious, corrections have been made in the text; and 'On Abstract Ideas,' separately published by Hazlitt's son (see Bibliographical Note) without explanation, has, for purposes of convenience, been regarded as the third lecture of the course. The descriptions of the lectures are given in the notes which follow from Hazlitt's letter to Crabb Robinson, explanatory of the course, of October 29, 1811 (*Life*, pp. 136-7). The official syllabus, which agrees as to the sequence of the lectures, is given by Mr. W. C. Hazlitt (*Memoirs*, I. 192-3).

ON THE WRITINGS OF HOBBS

Lecture I. was 'On Hobbes's writings with a general view of philosophy since his time, shewing that succeeding writers have done little more than expand, illustrate, and apply the metaphysical principles distinctly laid down by him.'

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123. 'But dry discourse.' I have not succeeded in identifying this quotation.
125. *Secondly*. From this paragraph to a point near the bottom of p. 126 Hazlitt is drawing on his 'Prospectus,' with occasional variations and additions. Cf. *ante*, pp. 113-116, and notes.
127. *It has been generally supposed, etc.* Cf. the essay 'Mr. Locke a Great Plagiarist,' in the later volume devoted to Hazlitt's journalism.
130. 'Discourse of Human Nature.' This work, though circulated in MS. as early as 1640, was not published till 1650, the year before the publication of *Leviathan*.
142. 'This difference of quickness,' etc. *Leviathan*, part I. chap. viii.
143. *Harris, the author of Hermes, etc.* Cf. vol. vi. (*The English Comic Writers*) p. 19, where the same passages are quoted from Locke, Hobbes, and Harris. 'Though the effect of folly,' etc. *Leviathan*, part I. chap. viii. *The other passage which I propose.* 'Passages which I proposed' in *Literary Remains*.
144. 'The foolish daughters of Pelias' [Peleus], etc. *Leviathan*, part II. chap. xxx. *The same allusion in Burke. Reflections on the French Revolution* (ed. Payne, p. 113). *In another Lecture.* 'In my next Essay' in *Literary Remains*.
145. *The next Lecture.* 'The Essay next but one' in *Literary Remains*. Rousseau's 'Social Contract.' Published 1762. Cf. 'On Reading Old Books' (vol. xii. p. 224).
146. 'Soft collar of social esteem.' *Reflections* (ed. Payne, p. 90). 'Order of thoughts,' etc. *Leviathan*, part I. chap. iii. 'Stood all astonished,' etc. *The Faerie Queene*, VII. vi. 28.

ON LOCKE'S 'ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING'

Lecture II. was 'On Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, or on the nature of ideas, shewing that all ideas necessarily imply a power for which sensation or simple perception does not account, viz. an understanding or comprehending faculty.'

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151. 'Discourse of reason.' *Hamlet*, i. 2, 150.
153. 'Without form and void.' *Genesis*, i. 2.
A great German writer. Kant. Cf. vol. i, pp. 129-30. See also 'Madame de Stael's Account of German Philosophy and Literature' in the later volume devoted to Hazlitt's journalism.
154. *The natural fool, etc.* Cf. *ante*, p. 138.
156. *Mr. Horne Tooke . . . says.* Cf. *ante*, p. 278.
157. 'Peace to all such.' Pope, *Prologue to the Satires*, 193.
The Vicar's profession of faith. See *Émile*, Livre iv.
'Light of Nature Pursued.' Book i. chap. i. of Hazlitt's abridgement. See vol. i. of the present edition.
158. *Philosophy is not their forte.* Cf. vol. i. pp. 24-6.
160. 'Fluttering its pennons vain,' etc. Cf. *Paradise Lost*, II. 933-4.
161. 'The latter end,' etc. Cf. *The Tempest*, II. i. 157.
Mr. Horne Tooke very gravely defines. Cf. *ante*, p. 272 *et seq.*
168. *The Bishop of Worcester.* Edward Stillingfleet (1635-99), who published three pamphlets in reply to Locke's *Essay*. For an account of the controversy see Locke's *Works* (Bohn), II. 339 *et seq.*
169. *Finer dreams than I have.* Cf. 'On Dreams' (vol. XII. p. 23).
170. *Persons who walk in their sleep.* Cf. this passage with another in the same essay (vol. XII. p. 19).
172. *Hume says.* *A Treatise of Human Nature*, part IV. sect. iv.
180. *The 'Essay on Vision.'* Published in 1709.
182. 'Reason pandering will.' Cf. 'And reason panders will.' *Hamlet*, III. 4, 88.
185. *Will be commented upon in another Lecture.* 'Has been commented upon in the previous Essay. As is there remarked,' in *Literary Remains*.
190. *Dr. Clarke's celebrated work.* Samuel Clarke's (1675-1729) *Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, etc.*, one of the Boyle lectures delivered in 1704 and 1705.

ON ABSTRACT IDEAS

Lecture III. was 'On Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, and on abstract ideas.'

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191. *It is by Mr. Locke . . . denied, etc.* See *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II. Chap. xi. § 10.
'From the root,' etc. *Paradise Lost*, v. 479-81.
196. *The Bishop of Worcester.* See *ante*, p. 168 and note.
197. 'General ideas,' etc. Condillac, *La Logique*, chap. v.
198. 'To speak,' etc. *Ibid.*
199. 'It is agreed on all hands,' etc. All the passages quoted from Berkeley are from the Introduction to *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710).
202. 'Abstract ideas,' etc. Locke's *Essay*, Book IV. Chap. vii. § 9.
204. l. 8. 'Applies' in Hazlitt's son's text.
205. l. 24. 'A comprehensive facility' in Hazlitt's son's text.
l. 30. Word omitted in Hazlitt's son's text.
207. *They supposed with the vulgar.* Cf. Hazlitt's *Atlas* paper, 'Originality.'

ON SELF-LOVE

Lectures IV. and V. were 'On Self-love and benevolence' and 'On Helvetius' doctrine on the same subject, and on Hartley's attempt to resolve all our affections

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and faculties into association of ideas.' Lecture vi., 'On Bishop Butler's theory of the mind, or an account of the different original springs which move that various machine, such as sensibility, understanding, will, or the love of pleasure, the love of truth, and the love of action,' is missing.

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215. 'Wise saws and modern instances.' *As You Like It*, II. 7, 156.
 219. 'Mutual interest,' etc. *Jonathan Wild*, Book I. Chap. 4.
 221. *Shaftesbury or Hutcheson*. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), author of the *Characteristics* (1711), and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), a supporter of Shaftesbury's ethics.
 223. 'Pity is only,' etc. See Hobbes's *Human Nature*, Chap. ix. Sect. 10.
 225. *This objection was long ago stated*. From here to the end of the first paragraph on p. 232 Hazlitt is reproducing, with additions and variations, a passage from his 'Remarks on the Systems of Hartley and Helvetius,' appended to *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action*. Cf. vol. I. pp. 83-91 and notes.
 230. 'The jealous God,' etc.
 'Love, free as air, at sight of human ties,
 Spreads his light wings, and in a moment flies.'
 Pope, *Eloisa to Abelard*, 75-6.
 233. *Every human being is distinguished*. From here to the end of the Lecture Hazlitt is reproducing, with additions and variations, a passage from *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action*. Cf. vol. I. pp. 32-45 and notes.
 241. 'Thrills in each nerve,' etc. Cf.
 'Feels at each thread, and lives along the line.'
 Pope, *An Essay on Man*, I. 218.
 242. 'The hair-breadth scapes,' etc. *Othello*, I. 3, 236.
 243. *Junsus has remarked*, etc. In his letter to George III. (Dec. 19, 1769).

ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

Lectures VII. and VIII. were 'On the controversy between Price and Priestley or on materialism and necessity,' and 'On the same subject continued.'

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245. *Gassendi*. Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), the French philosopher and mathematician, with whom Hobbes had been intimate at Paris.
 246. *Dr. Jonathan Edwards*. Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), the American theologian and metaphysician, published his work *On the Freedom of the Will* in 1754. Cf. vol. IV. footnote p. 49 and note.
 250. *Spinoza's most exact and beautiful demonstration*, etc. In the *Ethica*, published in *Opera Posthuma* (1677).
Marsennus. Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), the friend and disciple of Descartes.
Dr. Priestley. Joseph Priestley's (1733-1804) *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* appeared in 1777. His controversy with Horsley (see ante, pp. 261-2) lasted from 1783 till 1790, during which time many letters to Dr. Horsley were published.
Bishop Bramhall. John Bramhall (1594-1663), successively Bishop of Derry and Archbishop of Armagh, whose controversy with Hobbes arose in 1655.
 253. *Tripes*. 'Hobbes's Tripes' (1684) contained, among other things, the essay 'Of Liberty and Necessity' (1654).
 254. 'With all these means,' etc. 2 *Henry IV.*, III. 1, 29.
 256. *Of great pitb and moment*. Unacknowledged from *Hamlet*, III. i. 86.
 'Fixed fate,' etc. *Paradise Lost*, II. 560.

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258. l. 20. The words in brackets are Hazlitt's interpolation.
 260. '*Ob! who can paint,*' etc. Cf. vol. vi. p. 237.
 261. *The Scotch in general.* Cf. '*On the Scotch Character.*'
 263. l. 6 from bottom. Hazlitt's interpolation.
 265. l. 10. Hazlitt's interpolation again.
 268. '*Something far more deeply interfused,*' etc. Unacknowledged from Wordsworth, *Tintern Abbey*, 96.
 269. '*Ille igitur,*' etc. Cicero, *De Fato*, xix. 43.

ON TOOKE'S 'DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY'

Lecture ix. was 'On Tooke's Diversions of Purley—theory of language and nature.'
 Lecture x., 'An argument on natural religion,' is missing.

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270. '*Mere [very] midsummer madness.*' *Twelfth Night*, III. 4, 61.
 271. *The Iturbid spear.* *Paradise Lost*, IV. 210.
 272. *Inexplicable dumb-show.* Unacknowledged from *Hamlet*, III. 2. 14.
 273. *M. Portalis.* Jean Étienne Marie Portalis (1745–1807), one of the compilers of the *Code Napoléon*.
 275. '*Of the little sneering,*' etc. Junius, Letter LIV.
 '*Undoes creation,*' etc. Gay, *Verses to be placed under the Picture of Sir R. Blackmore*.
 '*Rebelling angels,*' etc. Marvell, *On Mr. Milton's Paradise Lost*.
 '*Holds us a while,*' etc. *Ibid.*
 Dr. South. Robert South, D.D. (1634–1716).
 Dr. Conyers Middleton. See vol. III. p. 169 and note.
 277. '*That honour consists,*' etc. *Jonathan Wild*, Book I. Chap. 13.
 280. *All nature, etc.* A dozen lines are here reproduced, with slight variation, from an earlier Lecture (*ante*, p. 153).
 281. *The passage which has already been quoted.* *Ante*, p. 138.
 283. *I do not think it possible, etc.* This paragraph presents only minor differences from another in 'On Abstract Ideas' (*ante*, p. 191).
 Lastly, I conceive, etc. Cf. this passage also with 'On Abstract Ideas' (*ante*, p. 211).
 284. '*Has oft been chased,*' etc. Dryden, *The Hind and the Panther*, I. 5–8.

